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Climate change has been a contentious issue in international politics, and academic and 
scientific communities. Its progressive move into the sphere of “high politics” has paralleled a 
structural shift in the global centres of power, especially towards the emerging economies of 
China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. Among them, Beijing is playing an increasingly 
pivotal economic, political, diplomatic, and military role.  
In this context, as climate change has emerged as a major policy issue in national and 
international security affairs, an increasing number of countries have started to urge China to 
take on binding emission reduction commitments commensurate with its level of economic 
development. They have used international climate change negotiations (ICCN) to pressure 
Beijing and criticize its climate change policy as inadequate. While criticism has not died 
down entirely, critics have to contend now with China’s apparently evolving behaviour. 
 Beijing’s response to this international pressure has been twofold. On the one hand, it has 
anchored its negotiating position in ICCN to the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” (CBDR), thereby claiming its developing country identity and rights. On the 
other hand, China has progressively switched, at both domestic and international levels, from 
a predominantly reactive role of a recipient of criticism and policy demands to one of 
proactive engagement in environmental protection, climate change policies, and ICCN. 
Thereby, it has become an unavoidable player in global environmental governance. 
This research investigates the driving forces behind China’s increasing engagement in global 
environmental policy and, ultimately, Beijing’s shift to a leading role in global environmental 
governance. It addresses the ostensibly puzzling change in China’s behaviour from “norm 
taking” to “norm making”. My argument is that China’s unfolding engagement arises from a 
changing self-perception and identity shift from a recipient of international norms and 
expectations to a global norm entrepreneur and leader of the “global South” who also sees 
economic, technological, political, and diplomatic benefits in environmental and climate 
change reforms. Ultimately, I argue that Beijing’s strategic pursuit of material gains and new 
reputation has been enabled and reinforced by its identity transformation. 
To address the research question and substantiate the core argument, a threefold document, 
literature, and discourse-analysis approach has been employed. It has been used to investigate 
the evolution of China’s environmental policy at domestic and international levels. To 
examine and substantiate the hypothesized norm-making evolution, this study has tied its 
dynamics to underlying shifts in China’s collective social identities along a number of key 
and interconnected dimensions. Moreover, this course of analysis has been enabled by a 
critical use of International Relations (IR) theories. In analysing which IR theory could best 
explain China’s evolving behaviour in global environmental governance, this research argues 
that limitations of realist and liberal theories call for a more sociological and identity-based 
contribution. Therefore, by drawing on a set of social constructivist ideas, this study shows 
how China has used diplomacy, clean energy research, development aid, and South-South 
Cooperation and its own understanding of soft power to secure broad political support within 
the global South for its climate change and development policy in relevant international 
forums. Thereby, China has progressively strengthened its normative power and, accordingly, 
framed the global debate on climate change as a subject of North-South politics.  
By utilizing a social constructivist lens, this research makes a combined theoretical and 
empirical contribution to interpretive, constructivist, and sociological-organizational accounts 
of great power behaviour, power transition, and institutional participation – areas of study 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present the topic of research to the reader. It focuses on China’s 
role in international climate change negotiations (ICCN) in light of both the climate change 
securitisation debate and China’s broader rise to power in international affairs. 
 
1.1 Climate Change, Sustainable Development and International Security 
 
In the post-Cold War era, a new understanding of the concept of security began to emerge and 
non-traditional threats to security, such as economic decline, social and political instability, 
and international terrorism, as well as environmental stress, were incorporated into the 
concept of security (Homer-Dixon, 1991; Slantchev, 2009). Since then, a great deal of 
research has focused on the relationship between environment and security. Consequently, 
environmental security has become one of the “new” non-traditional security issues that have 
served to deepen and broaden the concept of security (Collins, 2007: 182; Freeman and Hill, 
2007). 
Scholars of environmental security argue that if environmental change is a potential source of 
destabilisation and conflict, and if societies face dangers from environmental change, then 
security policies must be redefined to account for these threats (Conca & Dabelko, 1998). 
Within this debate, climate change has emerged as a major issue in national and international 
security affairs. This is mostly due to the increasing evidence of climate change effects in 
many regions of the world and medium-term forecasts of extreme weather events with greater 
frequency and intensity (IPCC, 2007).  
Within the scholarly framework of environmental and security studies1, the threats posed to 
global security by a changing climate are conceptualised mainly in two ways. First, climate 
change could threaten international security through the direct impact of rising sea levels, 
extreme weather events, and other climate change consequences such as droughts or floods. A 
one-meter sea level rise is likely to adversely impact the economy and infrastructures of 
virtually every costal city in the world. Increasing temperatures may also facilitate the spread 
of disease and result in crop losses. Such phenomena threaten the survival and well-being of 
people as well as the territorial integrity of states, even in the absence of conflict (Scott & 
Andrade, 2012). 
                                               
1
 See Chapter IV for further details. 
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The second way in which climate change could represent a threat to global security is through 
the exacerbation of already existing tensions in those countries already facing a high risk of 
political instability due to social, economic, and political instability. In this conceptualisation, 
climate change acts as a threat multiplier. In fact, climate change interacting with a number of 
other socio-economic factors could contribute to an increasing potential for insecurity and 
conflict2. 
In the course of the 2000s, a range of speeches, reports, and media articles were released, 
warning about climate conflicts over resource scarcity, about chaos caused by mass climate 
migration, and about border disputes over changing landscapes (Boas, 2014). While such 
ideas were present from the early 1990s3, this “alarmistic” approach to climate security newly 
emerged in policy circles after the turn of the millennium. This approach has been largely 
supported by the US government, and is particularly reflected in the growing involvement of 
the military and the security community in the environmental security debate in the aftermath 
of the Cold War. In 2002, on the eve of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
Colin Powell, the former US Secretary of State, stated that:  
 
“Sustainable development is a compelling moral and humanitarian issue, but it is also a 
security imperative. Poverty, environmental degradation, and despair are destroyers of 
people, of societies, of nations. This unholy trinity can destabilise countries, even entire 
regions" (UNEP, 2002). 
 
A 2003 US Department of Defense report, commissioned by Andrew Marshall, one of the 
most influential US foreign policy strategist who served as director of the United States 
Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessment from 1973 to 2015, claimed that climate 
change could lead to violent conflict (Schwartz & Randall, 2003). A few years later, in 2007, 
a report commissioned by the Pentagon to the CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis 
organisation located in Arlington (VA), advised the US Government to fully integrate the 
consequences of climate change in national security and national defense strategies (CNA, 
2007). The study, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, conducted by a 
                                               
2
 See: Myers, 1986, 1989, 1993; Deudney, 1990, 1991; Rowlands, 1991; Shaw, 1996; Deudney and Matthew, 
1999; Murphy, 1999; Barnett, 2001, 2001a, 2003; Dalby, 2002, 2002a, 2009, 2009a; Schwartz & Randall, 2003; 
CNA, 2007; UNEP, 2007; Scott, 2008; UNGA, 2009; US Joint Forces Command, 2010; US Naval Studies 
Board, 2011. 
3
 For older debates on environmental degradation and conflict, see, for example, the State Failure Task Force 
Project - Etsy et al. 1994 - and Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994, 1999. 
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military advisory board of retired US admirals and generals and released in April 2007, 
explores ways in which climate change acts as a "threat multiplier" in already fragile regions 
of the world, creating breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism. The report, moving 
beyond the arguments about the causes and effects of climate change, stressed the importance 
for the US military to start planning to address the potentially devastating effects of a 
changing climate (CNA, 2007).  
Furthermore, the scientific findings of the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report contributed to strengthening the link between climate 
change and security, highlighting that climate change represents one of the most serious 
threats to international security and the well-being of human kind. The Nobel Prize awarded 
to Al Gore and the IPCC in October 2007 has significantly contributed to the understanding of 
climate change as a security risk. In announcing the award, the Norwegian Nobel Committee 
called climate change both a fundamental threat to human well-being and a contributing factor 
to more traditional violent conflict. 
As of 2007, the issue has also been acknowledged by the United Nations (UN); debates took 
place at the UN Security Council in 2007, 2011, and 2013 over the link between climate 
change and security. In 2009, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a first 
resolution on the possible security implications of climate change (UNGA, 2009). In 2011, 
the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement recognising that climate change may 
aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security. As explained by UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon “the facts are clear: climate change [...] not only exacerbates 
threats to international peace and security; it is a threat to international peace and security” 
(UNSC, 2011). 
In this framework, a language of security has pervaded the discourse on climate change, and a 
number of actors from the political, academic, and public spheres now classify climate change 
as a threat to security, following a clear path to the securitisation of environmental issues and, 
more recently, climate change itself. While this process is an attractive strategy (given the 
extraordinary responses it implies) that could be used to raise awareness about the severe 
effects of climate change, it would place the debate in a political context that is dominated by 
security institutions designed for completely different types of threats (Buzan, 1998). As a 
consequence, climate change would turn into a military problem and not a political one, 
dramatically narrowing the field of actions and the policy choices available.  
Today, climate change is widely perceived to be one of the greatest threats of the twenty-first 
century and, at an international level, climate change has been identified as a growing threat 
13 
 
to governance and a force capable of exacerbating already existing conflicts. The inclusion of 
climate change in the US Department of Defense’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 
2015 National Security Strategy acknowledged climate change as a crisis capable of limiting 
the United States’ capacity to respond to international events and maintain a strong security 
posture. Therefore, while there has been some resistance to conceptualising this phenomenon 
in terms of “security”, it seems that an apparent global consensus about the close association 
between climate change and national security has been achieved in Europe and in the United 
States (Freeman, 2010)4.  
Like the broader field of security studies, approaches to environmental security are diverse 
and reflect many theoretical perspectives. Since the early 2000s, however, the security focus 
has been dominated by state-centric approaches, which interrogate the implications of 
environmental degradation in the global South for security of states in the global North 
(Swatuk, 2004), an argument described by many critics as ‘Malthusian’ or ‘neo-Malthusian5’ 
(Dalby, 2002a). This approach faces a severe opposition from several developing countries 
and emerging economies6, such as Brazil, India and, above all, the People’s Republic of 
China. They argue that climate change is essentially a development issue and not a security 
one, and that it should be tackled accordingly. 
When in April 2007 the United Nations Security Council held its first ever debate on the 
security implication of climate change, the Group of 77 (G77)7 and China sent a letter to the 
President of the Council expressing their concerns regarding the Security Council’s 
                                               
4
 See Chapter IV for more details. 
5
 Thomas Robert Malthus was the first economist to propose a systematic theory of population in his 1798 Essay 
on the Principle of Population, where he argued that human populations grow exponentially while food 
production grows at an arithmetic rate. This scenario of arithmetic food growth with simultaneous exponential 
human population growth predicted a global crisis in which humans would have no resources to survive on. Neo 
Malthusian theorists share this premise but their notion of crisis encompasses more than the disproportionate 
relation between demographic growth and food production, including also an imbalance between rates of mineral 
and fossil resources consumption and the planet’s finite capacities. 
6
 Like other attempts at country classification, the term “rising power” is controversial, competing partly with 
designations including emerging economies, middle-income countries, medium-sized powers or regional powers 
(see: Paul, 2016; Scholvin, 2014; Manicom & Reeves 2014). The language of “BRICs” and of “rising” or 
“emerging” powers took off from the early 2000s. Since then, both popular commentary and a great deal of 
political rhetoric has focused on the emergence of new powers. See: O’Neill, 2001; Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012; 
Tank, 2012; Stratfor, 2012; Stuenkel, 2015. 
7
 The Group of 77 (G-77) was established on 15 June 1964 by seventy-seven developing countries signatories of 
the “Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries” issued at the end of the first session of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. The Group of 77 (which now has 
134 members) is the largest intergovernmental organisation of developing countries in the United Nations, which 
provides the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests 
and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United Nations 
system, and promote South-South cooperation for development. 
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involvement in matters of climate change. In the letter, they argue that focusing on the 
linkages between climate change and security would only divert attention and distract 
resources from the main goal, which is the achievement of sustainable development. In 
addition, some developing countries and, above all, leading emerging economies - namely the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) - fear the “green imperialism” of the 
developed world and the risk of interference in their own security agendas. In fact, the 
recognition that climate change threatens international peace and security raises the possibility 
that the Security Council could undertake active steps to counter the threat. 
From a “southern perspective”, environmental security is mainly perceived as a discourse 
about the security of northern countries, their access to natural resources, and the protection of 
their pattern of consumption (Shiva 1994; Dalby 1999; Barnett 2001). The German Advisory 
Council on Global Change has, for instance, produced a map visualising the “hotspots” of 
climate migration. All of these hotspots are located in the global South, notably in Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa (German Advisory Council on Global Change, 2007: 4). This tends to 
give the global South a stereotypical image of a vulnerable and dangerous actor that can 
weaken the stability and prosperity of the global North (Hartmann, 2010; Oels, 2012; Boas, 
2012, 2014; Bettini, 2013).  
In this regard, within the growing international debate on environmental security, scholars, 
pundits, and politicians have started to issue warnings on potential resource wars between the 
global North and the global South, emphasising, among other examples, the increasing 
Chinese demand to fuel its impressive economic growth. China’s increasing quest for natural 
resources and its opposition to the climate security paradigm have fueled the Western-based 
narrative, which pictures China as the climate villain in international environmental 
governance. In this framework, the securitisation of environmental issues with the 
development of the climate security paradigm can be read as a strategy to slow down or, at 
least, to interfere with China’s impressive economic growth. As argued by Gupta and Dutta, 
the West’s agenda appears to be to use the security dimension of climate change to force the 
developing world to fall in line on climate change negotiations and pressurise them on 
governance-related issues (Gupta & Dutta, 2009: 36). Research shows that some Western 
actors, such as the UK government and the EU, have indeed used warning messages about 
climate conflict and mass migration to raise the urgency of climate action among countries, 




In parallel, international climate talks - which were initially developed solely within the 
scientific arena - shifted from the level of low politics to that of high politics, and climate 
change evolved from an environmental concern to a matter of geopolitics. Since 2007, it has 
become a major agenda item at the European level, a top priority of the G-8 Summit, and both 
the United Nations Security Council and the UN General Assembly placed it high on their 
agendas (Oberthür and Roche Kelly, 2008). 
Within the scientific community, there is a general and common understanding that to stop, 
or, at least, to slow down the process of global warming, the only feasible solution is to 
reduce greenhouse gases emissions (GHG) or remove them from the atmosphere. In this 
context, the focus has been placed on climate change mitigation and adaptation measures 
designed to reduce the negative effects of global warming. Both mitigation and adaptation 
measures, however, have been difficult to agree upon politically and to implement because the 
burning of fossil fuels is integral to the provision of energy for modern society. Bringing 
about the necessary transformations in infrastructure and lifestyles constitutes, therefore, the 
global governance challenge of our era.  
To date, the main vehicle by which climate change has been addressed at the global level has 
been through multilateral treaties, namely the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol (Scott & Andrade, 2012). When, after 
almost fifteen years of international negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol finally entered into force 
in February 2005, it was celebrated as a great achievement for international environmental 
cooperation. However, although Kyoto can be argued to have been a step forward for climate 
diplomacy, on a practical level, it has had a limited impact on the current pace of global 
warming (Hamilton, 2014). According to a large number of developed countries led by the 
US, the major impediment of the Kyoto Protocol was the uncompromising position of 
developing countries and emerging economies, above all China, to commit to any binding, 
international carbon emissions reduction targets, on the basis of the Principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR). In fact, the Kyoto Protocol did not call for binding 
commitments from developing countries, which were only needed to report their emissions in 
respect of the CBDR. On the other hand, according to the G77, the real impediment for the 
achievement of the Kyoto Protocol targets has been that developed countries failed to comply 
with their obligations under the CBDR principle, as incorporated into both the UNFCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
The tension among the different and competing interests of developed and developing 
countries reached its peak at the 2009 fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 
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15) in Copenhagen. At the meeting, this tension was clearly summarised in the sharp division 
between the two negotiating fronts, led respectively by the US and China, which embody the 
opposite and conflicting positions of the global North and the global South. While both sides 
agree on the reality of climate change as currently unfolding, their perspectives on it are 
opposite. On one side, the global North focuses on the necessity to limit GHG and having all 
countries commit to binding emission reductions according to their level of economic 
development. This should purportedly be done in order to avoid the potentially catastrophic 
consequences of climate change. Conversely, the global South approach is centered on the 
concept of sustainable development and argues that the efforts of developed countries and 
international organisations should be placed on policy responses required for climate change 
mitigation and on adaptation measures designed to reduce the negative effects of global 
warming. This approach is coherent with the findings of the 1987 Brudtland Report which 
stated that:  
 
‘Few threats to peace and survival of the human community are greater than those posed by 
the prospects of cumulative and irreversible degradation of the biosphere on which human life 
depends. True security cannot be achieved by mounting buildup of weapons (defense in a 
narrow sense), but only by providing basic conditions for solving non-military problems which 
threaten them. Our survival depends not only on military balance, but on global cooperation 
to ensure a sustainable environment’ (WCED, 1987). 
 
Emerging economies hold the developed world responsible for the bulk of historical 
emissions and for having “colonised” emissions space (Mattoo & Subramanian, 2013: 5), 
which, in the framework of the efforts to achieve the common agreed target of limiting 
temperature rise to 2°C, could de facto hamper their growth and development prospects. In 
fact, applying binding emission reductions to all countries according to their level of 
economic development will immediately eliminate any possibility of emerging economies 
supporting their fast economic growth and of developing countries lifting their citizens out of 
poverty. Indeed, at least for the foreseeable future, under current technology conditions, any 
emission reduction would entail dramatic economic costs for emerging economies given their 
need for massive expansions in energy, transport, and urban structure (Ma, 2010; Chen, 
2012). 





“The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities represents the core and bedrock 
of international cooperation on climate change and it must never be compromised. Developed 
countries account for 80% of the total global carbon dioxide emissions since the Industrial 
Revolution over 200 years ago. If we all agree that carbon dioxide emissions are the direct 
cause for climate change, then it is all too clear who should take the primary responsibility. 
Developing countries only started industrialization a few decades ago and many of their 
people still live in abject poverty today. It is totally unjustified to ask them to undertake 
emission reduction targets beyond their due obligations and capabilities in disregard of 
historical responsibilities, per capita emissions and different levels of development. Developed 
countries, which are already leading an affluent life, still maintain a level of per capita 
emissions that is far higher than that of developing countries, and most of their emissions are 
attributed to consumption. In comparison, emissions from developing countries are primarily 
survival emissions and international transfer emissions. (…) Action on climate change must be 
taken within the framework of sustainable development and should by no means compromise 
the efforts of developing countries to get rid of poverty and backwardness” (MoFa, 2009; 
Xinhua, 2009).  
 
Considering the linkages of climate change with global strategic issues such as energy 
security, water security, food security, and therefore its relevance in terms of political 
stability, climate change policy may act as a major ‘game-changer’ in international relations. 
In fact, the evolution of a climate change regime based on the Chinese approach which 
emphasises the development aspect of climate change in opposition to the Western approach, 
built on a narrow focus on emission reductions, may shape an alternative vision in global 
climate governance, bringing a new perspective to the international climate change debate8. 
China, which plays an important role in the current ICCN, as it represents the interests of 
developing countries through the mechanism of the G77 and China, is working to promote an 
approach on global environmental policy based on the understanding of climate change as a 
socio-economic development issue towards the development of a low carbon economic model 
of growth. Accordingly, Beijing has developed a growing number of national policies and 
programs in recent years aimed at stabilising CO2 emissions without undermining its 
development objectives. In this framework, China’s role in the global fight against climate 
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 See Chapter VII for further details. 
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change has increasingly become an issue of international attention, above all, by an increasing 
number of emerging economies and developing countries. 
The challenge of climate change arises in parallel to a far reaching shift at the centres of 
power of the political world order, especially towards the major emerging economies of 
Brazil, South Africa, India and China (the so-called BASIC countries). Hence, my analysis 





1.2 Research Question  
 
As climate change has emerged as a major policy issue in national and international security 
affairs, an increasing number of developed and developing countries alike have pressed China 
to take on binding emission reduction commitments commensurate with its level of economic 
development. This has largely taken place in the framework of ICCN, and the reaction of 
Beijing to this increasing pressure has been twofold. On the one hand, China has become 
entrenched in its non-negotiable position, underlining that: (1) climate change should be dealt 
with in the framework of sustainable development rather than security policy; and (2) it would 
be irresponsible for China to engage in binding commitments while it is still struggling with 
poverty and underdevelopment in many of its provinces. On the other hand, since the late 
1990s, Beijing has progressively switched, both at national and international levels, from 
having a passive role to active engagement in environmental protection and climate change 
policies, thereby becoming an unavoidable player in global environmental governance (Liang, 
2010; Barbi et al., 2016). 
Does this shift mean that China has been socialised and integrated into the Western-led global 
governance system, whereby it would be seen as a responsible stakeholder internationally? 
This dissertation’s response is a contingent one. China is not socialised into climate change 
politics in the way advocated by the large majority of developed countries of the global North. 
The “Northern” discourse of climate change politics was characteristically summarised by 
Robert Zoellick, former US Deputy Secretary of State, in his 2005 speech before the national 
committee on US-China relations: 
 
“For the United States and the world, the essential question is - how will China use its 
influence? To answer that question, it is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to 
China’s membership into the international system: we need to urge China to become a 
responsible stakeholder in that system” (Zoellick, 2005: 6-7). 
 
Therefore, the central research question posed here is: What has driven China’s shift in 
environmental and, ultimately, climate change policy from a generally cautious and defensive 
attitude towards a leading role in global environmental governance? 
I argue that China’s active engagement in global environmental politics arises from a self-
perception and identity shift from recipient of international norms to global norm 
entrepreneur. Arguably, this shift has been based on three main interconnected elements. 
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First, China’s self-perception in the international political-economic system has progressively 
evolved over the past three decades into one of a leading developing nation within the global 
South. A second shift refers to China’s concerns over the growing economic, social, and 
political costs of its environmental degradation and pollution, mostly due to its impressive 
economic and industrial development based on fossil fuels. Finally, a third element of this 
identity shift is related to China’s increasing concerns over its energy security. 
Since Deng Xiaoping launched the process of reform and opening to the world in the late 
1970s, the fundamental declarative goal of China’s diplomacy has been to create a stable and 
peaceful international environment to support its economic development. In parallel with its 
increasing economic, political, and diplomatic interaction with the international society, a 
central topic of discussion for many constructivist international relations scholars (Qin, 2011) 
has been the potential impact of such interactions on China’s identity9. Nowadays, the 
pressure for change comes from domestic and international fronts, both of which contribute to 
sparking debates over China’s identity.  
 
 
1.2.1 The First Element of China’s Identity Shift: China Opening Up to the World  
 
As for the first element of China’s shifting identity, early Chinese participation in global 
environmental governance was mainly characterized by Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy 
doctrine of “keeping a low profile and never tak[ing] the lead”. The main objective of China’s 
foreign policy was to create conditions that were advantageous for its economic development 
in the framework of national sovereignty and security. After joining the UN in the early 
1970s, China slowly entered the global institutional order, and, according to David 
Shambaugh,10 this process passed through four broad phases of system challenger, system 
studying, system exploitation, and system altering (Shambaugh, 2013: 133).  
Initially, Beijing’s approach was characterised by an attempt to challenge the existing order 
that had excluded China’s participation in global governance institutions over the previous 
two decades. In the framework of ICCN, this was reflected by the large degree of suspicion 
                                               
9 Scholars who have attempted to study China’s identity include: Yong Deng, 2000: 41-70; Anne F. Thurston, 
2001: 149-172; Zheng Shiping, 2001: 203-226; and Qin Yaqing, 2010: 249-270. 
10
 In 2015, researchers at the China Foreign Affairs University named David Shambaugh the second most 
influential China expert in the United States behind David Lamptom, Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of 
Advanced International Studies. See: http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/15/q-and-a-david-
shambaugh-on-the-risks-to-chinese-communist-rule/?_r=0  [accessed 30 November 2016]. 
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Beijing attached to any proposals from developed countries, such as the flexible mechanism 
of the Kyoto Protocol, which were considered tools for “environmental imperialism” by a few 
political elites and climate policy makers (Yu, 2008: 75). In parallel with its integration into 
the international institutional order, Beijing progressively learned how to play by the system’s 
rules, and its presence and voice grew accordingly (Shambaugh, 2013: 134). After a phase of 
passive but rather cooperative participation11, China gradually saw international 
environmental cooperation as a valuable diplomatic way to promote its own foreign policy 
goals as well as to defend its sovereignty, protect its strategic interests, and enhance its 
international image. 
Since joining the United Nations in 1971, China has ratified more than fifty multilateral 
environmental agreements and its national climate change policy has been developed in 
parallel with the evolution of the UNFCCC, which was ratified by China in 1993. In this 
framework, over the past two decades, it has progressively achieved a central role within the 
global South, and it has been successful in building large coalitions in support of its stances, 
becoming a key player in climate change diplomacy. At the same time, in parallel with its 
international engagement since the early 1990s, China has begun adopting a number of 
policies and undertaking several actions to address climate change in its national legislation. 
These policies and measures come in response to concerns about several interrelated issues, 
including climate change, energy efficiency, air pollution, long-range planning, and 
international opinion (Downie et al. 2009, 105). 
Since 2005, through the process of reform and opening, China has made staggering progress 
in building its economy; becoming the world’s factory while successfully fighting poverty at 
home. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth has averaged a rate of about 9% a year; the 
fastest sustained expansion by any major economy in history, and has lifted more than 800 
million people out of poverty. With a population of 1.3 billion, China is the second largest 
economy and is increasingly playing an important and influential role in development and in 
the global economy12. From 1990 to 2013, the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita based 
on purchasing power parity increased almost 12 times from 1,010 US dollars to 11,850 US 
dollars, extreme poverty (living under 1.25 dollar/day) was reduced from 60% to 6% (as of 
2011) of the population (WB, 2015), and the Human Development Index (HDI) hiked from 
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 China was the first among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to sign the UNFCCC 
Treaty, and the 10th earliest state-party to join the convention (Yan & Xiao, 2010). 
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0.49 to 0.73 (UNDP, 2014). Reflecting on this economic success, intellectuals and policy-
makers in China have been asking, “What comes next”? How can China convert this new 
economic power into enduring political and cultural influence? (Callahan & Brabantseva, 
2011: 2). 
The challenge of climate change has coincided with a long-term shift in the global balance of 
power, especially towards the major emerging economies of Brazil, South Africa, India, and 
China, whose individual statuses in world affairs have grown progressively in recent years. 
The Copenhagen Climate Summit has been used as a “vignette” to capture this power shift 
with the perception that geopolitical power has moved towards major emerging developing 
countries, such as China, India, South Africa, and Brazil (Hurrell & Sengupta 2012; Jacques, 
2012). The four BASIC countries share aspects of a common Third World and postcolonial 
identity, have been aligning with one another since the turn of the millennium in several 
policy areas, and, above all, have jointly demanded more of a say in international institutions 
(Hallding et al., 2013). 
Therefore, I argue that the new leading role of the PRC in global environmental policy should 
be analysed in the framework of China’s economic, as well as political, rise at the 
international level. In fact, as Terhalle and Depledge put it, the complex politics of climate 
change cannot be properly understood without reference to deeper geopolitical trends in the 
wider international system (Terhalle & Depledge, 2013). The political, economic, and military 
rise of China has changed the balance of power between the global South and the global 
North, as well as the mutual perceptions among their national leaderships. This new 
geopolitical context has been reflected in Global Environmental Governance. The 2009 
Copenhagen climate summit is frequently framed as a political earthquake for global climate 
diplomacy (Backstrand & Elgstrom, 2013: 1377), where emerging economies – looking for an 
international political dimension congruent with their increased economic relevance in world 
affairs – exercised their newly achieved international economic role to safeguard their own 
national priorities and interests. This trend emerged very clearly and was strengthened in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis.   
In this context, leaving behind Deng Xiaoping's policy "hide brightness, cherish obscurity", 
even some Chinese policy analysts began discussing China's rise as a world power, arguing 
that the United States had begun an inevitable decline that would leave room for China at the 
top of the global “pecking order” (Economy, 2014). Fu Mengzi claims that US power 
projection peaked in 2000, and has been declining ever since, partially inhibited by Iraq and 
Afghanistan. “It is just that the financial crisis has made it seem more and more obvious” 
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(Dyer, 2009). China’s challenge to Euro-American dominance in international politics 
became even sharper just after the 2008 Olympic Games, when the global financial crisis 
erupted in the United States in September. Many Chinese analysts and commentators thus see 
not just the rise of China, but also the fall of the West (Callahan & Brabantseva, 2013: 3).13 
Since 2010, the long-discussed topic of China’s rise has come to be dominated by a new 
theme among both Chinese and foreign observers: the image of the supposedly cautious, low-
profile Beijing of the past giving way to one of a more confident, assertive China (Swaine, 
2010). However, Alastair Johnston, in his article How New and Assertive is China’s New 
Assertiveness, claimed that historical records of the last decades seem not to support the claim 
of a more assertive China (Johnston, 2013). China has simply never stopped confronting the 
US and other developed countries over a number of issues that question its national 
sovereignty and domestic priorities. The only difference is that today, in comparison to the 
early 1990s, the bargaining power of the country at international level has increased 
exponentially, not only thanks to its constant double digit growth rate but also to its leverage 
vis-à-vis other developing countries and emerging economies. This leverage vis-à-vis other 
developing countries and emerging economies has been progressively acquired by Beijing 
through an impressive use of South-South Cooperation (SSC) and the projection of Chinese 
soft power14. Although SSC practices have been evolving in the past years they have always 
preserved a constant and specific focus on “Climate Finance”. Since 2001, China has 
contributed a total of about 270 million yuan ($44 million) to help other developing countries 
enhance their capacity to address climate change, and trained nearly 2000 climate change 
officials and professionals from developing countries, according to the statistics of NDRC 
(Beijing Review, 2014: 17). 
Cooperation on environmental challenges has always been one of the key dossiers in the 
framework of SSC. With increasing levels of economic interactions and political cooperation, 
environmental concerns have become increasingly important and, among them, the hot topic 
of climate finance. Climate finance is critical to addressing climate change because large-
scale investments are required to significantly reduce emissions, notably in sectors that emit 
large quantities of greenhouse gases. Moreover, climate finance is equally important for 
adaptation, for which significant financial resources will also be required to allow countries to 
adapt to the adverse effects of climate change and reduce their impacts.  
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 See: Ramo, 2007; Fletcher, 2008; The Economist, 2009; Jacques, 2009; Zakaria, 2009. 
14
 The elements of China’s identity shift to leading nation in the global South, such as the so-called Beijing 
Consensus, South-South cooperation, and Chinese soft power are analysed in detail in Chapter VIII. 
24 
 
North-to-South climate finance has long been a central focus of the UN climate negotiations, 
with disputes between countries over the amounts, timing, and conditions of transfers to 
developing countries. Hence, alongside official North-South transfers, South-South financing 
for climate change mitigation and adaptation has increased significantly in recent years under 
the framework of the SSC. The growing institutional landscape in the context of SSC is a sign 
of growing discontent among emerging economies which seek a stronger voice in global 
governance structures, and which often suffer the severity of existing structures that are too 
rigid and do not grant them the space and responsibility they require. 
The message that China is channeling through SSC reflects Beijing’s subscription to the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence15: (1) Mutual respect for territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs, (4) equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence. 
The guiding principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states has supported 
China’s position as an international actor that can both be trusted and emulated by developing 
countries and emerging economies. 
Together with SSC, ‘Beijing has mounted a major public relations offensive in recent years’ 
in what David Shambaugh defined China’s Soft-power push (Shambaugh, 2015). 
In an internal speech to the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group in January 2006, President 
Hu Jintao said that “the enhancement of China’s international status and international 
influence must be reflected both in hard power, including the economy, science and 
technology, and national defense power, and in soft power such as culture” (Glaser & 
Murphy, 2009). One year later, in his keynote speech at the 17th National Congress of the 
Communist Party in 2007, Hu Jintao stressed the need to enhance Chinese culture as the 
country's soft power. As a consequence, since the late 2000s, the Chinese leadership has 
progressively increased government funding for the development of China’s soft power 
resources at home and its expansion abroad as a tool to present a less threatening image to the 
world, caused by the country’s rise. 
Beijing’s Olympic Games in 2008, the large-scale celebrations of the PRC’s sixtieth 
anniversary in 2009, and the Shanghai Expo in 2010 are all global spectacles aimed at 
                                               
15
 The Chinese leadership originally enumerated these principles in 1954 when China was trying to reach out to 
the non-communist countries of Asia. Today, the Five Principles have a different purpose: they offer an 
alternative to the Western conception of “world order” which stresses the equal, uninfringeable sovereignty of all 
states. large and small, Western and non-Western, rich and poor, democratic and authoritarian, each to run its 
own system as it sees fit, whether its methods suit Western standards or not.  
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presenting China to the world, which, in turn, testifies to China’s entitlement to act as a global 
player. 
1.2.2 The Second Element of China’s Identity Shift: China’s Environmental Crisis 
 
The second element of this identify shift is linked to China’s environmental challenges which 
emerged from the country’s rapid industrialisation and turned China into the largest emitter of 
GHG. Its economic rise, in which GDP grew on average 9% each year for more than a 
decade, has come at the expense of its environment and public health: air quality in hundreds 
of cities is worsening and water resources across the country are deteriorating. 
These environmental challenges are exemplified by the persistently high air pollution that all 
too frequently envelops many of the country’s major cities and produces increasingly 
distressing human and economic costs. Some western journalists and scholars have coined a 
new ad hoc term to describe the severity of air pollution in Beijing: Airpocalypse16.  
According to a 2007 report conducted jointly by the World Bank (WB) and the Chinese 
government on the costs of pollution in China, from 2001 to 2005, an average of about 54% 
of the seven main rivers in China contained water deemed unsafe for human consumption 
(WB, 2007: xi). The same year, the Yellow River Conservancy Commission, a Chinese 
governmental agency, surveyed 13,000 kilometres of the river and its tributaries and 
concluded that a third of the water was unfit even for agriculture due mostly to the pollution 
generated by the four thousand petrochemical plants built on its banks (The Economist, 2013). 
In January 2013 alone, 25 days in Beijing were categorised as unhealthy, very unhealthy, or 
hazardous, according to World Health Organization Air Quality Guidelines. A joint study by 
Peking University’s School of Public Health and Greenpeace East Asia found, in 2012, that 
more than 8500 premature deaths resulted from fine particulate matter (PM2.5) air pollution 
in Beijing, Shanghai, Xian, and Guangdong (Greenpeace, 2012). Meanwhile, the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection’s Academy of Environmental Planning calculated the losses in 
2010 due to pollution (excluding the cost of health care) to be 1.1 trillion RMB - equivalent to 
3.5 % of GDP (South China Morning Post, 2013). 
Air pollution and acid rain from China are also serious problems affecting the Korean 
peninsula, Japan to the east, and Hong Kong to the south. Polluted rivers in southern China 
that flow into the Mekong River similarly affect down-stream Laos and Vietnam. The 
                                               
16
 The Economist, 2013; Kaiman, 2013; Wong H., 2013; Wong E., 2013; Saint-Paul, 2013; Hall, 2013; Carter, 
2013; Bhatnagar, 2014; Moore, 2014; Hanningan, 2014: 61; Gallagher & Lewis, 2015: 192. 
26 
 
extensive use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides in agriculture, combined with industrial 
waste and raw sewage, account for the main source of river and lake contamination 
(Shambaugh, 2016: 89-90). The use of fossil fuels, especially by a coal-dominated energy 
system, was a driving force behind China’s 9% rate of economic growth between 1990-2010, 
however it is also responsible for the poor air quality.  
Approximately 90% of the sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions and 50% of the particulate 
emissions in China result from coal use (Economy, 2010: 309). China is also the largest SO2 
emitter in the world. From a sectoral perspective, the industrial sector produces around 90% 
of the total SO2 emissions, and the electric power industry specifically makes around 60% of 
total industrial SO2 emissions (Zhang & Crooks, 2012: 61). As around 77% of China’s 
electricity generation is based on fossil fuels (USEIA, 2015), 70% of SO2 emissions can thus 
be attributed to the combustion of fossil fuels, with coal being the major component. 
As the former Deputy Minister of China’s State Environmental Protection Agency, Pan Yue, 
said in an interview with Der Spiegel in 2005: 
 
“Many factors are coming together here: Our raw materials are scarce, we don't have enough 
land, and our population is constantly growing. Currently, there are 1.3 billion people living in 
China, that's twice as many as 50 years ago. In 2020, there will be 1.5 billion people in China. 
Cities are growing but desert areas are expanding at the same time; habitable and usable land 
has been halved over the past 50 years. […] The environment can no longer keep pace. Acid 
rain is falling on one third of the Chinese territory, half of the water in our seven largest rivers 
is completely useless, while one fourth of our citizens does not have access to clean drinking 
water. One third of the urban population is breathing polluted air, and less than 20 percent of 
the trash in cities is treated and processed in an environmentally sustainable manner. Finally, 
five of the ten most polluted cities worldwide are in China. […] Because air and water are 
polluted, we are losing between 8 and 15 percent of our gross domestic product. And that 
doesn't include the costs for health. Then there's the human suffering: in Beijing alone, 70 to 80 
percent of all deadly cancer cases are related to the environment. Lung cancer has emerged as 
the No. 1 cause of death” (Der Spiegel, 2005).  
  
The turning point in the government’s environmental policy arrived with the integration of 
environmental degradation in the New Security Concept in September 1997 (Baiyi, 2001), 
marking the upgrade of the environment from the level of “low politics” to the one of “high 
politics”. The integration arose mainly from the acknowledgement of Beijing that short-term 
considerations and the acceptance of environmental degradation for economic reasons were 
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not sustainable, jeopardized stability, and could not maintain China’s growth in the long run 
(Richerzhagen & Scholz, 2007: 9). China has also been witnessing an alarming increase in 
societal unrest linked to environmental pollution, especially in rural areas. These occurrences 
have been labelled by the central government as “environmental mass incidents”. Mass 
incidents refer to large-scale demonstrations, which have the potential to develop into violent 
stand-offs between demonstrators and the authorities, or violent attacks on government 
facilities (Tanner, 2010). 
In April 2005, a large-scale violent protest, sparked by industrial pollution in a small village 
in Dongyang, Zhejiang province, shocked the Chinese authorities, news media, and the 
general public, as the scale of such a protest, involving thirty to forty thousand villagers and 
thousands of armed police, was previously unseen in China (Economy, 2007: 48). 
In her 2007 article in Foreign Affairs, Elizabeth Economy, Director of Asia Studies at the 
Council on Foreign Relations, summarised the protest:  
 
“After trying for two years to get redress by petitioning local, provincial, and even central 
government officials for spoiled crops and poisoned air, in the spring of 2005, 30,000 to 40,000 
villagers from Zhejiang Province swarmed 13 chemical plants, broke windows and overturned 
buses, attacked government officials, and torched police cars. The government sent in 10,000 
members of the People’s Armed Police in response. The plants were ordered to close down, and 
several environmental activists who attempted to monitor the plants’ compliance with these 
orders were later arrested” (Economy, 2007: 48). 
 
The Dongyang case is probably the most well documented social riot due to environmental 
degradation, but China now sees thousands of these kinds of protests every year 
This was the result of more than 30 years of uncontrolled pollution in which Chinese leaders 
consciously traded environmental protection and public health for economic growth following 
the principle of “grow first, clean up later”. This principle was backed up by the famous Deng 
Xiaoping maxim: “Black cat, white cat, all that matters is that it catches mice” that clearly 
favored China’s growth over the competing social concern of environmental degradation.  
However, since the late 1990s, the inclusion of environmental degradation into the New 
Security Concept testified to a change of course in Chinese leadership. Indeed, Beijing 
realized that the environmental and social costs of indiscriminate pollution were undermining 
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the country’s development priorities of securing economic growth and maintaining social 
stability17.  
On top of that, China’s political leadership realised that their past inability in handling 
environment issues could pose challenges to the regime’s legitimacy (Wang, 2013). 
Therefore, undertaking a path toward sustainable development was becoming “a must” for 
Beijing, which started to implement a number of regulatory steps to accelerate the transition 
from a brown economy model to a green and low-carbon development one (Hu & Liang, 
2011)18.  
In the late 1990s, after almost three decades of impressive industrialisation, environmental 
protection started to become a key issue for Beijing and, since the first Environmental Law in 
1979, the Chinese government have passed more than 40 environmental protection laws and a 
large number of state regulations19. 
In November 2012, the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
proposed building an ecological civilization and embarking on the path of sustainable 
development through green development, a circular economy, and low carbon incentives 
(Xinhua, 2012). In November 2013, the third plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee 
reiterated the need to accelerate the process of building institutions on ideas of ecological 
civilization and the rule of law with law-based thinking. In March 2014, Premier Li Keqiang 
declared a war on pollution. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping also stressed that only with the 
strictest systems and the rule of law could the state provide reliable guarantees for the 
building of an ecological civilization. The slogan of “Gold mines override clear water and 
green mountains” at the beginning of the reform has evolved into that of “Both gold mines 
and clear water and green mountains are wanted” at the beginning of the 21st century and, 
finally, “Clear water and green mountains are gold mines” today (Zhang et al, 2016). 
Meanwhile, from 2011 to 2014, China’s legislative body has amended its Environmental 
Protection Law (EPL), setting forth a stringent legal framework for China’s sustainable 
development including toughening penalties for environmental offenses. According to the 
newly amended EPL, local environmental protection bureaus are required to disclose 
environmental information and build unified pollution control and coordination mechanisms 
for some key areas across administrative units (Zhang, ibid.). Furthermore, in 2013, the State 
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 See chapter VI for more details.  
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 See chapter VI for more details. 
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 http://english.sepa.gov.cn/Resources/Policies/policies/ [accessed 20 March 2017]. 
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Council released an action plan of prevention and control for air pollution aims to reduce the 
consumption of coal below 65% in terms of total energy consumption and cut the level of 
PM2.5 in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Province, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta 
by 25%, 20% and 15% respectively. 
Since 2013, the Chinese government has launched a range of initiatives in order to establish a 
green financial system. Following the plan to grow a corporate green bond market to assist 
China’s transition to a low-carbon economy, announced by the State Council, China’s central 
bank and the United Nations Environmental Program initiated a Green Finance Task Force in 
2014, which comprises more than 40 Chinese and foreign experts from regulatory institutions, 
think tanks, academia, and the private sector. In April 2015, this task force proposed fourteen 
specific recommendations for building China’s green finance system and a few months later, 
the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) published the Green Bond Guidelines with the Green 
Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue. The green bond market has grown incredibly fast in China: 
in 2016 two commercial banks issued more than US$ 4.5 billion bonds, and the Bank of 
China launched the largest multi-denominated issue of green bonds so far on international 
markets, worth US$3 billion (Xu & Wang 2016). 
Indeed, China’s move towards green finance constitutes a key element of a reform on green 
economy, identified by the country’s 13th Five-Year Plan (FYP), which aims to build a green 
financial system, develop green credits, green bonds, and establish green development funds. 
More recently, China’s leadership shows its determination on the issue by approving the 
“Guidelines on Establishing the Green Financial System” on 31 August 2016, jointly issued 
by seven government agencies. In putting forward a wide range of financial instruments, these 
guidelines can be seen as the world’s first attempt at an integrated policy package to promote 
an ambitious shift towards green economy (Ma & Zadek 2016). 
On the international stage, China has also shown its intention to lead a global reform. Hosting, 
for the first time, the 11th session of a G20 summit in Hangzhou in September 2016, China 
put green finance high on the G20’s agenda with the aim of promoting cooperation on a green 
financial system and developing the attractiveness of green finance. 
In 2016, as part of the Chinese government’s war on pollution, 335 factories were shut down 
in Beijing and more than 400,000 high-emitting vehicles were ordered off the roads – helping 




1.2.3 The Third Element of China’s Identity Shift: Energy Security 
 
The third element of this identity shift is related to energy security, which is intrinsically 
linked to the government’s development priorities to secure economic growth and maintain 
social stability. Thereby, the energy security has topped China’s policy agenda due to an 
increasing energy demand and a need to fuel the country’s fast economic growth and 
development. The primary concern for China is to ensure it has sufficient energy volumes to 
support its economic growth and prevent debilitating energy shortfalls that could trigger 
social and political turbulence (Wang & Zheng, 2013: 508). Oil dependence has always been 
the biggest concern in the framework of energy security. China became a net importer of oil 
in 1993 and of natural gas in 2007 (IEA, 2011a). Furthermore, China has been also a net 
importer of coal since 2009, importing 103 million tonnes that year (Yu, 2010). 
In 2006, former President Hu Jingtao proposed a “new energy security concept” when he 
talked about energy security issues at the G8 Summit in St Petersburg. He called for close 
international cooperation to increase oil and gas supplies and addressed the need to control 
domestic demand for the “sustainable development of human society”. This new energy-
security concept was expressed by other Chinese leaders in international meetings in the 
framework of constructing a “resource-conserving and environmentally friendly society” 
(Kennedy, 2010). This broader concept of energy security is firmly based on the Chinese 
approach of understanding energy security as a combination of three key elements: (1) 
sufficient energy supplies to protect the Chinese government’s core objectives of prioritising 
economic development and social stability; (2) affordable energy prices; and (3) reliability for 
oil and natural gas to have the safe delivery of imports to China (Downs, 2006). In this 
framework, the Chinese government identified and started to implement two fundamental 
steps toward energy security: (1) the improvement of energy intensity (the total amount of 
energy consumed per unit of GDP) in order to increase the efficiency of energy consumption; 
and (2) the transformation of the domestic energy consumption pattern, encouraging the 
development of renewable and clean energy.  
This means that the government’s energy security strategy has been managed by both supply 
and demand to cope with risks of energy shortage and supply disruptions, due also to extreme 
weather events. In fact, climate change, especially through extreme weather events, has 
threatened China’s energy security in recent years by damaging energy infrastructure and 
directly cutting off energy services. These energy supply disruptions caused by extreme 
weather events warned that simply acquiring enough energy resources was not sufficient to 
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secure China’s energy supply, and building up a stronger and firmer energy system capable of 
managing the emerging climate risks and unexpected disruptions was another fundamental 
element for the country’s energy security.  
Starting from the 11th FYP, set in 2005, the Chinese government made impressive progress in 
decreasing its national energy intensity and building up a set of strategic low-carbon 
industries. Although China made the greatest contribution to the overall increase in GHG 
emissions in 2012, thanks to the measures undertaken in the 11th and 12th FYPs, its growth 
rate was one of the smallest in the past decade. Furthermore, China’s energy intensity 
declined between 2000 and 2012, even with an increasing GDP (IEA, 2013). Since 2007, the 
state has shut down thousands of inefficient power and industrial facilities so that its energy 
consumption per unit of GDP continues to decrease over the last decade – 19.1% from 2005 
to 2010, and 18.2% from 2010 to 2015, and a target of a further 15% decrease by 2020 has 
been set in its 13th FYP (Sun, 2016). Moreover, thanks to a strong policy of energy reforms - 
including the Renewable Energy Law launched in 2006 - and massive state-led investments, 
the share of coal in the energy mix fell from 76% in 1990 to 68% in 2005, and the renewable 
share reached 20% of the mix in 2012 (Ren21, 2013). 
In addition, in 2011, Beijing has also decided to institutionalise seven pilot emission-trading 
schemes (ETSs) at the city and province levels, and to establish, as from 2016, a national cap-
and-trade system to be full in operation between 2017 and 2020 (Lo, 2016). Such progress 
helps China make ambitious pledges in the international arena. In its “intended nationally 
determined contribution” (INDC)20, submitted to the UNFCCC in June 2015, China puts 
forward several concrete and challenging climate actions goals to be reached before 2030, 
including, among others: (1) peaking its CO2 emissions around 2030 and striving to peak 
early; (2) lowering CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 60% to 65% from the 2005 level; and 
(3) increasing the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20% 
(NRDC, 2015). 
Furthermore, in early January 2017, the Chinese government announced its plan to invest 
more than $360 billion by 2020 in renewable energy and low carbon energy technologies - 
                                               
20
 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) is a term used under the UNFCCC for GHG emission 
reductions that all countries that signed the UNFCCC were asked to publish in the lead up to the COP 21. Before 
the conference, countries publicly outlined what post-2020 climate actions they intended to take under the new 
international agreement, known as INDCs. The climate actions communicated in these INDCs largely determine 
whether the world achieves the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement: to hold the increase in global average 
temperature to well below 2°C, to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C, and to achieve net zero emissions 
in the second half of this century. Countries first signed on to the notion of INDCs at the UN’s 2013 climate 
negotiations in Warsaw (COP19). The final text invited all governments, who were “ready to do so”, to set out 
their intended contribution to the Paris deal by the “first quarter of 2015”. 
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39% more than the 2011-2015 period - to meet its commitments under the 2015 Paris 
Agreement on climate change. The investment is part of the 13th FYP, and will support the 
national target for half of all new electricity generation to come from low carbon sources by 
2020. The new investment plan has enhanced China’s trajectory towards a low carbon 
economy: in 2014, the country achieved a decarbonisation rate of 4% - almost double the 
average G7 rate of 2.2%. This is despite the fact that China’s per capita GDP is six times 
smaller than that of the USA and five times less than that of G7 countries. Until the early 
2000s, the alternative to an inefficient coal plant in China was generally a more efficient 
modern coal plant, but renewables are now a valid competitor in many regions. Moreover, the 
increasing role of “soft tech” and engineering services in the Chinese economy, and the large 
investments and deployment in high-speed electric trains, electric buses, electric cars, and 
electric bikes, by millions of Chinese users, have played a relevant role. 
With the double aim of diversifying its own energy mix and implementing climate mitigation 
policies, China implemented an ambitious long term program of investment in renewable 
energy that positioned the country as a world leader in manufacturing renewable energy parts, 
coinciding with a global surge in wind and solar power. Thanks to its aggressive green policy, 
China has now become the world’s second largest market for, and investor in, clean energy 
(after the EU), and the market size of its clean technology sector is estimated to be worth 
more than $100 billion (€76 billion) by 2020 (Mu, 2010; China Greentech Initiative, 2013).  
 
 
1.2.4 China’s Identity Shift: Conclusions 
 
Environmental governance is critical to China’s future because a better environment and 
cleaner energy are instrumental to maintaining the government’s legitimacy, both 
domestically and abroad, moving towards a sustainable model of economic growth, and 
building an image of leading rising power within the global South. Having realised the 
importance of environmental protection, China has launched several environmental policy 
reforms since the late 1990s, and has made important progress in the past decade, especially 
on the reductions of energy and carbon intensity.  
The three elements of China’s identity shift discussed above are mutually reinforcing and, 
combined together, shape Beijing’s change of course from having a defensive attitude to 
acting increasingly as a leader in global environmental governance. The Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDC) were announced in juncture with the ambitious plans to 
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further mitigate climate change, promote green finance, and control pollution, as foreseen in 
the 13th FYP. Both have correlated with Beijing’s rhetorical determination to play a leading 
role in global environmental governance. 
 
 
1.3 Core Argument 
 
China has strong normative preferences regarding climate change policies and it has pushed 
for their international recognition since Copenhagen. To this aim, Beijing has worked within 
the existing Western-led institutions while, at the same time, deepening ties with other 
developing countries and emerging economies to propel a different approach to global climate 
change policy that emphasises the development aspect of climate change. 
This research argues that the transformation undertaken by the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) since 1978 has correlated with an identity shift based on the three main interconnected 
elements discussed in section 1.2. Furthermore, I argue that China’s political-economic and 
identity transformations have been mutually constitutive and reinforcing, therefore, unfolding 
in unison and as inseparable from one another. Finally, this shift has been reflected 
internationally in Beijing’s changing attitude to global environmental governance and its 
unfolding role of a proactive “norm maker”. Its normative entrepreneurship has operated via 
and been enabled by the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR).   
Accordingly, the Chinese government has demonstrated a commitment to reducing 
dependency on energy-intensive industries and introducing more efficient ones by specifying 
targets in its five-year plans and by promulgating new laws, standards, and rules. With 
reforms implemented through its domestic environmental and energy policies and the 11th and 
12th FYPs21, and factoring in the ambitious new targets set for the 13th FYP for the period of 
2016-2020, China is, today, a key player in global climate change mitigation efforts. Since the 
early 2000s, driven primarily by concerns over its immediate pollution problems related to 
industrial development, as well as issues of energy security and national image, the Chinese 
government has been pushing for a transformation towards a low carbon economy model of 
growth. In so doing, Beijing has started to play a key role in decoupling energy consumption 
                                               
21
 The Chinese government had promised in 2009 to cut its carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 40 to 45% from 
its 2005 level, and to do so by 2020. By late 2014, according to government data, China had already fulfilled 
much of its original commitment and the carbon intensity was down by 33.8% from the 2005 level. See chapter 
VI for more details. 
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from carbon emissions, and climate change has become a driving force to address both energy 
security and air quality restoration. In fact, new technologies that improve energy efficiency 
reduce overall energy consumption which, in turn, causes fewer pollutants to be released into 
the air and requires less energy to be imported from other countries (Gallagher, 2014: 15). 
As discussed in the previous section, the Chinese government has made considerable progress 
in the field of R&D spending on green energy and low carbon technologies in recent years, 
strengthening its world leadership in clean energy development. In this context, the key to 
China’s approach is to view renewable energy not primarily as a source of emission 
reductions, as do many Western developed countries, but as a source of energy security 
(Mathews & Tan, 2015: 145). As argued by Kelly Sims Gallagher, China’s long term energy 
security is dependent not only on having sufficient supplies of energy to sustain its incredible 
rate of economic growth but also on being able to manage the growth in energy demand in a 
way that does not continue to damage the local environment, harm human health, or 
irreversibly alter the global climate (Gallagher, 2014: 29-33). 
The change of course undertaken by Beijing on domestic environmental and energy policy 
has been reflected also in the government attitude at international level in the framework of 
international climate talks. Starting from the COP 16 in Cancun, Beijing has progressively 
assumed a more cooperative attitude in ICCN, eventually becoming a key player in 
facilitating the conclusion of the Paris agreement at COP 21 in December 2015.  This was 
made possible by reaching a joint deal on climate change with the United States in November 
2014, during the 22nd Asia-Pacific economic Cooperation Summit, where China, for the first 
time, indicated a goal on an emissions peak.  
A few weeks before the Lima Climate Conference (COP 20), the two main actors in global 
climate governance presented their joint ambitious climate strategy to reduce carbon 
emissions in the post 2020 period. The White House press office stated ‘the United States and 
China hope that by announcing these targets now, they can inject momentum into the global 
climate negotiations and inspire other countries to join in coming forward with ambitious 
actions’ (White House, 2014). According to the deal, the United States intends to achieve an 
economy wide target of reducing its emissions by 26%-28% below its 2005 level by 2025, 
and to make best efforts to reduce their emissions by 28%. China intends to achieve peak CO2 
emissions around 2030, and intends to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy 
consumption to around 20% by 2030. In China, almost 70% of the electricity generated goes 
to industrial production and any reduction in emissions will have a direct impact on economic 
growth and poverty eradication. China is in a stage of rapid urbanisation, which is driving 
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increasing energy consumption in all sectors. The urbanisation rate has risen from 31.9% in 
2000 to 51.27% in 2011, an increase by 19.37% in the last twelve years. According to the 
experience of developed countries, the urbanisation rate of a mature industrial economy 
should reach at least about 70%. Therefore, following current annual urbanisation growth, 
China will not complete the process of urbanisation until 2030. This means that increasing 
related urban energy consumption will peak in 2030. 
For Beijing, this deal is a turning point because it represents the recognition of its role as 
climate leader for the global South and its ability to shape international norms. In fact, the 
deal shifts the criteria upon which actions taken by developing countries are reviewed, from 
emissions reduction to longer-term transformations, which acknowledge the importance of 
social and economic development for developing countries and emerging economies. 
China’s rise in the framework of Global Environmental Governance represents an interesting 
case study. In fact, in order to (1) deal with the international pressure on climate security, (2) 
avoid being singled out in ICCN and, (3) support the transition of its economy to a low carbon 
development one, the PRC is developing an alternative model of sustainable economic 
development.  
Internationally, Beijing has been slowly working on a different policy option divorced from 
the securitisation of climate change and a narrower focus on emission reduction towards an 
understanding of climate change defined in terms of sustainable development. Accordingly, 
the CBDR principle has become a fundamental tool used by the Chinese government to de-
escalate the issue of climate security and to switch the international focus from security 
discourses to development. In doing so, China has attempted to diplomatically and politically 
engage countries that do not feel represented by today's global governance system, reinforcing 
its much-discussed alternative model of economic development, the so-called Beijing 
Consensus22.  
China’s economic success generated a lot of discussion about a Chinese model of 
development and, since the early 1990s, economists, policy makers, and researchers have 
started to analyse the “case study” of Chinese economic development23. The term “Beijing 
Consensus” was coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004, in an attempt to define the Chinese 
development model in comparison with the Washington Consensus, as an alternative model 
for developing countries and emerging economies: 
                                               
22
 The Beijing Consensus will be analysed in detail in Chapter VIII.  
23
 See, among others: Ramo, 2004; Callahan, 2005; Callahan, & Barabantseva, 2011; Jacques, 2012; Carmody, 




“China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not 
simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way 
that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a 
world with a single massively powerful centre of gravity. I call this new centre and physics of 
power and development the Beijing Consensus” (Ramo, 2004: 3-4). 
 
The Beijing Consensus has been widely discussed at an international level and has attracted 
the interest of developing countries and emerging economies from Latin America, Africa, 
South Asia, and the former Soviet republics, making it a major source of China’s soft power. 
Although questionable under several viewpoints, the economic success of China seemingly 
proves that America’s so-called “universal values” are not indispensable for developing 
countries to achieve modernisation and that the Western path is not the only choice for 
economic prosperity (Canrong, 2012). In this regard, for an increasing number of developing 
countries, China’s experience crafts an innovative model that fits their particular conditions 
and needs24.  
The Chinese model looks appealing in several developing countries and emerging economies 
from Africa to Latin America, Eastern Europe, and parts of Asia, where the popular 
impression of China might contrast favourably with the general perception of the West, or 
where Beijing might be seen as a more attractive development partner in comparison with 
other Western countries and/or institutions. The sharp expansion of trade and investment 
linkages among Southern countries underlines this phenomenon (RIS, 2013). In fact, in recent 
years, China has become the most important trading partner for Brazil, South Africa, India, 
and several African countries.  
Furthermore, the economic rise of China and the BRICS as key actors in the global political 
economy has also changed significantly the conventional practice of development cooperation 
set through established institutions, such as the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions. In 
fact, unlike Western aid, China's aid often comes with little, if any, political preconditions 
and, therefore, is increasingly more attractive for recipient countries. 
Emerging economies, with rapidly growing strength and size in the global economy, and 
moved primarily by a quest for energy security, new trading opportunities, and new economic 
                                               
24
 See, among others: Eisenman & Kurlantzick, 2006; Naidu & Davies, 2006; Garner, 2007; Alden et al. 2008; 
Brautigam, 2009, 2010; Gardelli, 2009; Moyo, 2009, 2012, 2013; Kopinski et al., 2012; Eisenman & 
Kurlantzick, 2006.  
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and diplomatic partnerships, have therefore started to change the rules of the game, providing 
aid on their own terms and according to their own norms. At the head of this group of 
emerging donors is China, which is increasingly expanding its bilateral cooperation with other 
emerging economies and developing countries. 
Politically, as well as economically, China has provided an alternate development model for 
African states in the eyes of many of their leaders (Taylor, 2009: 23). The conviction is that, 
as a successful late developing country, Beijing might become a model for others to follow 
(Spakowski, 2009: 489). As a consequence, China’s relationship with Africa is seen as a 
refreshing alternative to the traditional engagement models of the West. By a large majority, 
African governments see China’s engagement as a point of departure from Western neo-
colonialism and political conditions (Naidu & Davis, 2006: 80). This approach allows 
Southern countries to enjoy some level of autonomy towards traditional multilateral aid 
agencies, creating a domestically driven development agenda influenced by their own 
development priorities and challenges. It simultaneously allows Beijing to secure both 
political and diplomatic support for its stances from developing countries and emerging 
economies in the international arena, as well as new market opportunities for its growing 
economy.  




1.4 Outline of the Dissertation 
 
This research project is organized into nine chapters.  
Chapter I introduces the topic of the research and conveys its focus on China’s role in 
International Climate Change Negotiations in light of both the climate change securitization 
debate and China’s political, military, and economic growth domestically and in international 
affairs. Chapter I also presents the research question and hypothesis, or the core argument of 
the research. It argues that China’s active engagement in global environmental politics arises 
from a self-perception and identity shift from recipient of international norms to global norm 
entrepreneur. 
Chapter II outlines the theoretical framework of the research. This chapter contextualizes the 
leading role of China for the Global South within the North-South divide debate. Moreover, 
by analysing the rise of China through the lens of three principal International Relations 
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theories, I explain why the limitations of Realism and Liberalism in understanding the shift in 
China’s environmental and climate change policy call for an identity-based contribution. 
Finally, the chapter introduces the concept of Normative Power China as critical to 
understanding the capacity of Beijing to act as a global norm entrepreneur in the framework 
of international environmental governance. 
Chapter III presents the methodology of the research, in particular the methods of data 
collection and data processing used to address the research question and substantiate the 
argument.  
Chapter IV analyses discourses on environmental security and climate change. In this chapter 
I explore the genesis and the development of environmental security as a field of study. 
Starting with an analysis of climate change as a geopolitical threat, the chapter surveys the 
process of broadening the concept of security from environmental security to climate security, 
as well as the deepening of the notion, roots and actors involved in the process of the 
securitization of climate change. Having analysed the main discourses on environment and 
security, the research introduces a different approach to deal with threats posed by climate 
change – one that follows the path of sustainable development and focuses on the human 
security dimension of climate change. 
Chapter V is a case study on the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility 
(CBDR). In this chapter, I analyse the rationale of the CBDR principle, its roots and 
development in the framework of international climate change negotiations as well as its 
relevance in China’s identity shift. The analysis of the CBDR here is instrumental to 
explaining, in the subsequent chapters, the role of the CBDR for China in designing and 
implementing its strategy within international climate change negotiations. 
Chapter VI is centred on the analysis of China’s framework policy on environmental 
protection and climate change. In this chapter, I explore the position of the Chinese 
Government on the issue of climate change and security and the way in which the topics 
under examination in Europe and the United States have been absorbed and interpreted in 
China. I will then investigate China’s views and actions on climate change and the reasons 
why the Chinese Government is not willing to apply the apparent global consensus of linking 
climate change to national security policies. This chapter explores also in details the 12th Five 




Chapter VII analyses the position of the Chinese government in international climate change 
negotiations, investigating how China’s role in global climate governance may shape an 
alternative global vision and a new perspective to the international climate change debate. 
In chapter VIII, I analyse how international institutions and great powers are responding to the 
emergence of China as a global power and how the Chinese government perceives and 
pursues its role of a global player through its own brand of soft power and public diplomacy. 
An in-depth analysis of Chinese policies and actions in the framework of South-South 
cooperation will be undertaken. Finally, I analyse the role of China as a norm maker in the 
framework of international climate change negotiations. 
Chapter IX is the final and concluding chapter in which I present the conclusions of the 
research summarizing its key findings and contribution.  
40 
 
Chapter II: Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter contextualises the leading role of China for the global South within the North-
South divide debate. Moreover, by analysing the rise of China through the lens of the three 
principal International Relations theories, I explain why the limitations of realism and 
liberalism in understanding the shift in China’s environmental and climate change policy call 
for an identity-based contribution and why it is useful in addressing my research question. 
Finally, I introduce the concept of “normative power China”, understood as the capacity of 
Beijing to act as a global norm entrepreneur in the framework of international environmental 
governance. 
This research employs a social constructivist conceptual lens to create a coherent analytical 
framework following the underlying theme of the research: China’s identity construction and 
national interest. By drawing on social constructivist ideas and their identity-based approach, 
this research shows how China has used SSC and its own understanding of soft power to 
secure broad political support within the global South for its climate change and development 
policy in relevant international forums. Thereby, China has progressively strengthened its 
normative power and, accordingly, played a crucial role in framing the global debate on 
climate change as a subject of North-South politics.  
 
 
2.1 The North-South Divide and the Rise of China as a Global South 
Leader in ICCN 
 
The North-South divide has been widely explored as an analytical tool to explain the process 
and outcomes of climate negotiations (Mejia, 2010). There is extensive literature that explores 
the centrality of the divide between developed and developing countries in the evolution and 
current dynamics of the climate change regime (Müller, 2002; Najam, 2004; Beyerlin, 2006; 
Prum, 2007). 
At the heart of the North-South debate on climate change lies the concept of equity25, which 
arose in parallel with the development of international environmental negotiations, 
                                               
25
 The concept of equity was included in the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of the NIEO, in the 1987 
Brundtland report and in the 1992 UNFCCC Treaty. Since then reminder to equity have been always present in 
the UNFCCC documents from 1995 COP I in Berlin till 2015 COP 21 in Paris. 
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highlighting the opposed perspectives of developed and developing countries. Developing 
countries and emerging economies feared restrictions on their economic growth, and 
emphasised the North’s wasteful use of planetary resources, advocating for a redistributive 
program that would benefit them economically and hasten the transition towards 
industrialisation. On their part, developed countries wanted Northern consumption off of the 
negotiating table, Southern population growth on the agenda, and the use of non-binding 
language on issues of financial assistance and technology transfer (Haas et al., 1993: 57). 
In the negotiation process, the global South has been united under two non-negotiable key 
bargaining positions: (1) developing countries will not accept responsibility for climate 
mitigation and, consequently, will not commit to any binding GHG emission reductions; and 
(2) developed countries should be responsible for financing climate change policies in 
developing countries. In February 1991, just a few days before the first meeting of the newly 
established Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (INC)26, China organised a widely attended Ministerial Conference on 
Environment and Development for developing countries. The outcome of this conference was 
the “Beijing Declaration”, which clearly framed the climate regime negotiations in North-
South terms by asserting that: 
 
“The FCCC currently being negotiated should clearly recognize that it is developed 
countries which are mainly responsible for excessive emissions of greenhouse gases, 
historically and currently. [...] Developing countries must be provided with full 
scientific, technical and financial cooperation to cope with the adverse impacts of 
climate change” (Prum, 2007: 230). 
 
In the following years, it became clear that the defining negotiation dynamics were between 
major developing countries, led by China, in confrontation with the United States 
(Athanasiou, 2010). This was particularly clear in the final stages of the 2009 Copenhagen 
Climate Summit when, for the first time in a major global conference in the modern era, 
neither the US nor Europe led the process. Key authors of the final agreement were the 
BASIC countries led by China (Jacques, 2012: 211). 
                                               
26
 The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change was 
established on 21st December 1990 by Resolution 45/212 of the United Nations General Assembly.   
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The common denominator that has held together the vastly heterogeneous group of 
developing countries in the framework of ICCN is its self-definition based on a “narrative of 
exclusion” from world affairs (Vihma, 2010: 4). The desire for unity in the face of an 
international order, which most developing countries and emerging economies conceive of as 
placing them at a systematic disadvantages, has outweighed the internal differences, therefore 
placing them and their negotiation stances within the narrative of a North-South relationship 
(Najam, 2004: 225). 
From the perspective of the G77, many negotiation processes were perceived as serving 
explicitly the Northern agenda (Vihma et.al, 2011). More specifically, they were perceived as 
being based on the neo-Malthusian approach discussed in Chapter I. As a consequence, this 
created a greater suspicion among developing countries that industrialised countries were 
using climate change negotiations to protect their own economic interests against the rise of 
developing countries and emerging economies (Hallding et al., 2013). In this context, Beijing, 
strengthening its diplomatic and economic ties within the global South progressively, has 
started to emerge as an inÀXHQWLDOQRUPDWLYHDFWRU in the international arena. 
The past two decades have seen a surge in South-South economic cooperation including trade, 
investment, development assistance, and other financial flows. China has been the main 
architect and leader of this trend, promoting a number of high-profile institutions of policy 
cooperation and cross-border financing within the global South. The Forum on China-African 
Cooperation (FOCAC), the Annual BRICS Summit, the BRICS New Development Bank, the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative, and the SSC Fund 
are all initiatives spearheaded by emerging economies, with China playing a key role. These 
institutions symbolise China’s growing influence in development funding and represent 
potential new sources of financing for climate change policies in the global South. In this 
regard, in early 2016, the first round New Development Bank (NDB) funding was dedicated 
to renewable projects across the BRICS, which received in total $811 million in loans to 
finance clean energy investments27. 
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 Brazil’s Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social received the biggest credit, worth $300 
million to help build 600 megawatts of renewable energy capacity. India’s Canara Bank received a $250 million 
loan as well, with $75 million earmarked for 500 megawatts of renewable-energy projects. South Africa’s 
Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd. secured a loan of $180 million for power lines that can transmit 670 megawatts and 
transform 500 megawatts of renewable energy generation. Finally, China’s Shanghai Lingang Hongbo New 
Energy Development Co. received an $81 million loan, to fund 100 megawatts of rooftop solar power. Available 




2.2 International Relations Theory and the Rise of China: Realism, 
Liberalism, and Constructivism 
 
The inquiry into the transformations and the transformative potential of China’s foreign 
policy has been the focus of in-depth analysis from International Relations scholars in recent 
decades. As China’s relevance continues to rise in world affairs, it will concomitantly become 
more important to analyse China’s international relations discourse in order to understand its 
possible actions and directions. Beijing’s ability to reshape the structure of global governance 
is important in understanding the significance and implications of its rise (Legro, 2007; Wang 
& Rosenau, 2009). Therefore, analysing the rise of China, a key aspect for many political 
analysts and International Relations (IR) scholars, is revolves around the the question of how 
the Chinese leadership will exercise its new economic influence on Western-led n lead global 
governance. As framed by James Reilly:  
 
“As China emerges as a global power, is it more likely to accommodate itself to the existing 
systems and norms; or will the Chinese government insist that the international system be 
reshaped more in its own image and reflecting China’s own national interests?” (Reilly, 2011: 
71). 
 
Answering this question is important to contemporary global politics because of China's 
growing relative power and influence, which may motivate Chinese attempts at restructuring 
elements of the international order with which current Chinese leadership is dissatisfied 
(Buzan, 2010; Ross & Zhu, 2008). The consequences of China’s rise affects relevant issues in 
international relations, such as whether a power transition between Washington and Beijing 
will trigger global conflict, or whether China will seek to overturn the contemporary liberal 
world order (Foot, 2006; Ikenberry, 2008). However, for the purpose of this research, more 
specific issues will also be considered, because China’s increasing influence in world affairs 
means that it is also critical to the success of global governance processes such as ICCN (Gao 
2011a; Gu, Humphrey & Messner 2008; Hurrell & Sengupta 2012; Reilly 2011).  
Within the discipline of international relations, competing theoretical perspectives offer 
different answers to the above question. So far, the debate on China’s rise has been dominated 





2.2.1 The Rise of China through the Lens of Realism  
 
The realist paradigm has been one powerful source of fears for a rising China and, within this 
branch of international relations theory, offensive realism has been the main proponent of the 
so-called “China Threat Theories”. “China Threat” claims that regardless of how integrated 
China is, it is a revisionist power that will attempt to change the balance of power to its 
advantage (Gertz, 2013; Al-Rodhan, 2007; Broomfield, 2003; Roy, 1996). Some realists, such 
as John Mearsheimer, even openly advocated a US policy to block its rise because “China 
cannot rise peacefully” (Mearsheimer, 2001; 2006; 2014). 
Realists argue that the international system is defined by anarchy, which means that 
international politics takes place in an arena that has no overarching central authority above 
the individual collection of sovereign states (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014: 101). In such an 
anarchic system, state power is key; the only variable of interest, because only through power 
can states defend themselves and hope to survive. However, neorealists are divided over the 
structural implications of anarchy. Defensive realism's most prominent adherent, Kenneth 
Waltz, argued that great powers will act to preserve rather than upset the balance of power in 
the international system, in order to maintain their great power status. Waltz argues that states 
should strive for what he calls an ‘appropriate amount of power’ (Waltz, 1979: 40). Waltz 
maintains that it is unwise for states to try to maximise their share of world power, because if 
any state becomes too powerful, balancing will occur. Specifically, the other great powers 
will build up their militaries and form a balancing coalition that will leave the aspiring 
hegemon at least less secure, and maybe even destroy it (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014: 105). In 
contrast, scholars of offensive realism argue that the ultimate goal of every great power is to 
maximise its share of world power and eventually dominate the system, becoming the 
hegemonic player. However, since global hegemony is “almost impossible”, a great power 
has two goals: to dominate its region and to prevent other powers from dominating other 
regions (Mearsheimer, 2001). In this view, China’s growing economic relevance in world 
affairs will translate into increased military power and allow China to use force to assert its 
strategic aims in Asia and, eventually, across the world. As new powers rise, they will 
inevitably seek to replace the leading nation, therefore China’s rise will inevitably challenge 
the United States for supremacy and in a struggle for mastery in Asia (Sutter, 2005; 
Mearsheimer, 2006).  
From a “power transition theory” perspective, rising powers will delegitimise the existing 
authority and replace the current order with something entirely new (Schweller & Pu, 2011). 
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Therefore, China’s double-digit economic growth matched by double-digit annual increase in 
defense spending foresaw an inevitable confrontation between the United States, the status 
quo power, and its rising power challenger. In this regard, the 2006 US Quadrennial Defense 
Review Report asserted that China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the 
United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional 
US military advantages (US Dept. of Defence, 2006: 41).  
In this framework, realists see the advent of the US rebalancing strategy - the so-called 
“pivot” - as a proof that power balancing, rather than institutional engagement, would be the 
predominant force shaping the international order of Asia. This argument is bolstered by the 
view held by many in China that the US pivot is a form of “containment” of China (Acharya, 
2014). In fact, the US’s decision to strengthen American relations with other democratic 
countries in the Asia-Pacific, such as India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia on the basis of 
common values could be seen as a move to deny China’s moral authority as a regional leader.  
In this frame of thought, as China becomes more powerful and the United States' position 
erodes, two things are likely to happen. Firstly, China may try to use its growing influence to 
reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests. 
Secondly, as a consequence, other states in the system - especially the declining hegemonic 
players - will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, 
according to the realist school, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a 
power transition process (Gertz, 2000; Friedberg, 2011). Consequently, realists advocate and 
support an aggressive policy of containment to prevent China from becoming too strong.  
Contextualising global environmental governance under a realist perspective, the theory could 
offer a treatment of the political symptoms of climate change as a state-centric security threat. 
For a climate change impact to be classified as a traditional security threat, it must have some 
demonstrable connection to a vital national interest, which can be enhanced or defended 
through the application of military, economic, and political power (Gleick, 1991). However, 
climate change is better defined as a threat multiplier for those fragile countries already 
affected by internal instability and economic weaknesses, rather than as a threat per se. The 
progressive securitisation of the climate change debate and the development of the climate 
security paradigm could be understood as the transposition of the offensive realist approach to 





2.2.2 The Rise of China through the Lens of Liberalism 
 
The basic insight of liberal international relations theories is at least twofold. First, liberal 
theorists argue that the national characteristics of individual states matter for their 
international relations and, second, that the incidence and prospect of conflict in international 
relations are exaggerated by realism (Slaughter, 2013). 
Classical liberalism rests on three pillars. The first is commercial liberalism, or the view that 
economic interdependence, especially free trade, will decrease the likelihood of political 
conflicts (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Drawing on theories of economic interdependence, 
scholars highlight the wide-ranging costs that China would have to pay for aggressive foreign 
policies aimed at destabilising an international order that has largely facilitated and supported 
its impressive economic growth (Goldstein, 2005; Fravel, 2010; Luckhurst, 2013; Johnston, 
2013). In fact, most of China’s neighbours, and indeed the world’s most developed countries, 
have contributed substantially to Beijing economic rise through the provision of market 
access, technology and capital investment, and even foreign aid. Considering that China is 
one of the largest beneficiaries of today’s global order, it is unlikely that it will move away 
from a system that has allowed its internal economic growth, its international political rise, 
and from which it still benefits. 
The second pillar is republican liberalism, which assumes that regime types of individual 
nation-states crucially determine their foreign policies and, by implication, overall 
international relations. Therefore, this variant of liberalism implies that liberal democracies 
are more peaceful than autocracies, or at least seldom fight one another (Shambaugh & 
Yahuda, 2014: 69). While both strands of thought are commonly referred to as “Democratic 
Peace Theory”, the former is typically known as its monadic version, whereas the latter 
(involving comparisons between two broad types of regimes) is commonly labelled dyadic.  
The third is liberal institutionalism, which focuses on the contribution of international 
organisations in fostering collective security, managing conflict, and promoting cooperation. 
A modern variant of liberal institutionalism is neoliberal institutionalism. Unlike classical 
liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism accepts the realist premise that the international system 
is anarchic and that states are the primary and utility-maximising actors in international 
relations. But it disagrees with neorealism’s dismissal of international institutions. Neoliberals 
maintain that international institutions can regulate state behavior and promote cooperation by 
reducing transaction costs, facilitating information-sharing, and providing opportunities for 
peaceful bargaining and quid-pro-quos, and, by extension, peaceful resolution of conflicts, 
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including international courts, arbitrations, and mediations (Acharya, 2014). As posited by 
John Ikenberry, by strengthening global economic and institutional ties, prospects for conflict 
are reduced. Thereby, the promise of economic, diplomatic, and political gains will 
incentivise emerging powers to participate in the existing liberal order, and will progressively 
make them internalise existing liberal norms (Ikenberry, 2008). 
Since Beijing obtained its UN seat in 1971, the country launched massive economic reform 
programs in 1978, and joined the WB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 
1980s. Arguably, the socialisation of China into the behavioral norms of the modern 
international society has been one of the defining stories of the last four decades (Chin, & 
Thakur, 2010: 119). From the early 1970s onwards, at least until the 2008 global financial 
crisis, China had become increasingly reliant on the advanced markets of Europe and the 
United States to facilitate its export-led growth.  
In the past three decades, China has largely taken to ‘‘learning’’ the rules of global order 
(Pearson, 1999). During this period, Chinese foreign policy has been engaged in a relevant 
diplomatic effort aimed at reassuring the international community of China’s “peaceful rise”. 
This term, forged in the early 2000s by Chinese Communist Party theoretician Zheng Bijian, 
and replaced soon after by “China’s peaceful development”, called for a harmonious 
international environment for China’s growth, focusing on the paradigm that stable economic 
growth is the key in maintaining domestic political stability.  
The highest point of its socialisation into global practices and norms was China’s 2001 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), when Beijing accepted and implemented 
the comprehensive transparency obligations of the WTO (Pearson, 2006). Furthermore, 
through its active participation in non-proliferation diplomacy and its contribution with more 
than 3000 troops to serve in UN peacekeeping operations, China has come a long way in 
altering the common international stereotype of a reactive and obstructive actor (Zhu, 2007: 
15–20; He, 2007; Guo, 2008).   
Neoliberals claim that, as China increasingly integrates with rest of the world, its social and 
political systems will also change incrementally, moving towards Western-style democracy 
and liberalism. This will, in turn, greatly limit the potential for conflicts. John Ikenberry 
suggests that rising powers such as China and India – direct potential challengers to US 
hegemony in Asia – have benefitted from the liberal order to the extent that compels them to 
refrain from revisionism and they will instead be co-opted and socialised into the existing 
order (Ikenberry, 2011).   
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However, while Beijing respects and defends the norms that are in accordance with its own 
national interests, such as the Westphalian norms of state sovereignty and, above all, non-
interference in the internal affairs of foreign states (Chin &Thakur, 2010: 127), there are a 
number of examples which demonstrate that China is not quite internalising existing liberal 
norms. These range from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea28 to most aspects of the 
international human rights order. 
In this regard, scholars like Amitav Acharya emphasise that the optimism about rising powers 
progressively internalising existing liberal norms could be questionable for three main 
reasons.  Rising power such as China and India did not participate in the creation of the liberal 
order; indeed, before their large-scale economic reforms (China’s since 1979 and India’s since 
the early 1990s), they mostly stayed out of it or even opposed it. Second, both China and 
India are uncomfortable with new norms of liberal internationalism that challenge state 
sovereignty, especially humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (RTP) 
principle. Finally, both countries, along with other emerging powers such as Brazil, are 
claiming and working towards a reform aimed at acquiring a greater voice in the decision-
making process of institutions such as the IMF and the WB to achieve an updated balance of 
voting power that reflects the economic power of the members of the board. Until these 
reforms are carried out, resistance, rather than co-option, may be a more likely element of 
their attitude toward existing global institution (Acharya, 2014). 
All in all, the attitude of resistance rather than co-option reflects China’s behaviour in the 
framework of ICCN. It is captured in its treatment and understanding of the CBDR principle, 
which, for Beijing, represents the core and bedrock of international cooperation on climate 
change and, therefore, is non-negotiable (MoFa, 2009; Xinhua, 2009). 
                                               
28
 Control of the South China Sea is one of the most contentious and diplomatic issue in east Asia, with China 
asserting sovereignty over maritime areas that span 3.5m square kilometres but are also claimed by Vietnam, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Japan. Washington has become deeply involved, backing those 
against China and conducting military patrols. In essence, the South China Sea disputes is over the Parcels and 
Spratlys islands, together with various uninhabited atolls and reefs, especially the Scarborough Shoal. China 
claims historical rights to the islands dating back 2000 years. Vietnam rejects these historical claims and says it 
has ruled over both the Parcels and Spratlys islands chains since the seventeenth century. At the same time, the 
Philippines also claims the Spratlys islands because geographically they are close to its territories. The 
Philippines also has a further dispute with China over the Scarborough Shoal. These islands lie 100 miles away 
from the Philippines and 500 miles from China. The arbitration lawsuit brought by the Philippines, have 
stimulated debate and research about China’s South China Sea policy, as well as about the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). For Beijing, the South China Sea dispute is essentially a dilemma 
with UNCLOS, which the PRC took part in negotiating from 1973 to 1982, and finally ratified in 1996. In 2013, 
China declared that it would not participate in the arbitration and in 2016 the tribunal ruled in favour of the 
Philippines stating that China has "no historical rights". However, China has rejected the ruling. 
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The outcome of socialisation is the production of agents who can adjust themselves and their 
behavior in accordance with the guidelines, values, and norms of the social environment into 
which they have been integrated. This happens because these rules come to be seen as natural, 
rightful, expected, and legitimate. In this framework, an agent follows its internalised 
prescriptions of what is socially defined as normal, true, right, or good, according to a logic of 
appropriateness that is without, or in spite of, calculation of consequences and expected utility 
(March & Olsen, 1998).  
As explained by James March and Johan Olsen in The Institutional Dynamics of International 
Political Orders, when analysing the dynamics of social and political action and structures, 
there are two basic logics of action by which human behavior is interpreted. On the one side 
are those who see action as driven by a logic of anticipated consequences and prior 
preferences. On the other side are those who see action as driven by a logic of appropriateness 
and senses of identity. An interest-driven actor behaves according to a logic of consequence; 
it reasons on the basis of instrumental calculations concerning its self-interest, i.e. in defense 
of its very own benefit. By contrast, a norm-driven actor follows a logic of appropriateness; it 
decides and behaves in accordance with norms that it has internalised and that it considers to 
be the most appropriate in a given context (March & Olsen, 1998).  
In the framework of ICCN, the question that needs to be addressed is therefore about the logic 
underpinning Beijing’s efforts on international climate change policy. Does Chinese climate 
policy (both internal and external) follow a logic of appropriateness (i.e. acting as a 
responsible stakeholder doing what the relevant international players believe is appropriate) or 
a logic of consequence, focusing primarily on its domestic interests and expected utility? 
In the context of the two logics, the “responsible stakeholder” narrative of developed 
countries could be understood as an attempt to include emerging powers and present them 
with two clear options of responsible integration (i.e. logic of appropriateness) or 
irresponsible confrontation (i.e. logic of consequence) (Stuenkel, 2012; Economy & 
Oksenberg, 1999). Yet it remains up to the system’s creators and norm setters to define what 
“responsible” and “irresponsible” mean. Applying this framework to ICCN, emerging powers 
have been called irresponsible whenever they happen to disagree with the developed world 
(Stewart, 2010). 
However, the stark dichotomy of emerging powers either confronting the existing order or 
becoming fully-fledged members of it oversimplifies a more complex reality (Barna et al., 
2008: 166-7) because the ascent of China, coupled with both global and regional dynamics, 
has significantly challenged the global governance system. Both realists and liberal 
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institutionalists generally take the interests of China for granted or deduce its interests from 
systemic variables (Bøje Forsby, 2011). On the one hand, realism’s state-centric focus fails to 
see that domestic politics has a fundamental influence in Chinese foreign policy. In the 
framework of ICCN, the Chinese position is determined by key domestic priorities such as 
economic development, ecological vulnerability, and energy issues. In this context, the CBDR 
is seen as a fundamental tool to safeguard China’s domestic priorities because it represents an 
anchor to counterbalance the climate security discourses. 
Conversely, the general argument that economic interdependence would lead to reductions of 
conflicts and improvements of political relations does not work for China. In fact, a liberal 
unipolar system, what John Ikenberry calls a “one-hub” international system, could best seen 
as “an organizational complex in which the United States is the organizational hub” 
(Ikenberry, 2011). Unipolarity is established on the basis of an American-led open and rule-
based global system, which can be joined by other great powers.  
From this perspective, the US’s calls for China to take the role of “responsible stakeholder” 
indicate that China should come to embrace and accept this system. However, this type of 
global leadership portrays the United States as a benign hegemon29 that builds a liberal 
international order with the cooperation of other countries, which then internalise and 
implement the values and norms of the hegemon. While China has benefited substantially 
from the existing international economic order, there is no evidence that the country is 
moving towards an open, rules-based international order that promotes the US’s universal 
values of liberal democracy, human rights, and economic freedom. 
 
 
2.2.3 Rethinking the Rise of China through a Constructivist Approach 
 
In analysing which IR theory could best explain Chinese behavior in the international system, 
and particularly on the issue of climate change, at least two issues prompted by China’s rise 
should be considered. One relates to the application of Western standards for gauging the 
international behavior of non-Western actors and the second is the lack of language to both 
articulate and engage the novelty of China’s rise (Kavalski, 2009: 2-3). 
At a glance, while realism and liberal international relations theories provide valuable insights 
into the discussion about China’s rise, they pay little attention to the ideational side of the 
                                               
29
 See at this regard: Kehoane, 1984; Ikenberry, 1989; Nye, 1992. 
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debate, such as the values and identities that shape the decisions of Chinese policy makers 
(Liu, 2010). Realists assume that states are the primary actors in the anarchic realm of 
international politics; therefore they are restricted to seeing threats only from the power 
maximisation strategies of other states. However, global warming is a common problem and 
GHG emissions, regardless where they are generated, are dispersed throughout the 
atmosphere and exert influence on the global climate as a whole (Gardiner, 2006). Moreover, 
neorealist theorists emphasise structural factors as the driving force of international relations. 
Specifically, the anarchic international system forces states to privilege survival and power 
maximisation over other ends. However, assuming that state interests remain fixed over time 
does not allow one to understand neither China’s changing behavior in international climate 
change negotiations nor its entitlement to play a leadership role in the global South. 
On the other hand, a liberal approach could be valuable for a discussion on global 
environmental governance because it focuses on the role played by institutions within 
interstate cooperation and is therefore helpful in explaining the basic features of international 
climate change negotiations. Hence, neoliberal institutionalism captures the transnational 
element of climate change politics in a way that realism is incapable of doing. However, this 
approach also implies a number of problems when applied to my research question.  
The first problem, as highlighted by Cutler, is the lack of historical awareness. Given that 
neoliberal institutionalism as a theory is broadly based on game theoretical approaches and a 
positivist methodology, it fails to capture the historical dimensions of climate change (Cutler, 
2002: 181), which is very relevant for Beijing in the framework of international climate talks. 
Moreover, much like realism, it takes actors’ identities as given. Neoliberal institutionalism 
subscribes to the notion that states react to the state of anarchy in similar, predictable ways, 
based on rational analysis. As a rationalist theory, neoliberalism takes utility-maximisation as 
the underlying motivation behind most state-based action (Sterling-Folker, 2010: 118). A 
neoliberal analysis therefore struggles with normative concepts such as equity, fairness, or 
common responsibility, which have been repeatedly invoked and highlighted by Beijing since 
the establishment of the Climate Convention in 1992. 
As a consequence, the limitations of the above mentioned International Relations theories call 
for a more sociological and identity-based contribution to address my research question. A 
constructivist lens allows us to understand how China’s shifting and evolving identity has 
shaped the country’s behavior regarding its integration into the global economy, providing a 
lot more explanatory power for China’s behavior in international environmental governance. 
52 
 
Identity issues have been a central topic of discussion in Chinese society because as China’s 
role expanded in the international system it has been forced to re-evaluate its identity and 
preferences (Wong, 2013). Since the policy of reform and opening up began in 1978, China 
has changed itself and has incrementally joined the international society. In this framework, 
the shift in China’s environmental policy, and, ultimately, climate change policy, from a 
suspicious and defensive attitude to active engagement in global environmental governance 
has been largely caused by China’s integration into the international economic and social 
system. It is the opening up that has encouraged China to carry out domestic reform and has 
eventually led to the three dimensions of China’s identity shift outlined in Chapter I. China’s 
new role and proactive engagement in global environmental governance is thus a result of 
both reform and opening up. Without opening up, the reform could not have been so 
successful. 
A state’s attitude toward international society and its international behavior are rooted in its 
identity. States with different identities have different worldviews, which, in turn, make 
different impacts upon its foreign policies and strategies. As a state’s identity changes, its 
attitude and policy toward international society also changes (Jepperson et al., 1996: 52). 
Since the end of the Cold War, constructivist IR scholars have been focused on analysing the 
revolutionary impact of ideas to transform the organisation of world politics providing insight 
into the dissolution and creation of new regional and international orders (Barnett, 2014: 157). 
According to Alexander Wendt, the debate between "neorealist" and "neoliberals" has been 
based on a shared commitment to "rationalism." Like all social theories, rational choice 
directs us to ask some questions and not others, treating the identities and interests of agents 
as exogenously given, and focusing on how the behavior of agents generates outcomes. As 
such, rationalism offers a fundamentally behavioral conception of both processes and 
institutions: they change behavior but not identities and interests. On the contrary, a 
fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act towards objects, 
including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them (Wendt, 
1992). For constructivists, international relations are shaped not just by material forces such 
as power and wealth, but also by subjective and intersubjective factors, including ideas, 
norms, history, culture, and identity. Constructivists take a sociological, rather than “strategic 
interaction” view of international relations. The interests and identities of states are not pre-
ordinated or given, but emerge and change through a process of mutual interaction and 
socialisation (Acharya, 2014).  
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In order to understand the national identity dimension of China’s international relations, it is 
necessary to assess how identities are constructed and how changing identity discourses are 
linked to foreign policies. Identity can be defined as the understanding of the self in relation to 
an “other”. The scholarly insight into personal identity can be usually applied to the analysis 
of national identity and international relations (Neumann, 1992). National identity is a form of 
collective identity, whereby the identity of a group of people is defined and shaped by its 
internal cohesion and external relationship with other groups of people. National identity 
matters because it provides a cognitive framework for shaping state’s interests, preferences, 
worldview and, consequently, foreign policy actions (Kim, 2004: 41). As Wendt argues, 
without interests, identities have no motivational forces and, without identities interests have 
no direction (Wendt, 1999: 231). A state (the self) forms its identity in relation to how it 
evaluates the perception of other states (the other) and their actions. According to Wendt, 
conditions such as anarchy and power politics are not permanent or “organic” features of 
international relations, but are socially constructed: “anarchy is what states make of it” 
(Wendt, 1992). Actors' identities and interests are constructed by intersubjective social 
structures rather than given exogenously by the system, human nature, or domestic political 
regimes. Constructivism maintains that states’ goals, either material/objective such as 
economic development, or immaterial/subjective such as international recognition and 
standing, are generated by their social corporate identities or how they view themselves in 
relation to other actors in the international community (Griffiths et al., 2008: 52). Therefore, 
identities and interests can also be transformed. 
Through interaction and socialisation, states may develop a “collective identity”30 that would 
enable them to overcome power politics and security dilemmas (Acharya, 2014). In this 
framework, constructivists see diplomacy as a pattern of behavior between states and their 
environment that may play a central role in helping to confirm, recreate, or challenge their 
identities (Berger, 1996: 326). In analysing the development of China’s post-war international 
relations, constructivists emphasise the fundamental role of collective identities. Indeed, the 
concept of collective identities can be used to understand China’s diplomacy from the late 
1980s onwards, its proactive engagement in multilateral settings in the global South and, more 
                                               
30
 Wendt defines collective identity as a positive identification with the welfare of another. It is based on 
solidarity, community, and loyalty; it discourages free-riding by increasing diffuse reciprocity and the 
willingness to bear costs without selective incentives. Collective identity is different from an alliance, which is a 
temporary coalition of self-interested states in response to a specific threat. Collective identity results in 
multilateral actions against non-specific threats by diffusing reciprocity and increasing the willingness to act on 
“generalized principles of conduct” (Wendt, 1994). 
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recently, with the BRICS, and its repositioning from a “taker” to a “maker” of the 
international order. Constructivist analyses, focusing on the role of national identity in 
China’s strategic choices, gravitate towards seeing diplomacy as a tool that confirms Chinese 
beliefs about its entitlement to play a leadership role in the global South. According to them, 
Beijing adheres to traditional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention in its pursuit of a 




2.3 Normative Power China 
 
Adherence to the traditional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention has had significant 
implications for the evolution of China’s normative power. As noted by Kavalski, this has 
promoted an understanding that a position of leadership cannot be imposed upon others by 
force or through domination, but needs to be earned in the process of interaction (Kavalski, 
2014: 313). In this regard, Womack argues that this attitude is crucial to understanding 
China’s engagement towards African countries. He singles out respect for the other as the 
“cardinal virtue” of Beijing’s normative power (Womack, 2008). Thus, by focusing on 
countries that normally do not get much respect or political consideration at the international 
level, China sets itself apart as a different kind of actor that is welcomed by a large majority 
of developing countries and emerging economies. 
That which is crucial in understanding normative power through a logic of relationships is 
that the norms underwriting the “normal” are no longer de¿QHGE\WKHOHDGLQJVWDWHLQWHUPV
of “rights and obligations”, but emerge as “behavioral standards” accepted by the majority of 
participating states in the process of interaction (Yan, 2012: 238). A clear example is 
represented by the normative implications of the AIIB, a multilateral development bank 
initiated by China in 2013. At the early stage of its formation, the inÀXHQFHRIWKHEDQNZDV
rather limited, since the United States and Japan immediately rejected the initiative (New 
York Times, 2014). Notwithstanding the position of the United States, the announcement of 
the United Kingdom to join the bank, followed immediately after by a large number of 
Western countries, changed the situation dramatically. As a result, when the AIIB opened for 
business on 16 January 2016 there were 57 Founding Members. The AIIB, being a Chinese 
initiative, is an important vehicle to spread Chinese norms of financial governance, which, 
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since the early 2000s, have been a major target of Western criticism in relation to its foreign 
aid, above all in Africa31. The conventional Western aid programs not only provide ¿QDQFLDO
assistance, but also impose social and political requirements on recipient countries. These 
conditions are not foreseen in the Chinese legal framework for development. Furthermore, 
Beijing has not only introduced its norm of unconditionality into the AIIB, but also managed 
to gain endorsement for this norm from all of the member states of the bank (Peng & Tok, 
2016). 
Marta Finnemore, in her 1996 book National Interests in International Society, analyses the 
norms of international society and the way in which they affect state identities and interests. 
State behaviour is de¿QHG E\ LGHQWLW\ DQG LQWHUHVWV ,GHQWLW\ DQG LQWHUHVWV DUH GH¿QHG E\
international forces; that is, by the norms of behaviour embedded in international society. The 
norms of international society are transmitted to states through international organisations and 
shape national policies by ‘teaching’ states what their interests should be (Finnemore, 1996). 
In interpretive and constructivist IR theory, there is a general agreement on the definition of a 
norm as a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity (Katzenstein, 
1996; Finnemore, 1996; Klotz, 1995). Furthermore, scholars across disciplines have 
recognised different types or categories of norms. The most common distinction is between 
regulative norms, which order and constrain behaviour, and constitutive norms, which create 
new actors, interests, or categories of action (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 891).  
In International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, Marta Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink outline how norm influence may be understood as a three-stage process, the so-called 
“life-cycle of norms”, which explains the political process of norm evolution. The first stage 
is "norm emergence", followed by broad norm acceptance, or “norm cascade" (Sunstein, 
1997), and the third stage involves “norm internalisation”. The first two stages are divided by 
a threshold or "tipping" point, at which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm. 
The characteristic mechanism of the first stage, norm emergence, is persuasion by norm 
entrepreneurs. Norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) 
to embrace new norms. The second stage is characterised by a dynamic of imitation as the 
norm leaders attempt to socialise other states to become norm followers. At the far end of the 
norm cascade, norm internalisation occurs; norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are 
no longer a matter of broad public debate (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 895). In the 
framework of international environmental protection, an example of a new accepted norm and 
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 See: Zweig & Jianhai, 2005: 31; Taylor, 2009: 1-2; Shambaugh, 2013: 110. 
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its life cycle is well represented by the successful achievement of the 1987 Montreal Protocol, 
a landmark agreement for the reduction of global production, consumption, and emissions of 
ozone-depleting substances (ODSs). In this framework, norms about the environment, climate 
security, or sustainable development not only regulate what states do, but they can also be 
connected to their identities and are thus expressive of how they define themselves and their 
interests. Therefore, norms constitute and redefine state interests and approaches. 
As previously mentioned, in analysing norms and interests in China’s domestic and 
international climate change policy, the aim of this research is to investigate the logic behind 
Chinese actions. In considering climate change as a problem whose solution necessitates the 
transformation of energy – and ultimately economic – systems, adopting March and Olsen’s 
analysis, both normative (logic of appropriateness) and interests-based (logic of consequence) 
explanations can be considered in analysing Chinese activism in national and international 
climate change policy. In this regard, as argued by March and Olsen32, although there is some 
tendency for society to be divided into separate spheres, each based primarily on either 
consequential calculation or rules, the two logics are not mutually exclusive. As a result, 
political action generally cannot be explained exclusively in terms of a logic of either 
consequences or appropriateness. Any particular action probably involves elements of each. 
Political actors are constituted both by their interests, by which they evaluate their expected 
consequences, and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions. They 
calculate consequences and follow rules, and the relationship between the two is often subtle 
and mutually reinforcing (March & Olsen, 1992). 
In this context, following the logic of consequences, China acts on climate change because it 
believes to be working to its own advantage by simultaneously tackling the considerable 
domestic problem of environmental degradation and pollution, as well as by achieving energy 
security. Furthermore, following the same logic, China participates actively in the ICCN and 
is investing great diplomatic and economic resources in SSC in the field of climate change 
because it sees these actions as commensurate to playing a leadership role in the global South. 
On the other hand, following the logic of appropriateness, China can be interpreted as taking a 
proactive role in global environmental governance because there is a strong (normative) 
expectation from the international community for Beijing to take on commitments, 
proportionate to its level of economic development. 
                                               
32
 According to March and Olsen there are four interpretations of the relationship between the two logics. 
However, they believe that the two logics are sufficiently distinct to be viewed as separate explanatory devices. 
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With the aim of (1) reconverting its “brown” and energy-intensive economy toward a more 
efficient and low-carbon one33, (2) opposing the development of environmental norms which 
could negatively impact its economic growth and, finally, (3) enhancing its international 
image of a responsible rising power, Beijing has started to act as a norm-driven actor 
behaving in accordance with and building consensus around the CBDR principle.  
Using Finnemore and Sikkink’s approach, the development of the climate security paradigm, 
led by the US and carried forward by other key Western countries, could be read as an attempt 
to create a new set of constitutive norms that, among other social effects, also constrain 
China’s growth. By analysing China’s push towards clean energy technologies and its 
increasing proactive engagement in global environmental policy, I argue that its adherence to 
the CBDR has been integral to creating a network of partners. This network is built on the 
collective identity of the global South to promote an alternative model of development – one 
that allows for the possibility to oppose the securitisation of climate change. Thus, China's 
response to what it encounters internationally as a North-driven securitisation of climate 
change has been based in a broader process of identity construction and performance, both 
domestically and abroad. 
Following Ian Manners’ oft-quoted proposition that normative powers are only those actors 
that have the ability to shape what is considered normal in international life (Manners, 2002), 
the notion of a “normative power China” might appear provocative and controversial (Pu, 
2013), especially if applied to global environmental governance. In fact, for many years, the 
common narrative on global environmental policies has been that China was the climate 
villain obstructing and delaying the international negotiations on climate change (USHC on 
IR, 1998). The country has been blamed for acting irresponsibly and for hampering any 
United Nations Security Council resolution on the threats that climate change poses (UNSC 
6587th meeting, 2011). 
On the contrary, in the last decade, both internationally and domestically, China has 
manifestly made considerable progress in the field of R&D spending on green energy, low 
carbon technologies development, and environmental protection legislation. Beijing signed 
the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, and since then, it has upheld the UNFCCC as the most 
authoritative, universal, and comprehensive international framework for coping with climate 
change (SCIO, 2008), and it has also treated the Kyoto Protocol as the basic framework and 
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 See: Der Spiegel, 2005; Craig, 2007; Wang & Zheng, 2007; Lewis, 2008; Friedman, 2009; Kennedy, 2010; Hu 
& Liang, 2011; Ng & Mabey, 2011; Chen, 2012; Wang & Zheng, 2013; Gallagher, 2014; Wang et al., 2014; 
Mathews, 2015; Mathews & Tan, 2015.  
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legal foundation of international cooperation for addressing climate change (SCIO, 2011). 
Moreover, China has acknowledged the need for a post-Kyoto agreement and has actively 
worked for it. China has also accepted voluntary targets for developing countries and has 
lowered its resistance to the international monitoring of developing country mitigation efforts. 
Internationally, by drawing on climate diplomacy and SSC, Beijing has developed a large 
number of partnerships and cooperative frameworks on climate policies, above all with 
African countries and other emerging economies, which have significantly improved its 
diplomatic credentials in the framework of ICCN.  
Based on the discussion about normative power China, Kavalski stresses that external 
perception is another essential criterion of a normative power quali¿FDWLRQ +H DUJXHV WKDW
since normative power emerges from interactions with others, recognition from one’s social 
counterparts is also crucial for an international actor to qualify as a normative power 
(Kavalski 2013: 250). In other words, there needs to be an intersubjectively established 
understanding of China as a normative power for it to be one. In this regard, new institutions 
and instruments promoted by China, combined with the long lasting efforts the country is 
implementing in its African policy, could be understood as the basis of Beijing’s strategy to 
build consensus around its ambitions to secure the role of the global South’s leader in the 
framework of ICCN.  
The study of “normative power China” is a recent subject in IR (Kavalski, 2007, 2012; Zhang, 
2011; Pu, 2012; Wang, 2009; Womack, 2008). Until the early 1990s, developing countries 
were assumed to be the “passive recipients of the external rule scripted by the template of 
colonialism or Cold War bipolarity system” (Kavalski, 2012: 2). Today, the international 
geopolitical context is changed and is dominated by the rise of new powers seeking a global 
political role comparable with their increased economic relevance in world affairs. The idea 
that rising powers will either challenge or be assimilated into the existing order does not 
reflect the state of today’s world and needs to be updated to understand the rise of China and 
its consequences for world politics (Gat, 2007; Jacques, 2009; Kupchan, 2012). In fact, while 
China has shown its willingness to work within the system, internalising some of its basic 
norms and by being involved in a number of international organisations and multilateral 
dialogues, it has also endeavoured to reshape other norms to defend its national interest and 
domestic priorities.  
Seeing itself as a large country with a five-thousand-year-old of civilisation, China desires 
and expects to gain a proper status in the international system and a proper identity in 
international society, which fit and correspond to its land scale, population size, resources, 
59 
 
and history (Qin, 2010: 226). In the framework of ICCN, the uncompromising position of 
Beijing around the CBDR principle and its refusal to accept the climate security paradigm 
suggests that any expectations that China will undertake a clear process of “socialisation”, 
passively adopting international existing norms, may be misplaced. Given the choice between 
the two stark options of passive acceptance or complete refusal, Beijing is instead undertaking 
a third path by internalising selected global practices and norms while at the same time 
claiming its seat at the table in order to rewrite some others. 
Most existing IR theories tend to focus on how emerging powers are socialised into the 
existing international norms and orders (Johnston, 2007) but the other side of the story, how 
emerging powers might influence the evolution of norms, has been relatively under-theorised 
(Pu, 2012:47). However, Beijing’s increasing economic and political clout demonstrates that 
non-Western actors can be equally able and willing to engage in the global playground 
(Kavalski, 2009: 2) with the aim of shaping existing norms. This process was accelerated after 
2008, when the global financial crisis seriously undermined the economic strengths of many 
of the dominant players of the world economy. While in 2009 the United States and other 
Western powers were still struggling to revive their economies, China had quickly recovered 
and by the end of 2008 become the world’s largest creditor nation and holder of foreign 
reserves. Making its economic development less dependent on Western consumers, China has 
grown rapidly, boosting its confidence and leading to a reassessment of the global strategic 
environment. America’s weakened position and China’s continued rise were said to be a clear 
indication of the changing global balance of power (Li, 2013). At the same time, the so-called 
China Model started to attract considerable international attention. 
In fact, even before the outbreak of the financial crisis, China’s confidence in its own role 
(constitutive of its shifting identity) in the world was already present in Chinese political 
discourses. In an internal speech to the party’s powerful Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group 
in January 2006, President Hu Jintao said that “the enhancement of China’s international 
status and international influence must be reflected both in hard power including the 
economy, science and technology, and national defense power and in soft power such as 
culture” (Glaser & Murphy, 2009). In this regard, as argued by Buzan, the often-heard 
Western reservation that China does not possess persuasive soft power appeal is not so much 
erroneous as it is irrelevant (Buzan, 2010: 22). In fact, over the last decade, PRC leaders and 
elites have made a strong effort to develop China’s own understanding of soft power and 
cultural influence in order to advance its global position.  
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Through the projection of its soft power, China presents itself to the world as a source of 
ancient wisdom and high technology, which together form an alternative model of progress 
and development (Callahan & Barabantseva, 2011: 3). This image reinforces China’s 
entitlement to play the role of climate leader in the global South. 
 
 
2.4 “Norm Making” and “Normative Power” 
 
Following the work of Ian Manners, the concept of “normative power” refers to an actor’s 
ability to shape or change what passes for normal in international relations (Manners, 2002). 
According to Manners, the concept of normative power is at its core ideational rather than 
material or physical. This means that its use involves normative justifications rather than the 
use of material incentives or physical force. In the post-Cold War period, the power of ideas 
and ideation has been seen as particularly influential in the evolution of the European 
Community into the European Union (EU). Such ideas have helped create an EU which is 
concerned about more than economic policies and which exercises more than material forms 
of influence and power (Manners, 2009).  
Furthermore, the legitimacy of normative power should primarily be analysed through the 
principles that it promotes. The legitimacy of principles in world politics may come from 
previously established international conventions, treaties, or agreements, particularly if these 
are important within the UN system. 
Overall, these principles can be summarized as the core values of peace, freedom, democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law, as well as the objectives of equality, social solidarity, 
sustainable development, and good governance (Manners, 2009). In this context, the EU’s 
constitution as an “elite-driven, treaty based, legal order,” means that its identity and behavior 
are fundamentally based upon a set of common values (Manners 2002). Among those, five 
core norms — peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms — are said to exemplify the EU as a “normative power” and define the 
principles and objectives of the EU’s “presence” in the international arena (Allen & Smith, 
1990).  By integrating these norms with its various bodies’ official and legal documents, 
white papers, and formal and informal statements of its representatives, the EU reinforces 




Therefore, being a normative power seems to imply not only the ability to shape norms and 
act as a norm entrepreneur but also one’s adherence to and the promotion of a common set of 
values which are considered legitimate by state and non-state actors globally. 
As a consequence, being a norm maker does not imply automatically the status of normative 
power. A clear example of this subtle but fundamental difference between “normative power” 
and a “norm maker” is “Official Development Assistance” (ODA). 
ODA is one of the instruments used by the EU as an international actor - and by its Member 
States at the bilateral level - to spread some of the norms discussed above. The EU does this 
by making ODA an object of its positive and negative conditionality, i.e. by insisting on a set 
of social and political requirements in relations with aid-receiving countries34.  
On the contrary, China rejects the imposition of political or economic conditions considering 
it as interference in recipients’ domestic affairs. Instead, Chinese leaders insist that achieving 
economic growth in recipient countries should be the core objective of assistance programs 
(Reilly, 2012).  In its latest 2014 White Paper on Foreign Aid published in July 2014 Beijing 
stated that: 
 
“When providing foreign assistance, China adheres to the principles of not imposing any 
political conditions, not interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries and fully 
respecting their right to independently choosing their own paths and models of development. 
The basic principles China upholds in providing foreign assistance are mutual respect, 
equality, keeping promise, mutual benefits and win-win” (SCIO, 2014). 
 
Although Beijing’s aid and cooperation programs implemented in the framework of SSC do 
not follow the OECD-DAC guidelines35, China’s active engagement in several norm-setting 
forums has allowed Beijing to switch from the role of norm taker to the one of norm maker. In 
fact, for China to be a successful norm maker, other states have to accept its ideas as valid and 
appropriate standards and this seems to be the case above all for an increasing number of 
developing countries and emerging economies36. 
This does not constitute the type of explicitly value-driven and value-oriented social practice 
across a number of issues that the Manners-inspired literature on the EU’s normative power 
tries to account for. It is a qualitatively different kind of norm entrepreneurship and is distinct 
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from the European Union’s diplomatic and rhetorical effort to maintain (at least a semblance) 
of normative consistency across nearly every policy and political issue with “external” 
implications. However, as section 2.3 of this chapter has already argued, China’s foreign, 
development, trade, and environmental policies are integrated with identifiable normative 
practices, albeit of different scope, legitimacy, and application. The concept of “normative 
power China” is understood here as the capacity of Beijing to push for the (formal and 
informal) adoption of a relatively specific set of rules and flexibilities in the framework of 
international environmental governance. Therefore, the term “normative power China” refers 
here solely to the capacity of the PRC to act as a norm maker within the international system 
on specific issues. A conceptual alternative would be to study China “merely” as a “norm 
maker” and preserve the status of “normative power” for the EU alone. However, this would 
be at odds with important aspects of Manners’ work on value-driven elite behavior, and would 
artificially limit the concept to largely one actor in world politics (sui generis as that actor 
may be). Kavalski (2014) and Womack (2008) make a strong case against this, as does, 
arguably, the remainder of this work.  
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Chapter III: Methodology  
 
The empirical part of this research examines the drivers behind China’s increased engagement 
in global environmental policy. Ultimately, it scrutinizes the proposition that Beijing is 
developing an alternative model of sustainable economic development moving from the role 
of norm taker to the one of norm maker in the framework of International Climate Talks. 
To this end, a tripartite document, literature, and discourse-analysis approach, broadly 
defined, is employed to investigate the evolution of China’s environmental policy both at 
domestic and international level; a process this thesis claims has been centred on the three 
interconnected elements of its identity shift. This chapter first outlines data collection methods 
and sources that will be used. It then moves on to present the study’s tripartite data processing 
method.  
 
3.1 Data Collection  
 
Data collection and processing have been designed to buttress this dissertation’s hypothesis 
that: 
1) The political and economic transformation following the reform and opening up policy 
undertaken by the People Republic of China since 1978 has been contingent upon, and has 
reinforced, an identity shift based on three main interconnected elements, namely:   
a) China’s self-perception in the international political-economic system as a leading 
developing nation within the Global South; 
b)  China’s concerns over the growing economic, social and political costs of its 
environmental degradation and pollution, mostly due to its economic and industrial 
development based on fossil fuels; 
c) China’s increasing concerns over its energy security. 
2) This identity shift has been reflected at the international level in Beijing’s changing attitude 
toward global environmental governance; 
Therefore, this dissertation analyses the PRC foreign policy, diplomatic, 
economic/development energy and other associated discourses in contexts relevant to the 
research question and core hypothesis. Specifically, it considers: 
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a) Beijing’s “rhetorical action” aimed at framing climate change as a North-South issue, 
primarily through the promotion of the Common but Differentiated Responsibility 
norm; 
b) The security dimension of climate change in China vis-à-vis the Western-led 
environmental security discourses; 
c) Chinese discourses related to the processes of reform and opening up launched in 1978 
as well as those – both new and re-framed – related to the post-Deng period, namely:  
- the five principles of peaceful coexistence; 
- socialism with Chinese characteristics; 
- China as a ‘permanent country of the Third World with international 
obligations’37; 
- the peaceful development; 
- the Beijing consensus; 
- Chinese soft power; 
- the south-south cooperation (i.e.: the shift from “economy serves diplomacy” 
to “diplomacy serves the economy”); 
- the Chinese dream of the Great rejuvenation. 
Moreover, in order to contextualize these foreign policy, diplomatic and other associated 
discourses in the framework of Chinese domestic, as well as international environmental and 
climate change policy, I will analyse: 
a) China’s framework policy and approaches to climate change, and 
b) China’s role in the framework of international climate change negotiations; 
While more detail will be offered below on this dissertation’s use of discourse analysis, a note 
associating it with data sources is opportune here. A discourse analysis approach to 
investigating China’s climate policy and diplomacy in the context of the country’s economic 
and political rise is crucial to understanding how discourses on environmental justice, equity 
or fairness act as powerful tools for Beijing to defend and promote its interests. As argued by 
Hajer and Versteeg, studying environmental politics through a discourse analysis approach 
has three particular strengths: the capacity to reveal the role of language and its social context 
in politics, to reveal the embeddedness of language in practice, and to illuminate mechanisms 
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by which a policy does or does not come about and answer ‘how questions’ (Hajer & 
Versteeg, 2005).   
Regarding the first strength, as already mentioned, defining climate change in the framework 
of sustainable development rather than security policy is strategically crucial to Beijing and 
tied to its evolving identity. Understanding climate change through a language of security 
instead of that of development would turn climate change into a military problem rather than 
one of societal welfare. This would, in turn, narrow considerably the field of action and the 
policy choices available to tackle it. 
With reference to the second strength, applying a discourse analysis approach allows this 
research to understand how a number of actors actively try to influence the definition of a 
problem or an issue, as they try to impose a particular frame of thought or discourse upon a 
discussion. In this regard, the case of the CBDR principle is an emblematic one.  
Finally, regarding the method’s third strength, analyses of discourses can help to illuminate 
why certain definitions do or do not catch on at a particular place and time and help to explain 
the mechanisms by which a policy does or does not come about. For example, it provides a 
valuable key to understanding why for Beijing water, food, or energy are all perceived as 
security issues, while climate change is classified solely as a development one, remaining the 
singular global concern in the broad framework of environmental protection that has not been 
securitized yet through Chinese governmental discourses. 
On the basis of this dissertation’s research question and hypothesis, empirical data have been 
collected to paint a picture of China’s shifting role and behaviour in international climate talks 
as tied to the country’s multipronged identity shift. Both primary and secondary sources have 
been used accordingly.  
A crucial pool of data that has driven this study comes from in-depth analyses of monographs, 
newspaper articles, governmental documents, official statements and speeches about the 
evolution of (1) the international climate change regime, (2) Chinese security policy, (3) 
Chinese foreign policy, (4) Chinese environmental policy, and (5) Chinese development 
policy. The reason for focusing on the secondary literature as a critical source of data is due to 
its advantages in accessibility and coverage.  
In addition, literature on China’s National environmental policy has been gathered from 
conversations with researchers of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) during 
two short-term visit in Beijing in October 2012 and September 2013 where I had the 
opportunity to present and discuss my research topic with researchers of the Institute for 
Urban and Environmental Studies of the CASS. On that occasion, I also had the opportunity 
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to exchange views with a number of researchers who worked on China’s 2013 National 
Human Development Report, prepared in collaboration between UNDP China and the 
Institute for Urban and Environmental Studies of the CASS. 
Data for this project consist of six main categories:  
1) Textual (categorical, qualitative) and quantitative data from Chinese publications (in 
English) including official government statements and declarations, academic articles 
and newspaper articles on Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy, Chinese security 
policy, Chinese climate change policies, Chinese development policy (mainly the 
10th, 11th and 12th FYP), China environmental policy, Chinese soft power and South 
– South cooperation.  
In this context, I also collected news articles from Xinhua - China’s official state news 
agency - and the China Daily, an English language Chinese newspaper often used as a 
guide to government policy, and which is run by the Publicity Department of the 
Communist Party of China. These articles have been collected from 2007 to 2015 and 
selected via a set of keywords, including (but not limited to) “global warming”, 
“climate change”, and “environmental security”. The data so collected has been used 
primarily to trace the evolution of narratives in how the government communicates 
issues of climate change. 
2) Data and policy documents from international organizations such as the WB, the UN 
and its agencies (mainly UNDP and UNEP) and IEA on China economic 
development, China GDP trend and China CO2 emissions;   
3) Textual (categorical, qualitative) and quantitative data drawn from conference 
proceedings and final statements related to major international conferences on 
environment and development from the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment to the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development  
(Rio + 20); 
4) Textual (categorical, qualitative) and quantitative data extracted from conference 
proceedings, speeches and official statements of the UN Security Council and at the 
UN General Assembly related to the discussions held on climate change and security 
from 2007 to 2013; 
5) Textual (qualitative, categorical) data drawn from decisions, conference proceedings, 
speeches and final statements related to the first 21 Conferences of The Parties to the 
United Nations Convention on Climate Change with a particular focus on COP 3 
(Kyoto, 1995), COP 7 (Marrakech, 2001), COP 13 (Bali, 2007), COP 15 
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(Copenhagen, 2009), COP 16 (Cancun, 2010), COP 17 (Durban, 2011), COP 18 
(Doha, 2012), COP 20 (Lima, 2014) and COP 21 (Paris, 2015). 
6) Data related to the five Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (mainly from the Summary for Policymakers):  
a. IPCC First Assessment Report (FAR), 1990 and the 1992 Supplementary 
Report requested in the context of the negotiations on the UNFCCC at the Rio 
Earth Summit; 
b. IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR), 1995; 
c. IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR), 2001; 
d. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), 2007; 
e. IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5),  2013; 
Moreover, I conducted a literature review of theories related to: 
- The North-South divide;   
- A Liberal and Realist Perspective of China’s rise; 
- A Constructivist perspective on the rise of China; 
- Emerging powers as normative powers; 
- Emerging power’s role in International Development; and 
- The changing concept of security and environmental security studies; 
Data collection has been conducted in light of my hypothesis and data analysis has been 
performed adopting a Social Constructivist approach in an attempt to address my research 
question. 
While details about the theoretical foundations of this research will be discussed in the 
following chapter, the core idea is that both Realist and Liberal International Relations 
theories display limitations in understanding the evolution of China’s climate policy and 
diplomacy in the context of the country’s economic and political rise. Therefore, a more 
comprehensive account calls for an identity-based contribution built upon a social 
constructivist approach. 
Discourses articulated as concepts, narratives, and practices are generally theorized as the 
“non-material” or “ideational” kind of unit of analysis in the conventional material-ideational 
divide in the philosophy of social sciences” (Wendt, 1999). The inadequacy of Realist and 
Liberal theories emerges in particular from the limited attention that they pay to the ideational 
factors of the debate about China’s rise, such as the values and identities that shape the 
decisions of Chinese policy makers (Liu, 2010). Therefore, a Social Constructivist approach 
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has been selected since it allows to create a coherent analytical framework following the 




3.2 Data Processing: Document and Literature Analysis 
 
Like other analytical methods in qualitative research, document analysis requires that data be 
examined and interpreted in order to extract meaning, gain understanding, and develop 
empirical knowledge (Rapley, 2007; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). This analytic procedure entails 
finding, selecting, appraising (making sense of), and synthesising data contained in 
documents. Document analysis yields data - excerpts, quotations, or entire passages - that are 
then organised into major themes, categories, and case examples specifically through content 
analysis (Labuschagne, 2003). 
As a research and data processing method, document analysis is particularly applicable to 
qualitative case studies such as intensive studies producing rich descriptions of a single 
phenomenon or event (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1995). In this regard, this type of research method 
fits well with the analysis of the economic, political, and diplomatic rise of China. Much ink 
has been spent in recent years analysing what this “rise” implies (Albramowitz & Bosworth, 
2006: 13–14) through a variety of methodologies and conceptual approaches, but document 
analysis is also useful to unpacking the wide and perhaps even more discussed themes of 
climate change and international climate change negotiations. Non-technical literature, such 
as reports, minutes of policy meeting, conference proceedings, etc., can provide a potential 
source of empirical data for the research. As Merriam pointed out, ‘Documents of all types 
can help the researcher uncover meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights 
relevant to the research problem’ (Merriam, 1988: 118). 
As highlighted by Bowen in Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method, 
‘documents can serve a variety of purposes as part of a research undertaking’ which can be 
summarised to ‘provide background and context, additional questions to be asked, 
supplementary data, a means of tracking change and development, and verification of findings 
from other data sources’ (Bowen, 2009: 29-30). 




a) Provide background information and create a solid knowledge base about the 
phenomena under investigations, namely: 
- The changing concept of security in the post-Cold War period; 
- The development of environmental and security studies; 
- Different conceptions of power in International Relations; 
- The changing balance of power between the global South and the global North and 
its repercussions in ICCN;  
- China’s broader political, economic, and military “rise” in international affairs; 
- The changing role – and identity – of China in a multipolar world. 
b) Provide historical insight as well as track changes and development of those 
phenomena, and 
c) Verify findings and corroborate evidence by comparing different sources in order to 
solidify the research argument and rule out possible alternative explanations. 
Thereupon, information collected has been organized into ten main categories related to the 
central question of the research: 
1. Information and data related to the genesis, historical roots and development of the 
present climate regime; 
2. Information related to the North-South Divide; 
3. Information related to Chinese policies and programs in the field of environmental 
protection and climate change; 
4. Information related to Chinese development policy through the evolution of its Five 
Years Plan on National Economic and Social Development; 
5. Information and data related to the Chinese political and economic expansion in 
Africa; 
6. Information related to the concept of soft power and, specifically, to Chinese 
understanding and use of soft power; 
7. Information related to the economic and political rise of emerging powers with a 
specific focus on the BRICS countries;  
8. Data related to the analysis and interpretation of the meaning of “China’s rise” from 




9. Data related to the academically and politically evolving concept of security, its 
progressively broadening in the aftermath of the Cold War, and the development of 
the climate security paradigm; 
10. Information and data related to scientific evidence of climate change and its potential 
negative impact on international security;  
11. Information related to the concept of normative power and, specifically, the concept of 
“normative power China”; 
12. Information related to Chinese collective identity, specifically in relation to its 
changing behaviour in ICCN;  
The usefulness of the data collected has been assessed in function of its systematic 
contribution to the logical development of the argument. In this process, I have progressively 
selected core information and separated it from contextual or tangential information less 
relevant for the construction of the core argument and its substantiation.  
Regarding the collected data, it is worth cautioning that a relatively large quantity of material 
pertinent to categories 1 through 10 is not matched by studies (secondary data) related to 
identity-based and sociological explanations of China’s changing role and behaviour in ICCN, 
in particular regarding the notion of Chinese normative power. 
 
 
3.3 Data Processing: Discourse Analysis 
 
According to Vivien Burr, discourse is a form of social action that plays a part in producing 
the social world – including knowledge, identities and social relations – and thereby in 
maintaining specific social patterns. Our knowledge of the world should not be treated as 
objective truth. Reality is only accessible to us through categories, so our knowledge and 
representations of the world are not reflections of the reality ‘out there’, but rather are 
products of our ways of categorising the world, or, in discursive analytical terms, products of 
discourse (Burr 1995: 3). Hajer and Versteeg, define discourse as ‘an ensemble of ideas, 
concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, 
and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices’ (Hajer & 
Verteeg, 2005). 
Overall, discourse analysis is the analysis of these patterns. Discourse analysis is a broad and 
diverse field, including a variety of approaches to the study of language, which derive from 
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different scientific disciplines and utilize various analytical practices (Wetherell, et al., 2001). 
In discourse analysis, language is examined in terms of construction and function; that is, 
language is considered a means of constructing, rather than mirroring, reality. Discourse 
analysis, therefore, examines how certain issues are constructed in individual and group 
accounts and the variability in these accounts. It explores the rhetorical aspects and the 
functions of talk in the context of the on-going interaction (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
Thereby, John L. Austin, in his series of lectures published posthumously as How to Do 
Things with Words, argues that a statement or ‘the uttering of a sentence is, or is part of, the 
doing of an action’ (Austin, 1975: 5). He presented a new picture of analysing meaning; 
meaning is described in a relation among linguistic conventions correlated with 
words/sentences, the situation where the speaker actually says something to the hearer, and 
associated intentions of the speaker. The idea that meaning exists among these relations is 
captured successfully by the concept of acts: in uttering a sentence, that is, in utilizing 
linguistic conventions, the speaker with an associated intention performs a linguistic act to the 
hearer (Oishi, 2006). For Austin, different circumstances require that words are uttered in 
different and appropriate ways, and, it is usually analytically desirable that the person uttering 
a certain statement performs other physical or mental actions (Austin, 1975: 8). Moreover, the 
effectiveness of any statement depends of a series of factors (“felicity conditions”) and on 
their illocutionary force, i.e., the property of an utterance to be made with the intention to 
perform a certain act. 
Furthermore, as underlined by Hansen, the words we use to describe something are not 
neutral, and the choice of one term over another has political implications (Hansen, 2014: 
172). In this sense, defining climate change in the framework of sustainable development 
rather than security policy has a critical meaning for Beijing. James P. Gee describes 
discourse analysis as ‘the study of language-in-use. Better put, it is the study of language at 
use in the world, not just to say things, but to do things’ (Gee, 2010: ix).  
This research adopts a broad and eclectic understanding of discourse that draws on the 
conceptualizations of Burr, Austin, and others who view discourses as productive and 
operative. Thereby, the meaning adopted here refers to social forces and relations beyond the 
linguistic or the “text”, and engages with the con-text of the textual. In fact, as previously 
mentioned, I argue that in order to fully understand China’s shift in global environmental 
governance, it is necessary to embed it into the wider context of China’s economic and 
political rise.  
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Studying China’s economic and political rise’ by adopting a methodological approach based 
on document and discourse analysis is crucial to understanding transformations and 
continuities in contemporary Chinese identity politics. In fact, with levers and mechanisms of 
social control being relatively centralized in China’s political system of “fragmented 
authoritarianism”, speeches, statements, and formal and informal remarks of the Communist 
Party and state leadership articulate critical concepts and imaginations of the nation’s Self and 
its foreign, security, trade, energy, and environmental policies (Brødsgaard, 2017).  
Overall, drawing on these general guidelines, the following key discourses have been 
analysed in relation to their contribution to the development of the core argument and in order 
to answer the research question: 
1. Environmental security discourses – Environmental security discourses largely 
emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War and have become one of the “new” non-
traditional security issues that have served to deepen and broaden the concept of 
security. Scholars of environmental security argue that if environmental change is a 
potential source of destabilisation and conflict, then security policies must be 
redefined to account for these threats (Conca & Dabelko, 1998). Most of the 
discourse’s key promoters are actors from the Global North, such as the government of 
the United Kingdom and the United States’ security institutions and state apparatus. 
Their arguments largely build on the assumption that climate conflicts and climate 
migration will predominantly originate in the Global South (Boas, 2014). 
2. China’s official (governmental and academic) conceptions of national and 
international security – Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end 
of the Cold War, the Western debate around the redefinition of the concept of security 
has also altered the context of Chinese security thinking. Chinese analysts started then 
to consider a new broader concept of security which have been incorporated in the 
1996 New Security Concept. 
3. The discourse of peaceful coexistence – The Chinese leadership originally enumerated 
five principles of peaceful coexistence in 1954 when China was trying to reach out to 
the non-communist countries of Asia. Today, these principles are central in the new 
international political and economic order that Beijing proposed to replace Cold War 
bipolarity. They offer an alternative to the Western conception of “world order” which 
stresses the equal, uninfringeable sovereignty of all states (democratic and 
authoritarian as well), each to run its own system whether its methods suit Western 
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standards or not. The Five Principles has been the basis of Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious 
world ‘discourse and Xi Jiping “China Dream”. 
4. China Threat discourse – China’s economic rise has been largely viewed with 
uncertainty and anxiety in the Western world. Its rapid economic growth, military 
modernisation, and increasing appetite for energy has prompted many in the United 
States and Europe to talk about a “China Threat” which led to the development of the 
so-called China Threat Theories. 
5. China’s Peaceful Development – Since the early 1990s China’s leadership has been 
engaged in a significant diplomatic effort aimed at reassuring the international 
community of “China’s peaceful rise” which calls for a harmonious international 
environment for China’s growth. The concept was the object of a White Paper in 2005 
and of a second one in 2011. 
6. Harmonious Socialist Society – This preexisting discourse was rearticulated and 
reinforced in 2007 and presented as “scientific outlook on development” that “calls for 
comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development” (Wang & Zheng, 2007; 
Xinhua, 2007). 
7. Sustainable development discourses - The notion of sustainable development is one of 
the key discursive framings of China’s process of economic and social transformation. 
The Government, in particular the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC), have deployed and been both enabled and constrained by this discourse in 
underscoring its comprehensive mandate to steer processes of economic, social, and 
environmental development (Kuhn, 2016). 
8. Ecological Civilization and Inclusive Growth – The term of ecological civilisation is 
part of a series of visionary discourses about civilisations, societal transformations, 
and economic reforms that have a long tradition in China. Ecological civilization and 
inclusive growth are two interrelated discourses embedded in the 12 Five Year Plan 
for National Economic and Social Development (2011 – 2015) which marked the shift 
toward a low-carbon economic model of growth.  
9. Environmental justice – Environmental justice is intrinsically linked to the broader 
discourse on the North-South divide and has been a recurrent discourse in the effort of 
the global South towards a New International Economic Order (NIEO) during the 
1970s.  In the context of ICCN discourses on environmental justice have been 
instrumental to support and strengthen the position of the global South in defending 
the rationale of the CBDR norm. 
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10. China’s discourses on soft power – The concept of soft power fully entered Chinese 
academic discourse when former President Hu Jintao made a specific mention to ‘soft 
and cultural power’ in his keynote address to the Seventeenth Party Congress in 2007 
(Shambaugh, 2013: 210). Academic, policy, and political elites in the West have 
criticized China’s understanding and use of the concept as disingenuous, ineffective, 
and strategic. Conversely, a degree of practical engagement with it has been identified 
in some African political and business elites.  
11. The Chinese Dream of the Great Rejuvenation – The Chinese Dream is a discourse 
proposed by Xi Jiping in 2012, which involved a combination of a higher standard of 
living and the ascent of China to Global Power status. As asserted by Yang Jiechi, 
former Ambassador to the US and Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2007 to 
2013, the Chinese Dream is a tool appropriate to and useful in boosting China’s 
influence in international relations, thereby underwriting strong integration between 
China’s domestic and foreign policies (Yang, 2014). 
Even if the concept of environmental degradation was clearly mentioned on the 1996 NSC, 
Chinese official narrative and discourses started to become structurally associated with 
environment and climate change starting with the last period of the 10th FYP (2001-2005). A 
significant watershed for domestic climate change policy came in 2007 with the National 





Chapter IV: Environmental Security and Climate Change: 
Analysing the Discourse 
 
“The majority of the United Nations’ work still focuses on preventing and ending conflict, but 
the danger posed by war to all of humanity and to our planet is at least matched by the climate 
crisis and global warming… [the effects of climate change are] likely to become a major 
driver of war and conflict.” 
United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, Geneva, March 1, 2007 
 
On 15 February 2013, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) hosted an Arria Formula 
meeting38 co-chaired by UK Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant and Pakistan Ambassador 
Masood Khan on the security dimension of climate change. This was not the first time that the 
UN Security Council had such a debate. A previous debate was held on 20 July 2011, with a 
focus on the impact of climate change on the maintenance of international peace and security 
and, back in April 2007, the Security Council held its first ever debate on the impact of 
climate change on international security.  
On that occasion, as well as on occasions that followed, there was a strong opposition from 
China, Brazil, India, Russia, and the entire G77 that argued that climate change was a socio-
economic development issue to be dealt with within the appropriate UN Bodies, in particular 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and not by the 
Security Council.  
China’s official English language newspaper, the China Daily, labelled the meeting as a clear 
attempt to interfere in domestic affairs: “The call for the international community to address 
climate change is sensible, but sensationalising it as an issue of security is conspiratorial. 
Discussing climate change at the Security Council will not help countries in their efforts to 
mitigate its effects” (China Daily, 2007; Le, 2007). Developing countries and emerging 
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they may wish to convey a message. The process is named after Ambassador Diego Arria of Venezuela, who, as 





economies argued that the Security Council was not the proper place to discuss such a matter 
and, even if climate change could have had some security implications, it was essentially a 
development issue and the Security Council did not have the means nor the resources to 
address it.  
On 16 April 2007, just one day before the debate called by the UK, the G77 and China sent a 
letter to the President of the Council underlying their concerns regarding the Security 
Council’s involvement in matters of climate change, asserting that: 
 
 “The Council’s primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and 
security, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. On the other hand, other issues, 
including those relating to economic and social development, are assigned by the 
Charter to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. The ever-
increasing encroachment by the Security Council on the roles and responsibilities of 
other principal organs of the United Nations represents a distortion of the principles 
and purposes of the Charter, infringes on their authority, and compromises the rights of 
the general membership of the United Nations” (S/2007/211, April 16th 2007). 
 
However, two years later, in June 2009, the General Assembly adopted a resolution asking all 
UN Bodies to analyze the implications of global warming in a way that could respect their 
own specific operating mandates.  
In July 2011, Germany, which then presided over the Security Council and organised the 
second Security Council meeting, stated that the Security Council debate followed up on the 
General Assembly request, addressing specifically the security implications of climate change 
faced by small island and coastal states due to rising sea levels. Notwithstanding the strong 
concerns of the vast majority of developing countries about the possibility of having such a 
debate at the Security Council again, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon argued that it was 
not only appropriate but, indeed, essential to hold the debate at the Security Council because 
“climate change is real, and it is accelerating in a dangerous manner. It not only exacerbates 
threats to international peace and security, it is itself a threat to international peace and 
security” (UNSC 6587th meeting, 2011).  
In the most recent 2013 session, Germany's representative stated that, with the current trends 
of CO2 emissions, climate change would produce devastating consequences, representing a 
high risk to economic growth and a grave threat to peace and security (German Mission to the 
UN, 2013). Addressing the session, leading German scientist Joachim Schellnhuber, Director 
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of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, explained that rises in global 
temperatures were likely to have catastrophic consequences: “Imagine India in 2033. It has 
overtaken China as the most populous nation. Yet with 1.5 billion citizens to feed, it’s been 
three years since the last monsoon. Without rain, crops die and people starve. The seeds of 
conflict take root” (Krause-Jackson, 2013).  
While from one side, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and, above all, the United 
States, have pushed for climate change to be recognised as a security issue by the UN Security 
Council, on the other, China, Russia, India, and more than 100 developing countries oppose 
this approach because the Security Council does not operate under the Principle of Common 
but Differentiated Responsibility, which underpins the UN climate talks. According to a large 
number of developing countries and emerging economies, the emphasis and the efforts of the 
United Nations should be placed on policy responses required for climate change mitigation, 
and on adaptation measures, finance, and capacity building to reduce the negative effects of 
global warming, rather than on the security options that its effects will imply. In fact, 
according to them, understanding climate change as a security issue risks making it a military 
rather than a foreign policy problem, and a sovereignty rather than a global commons problem 
(Barnett, 2001: 11).  
From a “Southern perspective”, environmental security is mainly perceived as a discourse 
about the security of northern countries; their access to natural resources and the protection of 
their pattern of consumption (Shiva 1994; Dalby 1999; Barnett 2001). In this context, some 
developing countries and emerging economies clearly fear the “green imperialism” of the 
Developed World and the risk of interference in their own security agenda.  
Understanding the links between “environment” and “security” has proven to be a challenging 
issue for policy-makers and researchers over the past years. Analysing the drivers behind 
different strategies in international climate change negotiations could serve as a useful and 
interesting exercise in understanding these links and could, furthermore, offer an important 
indicator of the balance of power between developed countries and emerging economies. 
 
 
4.1 Climate Change as a Geopolitical Threat: the Scientific Findings  
 
In the last two decades, climate change has progressively become a key global concern 
affecting almost all fields of science and politics, with huge attention given to it in popular 
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discourse and in the media, emphasising catastrophic consequences that could virtually 
impact the entire world. Disaster movies like The day after tomorrow (Emmerich, 2004) or 
books such as An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and 
What We Can Do About It, released in conjunction with the film An Inconvenient Truth (Gore, 
2006), further reinforced the representation of climate change as a threat and a security issue. 
Most of the contemporary concerns about extreme climate events are associated with 
anthropogenic global warming. This assumption is shared and accepted by the international 
scientific community but the magnitude of the future change and the variations in impact are 
disputed. The clearest fact in these studies is the dramatic change in atmospheric CO2 since 
the beginning of the industrial age, roughly 1790. 
In 1988, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to 
provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge about climate 
change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts. The IPCC is an 
intergovernmental body, open to all member countries of the United Nations, which reviews 
and assesses the most recent scientific, technical, and socio-economic information produced 
worldwide, relevant to the understanding of the risk of human-induced climate change. It is 
charged with undertaking a systematic review of climate change research, identifying gaps in 
knowledge, and recommending options for addressing the problem. The IPCC’s assessment 
work is mainly organised in three working groups. These groups prepare reports on the 
available scientific aspects of the climate system and climate change (Working Group I - 
WGI), on the impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability of climate change (Working Group II -
WGII), and on the options to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions (Working Group III - 
WGIII). IPCC reports are written by a team of authors who are all selected experts in their 
fields. Each report is subject to a first review by scientific experts and a second review by 
experts and governments. The first IPCC assessment report was published in 1990 and 
subsequent reports were published in 1995, 2001, 2007 and 2014. 
Each report has noted, with increasing confidence, that global warming is taking place, that it 
is due to anthropogenic causes, and that it will have serious and far-reaching consequences.   
The IPCC’s work prompted the creation of an international negotiating process that led to the 
first international environmental treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was signed at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de 
Janeiro in June 1992. The UNFCCC commits signatory nations to stabilising greenhouse gas 
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concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that "would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system39.  
In an effort to clarify which impacts of climate change might be considered “dangerous 
anthropogenic interference” (DAI) with the climate system, the IPCC’S 2001 Third 
Assessment Report (TAR) identified five different categories of key vulnerabilities40 to be 
considered of particular concern regarding the potential danger for society or the environment. 
Key vulnerabilities may be associated with many climate-sensitive systems, including food 
supply, infrastructure, health, water resources, coastal systems, ecosystems, global 
biogeochemical cycles, ice sheets, and modes of oceanic and atmospheric circulation (IPCC, 
2001). The five reasons for concern (RFCs) identified in the Third Assessment Report were: 
1. Risk to Unique and Threatened Systems, which addresses the potential for increased 
damage to, or irreversible loss of, unique and threatened systems, such as coral reefs, tropical 
glaciers, endangered species, unique ecosystems, biodiversity hotspots, small island states, 
and indigenous communities. 
2. Risk of Extreme Weather Events, which tracks increases in extreme events with substantial 
consequences for societies and the environment. Examples include increases in the frequency, 
intensity, or consequences of heat waves, floods, droughts, wildfires, or tropical cyclones. 
3. Distribution of Impacts. Some regions, countries, and populations face greater harm from 
climate change, whereas some others face much less. The magnitude of harm can also vary 
within regions and across sectors and populations. 
4. Aggregate Damages, which covers comprehensive measures of impacts. Impacts 
distributed across the globe can be aggregated into a single metric, such as monetary 
damages, lives affected, or lives lost. Aggregation techniques vary in their treatment of equity 
of outcomes, as well as in their treatment of impacts that are not easily quantified.  
5. Risks of Large-Scale Discontinuities, which represents the likelihood that certain 
phenomena (sometimes called singularities or tipping points) would occur, any of which may 
be accompanied by very large impacts. These phenomena include the deglaciation (partial or 
complete) of the West Antarctic or Greenland ice sheets and major changes in some 
components of the Earth’s climate system. 
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 Art. 2, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN, 1992. 
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 Key vulnerabilities can be identified based on a number of criteria in the literature, including magnitude, 




The relationship between impacts for the RFCs and increases in global mean temperature 
(GMT) were portrayed in what has been called the “burning embers diagram” (Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1: The five reasons for concern 
 
Source: IPCC 2001a: 5 
The diagram assumes that GMT could rise by up to 6° by 2100 and seeks to summarise the 
“reasons for concern” linked to the prospect of rising global temperatures. The diagram 
schematically represents the level of danger associated with these rises in mean temperature 
levels for the five categories, from 1990. The change in colour from white to yellow to red is 
taken to denote risks of increasing magnitude, severity, or geographic spread, and it is this 
colour palette which gave rise to the nick name “burning embers” among the diagram’s 
creators (Mahony and Hulme, 2012). The potential risks of global warming have been 
addressed in detail in the IPCC 2007 Fourth Assessment Report, which draws a 
comprehensive picture of the physical conditions, the magnitude and likelihood of impacts, 
and the possible strategies for mitigating and adapting to climate change.  
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, which took six years to be completed and draws on the 
research of 2,500 scientists from more than 130 countries41, launched the “global alarm” on 
climate change, warning that, without drastic reduction of greenhouse gases, the resulting 
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 IPCC 2007 flyer, available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/press-ar4/ipcc-flyer-low.pdf [Accessed 30 July 2016] 
81 
 
global warming would produce irretrievable damages to the environment and imperil the lives 
of hundreds of millions of people. Climate change is predicted to have a range of serious 
consequences, some of which will have impacts over the longer term, like the spread of 
disease and sea level rise, while others have immediately obvious impacts, such as intense 
rain and flooding (IPCC, 2007). These negative consequences of climate change not only 
threaten the natural environment and ecosystems, but could also negatively interfere with the 
social, economic, and political stability of a nation.  
At the end of 2004, the world witnessed a geologic phenomenon – a tsunami unleashed by a 
high magnitude earthquake in the Indian Ocean – which killed more than 150,000 people and 
devastated coastal zones from Indonesia to Somalia. Of the 200 inhabited islands of the 
Maldives, 14 were rendered uninhabitable or wiped off the map (Black, 2013: 290). Similar 
devastation will almost certainly imperil low-lying coastal zones and island states as sea 
levels rise and the acceleration of the global water cycle continues to drive extreme weather 
events. The tsunami also offered dramatic evidence of how natural disasters can eliminate 
homes and livelihoods, leaving societies with the challenge of not only relief and 
rehabilitation, but also the need to reconstruct economic and social activity (Kimble, 2005: 
105). It is estimated that the overall costs and risks of climate change impact would be at least 
5% of global GDP each year, and if a wide range of risks and impacts are estimated, the 
damage of climate change could reach 20% of global GDP or more (Stern, 2007: vi).   
According to an interesting report prepared by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s Climatic Data Center (NOAA), during the 1980-2005 period, the US 
sustained over $500 billion in overall inflation-adjusted costs due to weather extreme events, 
mostly hurricanes, storms, and tornados (Lott & Ross, 2006). Of the 66 disasters resulting in 
at least $1 billion overall damages considered in the report, 57 occurred during the 1988-2005 
period. According to Global Reinsurer Munich Re, since 1980, weather related disasters 
worldwide have more than tripled. In 2011, insurers endured one of the most extraordinarily 
violent years ever in terms of catastrophes on a global scale. According to 2011 data, mega-
catastrophes42 worldwide caused an estimated $350 billion in economic losses, shattering the 
previous record of $230 billion, set in 2005. The Insurance Information Institutes estimates 
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 Though definitions vary, a mega-catastrophe generally generates more than $50b of direct and indirect losses 
and very often occurs when a single peril triggers associated damage-inducing events. For instance, a hurricane 
may strike a costal area, causing damage from wind and storm surge; once overland, the storm may spawn 
tornados and additional rainfall causing even greater amounts of damages (Banks, 2005: 34). Mega catastrophes, 
by definition, constitute uninsurable risk and therefore no market solutions are likely to emerge by themselves 




that catastrophe losses around the world shaved 0.5 percent off global GDP in 2011. In the 
United States, catastrophe losses totaled $33.6 billion, implying economic losses in excess of 
$75 billion. On an inflation-adjusted basis, 2011 ranks as the fifth most expensive year on 
record for insured catastrophe losses (Hartwig, 2012). 
After the 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the earlier scientific hesitancy to link actual 
weather events to climate change shifted significantly (Oreskes, 2004). However, some 
environmental scientists and climate experts are still cautious when it comes to assessing and 
approving a direct cause-effect link between climate change and extreme weather events 
(Cotton & Pielke, 1995; Watson, 2008). They argue that it is only possible to demonstrate a 
change that might be attributable to climate by using long-term statistics because the detection 
of a change in climate requires a long-term record: weather is not climate and short term 
climate variability is not climate change. With all the natural fluctuations in the climate, an 
increase in the intensity or frequency of extreme conditions generally only becomes apparent 
in later stages. Nevertheless, in the last decades, new research, applied to specific events, 
seems to support the thesis of a climate change linkage with extreme weather events.  
A growing body of scientific research has documented that climate change is already 
underway and some dangerous impacts have already occurred. The most important study in 
this regard looked at the European heat wave in 2003, the hottest year on record since 1500, 
and demonstrated that the human-induced contribution to the atmosphere has doubled the risk 
of heat waves of this magnitude (Scott et al, 2004). These findings illustrated that the 2003 
July-August temperatures exceeded the level of normal variation to the point that natural 
drivers could not account for the deviation from the mean.  
For the IPCC, confidence has increased that some weather events and extremes natural events 
will become more frequent, more widespread, and more intense over the 21st century. 
Vulnerable systems include water resources, agriculture, forestry, human health, human 
settlements, energy systems, and the economy. The impacts are specific for each region and 
they spread from directly impacted areas and sectors to other areas and sectors through 
extensive and complex linkages (IPCC, 2007).  
In a peer-reviewed paper published in the Proceedings of the US National Academy of 
Sciences, some authors of the 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment report (AR4) have revised the 
sensitivities of the RFCs to increases in global average temperature and published a revised 
version of the “burning embers” graphic (Figure 4.2) following the new data presented in the 
AR4 (PNAS, 2008). The diagram shows clearly that, compared to the results reported in 
2001, smaller increases in global average temperature are now estimated to lead to significant 
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or substantial consequences for the five RFCs. These ‘reasons’ are assessed here to be 
stronger and many risks are identified with higher confidence. Some risks are projected to be 
larger or to occur at lower increases in temperature.  
The new assessment was based on observations of global warming impacts and supported by 
an improved understanding about the relationship between impacts (the basis for ‘reasons for 
concern’ in the AR4) and vulnerability (including the ability to adapt to impacts).  
Moreover, since the publication of the AR4 in 2007, the particularly affected regions, sectors, 
and groups have been identified more precisely. These results indicate that the risks of climate 
change may have been underestimated in the past. 
 
Figure 4.2: Updated reasons for concern of IPCC AR4 in comparison with IPCC AR3 
 
Source: Assessing dangerous climate change through an update of the IPCC ‘‘reasons for concern’’, Proceedings 
of the US National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), March 2008 
Climate change risk is about exposure to external climate hazards, affecting natural and 
human systems and regions, while vulnerability is a measure of capacity to manage such 
hazards without suffering a long-term, potentially irreversible, loss of well-being. The IPCC 
defines vulnerability as the degree to which a system is unable to manage and cope with 
adverse effects of climate change such as variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function 
of three factors: (a) exposure to changes in the climate, (b) sensitivity - the degree to which a 
system is affected by or responsive to climate stimuli, and (c) adaptive capacity - the ability to 
84 
 
prepare for or respond to and tackle the effects of climate change. If vulnerabilities are not 
overcome, climate change risk and its scale of damaging society are likely to increase (IPCC, 
2007). 
Scientific data presented in the IPCC 2007 report demonstrates that many aspects of climate 
change are happening earlier or more rapidly than climate models and experts initially 
projected. The scientific findings imply that the risks of climate change to the planet and 
human beings under the current climate change trend will be severe if global mean 
temperature keeps increasing (IPCC, 2007). The rate of change projected for global surface 
temperatures and related impacts, such as ice melting and sea level rise, is unprecedented in 
human history. Adapting to climate change will become then much harder and more 
expensive as changes happen faster, or on a larger scale, than expected. 
The scientific findings of the IPCC 2007 Fourth Assessment Report contribute to 
strengthening the link between climate change and security, underlining that climate change 
represents one of the most serious threats to international security and the well-being of 
human kind. Since 2007, climate change has become a major agenda item at the European 
level, regularly discussed by the European Council of EU heads of state and government and, 
internationally, the issue has become one of “high politics”. It was a top priority at the G8 
Summit, and both the United Nations Security Council and the UN General Assembly placed 
it high on their agendas (Oberthür and Roche Kelly, 2008). The first ever debate held at the 
UN Security Council in April 2007 on the impact of climate change on international security, 
and the awarding of a Nobel Prize to Al Gore and the IPCC in October 2007, have 
definitively contributed to the understanding of climate change as a security risk. In 
announcing the award, the Norwegian Nobel Committee called climate change both a 
fundamental threat to human well-being and a contributing factor to more traditional violent 
conflict43.  
In the same year, in the United States, a report commissioned by the Pentagon to a military 
advisory board of retired US admirals and generals switched the focus from how to prevent 
and mitigate the effects of climate change to the management of the threat of climate change. 
The study, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, released on April 2007, 
explores ways in which climate change acts as a "threat multiplier" in already fragile regions 
of the world, creating breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism. The report, moving 
beyond the arguments about the causes and effects of climate change, stressed the importance 
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 The text is available at: http://nobelpeaceprize.org/eng_lau_announce2007.html. 
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for the US military to start planning to address the potentially devastating effects of a 
changing climate (CNA, 2007). 
The concept of climate change as a threat multiplier was further analyzed in detail in the 2009 
UN General Assembly Report Climate Change and its possible security implications (UNGA, 
2009). According to the report, the magnitude of specific threats, the resilience of individuals, 
communities and societies, and their capacity to adapt effectively to those threats all bear on 
the security implications of climate change. Where climate change threats to human well-
being are expected to be severe - particularly where people are especially vulnerable because 
of low levels of human development and weak institutions of governance - the security 
implications are inclined to be most pronounced, including the possibility of social and 
political tensions and of armed conflicts. In this regard, according to the report, it is useful to 
think of climate change as a threat multiplier, namely as a factor that can work through 
several channels to exacerbate existing sources of conflict and insecurity (figure 4.3, below).  
By the same token, conditions, policies, institutions, and actions that serve to relieve and 
manage stresses effectively can be considered threat minimisers (UNGA, 2009). 
 
Figure 4.3: Threat multipliers and threat minimizers 
 
Source: UNGA (2009), Climate change and its possible security implications, follow up of the outcome of the 




Over the past 30 years, climate related disasters - storms, floods, and droughts - have 
increased tremendously, according to the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(ISDR). In 2006 alone, 134 million people suffered from natural hazards that cost $35 billion 
in damages, including some devastating droughts, in addition to massive flooding throughout 
Asia and Africa. These disasters scarred lives, shattered families, stripped away livelihoods, 
and set back development efforts (Wahlström, 2007).  
The IPCC AR4 states that, by 2020, between 75 million and 250 million people in Africa are 
projected to be exposed to increased water stress due to climate change, and agricultural 
production in many African countries and regions, including access to food, is projected to be 
severely compromised by climate variability and change. The forecasted impact of climate 
change on Asia is similarly drastic. The IPCC says that melting glaciers will result in 
increased flooding and rock avalanches in the Himalayas, followed by decreased river flow 
over the next several decades. Furthermore, freshwater availability in Central, South, East, 
and South-East Asia, particularly in large river basins, is projected to decrease and, along with 
population growth and increasing demand arising from higher standards of living, this could 
adversely affect more than a billion people by the 2050s (Parry et al., 2007: 13). 
In this context, it is likely that continued anthropogenic global warming will result in more 
extreme, and therefore more hazardous, meteorological phenomena, especially hydro-
meteorological events, in particular: 
a) The increase in the strength of tropical hurricanes and the frequency of heavy rains 
and flooding, due to the rise in evaporation with increased temperatures; 
b) The growth in the number of droughts, with evaporation contributing to a decrease in 
soil humidity, often associated with food shortages; 
c) The increase in sea levels resulting from both water expansion and melting ice. In this 
regard, a 2007 study conducted by the WB underlined that the impact of sea level rise 
from global warming could be catastrophic for many developing countries, as it was 
estimated that a single meter rise would impact at least 56 million people in 84 
countries (WB, 2007a). 
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report also makes it clear that, while poor people worldwide 
will suffer most from the effects of global warming, no person on Earth will escape its 
consequences. As was made dramatically clear in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
marginalised people are not only those living in developing countries or in conflict prone 
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regions in the less developed countries of the world (Cutter, 2005; O’Brien, 2006). The effects 
of global warming will be felt in every region of the world and at all levels of society. 
Regardless of any nation’s development and their contributions to the historically 
accumulated GHG emissions, no country in the world would avoid climate risks and threats 
that would have an impact on their ecosystems and inhabitants, social and human 
development, and political stability. 
In this framework, the main argument for an environmental security perspective arose from 
the consideration that environmental threats can lead to catastrophic consequences which 
society is not prepared to deal with using traditional instruments. Moreover, current research 
indicates that global environmental change and its subsequent socio-economic effects are 
likely to continue and intensify in the future (IPCC, 2007; IPCC, 2012; USGCRP, 2013). The 
intensity, as well as the interdependence of these problems, will have effects, not only at the 
local level, but also on an international scale and will begin to impact both developing and 
industrialised countries.   
While there is a consensus that climate change is real and produces consequences that can 
affect large numbers of people, several authors emphasise different environmental effects and 
predictions of how many people will be affected or displaced over a particular period of time 
(Ferris, 2007). These predictions vary significantly because they depend on assumptions about 
how the international community will respond, or fail to respond, to climate change. Many 
scientists have noted that even if natural disasters become more frequent in the future, 
political efforts and measures of protection will be able to lessen their impact, provided that 
necessary financial means are made available (Stern, 2007). 
Notwithstanding the differences in opinion regarding the magnitude of the future change and 
the variations in impact, both scientists and policy makers seem to agree that climate change 
could represent a geopolitical threat. 
 
 
4.2 Most Relevant Actors and Milestones in the Environmental Security 
Debate  
 
Environmental security, as a field of study, has long been contested. Beginning in the early 
1970’s with Richard Falk, and continuing today, scholars have debated whether, and to what 
extent, environmental issues are related to security. Since the early work on environmental 
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security, a leading theme within the literature has been that security threats should no longer 
be limited to military elements but viewed in a more holistic fashion (Freeman and Hill, 
2007). 
Richard Falk’s This Endangered Planet (1971) is one of the first studies linking 
environmental issues to international security. In his work, Falk highlighted the relationship 
between time and climate change introducing what he called the “first law of ecological 
politics”: the faster the rate of change, the less time to adapt (Falk, 1971: 353).  A few years 
later, Lester Brown, in his 1977 paper titled Redefining National Security, contested the 
meaning and practice of national security as it was defined, arguing that in a world that is not 
only ecologically interdependent but economically and politically interdependent as well, the 
traditional concept of national security was no longer adequate (Brown, 1977: 40-41).   
When the Independent Commission on Security and Disarmament Issues (ICSDI) developed 
and introduced the concept of common security in the early 1980s, giving a broader 
perspective to the idea of national security, other non-traditional threats to security, such as 
economic decline, social and political instability, ethnic rivalries and territorial dispute, 
international terrorism, as well as environmental stress, were incorporated (Homer-Dixon, 
1991). Since then, a great deal of research has been produced on the relationship between 
environment and security and the early 1990s saw two main interlinked discussions: one 
involving the redefinition of security (Ullman, 1983; Buzan, 1991; Baldwin, 1997; Krause & 
Williams, 1997; Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998; Lietzmann & Vest, 1999), and the other 
involving questions about how environmental change represents a threat to individual, 
national, and international security (Myers, 1989; Deudney & Matthew, 1999). Proponents of 
environmental security argue that if environmental change is a potential source of 
destabilisation and conflict, then security policies must be redefined to account for these 
threats (Conca & Dabelko, 1998).  
The current debate on environmental and security issues is the result of four generations (or 
phases) of environment and security research (Levy, 1995; Krause & Williams, 1997; Dalby, 
2002a; Brauch, 2003 and 2007). A first conceptual phase, between the 1970s and the 1980s, is 
marked by progressive concern about environmental issues and by an interdisciplinary debate 
on whether, and how, environmental factors should be integrated into the concept of security. 
The second phase, during the 1990s, is dominated by case studies and research projects aimed 
at identifying the causal pathway from environmental scarcity to conflict, and at basing 
research on firm empirical ground. The most relevant research was conducted by The Toronto 
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Group, guided by Canadian political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon and by the work of the 
Environment and Conflict Project (ENCOP), under Gunther Baechler’s overall direction.  
The third phase is characterised by a methodological critique of the second phase and mainly 
focuses on an attempt to place environmental and security research on firmer methodological 
ground. Since the mid-1990s, comparative studies and studies aimed at conceptual deepening 
have been launched by numerous research teams on projects focusing on the conflict potential 
of resource use and on state failures (above all, The Global Environmental Change and 
Human Project - GECHS, focusing on the human dimensions of environmental change and 
the reconceptualisation of security, and the State Failure Task Force). Finally, the fourth 
phase is a stage of synthesis and reconceptualisation (Dalby, 2002 and 2002a), focused on 
human and environmental security and combined structural factors from the natural 
dimension (climate change, water, soil) and the human dimension (population growth, 
urbanization, pollution, food), based on expertise from the natural and social sciences 
(Brauch, 2007).  
Within the environment and security research framework, a growing body of research has 
dealt with the relationship between environmental stress (environmental degradation and 
resource scarcity) and conflict. In fact, environmental degradation and violent conflict is the 
most heavily investigated research theme under the rubric “environmental security”. 
The link between environmental stress and conflict was explicitly presented by Richard 
Ullman in his Redefining Security in 1983 (Ulmann, 1983). Redefining Security is considered 
a watershed of contemporary environmental security studies because analysing the link 
between resource scarcity and population growth introduced the idea that environmental 
degradation may cause armed conflicts. The rationale behind this idea is that environmental 
degradation and environmental threats that result from scarcities of environmental resources 
directly or indirectly affect national security becoming a cause of conflicts between states 
(Barnett, 2001; Dalby, 2002; Collins, 2007). The concerns regarding growing uncontrolled 
consumption in an increasingly interdependent world with limited resources was not a new 
issue in the international debate: scholars like Peter Falk or even the Club of Rome launched 
the debate on this issue more than 10 years before. In 1972 the Club of Rome, an international 
team of government officials, business leaders, and scholars brought together by the Italian 
tycoon Aurelio Peccei, Alexander King, former OECD Director General for Scientific 
Affairs, and Hugo Ernst Thiemann, a Swiss research and development manager, warned the 
world that, continuing with a “business as usual” model of growth, humanity was condemning 
itself to an unavoidable catastrophe (Meadows et al., 1972). This group made the case in a 
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volume, The Limits to Growth, which became a mass phenomenon: it was indicated as “one of 
the most important documents of our age” by the New York Times, and it was translated into 
more than 30 languages and sold over 20 million copies (Schmandt, 2010: 33). The aim of the 
Club of Rome was to explore a number of scenarios, stressing the choices open to society to 
reconcile sustainable progress within environmental constraints, adopting a scientific 
approach. To this aim, the research was commissioned to the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. The MIT team developed a mathematical model that allowed for the calculation 
of the impact of changes on the planet’s future in a number of variables, considering five 
basic factors that determine, and therefore, ultimately limit, growth on this planet: population, 
agricultural production, natural resources, industrial production, and pollution (Meadows et 
al., 1972). The final result was unappealing: if we were to follow the path of the business as 
usual economic growth model, the world would end in a disaster.  
The Limits to Growth was neither the first nor the last publication to claim that the end was 
close due to the weakness of the modern model of economic development, but in many ways 
it was the most successful. A few years before, in 1962, Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring 
had raised concerns about pollution and sparked the modern environmental movement and, in 
1968, Paul Ehrlich's book The Population Bomb had argued that humanity was condemning 
itself into self-destruction. In 1970, the first Earth Day was marked by pessimism about the 
future, and later that year, also as a consequence of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill, U.S. 
President Richard Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency to address growing 
environmental problems44. This was the context in which The Limits to Growth was devised: 
its genius was to bring together, in one argument, the concerns over pollution, population, and 
resources, showing how so-called progress would soon run into the natural world's hard 
constraints. The Limits to Growth seemed to show that even if pollution and population 
growth were controlled, the world's resources would eventually be exhausted and food 
production would decline back to the subsistence level. Even though it proved to be wrong, it 
helped set the terms of debate on crucial issues of economic, social, and particularly 
environmental policy (Lomborg, 2012). 
Divergent from The Limits to Growth, Ullman’s analysis introduced a broad re-definition of 
security to account for a wide range of environmental threats, including natural catastrophes, 
such as earthquakes, and resource scarcities. Ullman challenged the state-centric 
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understanding of security and uncovered great concern for cross border security threats that 
demand different tools, techniques and, in general, a different approach from those which 
were conventionally used (Ullman, 1983). In his analysis, the threat represented by 
environmental degradation and resources scarcity was presented specifically as a threat to the 
developed economies, due above all to the immigration pressures in northern countries as a 
consequence of the deteriorating security of third world states, caused in large part by 
unwanted environmental events or conditions (Makinda, 2006). 
The need to consider environmental degradation within security studies and the link between 
environmental degradation and violent conflict was further developed, and concepts like food 
security, water scarcity, and environmental refugees were linked to global warming (Myers, 
1986). The main argument was that people who would no longer be able to gain a secure 
livelihood in their homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation, 
and other environmental problems in general, together with the associated problems of 
population pressures and profound poverty, would be forced to leave their country with the 
potential consequences of creating conflicts in receiving communities. This was specifically 
reported in an analysis made by British environmentalist Norman Myers for the Organization 
for Africa Unity about the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia. According to Meyers’ 
analysis, the war had been caused in major measure by deforestation and soil erosion, in 
addition to runaway population growth and poverty in the Ethiopian highlands, which 
triggered widespread famine, followed by a mass migration from the highlands toward the 
lowlands and hence toward the Ogaden, which Somalia viewed as a prelude to an invasion 
(Myers, 2002). 
A major advancement in linking environmental degradation and security issues was made in 
1987 when the World Commission on Environment and Development, also known as the The 
Brundtland Commission, presented the report Our Common Future. Significantly, Our 
Common Future was the first official international document to employ the term 
“environmental security”. From a security perspective, the Brundtland report45 launched the 
message that the adverse effects of climate change could contribute to an increasing potential 
for insecurity and conflict, particularly by interacting with a number of other socio-economic 
factors. The immediate drivers of conflict are likely to remain: national and regional power 
struggles; ideological, ethnic, religious, and national tensions; and economic, social, or 
political inequality (Baltes & Snoy, 2007). However, the cumulative impacts of climate 
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change could exacerbate these drivers of conflict and, in particular, increase the risk to those 
states already susceptible to conflict. 
Indeed, the phrase “environmental security” has prompted a re-examination of the essence of 
security, thus enriching the debate on social priorities and resource allocations (Sooros, 1994). 
The idea behind this is that the study of environmental security is based on environmental 
problems. Within this framework, it is argued that resource scarcity and environmental 
degradation lead to conflicts among states and nations, in turn inevitably leading to the 
inclusion of environmental issues on the international political agenda (Swatuk, 2014). 
This process of broadening the concept of security and identifying new security issues 
received further impetus with the fall of the Berlin wall, and found its height when the 
dramatic rise in intra-state conflicts in the early to mid-1990s led many academics, 
commentators, and policy makers to investigate the issue and search for an explanation, often 
looking for answers outside traditional models of state security (Barnett, 2001: 34; Brown, 
2008). Since the end of the Cold War, traditional security concepts, based on national 
sovereignty and territorial security, have increasingly been brought under review and a 
broader definition of security that incorporates non-traditional threats and their causes, 
including environmental stress, has been advocated (Kepner et al., 2003: xi). In this 
framework, the interest in environment and conflict grew even more rapidly and several 
research programs and projects were initiated with the aim of tracing the links between 
environment, population, and security. Among them, as aforementioned, the most renowned 
are those implemented by Canadian political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon and colleagues 
at the Toronto University, and the Swiss Environment and Conflict Project (ENCOP) in 
Zurich (Rønnfeldt, 1997; OECD, 2000). Although the initial hypotheses were different, both 
studies shared the same findings that many environmentally induced conflicts would take 
effect in developing countries due to their relative dependency on renewable resources, and 
especially in countries with pre-existing tensions (Baechler, 1998). This issue was deeply 
analysed and presented in the well-known 1994 article The Coming Anarchy by the American 
Journalist Robert Kaplan, who brought this research to a wider audience. Kaplan’s article was 
a milestone in the literature linking environmental change and security. He presented a 
distressing picture of West Africa condemned to a spiral of endemic conflict, overwhelmed by 
disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the 
increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private 
armies, security firms, and international drug cartels. He argued that this devastating mix was 
spreading to other regions and would be exacerbated by rising sea levels, changing rainfall 
93 
 
patterns, and more frequent natural disasters arising from anthropogenic climate change. The 
core message of the article was that the environment would become the national-security issue 
of the twenty-first century (Kaplan, 1994).  
In 1994, civil unrest in Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, as well as in Eastern Europe, offered 
fodder for the discourse of “state failure”. Senior politicians and academics started to 
investigate how these conflagrations might be related to natural resources. Citing Kaplan’s 
piece and political instability in West and East Africa, Vice President Al Gore established and 
funded the State Failure Task Force, a panel of distinguished academics, social scientists, 
experts in data collection, and consultants in statistical methods to investigate and examine 
the economic, social, and environmental causes of state failure, mandating that the analysis 
should fully integrate environmental and demographic variables (Esty et al., 1999). 
Assembled from 1994, with the guidance of over two dozen scholars with expertise on 
political conflict and on different parts of the world, this data set contains information for all 
countries in the world on nearly 1,300 political, demographic, economic, social, and 
environmental variables from 1955 to 1998. The research of the task force analysed the forces 
that have caused instability in the post-Cold War era, but in its latest report published in 2000, 
the project found only weak evidence for a direct influence of environmental degradation in 
violent conflict (Goldstone et al., 2000). 
Indeed, in the scholarly community there is no consensus on dire projections of future climate 
wars and several observers conclude that there is no robust and consistent evidence for an 
important relationship between climate change and conflict.  Although climate change is 
likely to have severe consequences for people around the world, in particular for already 
vulnerable populations, the link to violent conflict is a potential but contested consequence 
(Gleditsch & Nordas, 2014).  
However, from the early 1990s, the argument that environmental change should be considered 
a security issue, for nations and individuals, was increasingly raised in both environmental 
and security journals and it become almost commonplace to talk about waves of 
environmental refugees escaping from their countries due to wars over resource scarcity. In 
some ways, environmental security replaced the threat of the global nuclear warfare of the 
Cold War, as it shares the same two main characteristics: it is global in reach and its effects 
could be highly devastating (Smil, 1997).   
In the meantime, the end of the Cold War, the breakdown of the former Soviet Union, and the 
democratic transition of many socialist states during the late 1980s and 1990s marked an era 
of discussion and debate in the security field. Concepts such as human security, incorporating 
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freedom from fear with freedom from want, preventative diplomacy as a core mandate of the 
United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and 
the links between the environment and security, were all presented, debated, and, over time, 
incorporated into international organisations as principles, plans, and programs (Bortwick, 
2009: 160). 
These challenges called for cooperation at an international level, which required the 
integration of both technicians and policy-makers in the fields of environment, development, 
foreign relations, and security. Since 2002, the UNEP, the OSCE, and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) have been working together within the Environment and 
Security Initiative (ENVSEC), established to assess and address environmental problems that 
threaten, or are perceived to threaten security within and across national borders in conflict-
prone regions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) became an associate member 
of the initiative in 2004, through its Public Diplomacy Division and, since 2006, the initiative 
has been reinforced with two new members: the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE), and the Regional Environment Center for Central and Eastern Europe 
(REC). Since the beginning, the ENVSEC Initiative has worked to combine expertise in the 
fields of environment and development, and in security agencies, to identify, prioritise and 
tackle environmental issues that are perceived to be a threat to security.  
 
 
4.3 From Environmental Security to Climate Security: The Securitisation 
of Climate Change 
 
The new trend in environment and security research, inaugurated after the end of the Cold 
War, has catalysed the international attention of a wide audience to focus on environmental 
issues. However, it has also placed the debate in a political context that is dominated by 
security institutions, which are designed to face and manage different types of threat. 
As a consequence, this has generated a new debate about whether or not international 
institutions designed for completely different types of threats should be involved in the 
management of environmental security issues. In this regard, as argued by Professor Richard 
Black, member of the Centre for Migration and Diaspora Studies at SOAS, there is the danger 
that academic and policy writing on environmental refugees, water scarcity, food security, and 
climate security, has more to do with the bureaucratic agendas of academics or international 
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organisations looking for new rationales for their existence, rather than with any real 
theoretical or empirical insight (Black, 2001a: 14). The main question regarding whether or 
not to expand the notion of security to include environmental degradation and climate change 
is mostly linked with the problem of defining the referent object of security and with the 
obstacle of providing security in practical terms. Most discussions about the meaning of 
environmental security focus on the nature of security: whether it is fundamentally a military 
phenomenon that, by implication, would tend to render environmental concerns largely 
irrelevant, or whether it is something more robust and inclusive that logically would 
encompass, and perhaps even revolve around, environmental considerations (Foster, 2001: 
375). 
Proponents of a new, broader and up-to-date conception of security share the idea that the 
traditional definition of security must be broadened to incorporate new threats, which have to 
be managed with the same instruments and logic used to manage traditional threats. In this 
regard, the identification of a link between environment and security could be interpreted as a 
tool with which to alarm traditional security analysts about the issues that “really matter” (de 
Wilde, 2001: 2) and to elevate environmental problems from the level of low politics to high 
politics. In this way, states would be pushed to commit as much energy and as many resources 
to address environmental problems as they do to address other security problems, increasing 
the relevance of environmental problems on the international political agenda. On analytical 
grounds, it seemed a way to provide a better account of new typologies of vulnerability, as 
well as of the potential for conflict and violence with which these vulnerabilities could be 
associated (Trombetta, 2009: 586). 
The main critique of this approach is that the term “security” evokes a set of confrontational 
practices associated with the state and the military, which should be kept apart from the 
environmental debate.  Concerns included the possibilities of creating new competencies for 
the military - militarising the environment rather than greening security - or the rise of 
nationalistic attitudes in order to protect the national environment. Moreover, it has been 
noted that military threats are clearly different from environmental threats: particularly in the 
fact that military threats are deliberately imposed while environmental ones are not (Deudney, 
1990; Kakonen, 1994). Therefore, environmental problems should not be viewed as security 
problems because when an earthquake or hurricane causes extensive damage it is customary 




Indeed, defining something as a “security issue” implies that it is something that deserves 
particular attention and requires specifically dedicated measures and a high level of specialist 
expertise and knowledge. Interpreting a challenge as a security issue raises its status: it is no 
longer merely a problem to be dealt with through mainstream institutions, but instead requires 
extraordinary measures. This is a critically important aspect of the use of security: it raises the 
stakes of certain problems and justifies drastic and potentially unaccountable action (Barnett, 
2001a: 25). This process, known as securitisation, was introduced by scholars working at the 
Conflict and Peace Research Institute in Copenhagen (COPRI), generally known as the 
Copenhagen School.  As argued by Ole Waever, one of the three main representative of the 
School, security is a “speech act”, a power word that operationalises state monopolisation of 
responses to a challenge (Waever, 1995). From this perspective, security becomes a social 
practice: when an issue has been labelled a security issue, the procedures of managing it will 
change and this process is irreversible because, once an issue is securitised, the logic of 
security necessarily follows. The work of the Copenhagen School is crucial in understanding 
the discourse on environmental security because it considers the implications of broadening 
the concept of security, analysing specifically the risks of framing environmental problems in 
security terms (Trombetta, 2009: 587-588). In this context, the Copenhagen School 
underlined the difference between securitisation and politicisation, claiming that any specific 
matter can be politicised or securitised. An issue becomes politicised when it is managed 
within the standard political system. A politicised issue is part of public policy, requiring 
government decisions and resource allocations. On the other hand, an issue is plotted at the 
securitised end of spectrum when it requires emergency actions beyond the state’s standard 
political procedures (Collins, 2007: 111).  
A concrete example of this process is given by the response of the United States’ Bush 
Administration to the attack of 11 September 2001. In the aftermath of the attack, two options 
were available: the acts could have been presented as criminal terrorist attacks, thus requiring 
an international political and criminal justice response, or the attacks could be considered an 
existential threat to the nation-state itself, and thus be securitised. The second option was 
chosen and, by securitising the issue, other non-military options were automatically excluded 
(Buckland, 2007: 10). 
The theory of securitisation argues that there are no objective threats that are defined as such 
because of their intrinsic nature. Securitisation happens when an issue is presented as an 
existential threat and when the audience accepts the existence of such a threat. Security is a 
self-referential practice because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue, 
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not necessarily because a real existential threat exists, but because the issue is presented, 
perceived, and then codified as such a threat (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998: 24). 
The international debate on environmental security was overshadowed in the early 2000s due 
to the global attention on the war on terror. However, in recent years, the debate has returned 
to the spotlight of international attention because of the growing consensus on the global 
dimension of anthropogenic climate change. Several factors contributed to this comeback but, 
above all, there were two main reasons. From one side, the decision of the US Administration 
not to sign the Kyoto Protocol, mainly due to its negative impact on the US economy and the 
lack of binding commitments for emerging economies. From the other, the dramatic 
consequences of a number of environmental disasters that hit both developed and developing 
countries, such as the 2004 Tsunami in Thailand, the Maharashtra floods in India in the 
summer of 2005, and hurricane Katrina and Rita which struck the US in 2005. While security 
studies and international relations scholars remain sceptical about the idea of environmental 
security, arguing that it is too woolly and broad a concept to be useful either analytically or 
practically, decision-makers, international organisations, and governments are increasingly 
recognising the importance of environmental security as a policy framework (Bajpai, 2003: 
2).  
It is possible to identify several reference points that can be analysed as parts of the same 
process to attempt to securitise environmental issues and, more recently, climate change itself: 
the State Failure Task Force of the Clinton Administration in 1994, the 2003 US Department 
of Defence Report that put forward the view that climate change could lead to violent conflict, 
and the debates at the UN Security Council in 2007, 2011, and 2013 about the link between 
climate change and security. Evidence of this process can be found in the growing interest and 
involvement of militaries, intelligence agencies, and international security organisations in 
examining climate change and its implications. In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, 
stated that “the majority of the UN work still focuses on preventing and ending conflict, but 
the danger posed by the climate crisis and global warming are likely to become a major 
driver of war and conflict”. Moreover, in the same year, the UN Secretary General wrote, in 
an editorial in the Washington Post, that, “within the diverse social and political causes, the 
Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change” 
(Moon, 2007).  
In this context, many observers interpreted the sense of urgency around environmental 
problems as an attempt to securitise climate change, rather than as a tool addressed to 
sensitise policy makers and civil society. However, actions on climate change require a set of 
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policies and programmes that necessarily imply long-term, dedicated measures. This gets to 
the core of the problem and identifies two conflicting policy approaches in managing potential 
environmental threats arising from climate change: the “Southern approach”, represented by a 
large number of developing countries and emerging economies such as Brazil, India and, 
above all, China, and the “Northern approach”, represented by the UK, Germany and, above 
all, the United States of America. Both of them hold the same starting point, that climate 
change is happening now, but their approaches are opposed. The first approach argues that the 
efforts of developed countries and international organisations should be placed on policy 
responses required for climate change mitigation and on adaptation measures designed to 
reduce the negative effects of global warming. The second approach stresses the sense of 
urgency around climate change, arguing that it is necessary to put any available measures in 
place to face the catastrophic impacts it implies, marking a path towards the securitisation of 
environmental issues.    
From an academic perspective, these contrasting approaches rely on the premises of two 
different schools of thought. The first is described by critics as “Malthusian” or “neo-
Malthusian” and has been developed around the main state-centric approach to security, 
focusing on the implications of environmental degradation in the global South for the security 
of states in the global North (Dalby, 2002). The second is comprised of those opposing the 
strategy of securitising climate change, because it frames environmental issues in a logic that 
is not its own (Brock, 1997; Lipschutz, 1997). 
The securitisation of climate change may have problematic effects on international relations 
in general, as well as on the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change in particular. In 
fact, it may draw political focus away from mitigation and adaptation efforts as well as 
fostering an international climate in which co-operation around the issue(s) of climate change 
would be more difficult.  
These developments, switching the object of the analysis from climate change to climate 
security, follow the typical path of securitisation, presenting climate change as an urgent and 
existential threat, which implies immediate and concrete actions. According to Simon Dalby, 
a leading figure in the disciplines of environmental security and critical geopolitics, the key 
point about the operation of securitisation is precisely that it refers to pressing and immediate 
situations that normal political life cannot address (Dalby, 2009: 15). As a consequence, the 
invocation of security could justify the use of extraordinary measures to handle these new 
threats and, historically, it has opened the way for the state to mobilise, claiming the right to 
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use whatever means necessary to block a threatening development (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 
1998: 21). 
In this framework, one of the possible outcomes of the involvement of the UN Security 
Council and other national and international security organisations in the climate change 
debate could be to invoke the RTP principle. According to the RTP principle, the United 
Nations can claim high moral authority to take action in cases of the widespread destruction 
of natural environmental goods and grave violations of international environmental law, and 
apply appropriate sanctions against the responsible states. Alternatively, the United Nations 
could charge the UN Peacebuilding Commission with addressing the specific tasks arising 
from this principle (Homan, 2008: 4).  
If one of the most salient security effects of climate change will be the destabilisation of 
countries, or even entire regions, it will be consequently necessary to call for multinational 
responses in the form of peacekeeping and state building operations. In fact, the idea of a new 
peacekeeping force, the which could step into conflicts caused by sea level rise and shrinking 
resources is not a new one. In May 1992, Germany and Switzerland (supported by thirteen 
other countries) proposed the creation of a National Environmental Task Forces, called the 
"Green Helmets," to respond to environmental emergencies. This proposal was made at one of 
the follow-up meetings of the fifty-two-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, held in Helsinki, but the proposal has not (yet) been implemented at UN level 
(Malone, 1996: 519). During the discussion held at the United Nations in July 2011, the US 
Ambassador to the UN Susan E. Rice asserted that climate change has very real implications 
for international peace and security, stating that “the Security Council needs to start now to 
act on the understanding that climate change exacerbates the risks of conflict” (UNSC 6587th 
meeting, 2011). According to the US Ambassador, the Council had already demonstrated an 
impressive ability to combat new peace and security threats and to adapt peacekeeping tools 
to address more complex peace and security crises around the world. Furthermore, Rice 
claimed that climate change should be considered no different, being the central threat of our 
age. In this regard, many of the international military interventions of recent years have made 
the prevention of refugee flows one of their main objectives. The list includes the 
establishment of a “safe haven” for Kurds in Northern Iraq after the Gulf War, the US 
intervention in Haiti in 1994, and the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Fear of refugee 
flows has also played a major part in Western strategies in the current Afghanistan conflict. If 
environmental factors lead to refugee flows then this would be a powerful reason for the 
international community to take pre-emptive action (Castles, 2002: 6). In fact, the issue of 
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disruptive migration due to regional conflicts and government instability as a consequence of 
extreme weather events is one of the hot topics in the environment and security debate. In 
February 2013, during the press conference organised by the Partnership for a Secure 
America (PSA) to launch their latest initiative to raise awareness on the national security 
threats of climate change, former CIA director James Woolsey stated that: 
 
 “If we have difficulty figuring out how to deal with immigration today, look at the prospects for 
the glacial retreats in the Andes. (…) If that starts to go away, we will have millions upon 
millions of southern neighbours hungry, thirsty, with crops failing and looking for some place in 
the world they can go” (PSA, 2013). 
 
The terms to be used for those displaced by environmental factors vary. Some policy makers 
and researchers refer to “environmental refugees”, some others to “environmental migrants”, 
“climate change refuges”, or “climate refugees” (IOM, 2008; :LOOLDPVĆXUNRYiHWDO
2010: 6). If those displaced remain within their country borders, no matter why they have 
been displaced, prevailing international normative standards should apply to them: they are 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). Contrastingly, there is no legal definition for those people 
who cross into another country because of natural disaster and the term “environmental 
refugees” can be misleading. It implies a mono-causality, which very rarely exists in practice 
(Castles, 2002: 8). The only exception of climate change as a direct cause of migration is 
represented by those small atoll country populations, such as, for example, Kiribati and 
Tuvalu, who may lose their country in the near future as a result of sea level rise. 
However, the concept of environmental refugees is also problematic because the term 
“refugee” has a precise meaning in international law. A refugee is defined by the 1951 UN 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as a person outside his or her country of 
nationality who is unable to return because of a “well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”46. 
Clearly, someone who flees due to environmental problems does not fall under this definition 
and nobody receives asylum just because of environmental degradation (Castles, 2002: 8). 
The 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol were drafted at a time when the dangers of 
climate change were unknown and neither climate change nor environmental degradation are 
mentioned in any of the key legal conventions or norms that currently provide protections for 
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 Article 1 of the Convention as amended by the 1967 Protocol. 
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refugees and asylum seekers. According to some scholars, the opacity of the situation 
regarding the concept of environmental refugees lies in the agenda of the policy-makers of 
developed countries, who wish to further restrict asylum laws procedures. Thus, the term was 
invented at least in part to depoliticise the causes of displacement, so enabling states to 
derogate their obligation to provide asylum. Since current international law does not require 
states to provide asylum to those displaced by environmental degradation, the notion that 
many or even most migrants leaving Africa for Europe or Central America for the US are 
forced to move by environmental factors allows governments to exclude a significant number 
from asylum (Black, 2001a: 11). Because the word “environmental” can imply a sphere 
outside politics, receiving states may treat the term “environmental refugees” in the same way 
as the term “economic migrants”, in order to reduce their responsibility to protect and assist 
(Piguet, 2008: 3). Following this approach, as pointed out by Professor Stephen Castles, 
Honorary Associate and former Director of the International Migration Institute, it can be 
argued that the “non departure regime” of the Cold War has been replaced by the “non arrival 
regime” of the New World Order (Castles, 2002: 9). This policy has been identified as one of 
the first results of the securitisation of climate change. Securitising climate change and 
labelling migrants who are forced to leave their country to survive because of lack of fresh 
water supplies, arable land, and agricultural productivity “environmental refugees” make it a 
military rather than a political problem, and justify both restrictive immigration policies and 
investments in patrolling the country’s borders rather than in adaptation and mitigation 
policies in those countries where living conditions are already precarious. 
An essentially political problem, involving the costs of prevention and adaptation and the 
losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment, might be 
perceived as too difficult to be managed, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police 
forces to prevent it from becoming a major security risk. The portrayal of climate change as a 
security problem could cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected 
by climate change, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of 
conflicts from the poorer countries in the global South, which will be most affected by climate 
change. This kind of reaction to climate change would be counterproductive, mainly for two 
reasons. Firstly, more borders protection implies an increase in military expenses and, given 
that in an increasingly globalised world it has become more and more difficult to isolate and 
control borders, it would be difficult to quantify the precise cost of this action. As a 
consequence, the financial means to compensate for the negative economic effects of reducing 
greenhouse gas emission and adapting to climate change could be exponentially reduced. 
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Secondly, the acceptance of the climate security paradigm (which is the consequence of the 
securitisation of climate change) will not allow investigation into available solutions other 
than those that are contemplated in the security sphere of actions. From a security perspective, 
Western European states (and certain members of the European political elite) have often 
reacted to migration as if it posed a threat to social identity and values. From an economic 
perspective, however, the overwhelming consensus is that Europe needs to encourage 
migration in order to sustain its welfare entitlements (including pensions), in the face of an 
aging workforce and population. The securitisation of migration illustrates well some of the 
negative consequences of using the powerful concept of security in a loose, even perhaps 
politically careless, fashion (Krause, 2005). 
As noted by Buzan and Waever, one of the most striking features of the environmental sector 
is the existence of two different agendas: a scientific and a political one. Although they 
overlap and shape each other in part, the scientific agenda is constructed outside the core of 
politics, mainly by scientists and research institutions, and offers a list of environmental 
problems that already or potentially hamper the evolution of present civilisation. 
Contrastingly, the political agenda is essentially governmental and intergovernmental. It 
consists of the public decision-making process and public policies that address how to deal 
with environmental concerns. As such the political agenda reflects the overall degree of 
politicisation and securitisation (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998: 71-72). 
A leading criticism of securitisation, presented by Dr Olav Knudsen, Director of Research at 
the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, is that its practice is based on subjective, not 
objective threats (or, as one might say, on “perception”, not “reality”) and that this basis lacks 
substance (Knudsen, 2001; Parsons, 2010), and is particularly evident in the climate change 
debate. While distinctions between the “subjective” and “objective” are problematic in 
interpretive accounts, it is justified to say that the securitisation of climate change is not based 
on intersubjectively founded scientific analysis. Rather, it is largely driven by ad hoc theories 
on the links between environmental degradation and violent conflict that are mostly based on 
political assumptions rather than on empirical evidence. Furthermore, the latest studies in this 
field substantially confute the climate-conflict link (Scheffran & Battaglini, 2011; Bernauer et 
al., 2012; Gleditsch, 2012; Scheffran et al., 2012; Theisen et al., 2013). 
On one hand, Thomas Homer-Dixon has argued that there is “substantial evidence to support 
the hypothesis that environmental scarcity causes large population movement[s], which in 
turn causes group identity conflicts” (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Conversely, Dr Astri Suhrke, 
from the Norwegian Centre for Humanitarian Studies, argues that there is little empirical 
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support for the notion that people are forced to move because of environmental factors or the 
argument that refugees lead to conflicts (Barnett, 2003; Suhrke, 1997).  
The literature on environmental conflicts, with or without migration as an important 
component, has been criticised as being theoretically rather than empirically driven and 
“existing environment and conflict research has simply not produced sufficient evidence to 
enable us to make anything but highly speculative claims about the effects of climate change 
and violent conflict” (Barnett, 2001a: 5; Barnett, 2003: 10).  
For several years, researchers have been analysing the links between climate change and 
violent conflict, starting from the earlier research of the Toronto Group and the work of the 
Environment and Conflict Project in the 1990s, up until the latest analyses of Hsiang, Meng, 
and Kane (2011) and Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel (2013).  The dominant form of analysis is a 
quantitative approach, which correlates extreme weather events or temperature and 
precipitation data with conflict records. Yet the ambiguous findings of several studies have 
led to an intense controversy within the research community (Schilling, 2014) and a decade of 
generalisable quantitative research on climate change and armed conflict appears to have 
produced more confusion than knowledge (Buhaugh, 2015: 269). The relationship between 
climate, climate change, and conflict has been empirically tested in a wide variety of studies, 
but the literature has not yet converged on a commonly accepted set of results (Salehyan, 
2014). The battle line lies mainly between quantitative and qualitative research. On one side 
of the debate are the ‘quants’, who use quantitative methods to identify correlations between 
conflict and climate in global or regional data sets. On the other side are the ‘quals’, who 
study individual conflicts in depth (Solow, 2013). 
The most comprehensive assessment of the scientific literature to date, the Human Security 
chapter of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report, 
states that while individual studies vary in their conclusions, collectively the research does not 
conclude that there is a strong positive relationship between global warming and armed 
conflict (IPCC, 2014: 772). In itself, the climate is not a threat; it is a condition. Instead, the 
consequences of climate change are conditioned by the institutional, social, economic, 
political, and historical context of the societies facing them. As a consequence, securitisation 
is ultimately counterproductive because by securitising environmental issues - and making 
them part of high politics - efforts, energies, and resources will be used to address the weak 
link between climate change and violent conflict, excluding other policy choices.  
In the long run, to deal with environmental issues, desecuritisation, or politicisation, may be 
preferable to securitisation. Politicisation is a recognition of social-political responsibilities 
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for changes in the quality of environmental conditions, which makes environmental issues 
part of the usual day to day political business (Buzan et al., 1995: 15).  
Understanding climate change as a security risk involves the revolution of the traditional 
concepts of security, environmental security, and human security. In classical terms, security 
means the integrity of territorially organised sovereign nation states within the system of 
international law as represented by the United Nations since the end of the Second World 
War. Thus framed, security is the preservation of nation state integrity in the face of external 
threats in an anarchic world of states; the task of guaranteeing security is seen as being 
ultimately a military one (WBGU, 2007: 19). With the end of the Cold War and the 
globalisation process, which characterise the present world, security is no longer limited to the 
military capability to safeguard countries, and the concept has been extended to include 
economic, cultural, political, and ecological dimensions. Meanwhile, security policies have 
been expanded to economic and foreign non-military measures, such as development and 
environmental policies. When debating climate change as a security issue, human security is 
often discussed as one of the major threats that climate change poses to human societies. 
Climate change may undermine human security by reducing access to, and availability of, 
natural resources that are key to sustain livelihoods. It may, through a range of largely indirect 
effects, undermine the capacity of states to provide services and instruments to provide 
appropriate livelihoods. In this way, it may be one among several coexisting and interrelated 
factors that contributes to violence.  
 
 
4.4 Shifting the Discourse: Climate Change as an Issue of Human 
Security 
 
The concept of environmental security refers to a sector of security (the environment) rather 
than a referent object to be secured. Therefore, it is possible to talk of the environmental 
security of the international system, of nation states, and of people, which means talking about 
human security (Collins, 2007: 197). Human security, which is only the latest in a long series 
of attempts to challenge the traditional state-centred concept of security, is an increasingly 
popular notion which focuses on the security of individuals or groups. It aims at ensuring the 
survival, livelihood, and dignity of people in response to current and emerging threats that are 
widespread and cross-cutting. Such threats are not limited to those living in absolute poverty 
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or conflict. Today, people throughout the world, in developing and developed countries alike, 
live under several conditions of insecurity. These threats seriously challenge both 
governments and people47.  
The UNDP, in its 1994 Human Development Report New Dimensions of Human Security, put 
forward the concept of human security to assist in the framing of development and equity 
issues, defining it as being concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how 
freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social 
opportunities, and whether they live in conflict or peace. The two guiding principles on which 
the concept of human security has been developed in recent years can be summarised in the 
terms freedom from fear (the removal of the use of, or threat of, force and violence from 
people’s everyday lives) and freedom from want (the ensurance of the basic human needs in 
economic, health, food, social, and environmental terms) (UNDP, 1994). This concept 
became popular in the late 1990s, when Japan and Canada adopted it as an official policy 
through two specific political initiatives: the Human Security Network, initiated by the 
Canadian Government in 1999, and the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, established by 
the Japanese Government as early as 1999 (Bosold & Werhes, 2005; Remacle, 2008). 
According to the Human Development Report, human security is not a concern with weapons, 
but it is a concern with human life and dignity, therefore ensuring freedom from want and 
freedom from fear for all persons is the best path to tackle the problem of global insecurity. 
The vision presented in the UNDP Report was very broad and it dissected human security into 
seven main interconnected dimensions: economic security, food security, health security, 
personal security, political security, community security, and environmental security. The 
overall goal was to expand the concept of security which had “for too long been interpreted 
narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national 
interest in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust” (UNDP, 
1994: 22). The concept of human security was thus meant to change the referent object of 
security “from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s 
security” and, somewhat more problematically, to advocate “security through sustainable 
human development” (UNDP, 1994: 24). In fact, as noted by Liu Zhijun, an Associate 
Professor at the Zhejiang University Department of Sociology, the consecutive occurrences of 
events such as the Asian financial crises in the late 1990s, the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001, the 
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eruption of SARS in 2003, and the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004 further supports the 
evidence that a traditional security concept is no longer relevant to the new security threats 
confronting humanity. This broad definition of human security allows governments, 
international organisation, NGOs and scholars to apply different interpretations of the concept 
of human security, varying in accordance with their subjective values, understandings, and 
priorities (Zhijun, 2006).   
In this framework, environmental security aims to protect people from the short-term and 
long-term threats and disasters caused by the deterioration of the natural environment (UNDP, 
1994).  
The environmental dimension of human security has been addressed in several studies by the 
United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) and in 
other research projects implemented in the last decades. One of the most notable among them 
was the Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project (GECHS) which 
investigated environmental changes within larger socioeconomic and political contexts, 
focusing on the way diverse social processes such as globalisation, poverty, disease, and 
conflict combine with global environmental change to affect human security48.  
Framing climate change as an issue of human security raises several questions and concerns 
about the capacity of society to respond to current and future changes from a different 
perspective. The security of individuals, in the framework of human security, is derived from 
their well-being, which includes their economic, political, cultural, demographic, and 
ecological systems.  In this sense, the concept of human security helps to catalyse broader 
parallel discourses of security and development, which integrate research findings from the 
fields of international relations, development economics, and political sciences.  
Human security goes beyond the traditional understanding of security as a state-centred 
concept related to threats and conflict. In terms of environmental change, human security can 
be considered the condition wherein individuals and communities have the necessary options 
to end, mitigate, or adapt to risks to their human, environmental, and social rights; have the 
capacity and freedom to exercise these options; and actively participate in attaining these 
options (GECHS, 1999). This is a people-centred concept that focuses on enabling individuals 
and communities to respond to change, whether by reducing vulnerability or by challenging 
                                               
48
 The Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS) project became a core project under the 
auspices of the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change (IHDP) in 1999. 
The science plan set the foundation for exploring the relationship between global environmental change and 
human security, through interdisciplinary, integrative, and international research collaboration and extensive 
dialogue with policy makers and stakeholders. See http://www.gechs.org/ [Accessed 30 July 2016]. 
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the drivers of environmental change. Human security is therefore linked to the development 
of human capabilities facing change and uncertainty. In this way, human security is a variable 
condition where people and communities have the capacity to manage stresses to their needs, 
rights, and values. When people do not have enough options to avoid or to adapt to 
environmental change such that their needs, rights, and values are likely to be undermined, 
then they can be said to be environmentally insecure. This definition gives attention to values 
and recognises that human security concerns both needs and rights (Barnett et al., 2010: 18).  
Inequality and vulnerability are central to understanding both environmental insecurity and 
the impacts of climate change. Environmental insecurity is the double vulnerability of people 
that arises when underdevelopment and impoverishment are compounded by human-induced 
environmental change (Barnett, 2001: 17; Barnett, 2001a: 11).  
The degree to which people are vulnerable to climate change depends on the extent to which 
they are dependent on natural resources and ecosystem services, and the extent to which the 
resources and services they rely on are sensitive to climate change. In other words, people that 
are more dependent on climate sensitive forms of natural capital are more exposed to the risk 
of climate change. Yet environmental change rarely undermines human security in isolation 
from a broader range of social factors. These include, among other things: poverty, the degree 
of support people receive from the state, their access to economic opportunities, the 
effectiveness of decision-making processes that govern people’s lives, and the extent of social 
cohesion within and surrounding vulnerable groups. This means that marginalised people are 
more vulnerable to environmental change (Barnett & Adger, 2005: 5) and poor people in 
developing countries will suffer the most from climate change (AdB, 2003). Developing 
countries are affected more because of the economic importance of climate sensitive sectors, 
such as agriculture, in combination with their low adaptive capacity, which is the ability of 
individuals, groups, organisations, and institutions to address climate issues as part of a range 
of efforts to achieve sustainable development (OECD, 1995; Stern, 2006). Many developing 
countries lack the human and financial capacity to face the threats of climate change. Natural 
disasters, from floods, droughts, and cyclones, have major impacts on developing countries, 
not only in terms of human loss, but also on long-term development. Besides a lack of 
capacity, in many developing countries there is also a significant lack of data and knowledge 
on climate change impacts. The WB estimates that 40% of all overseas development 
assistance and concessional finance is devoted to activities that will be affected by climate 
change, but few of the projects adequately account for the impact that climate change will 
108 
 
have. As a result, dams are built on rivers that will dry up, and crops are planted in coastal 
areas that will be frequently flooded (WB, 2007a). 
Moreover, historic events show that droughts and large-scale floods have had a significant 
impact on the economy of developing countries. During these droughts or floods, government 
incomes are often reduced due to lower productivity, while government spending must 
increase to supply food aid and repair damaged infrastructure (EP, 2007). In this framework, 
natural disasters can quickly erase years of work and progresses because the lack of financial 
capacity will not allow the possibility of a rapid reconstruction process, and any natural or 
manmade disaster will indeed represent a total loss of investment and assets.  
Evidence that natural disasters are increasing in intensity is fairly solid, and it is likely that 
continued anthropogenic global warming will result in more extreme, and therefore more 
hazardous, meteorological phenomena, particularly hydro-meteorological events (IPCC, 
2007; IPCC, 2012). Understanding climate change from a human security perspective requires 
the basic premise that climate change is a global problem relevant to all societies. To use a 
familiar phrase, ‘pollution knows no borders’, whereas military security presupposes borders, 
or in any case boundaries (Haldén, 2007: 154), but the causes of anthropogenic climate 
change and its impacts on human societies are distributed across the boundaries and 
jurisdictions of individual states (Keohane et al., 1994; Vogler, 2011). 
In order to understand what it means to reframe environmental change as an issue of human 
security, it is necessary to start by considering that the framing of an issue influences the 
questions that are asked, the research that is prioritised, and the solutions and policies that are 
proposed. To reframe environmental change as an issue of human security involves asking 
some very relevant questions about equity, justice, vulnerability, power relations, and, in 
particular, questions about whose security is actually threatened by environmental change 
(O’Brien, 2006: 2-3). Therefore, applying the concept of human security to global climate 
change implies a move forward from the inverse correlation between developed countries and 
emerging economies, where one state’s gain in security equals another’s loss, toward a wider 
dimension in which climate change would be seen as an equal threat to all states of the world 
and tackled as a common problem of sustainable development. In other words, as suggested 
by Brauch (2003) and Dalby (2002), shifting the discourse from climate security to human 
security represents a step towards a fourth phase of social science research on human and 
environmental security. This phase marks a new generation of environmental and security 
research that moves forward from the current debate between environmental security studies 
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and critical environmental security studies, towards a human security perspective that 
considers an integrated analysis of causes, impacts, and outcomes of environmental stress. 
However, it should also be noted that human security relies on the broader framework of 
security, and therefore framing climate change as an issue of human security does not 





Environmental security is one of the new key security issues that has been discussed in the 
process of broadening the meaning of security in the post-Cold War era. However, although 
scientific community has debated climate change for some time now, it is only recently that 
the issue has entered the political mainstream and reached its current, highly exposed status 
(Haldén, 2007: 156). Moreover, the current discourse on climate instability is quite new in 
many respects, at least in the form that underpins the surge of interest in “climate security” 
shown by Western intelligence, security organisations, and military agencies, where the 
debate over the implications of abrupt climate change is taking place more and more often 
(Russill, 2010). According to some scholars, such as Lodgaard (1990) or Westing (1987), this 
process of linking the environment to security is fundamental in creating the political and 
social awareness to produce the sense of urgency required to tackle environmental problems. 
However, while the concept of environmental security was originally conceived with the 
intention of elevating environmental problems from the level of low politics to high politics so 
that states would commit as much energy and as many resources to address environmental 
problems as they do to other security problems, the result has been that problems of 
environmental change have been militarised. This process, fueled by ad-hoc catastrophic 
climate change communications focusing on climate wars, large and uncontrollable migration 
flows, and the possibility of unimaginable, devastating changes to our daily lives, has been 
highly supported by think tanks, policy makers, and also the film industry, above all in the 
United States of America (Russill, 2010). 
Therefore, instead of a trade-off of military security for environmental security, or an increase 
in resources and energy devoted to enhancing environmental security, the emphasis has been 
placed on environmental change as a cause of violent conflict rather than human insecurity 
(Dalby, 1999). As a consequence, the most influential interpretation of environmental 
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security, largely accepted by the security policy community and the armed forces, especially 
in the United States, is that climate change is a threat to national security.  
The climate security paradigm (i.e. the causality link between climate change and national 
security), has been largely criticised by a number of scholars, such as Deudney (1990; 1991), 
Peluso and Watts (2001), Dalby (2002; 2002a), and Buckland (2007), who argue that the 
securitisation of environmental problems is restricting the range of means available for 
resolving and managing the threats of a changing climate. However, environmental security is 
still largely understood to be about threats to the nation-state rather than to the environment, 
to other states, or to individuals. This suggests that, while environmental security may have 
broadened the meaning of security, it has been less successful in deepening it (Collins, 2007: 
201). 
Nevertheless, current practices of national security need to be re-evaluated and re-calibrated 
to face both the new security challenges and the new political balances of the world order, 
which is moving from a unipolar to a multipolar system, with the rising of emerging 
economies. Among them, China, which plays an important role in the current international 
climate change negotiations, representing the interests of developing countries through the 
mechanism of the G77 and China, is working to promote an approach on global 
environmental policy based on the understanding of climate change as a socio-economic 








“The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities represents the core and bedrock 
of international cooperation on climate change and it must never be compromised 
[…].Developing countries only started industrialization a few decades ago and many of their 
people still live in abject poverty today. It is totally unjustified to ask them to undertake 
emission reduction targets beyond their due obligations and capabilities in disregard of 
historical responsibilities, per capita emissions and different levels of development”. 
 
Wen Jiabao, Copenhagen Climate Summit, 2009 
 
 
In the framework of global environmental governance, there are several discourses49 that can 
be used to capture how China’s identity has shifted. One of them is Beijing’s attitude towards 
the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is the first international 
environmental agreement that seeks to achieve environmental targets using market-based 
instruments. This is executed by creating a demand for carbon credits by putting a price on 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and demanding that certain sectors hold CO2 permits to be allowed to 
operate. To this end, and in order for each country to fulfil its commitment, the Kyoto 
Protocol introduced three market-based mechanisms, known as flexible mechanisms, thereby 
creating what is now known as the “carbon market50”.  
Initially, the Chinese government was very sceptical about the Kyoto flexible mechanisms, 
fearing that this would result in rich countries circumventing their responsibility to reduce 
their own emissions (IIDS, 1995). However, the Chinese view on the flexible mechanism 
began to change after the adoption of the Marrakech Accords at the COP 7, were the 
modalities, guidelines, and procedures for the implementation of the mechanisms under the 
Kyoto Protocol were clarified and finally agreed. The Marrakech Accords paved the way for 
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 Based on Hajer and Versteeg, and as per Chapter III, I adopt the definition of discourse as “an ensemble of 
ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is 
produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer & Verteeg, 2005, p.175). 
50
 Emissions trading, as set out in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows countries that have emission units to 
spare - emissions permitted to them but not "used" - to sell this excess capacity to countries that are over their 
targets. Thus, a new commodity was created in the form of emission reductions or removals. Since carbon 
dioxide is the principal greenhouse gas, people speak simply of trading in carbon. Carbon is now tracked and 
traded like any other commodity. This is known as the "carbon market". 
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developed countries to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, leading to positive support from Beijing for 
the three flexible mechanisms. In particular, the CDM evolved from being labelled a tool for 
“environmental imperialism” to being considered “a creative mechanism of the international 
community to address global climate change, conducive to the sustainable development of 
developing countries as well as the achievement of an emissions reduction target by 
developed countries” (Jiang, 2005).Therefore, I argue that the Chinese government’s move 
from defensive scepticism to active support of the three Kyoto mechanisms can be considered 
one of the discourses that can capture China’s identity shift.  
Another example could be through a comparative analysis of China’s quantified commitment 
on CO2 emissions reduction, starting with Beijing’s first step towards quantified targets and 
timetables, pledged by former president Hu Jintao at the 2009 Climate Conference in 
Copenhagen. However, for the purpose of this research, I will focus on a third discourse to 
capture China’s identity shift: the strategic use of the CBDR principle in ICCN. In fact, while 
China’s changing attitude toward the Kyoto flexible mechanisms and its pledges on quantified 
commitments on emissions reduction are a sort of manifestation, or consequence, of China’s 
identity shift, the driving force behind the shift itself is the CBDR principle. 
The CBDR is the main pillar of the Chinese government negotiation strategy utilised to 
achieve China’s preferences in the framework of ICCN. In fact, by framing its opposition to 
binding commitments in the language of CBDR, China uses rhetoric that is aligned with the 
views and shared identity of the developing world. In this context, strengthening its 
diplomatic and economic ties within the global South, and using the CBDR principle as a 
catalytic force, Beijing has been able to inspire a broad coalition of developing countries and 
emerging economies to support its negotiating strategy and stances. In this process, through 
an extensive use of soft power and South-South cooperation, Beijing is emerging as an 
inÀXHQWLDOQRUPDWLYHDFWRULQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDODUHQD 
While soft power and South-South cooperation, as well as the potential role of China as a 
norm maker, will be discussed in detail in Chapter VIII, and the Kyoto mechanism in Chapter 
VI, the purpose of this section is to present the roots and development of CBDR within the 







5.1 The Rationale of the CBDR Principle  
 
The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities is a cardinal one in the context 
of international negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The notion of common responsibility in the climate regime brings together several 
discourses and is rooted in the principle of cooperation, which states that all countries are 
obliged to cooperate in preventing transboundary pollution51. The common responsibility 
primarily involves an obligation to cooperate to conserve, protect, and restore the health and 
integrity of Earth’s ecosystem52. In the complex puzzle of international climate change 
negotiations, CBDR reflects a political consensus that the widest possible cooperation by all 
countries is needed to fight climate change and the adverse effects thereof. In addition, it 
means that all countries have a responsibility to act according to their own capacities (Pauw et 
al., 2014).  
The 1992 UNFCC/C outlined the common responsibility in clear terms, stating that the 
Parties to the Convention acknowledge that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse 
effects are a common concern of humankind53. Accordingly, the UNFCCC aims to stabilise 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system54. To achieve this objective, the principle 
of common responsibility in  the  climate  change  regime  incorporates  states’ historical 
contributions to global environmental degradation and embraces the principles of fairness and 
justice, to be taken into account when  devising  relevant  legal  commitments55. 
By taking into account states’ historical contributions to CO2 emissions, their diverse 
circumstances and capacities, and their specific development needs in determining their levels 
of responsibility under the regime, the word “differentiated” implies the adoption and 
implementation of differing commitments for different states. Differential treatment applies 
assistance mechanisms and rules to deviate from general international obligations, favouring 
the least advantaged countries; usually, but not exclusively, this is equated with developing 
countries (Honkonen, 2009: 1-2). Thereby, the CBDR principle, as applied to international 
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environmental treaties, includes two fundamental elements. The first element concerns the 
common responsibility of states for the protection of the environment, or parts of it, at the 
national, regional, and global levels. The second element concerns the need to take into 
account the different circumstances, particularly each state’s contribution to the evolution of 
global environmental degradation and its ability to prevent, reduce, and control it.  
On the one hand, common responsibility under CBDR is based on the principle of solidarity 
of fair sharing of both the effort to protect a resource and of the enjoyment of the accruing 
benefits. Common responsibility under CBDR was a response to the voices mainly coming 
from the developing world demanding fairer rules to international environmental cooperation 
(Sands, 2003: 218-219). On the other hand, differentiated responsibility translates into 
differentiated environmental standards based on a range of factors, including special needs 
and circumstances, future economic development of countries, and historic contributions to 
the creation of an environmental problem. The rationale is to ensure that developing countries 
can come into compliance with particular legal rules over time, thereby strengthening the 
regime in the long term (Sands, ibid.). According to Oran Young, the essence of the CBDR is 
to “couple an acknowledgement that everyone bears some responsibility for coping with 
large-scale environmental problems with a recognition of the fact that some members of the 
international community are much better situated than others to provide the resources needed 
to address these problems” (Young, 2001: 169). 
In practical terms, the principle has at least two consequences. First, it entitles, or may 
require, all concerned states to participate in international response measures aimed at 
addressing environmental problems. Second, it leads to environmental standards that impose 
differing obligations on states. The differentiation is aimed at balancing the need for universal 
obligations in taking action against global environmental degradation with the need to 
consider and respect each country’s peculiarities and relevant circumstances. As a 
consequence, as argued by Oran, the principle has been designed to combine “a universal 
ethical standard with a pragmatic acceptance of marked differences in the material 
circumstances of individual members of international society” (Young, ibid.). 
The UNFCCC was signed by 154 nations at the 1992 Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro. 
The four key elements contained in the agreement are: (1) a general long-term objective to 
stabilise GHG concentrations; (2) a near-term quantitative emission reduction goal for 
industrialised countries; (3) the CBDR principle as the guidance of burden sharing; and (4) 
the preference for market-based measures. These four elements have largely defined the 
international climate change policy regime since 1992 (Aldy & Stavins 2007: 6). 
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However, since the UNFCCC was adopted in 1992, no updates have been made to better 
account for the dynamic diversification of developing countries and emerging economies. 
Moreover, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol marked the beginning of the controversial dichotomy 
between developed and developing countries. In practical terms, this means that the emissions 
of developing countries and emerging economies are allowed to grow in accordance with their 
development needs. 
The North-South politics related to the Annex I / Non-Annex I dichotomy has since been 
called “dysfunctional” and “the regime’s greatest weakness”, giving rise to several critiques 
questioning the utility of the CBDR principle in guiding climate negotiations (Depledge & 
Yamin, 2009: 443). This dichotomy has been incredibly controversial because it does not 
regulate sizeable, emerging (but still “developing”) economies such as Brazil, South Africa, 
India, and China (the BASIC countries), all of which are now among the world’s largest GHG 
polluters (Pauw et al., 2014). 
Paradoxically, the logic of common but different responsibilities, which first enabled 
negotiators to agree on a legal framework for international climate policy in the early 1990s, 
has since become a persistently challenging obstacle in international climate change 
negotiations.  
More than twenty years after the climate convention was agreed upon, most developing 
countries still want CBDR to maintain a clear differentiation between different categories of 
states (Pauw et al., 2014). From their perspective, the toning down or, even worse, the 
removal of the CBRD principle from ICCN would compromise their development path and, 
consequently, undermine their right to development. 
 
 
5.2 Roots and Development of the CBDR Principle in ICCN 
 
The principle of CBDR may be regarded as originating from the more general principle of 
differential treatment of countries in international regulation, which can be traced back to the 
1960s and 1970s when developing countries started to call for a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO). The call for the NIEO started in the late 1960s; a decade that was declared by 
the United Nations the Development Decade (UNGA, 1961). With the NIEO process, the 
global South was demanding a more equitable sharing of the resources and wealth of the 
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world. At the same time, developing countries were demanding assurances of their 
sovereignty over their natural resources and, more generally, over their economies.   
Developing countries have often argued that developed countries were allowed to exploit their 
own environmental resources without restraints in order to develop. On the contrary, for 
developing countries, hundreds of years of exploitation by the colonial powers have depleted 
their natural wealth and created conditions of trade and technological dependence, as well as 
extreme poverty among their citizens (Felice, 2009). For this main reason, among many 
others, developing countries should be entitled to achieve a certain level of development 
before implementing any environmental measures that could compromise their right to 
development56.  
In this sense, it was posited by the leaders of developing nations that all peoples have a right 
to the satisfaction of their basic needs, therefore, those that are already able to do so have the 
responsibility to help others (Cooper, 1977). According to the global South, new rules and 
preferential treatment for developing countries would both act to compensate for the injustice 
of the past and make the international system fair for trade and other interaction between 
states. In this context, it has been argued that the history of international environmental 
dialogue is a history of conflict between developed and developing countries (Honkonen, 
2009: 8). Post-colonial theory of international law is based precisely on this perceived conflict 
and its historical roots (Honkonen, ibid). According to the post-colonial argument, the CBDR 
principle cannot be understood without taking into account its broader historical and ethical 
context, in which the colonial encounter and its aftermath continue to play a critical role 
(Mickelson, 2007: 274). The poor conditions of developing countries were not only 
considered by Post-colonial theorists to be a result from the age of colonisation but also in 
large measure derived from the prevailing rules of the current economic order in which their 
specific needs were not taken into consideration. 
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 The Declaration on the Right to Development was adopted by the UN General Assembly with the resolution 
41/128 of 4 December 1986. However, the path to reaching this goal started 10 years earlier, on 10 February 
1975, when the Commission on Human Rights decided to place on its agenda the “Question of the realization of 
the economic, social and cultural rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and study of special problems relating to 
human rights in developing countries”. In this context, in 1981, the Commission established a Working Group to 
study the scope and contents of the right to development. The former president of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, the Senegalese jurist Kéba Mbaye, was one of the first expert scholars to refer to a right to 
development, which he defined as “the recognized prerogative of every individual and every people to enjoy in 
just one measure the goods and services produced thanks to the effort of solidarity of the members of the 
community” (Mbaye, 1981). 
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For this reason, the struggle for the establishment of the NIEO can be understood as a 
continuation of the process of decolonisation in the economic sphere and as an instrument to 
avoid neo-colonisation in international economic relations. Accordingly, it was also argued 
that the need for NIEO was justifiable, politically logical, and necessary, and it represented a 
step forward in freeing societies from the remnants of colonialism (Honkonen, 2009: 40).  
This challenging international context was further driven by mounting concerns about the 
increasing utilisation of natural resources within finite ecosystems as well as global 
environmental degradation. This was also the backdrop of the first major global 
environmental meeting held in Stockholm in 1972: the United Nations Stockholm Conference 
on Human Environment. The conference underlined the importance of common responsibility 
and international cooperation in the efforts to protect the global environment and the need to 
support developing countries in their difficult path to overcome poverty and 
underdevelopment. In analysing the roots of the CBDR, the Stockholm Conference can be 
considered a first milestone in its evolution. In fact, Principles 4 and 24 of the Stockholm 
Declaration stated respectively: 
 
Principle 4: “In the developing countries most of the environmental problems are caused by 
under-development. Therefore, the developing countries must direct their efforts to 
development, bearing in mind their priorities and the need to safeguard and improve the 
environment. For the same purpose, the industrialized countries should make efforts to reduce 
the [development] gap between themselves and the developing countries”.  
 
Principle 24: “International matters concerning the protection and improvement of the 
environment should be handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries, big and small, on an 
equal footing (UN, 1972). 
 
Two years later, in 1974, the pressure from the developing world resulted in the Declaration 
on the Establishment of the NIEO, launched by the UN General Assembly. In the preamble, 
the declaration stated:  
 
“…[It is necessary] to work urgently for the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation 
among all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct 
inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap 
between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating 
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economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations” 
(UNGA, Res. 3201, 1974). 
 
In the same year, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, which also addressed environmental issues, emphasising that, 
“The protection, preservation and enhancement of the environment for the present and future 
generations is the responsibility of all States” (UNGA, Res. 3281, Art. 30, 1974). 
A decade after the adoption of the Stockholm Declaration, The World Charter for Nature was 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and, in 1983, the General Assembly passed 
the Resolution 38/161 Process of preparation of the Environmental Perspective to the Year 
2000 and Beyond, establishing the World Commission on Environment and Development. 
The World Commission on Environment and Development, also known as The Brundtland 
Commission, can be considered a second milestone in the development of the concept of 
CBDR. The Commission officially dissolved in December 1987 after releasing its final report 
– Our Common Future – which put forward the concept of sustainable development, built 
upon the notion of “intergenerational equity” and on three main pillars of sustainability: 
economic, social, and environmental.  
The concept of sustainable development has since been regarded as an overarching 
framework for international environmental policy. As argued by Philippe Cullet, of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies ‘the realisation of environmental quality cannot be 
sought in isolation from the socio-economic elements that constitute the backbone of equity in 
general international law. Equity and its environmental offshoot, the CBDR principle, imply 
therefore that environment and development goals must be pursued at the same time’ (Cullet, 
1999: 170). 
Although Our Common Future did not explicitly mention the CBDR principle, it lay down a 
foundation for it. In fact, ideas constitutive of the concept of “common” and “differentiated 
responsibility”, such as intergenerational equity or the lower financial and technological 
capacities of developing countries to address the adverse effects of climate change, were 
included in the report: 
 
“Globally, wealthier nations are better placed financially and technologically to cope with the 
effects of possible climatic change. Hence, our inability to promote the common interest in 
sustainable development is often a product of the relative neglect of economic and social 




On one hand, the emphasis placed by the Brundtland report on intergenerational equity is in 
line with the notion of common responsibility, since only broad cooperation and participation 
in common efforts would ensure that future generations are able to enjoy a rich life on this 
planet (Honkonen, 2009: 5). Conversely, the recognition that developing countries have fewer 
financial and technological resources to invest in infrastructures that are resilient to the 
adverse effects of climate change implies that the capacity to take remedial measures should 
be one of the criteria for differentiating between countries under the CBDR. 
In 1989, the UN General Assembly, noting the Brundtland report, called for a UN Conference 
on Environment and Development57. The first UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth Summit, was held in Rio the Janeiro in 
1992 and represents a third fundamental milestone for the development of the CBDR. 
Formally, the CBDR evolved as an international principle during the 1992 UNCED, and is 
articulated in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration. According to Principle 7 the CBDR is 
defined as follows: 
 
 “States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the 
health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, states have common but differentiated responsibilities. The 
developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit 
of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global 
environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command” (UNCED, 1992). 
 
In essence, the Rio Declaration recognises the special needs of developing countries, 
especially in the context of international environmental law (Pauw et al., 2014). The 
negotiating history of the Rio Declaration is of interest because it unveils the different views 
of developed and developing countries regarding the purpose of environmental law-making 
and their relative bargaining power in negotiations. On the one hand, Western countries 
wanted to achieve a final declaration focused exclusively on environmental issues. On the 
other hand, developing countries argued that the Rio Conference was about people and their 
right to development. Finally, the developing countries were successful in influencing many 
                                               
57General Assembly Resolution 44/228, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 
A/RES/44/228, Dec. 22, 1989. 
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of the provisions of the declaration, including the articulation of a right to development58 and 
the focus on both poverty eradication59 and on the needs of developing countries60. In this 
respect, the Rio Declaration provided an opportunity for developing countries to use the 
environmental agenda as a means to advance their concern about development and growth 
(Louka, 2006: 33-38). Fundamentally, the divergence between the global North and the global 
South encompasses the framework, nature, and agenda of international environmental law. It 
is essentially focused on who should take responsibility, in what measure, and under what 
conditions to contain global environmental degradation (Mickelson, 2007: 8). 
A particularly important aspect of the CBDR principle is reflected in the issue of international 
assistance, including financial aid and technology transfer. Developed countries are seen as 
having played a critical role in global environmental degradation and climate change, and as 
actors with the unique ability to address, them thanks to their technological and financial 
capacity. Therefore, according to the CBDR, they are expected to take the lead on 
environmental problems. In addition to moving toward sustainable development on their own, 
developed countries are expected to provide financial, technological, and other assistance to 
help developing countries fulfil their sustainable development responsibilities (CISDL, 2002). 
On the other hand, with respect to the common responsibility foreseen in the CBDR, 
developing countries should actively implement adaptation measures in their economic 
development and poverty elimination policies, decrease their emission as much as possible, 
and fulfil their duties in addressing climate change. 
Since the early stages of its formulation there has been considerable debate around the 
definition and scope of the CBDR principle, as well as its content and the nature of the 
obligation it entails. All of these constitutive elements continue to be contested (Stone, 2004; 
Rajamani 2010; Deleuil 2012). 
Although included in the UNFCCC’s “principles” section, CBDR was explicitly not included 
as a legal principle. This has generated persistent vagueness and uncertainty around the 
CBDR principle in the realm of international law (Pauw et al., 2014). In this framework, its 
interpretation can reflect fundamentally different perspectives on the roles of the South and 
North in responding to global environmental challenges. In the aforementioned Principle 7 of 
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the Rio Declaration, CBDR is based on “the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation”.  
From the perspective of the North, this principle can be said to reflect a pragmatic recognition 
of the different financial and technological capacities of developed and developing countries, 
and of the current imbalance in consumption of resources between South and North 
(Mickelson, 2008). From the perspective of the South, in contrast, it can be said to reflect an 
acknowledgement of the historic, moral, and legal responsibility of the North to shoulder the 
burdens of environmental protection, just as it has enjoyed the benefits of economic and 
industrial development largely unconstrained by environmental concerns. Implicit in the latter 
view is a sense that the North has received a disproportionate share of the benefits of centuries 
of environmentally unsustainable development, and the underprivileged in the South have 
borne many of its costs (Mickelson, 2000). The opposite – and near incompatible - views on 
its content are also reflected in the fundamental disagreement as to the nature of the obligation 
it entails. While the G77 and China argue that it is obligatory, others, such as the US, contend 
that it can be nothing but discretionary. 
The increasing reach, significance, and application of the CBDR principle has led several 
international legal scholars to query whether the principle is a form of “soft law” - a 
nonbinding norm - or has emerged as a robust, acknowledged principle of international 
environmental law (Joyner, 2002: 358-359)61. 
However, as argued by Lavanya Rajamani, the preoccupation of international lawyers with 
the precise legal status of this norm is misplaced. The FCCC, as a framework convention, 
imposes obligations that are largely aspirational in nature and function as building blocks for 
the development of the climate regime. CBDR is a notion that, despite the legal wrangling on 
the point, is the overarching principle guiding the future development of the climate regime. 
Even though this principle does not assume the character of a legal obligation in itself, it is a 
fundamental part of the conceptual apparatus of the climate change regime such that it forms 
the basis for the interpretation of existing obligations and the elaboration of future 
international legal obligations within the regime in question (Rajamani, 2006: 159-162). 
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5.3 The Relevance of CBDR in China’s Identity Shift 
 
The formal establishment of CBDR was ultimately the result of decades of political action 
and negotiating efforts by developing countries, with China being a key player in the process 
(Stalley 2013; Biermann 1998). China’s influence traces back to the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference when it was able to insert two principles into the final declaration about the need 
to balance development with environmental protection (Aaronson, 1972; Najam, 1995: 253)62. 
While Beijing used to be a latecomer to international regimes63, especially before the 1990s, 
for the global climate change regime formation, China has participated in the process from the 
very beginning and has attended all the international negotiations leading to UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol as a full party. 
Over the years, within the group of developing countries and the G77 in particular, China has 
progressively assumed a leadership role in defending the right to development for developing 
countries and stressing the need for a poverty eradication policy, whilst simultaneously 
highlighting the historical responsibility of the global North for global warming. Following 
this negotiating line drawn by China in ICCN, developing countries and emerging economies 
were almost unanimous in putting forward the historical responsibility of the industrialised 
nations for exacerbating the greenhouse effect in international forums.   
The inclusion of the CBDR in the UNFCCC’s preamble is the most prominent manifestation 
of China’s influence in the international climate change negotiation process. The regime 
revolving around the UNFCCC has since been shaped by two distinct framings. First, climate 
change was framed as an environmental issue, to which pollution control is the answer. 
Second, climate change was linked to the emergent paradigm of sustainable development, 
thereby highlighting intra- and intergenerational equity and emphasising the minor 
contribution of developing countries to current global environmental problems and their 
limited capacities to deal with them (Depledge & Yamin 2009). Consequently, the CBDR 
principle was included in the UNFCCC’s preamble as follows: 
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 “…The global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and 
their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic 
conditions” (UNFCCC, 1992). 
   
Under the UNFCCC framework, China has been pushing for a strict divide between 
developed and developing countries’ mitigation responsibilities, and has favoured proposals 
that allow soft targets, protect developing countries’ autonomy, and call for more ambitious 
actions on the part of industrialised countries. Over the years, China has helped to keep the 
CBDR principle at the forefront of climate change debates in several different ways: 
organising international conferences, such as the Beijing Ministerial Conference in 1991, or 
sponsoring international gathering, such as the FOCAC since 2000, the BOAO Forum for 
Asia since 2002, or the BRICS annual Summit since 2009. China has helped mobilise 
developing countries and bind them around the principle of CBDR. Moreover, in the climate 
change negotiations, Chinese delegates repeatedly referred to CBDR in their formal 
statements. As a result, the CBDR principle is referred to in the Rio Declaration64, the 
FCCC65, several UNFCCC COP decisions66, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
200267, the RIO+20 Summit68, and finally in the 2015 Paris Agreement69. The Paris 
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Agreement, which is both the latest achievement in the framework of ICCN and the first 
major multilateral deal of the twenty-first century, clearly stated in Article 2 two that “This 
Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national 
circumstances”. 
Although China did not create the CBDR principle norm on its own, Beijing has been one of 
the norm’s key architects and most vocal advocates. While China’s active engagement in 
global environmental policy arises from an identity shift based on the three main 
interconnected elements previously described, I argue that the CBDR norm has been the main 
instrument that has allowed this shift. In fact, Beijing’s adherence to the CBDR norm has 
been instrumental in creating a network of partners built on the collective identity of the 
global South which, in turn, allows Beijing to achieve its preferences in ICCN and 
simultaneously creates the economic and political conditions necessary to promote the low 
carbon transformation of its economy without undermining its development objectives. 
China’s framework policies on climate change reflect its domestic circumstances and its 
national interest. While economic interests are certainly critical in explaining China’s position 
in climate change negotiations, it is also important to consider environmental justice 
arguments such as fairness and, above all, equity (Stalley, 2013). In fact, arguments such as 
fairness, equity, and the right to development have been used by China in an attempt to 
engage the global South. In so doing, China has been trying to position itself as a “different”, 
responsible and reliable international player that offers a political alternative to Western 
actors and organisations. Above all, this approach has been directed at African developing 
countries. Together, they hold strategic relevance for Beijing, while also being commonly 
imagined as the backbone of the developing world. In fact, this is the largest group of states 
that tend to vote as a block in multilateral contexts and their political and diplomatic support 
has been crucial for Beijing on several occasions70. 
According to Philip Nel, Professor of Political Studies at the University of Otago, New 
Zealand, China’s policy has contributed to what he labels “the struggle of developing 
countries”, regardless of whether they are in Central Asia, Africa or Latin America, against 
their own invisibility in terms of reigning (Western) discourses of development, 
modernisation, and global economic and cultural integration (Nel, 2010: 970-1). Therefore, 
environmental justice arguments are critical to both understanding China’s opposition to 
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emission targets and its ability to resist taking on more costly commitments in the climate 
change regime. In essence, these arguments are critical in understanding how China has 
become a key player in climate change diplomacy. 
In using arguments about environmental justice to pursue its self-interest in ICCN, China’s 
behaviour largely coincides with Schimmelfenig’s concept of “rhetorical action,” which refers 
to the “strategic use of norm-based arguments” (Schimmelfennig, 2001). China’s “rhetorical 
action” strategy has been to frame climate change as a North-South issue, primarily through 
the promotion of the CBDR norm. Framing its claims and preferences in ICCN in ways that 
appeal to commonly held principles and norms in international relations, China used its public 
diplomacy as a way of building legitimacy for itself as an actor, as well as for its policies. By 
framing its opposition to binding commitments in the language of CBDR, China uses a 
rhetoric that resonates deeply with the views and shared identity of the developing world. In 
so doing, Beijing maintains solidarity with developing countries, keeps the attention on 
industrialised nations and off major developing country emitters, and ultimately legitimises its 
opposition to binding reduction limits (Stalley, 2013). 
In the last two decades, the People’s Republic of China has developed a large number of 
partnership and cooperative frameworks with other emerging economies and developing 
countries. These have significantly improved its diplomatic credentials. At the same time, it 
has played an increasingly pivotal role in international climate talks, significantly influencing 
global South negotiating strategy, and has been successful in building large coalitions in 
support of its positions. Furthermore, by embedding its actions in both a “developing country 
rhetoric” (vis-à-vis developed countries) and a “donor role” (towards least developed 
countries), China has been able to raise its international profile and acquire a leading role 
among a large number of developing countries and emerging economies71. 
From the late 1990s, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, Beijing has progressively 
increased its engagement with existing global Western-lead institutions. At the same time, as 
China’s economy began its dramatic climb, Beijing started to invest a growing amount of 
diplomatic and economic resources into building alternative institutional options to the 
Bretton Woods system in several different fields. In the framework of financial and monetary 
policies, China was the main proponent of the New Development Bank, in the field of trade 
and investment policy, it established the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, in the field of 
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transnational infrastructural projects, it was the leading architect of the Silk Road Economic 
Belt and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and in the field of regional security, it was 
one of the founding members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These and other 
potential routing-around options, such as the annual Brics Summit or the BOAO Forum for 
Asia, caught the attention of foreign policy analysts in 2006, when Beijing hosted over fifty 
African leaders at the Fourth FOCAC Forum. On that occasion, China signed bilateral 
economic agreements and commercial contracts and pledged development aid, exercising its 
role as a great power vis-à-vis Africa (Chin & Thakur, 2010: 126). Indeed, since the early 
1990s, China strengthened its economic and political ties with African and Central Asian 
countries gaining a growing relevant role in many of them. 
In seeking to cultivate external relations with African countries, China has long stressed their 
shared history as developing countries, putting themselves in contrast to Western countries. 
Thereby, it has emphasised the symbolic attraction of China that resonates with African elites 
looking for a positive development model for the Third World. In fact, many African leaders 
are increasingly looking at China as a success story in that it has risen from backwardness to 
staggering economic growth without following the prescriptions of the West (Alden, 2005). In 
this process, in the framework of ICCN, the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility has been the catalytic force that holds together the interests of China and the 
global South, granting Beijing the political and diplomatic support of a large number of 




Chapter VI: China’s Approaches and Policies towards 
Climate Change 
 
“China may soon go green not because enough Chinese saw Al Gore’s movie and were 
persuaded, but because the grim realities of daily life are persuading China’s leaders that 
they have no other choice. They will realize that China must go green out of necessity […].  
A green China will invent the wind, solar, nuclear and carbon-capture sequestration power 
system at a price that can, first and foremost, scale in China. And once China has perfected all 
those clean power systems, it will sell them to us”. 
 
     Thomas Friedman, Hot, Flat & Crowded, 2009 
 
 
To understand China’s climate change policy is not easy, as the country itself is a paradoxical 
actor in the global climate political economy: historically, it took a very suspicious stand on 
the scientific certainty of climate change, but it finally became a signatory to and firm 
supporter of the Kyoto Protocol. It strongly refuses to accept any legally binding obligations 
to cut emissions, but is gradually investing increasing resources on the research and 
development of clean energy and other emission reduction technologies, taking the lead in 
developing renewable energies and in the carbon trading business. It accuses Western 
countries of hypocrisy and irresponsibility, but maintains close cooperation with them on low-
carbon projects (Chen, 2012: x).  
China has achieved an astonishing transformation over the past three decades. An impressive 
economic growth rate and several structural reforms implemented since 1978 have gained 
China a major role in the global, economic, and technological arenas. The country has become 
an industrial powerhouse, lifted hundreds of millions of citizens out of poverty, and created a 
growing middle class with rising levels of prosperity. On the other hand, this tremendous 
economic growth has also turned China into the largest emitter of GHGs and economic 
progress has come at a high environmental cost: air quality in hundreds of cities is worsening 
and water resources across the country are deteriorating.  
Early studies have shown that the climate change issue in China has been intimately linked 
with efforts to modernise the economy and the energy strategy employed to fuel that 
modernisation (Hatch, 2003: 45), and potential emission reductions are mainly a by-product 
of measures aimed at cutting energy costs and increasing energy security. However, it may 
not be appropriate to portray China’s climate change policies as simply a component of its 
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energy policy formulation, since the climate issue is generally a global environmental issue in 
which more complicated factors such as transnational cooperation, national image, ecological 
protection, and growing public awareness are closely involved (Economy, 1997: 21). 
In this chapter, I present the security dimension of climate change in China, analysing in 
particular three key themes which are crucial for Beijing’s development priorities of securing 
economic growth and maintaining social stability: water security, food security, and energy 
security. I will then analyse Chinese environmental protection and climate change policies 
with a specific focus on the actions and guidelines of the 12th Five Year Plan. Finally, I will 
present the main achievements of China within the frameworks of the instruments provided 
by the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
 
6.1 The Security Dimension of Climate Change in China 
 
Since the early 1990s, China’s role in the global fight against climate change has increasingly 
become an issue of international attention. As the scientific evidence and understanding of 
anthropogenic climate change continues to improve, so does the understanding of the severe 
social and political consequences that climate change will have on specific regions of the 
world. In China it is very likely that future climate change will cause significant adverse 
consequences on the ecosystems, agriculture, water resources, and coastal zones (IPCC, 
2013). Impacts already being observed include extended droughts in the north, extreme 
weather events and flooding in the south, glacial melting endangering vital river flows, 
declining crop yields, and rising sea levels along heavily populated coastlines (Lewis, 2010: 
273). 
In recent years, China has been affected by an increasing number of natural disasters, 
especially meteorological ones such as droughts, floods, and storms, that have become more 
frequent and severe since the 1990s and the trend is likely to continue according to the Beijing 
National Meteorological Centre. The consequences of these extreme weather events were 
mostly shortage of water as well as energy resources, heavy losses in agricultural production, 
a general deterioration in ecology and environment, and a continuous threat to coastal 
economic and social development due to coastal erosion and sea level rise. 
At the same time, since China started its own reform process, and adopted Deng Xiaoping’s 
approach, in 1992, which indicated that the market system was not incompatible with 
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socialism, and called for the creation of a socialist market economy “with Chinese 
characteristics”, its economic growth increased by an average rate of 9% annually, while its 
energy consumption rate increased by an average rate of 4% annually. 
This impressive economic growth, which is unparalleled in modern history, has been gradual 
and incremental, without any detailed “blueprint” or clear and agreed upon roadmap guiding 
the process, an approach captured by the metaphor ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones 
under the feet’ (Prasad, 2004: 2), attributed to Deng Xiaoping. 
This economic boom has come at a high environmental cost: air quality in hundreds of cities 
has been worsening and water resources across the country have heavily deteriorated. 
Therefore, in the early 1990s, the Chinese government started to realise that short-term 
considerations and the acceptance of environmental degradation for economic reasons was not 
sustainable, jeopardised stability, and could not maintained China’s growth in the long run 
(Richerzhagen & Scholz, 2007: 9). 
In this context, the Chinese Government realised that the combined effects of climate change 
and environmental degradation were undermining its priorities of securing economic growth 
and maintaining social stability. Thereby, they threatened the country’s development 
objectives and self-perception as a uniquely progressive communist welfare state and a 
mainstream alternative to Western economic and political hegemony. Consequently, Beijing 
started to invest large economic resources in adaptation and mitigation measures (both from a 
legislative and an infrastructural point of view) to achieve sustainable economic growth, 
trying from one side to maintain internal stability and from the other to possibly avoid or 
ultimately manage the worst consequences of climate change. Hence, China started to grant 
greater attention to its environmental policy and to progressively strengthen its environmental 
institutions. 
The Chinese government has acknowledged the “security dimension” of a changing climate. 
However, while in developed countries the link between climate change and security has been 
generally address to stress the security consequences of a changing climate (what I have 
previously defined as the “alarmist approach”), from a Chinese perspective the security 
dimension of climate change is centred on the concept of sustainable development and 
focuses on mitigation and adaptation measures designed to reduce the negative effects of 
global warming. 
In the document sent to the IPCC in June 2015 with its Intended Nationally Determined 




“As  a  developing  country  with  a  population  of  more  than  1.3  billion,  China  is  among 
those countries that are most severely affected by the adverse impacts of  climate  change.  
[…] To act on climate change in terms of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing 
climate resilience, is not only driven by China’s domestic needs for sustainable development 
in ensuring its economic security, energy security, ecological security, food security as well as 
the safety of people’s life and property and to achieve sustainable development, but also 
driven by its sense of responsibility to fully engage in global governance” (NDRC, 2015: 2). 
 
 
6.1.1 China’s New Security Concept 
 
Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Security Agenda of the 
Chinese Communist Party has been focused on the safety of its territory, the consolidation of 
the new regime, and the nation’s ideological unification.  
The traditional national security concept emphasised the protection and strengthening of state 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and regime security. As indicated by Professor Wang 
Zhengyi, from the School of International Studies at Peking University, national security 
meant to ensure independent state sovereignty and territorial integrity and was addressed to 
maintain the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system (Zhengyi, 
2004: 526).  
Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Western 
debate around the redefinition of the concept of security has also altered the context of 
Chinese security thinking. Chinese analysts started then to consider national security in the 
framework of comprehensive security, a new concept that broadens the definition of security 
to encompass not just national security concerns (i.e. military security), but also economic, 
human, and environmental concerns as well. Under this new “umbrella concept”, national 
security was no longer equal only to national defense and diplomacy and was no longer 
limited to the defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Yang, 2010: 141). 
According to Professor Wu Baiyi, an international relations scholar at the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, when analysing the security discourses in China, the communist era can be 
divided into five different periods72. The last period, which started in the aftermath of the 
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 The first period was the so-called pro-Soviet period (1949-1957), the second was the period of opposition to 
both superpowers (1958-1970), the third period was that of a united front of counter hegemony (1971-1981), and 
the fourth was the period of non-aligned security stance (1982-1991). Finally, the fifth period, which is the post-
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Cold War, was characterised by the “drive for a multipolar world”, in which a new and more 
comprehensive definition of security was introduced, the so-called New Security Concept 
(Baiyi, 2001). The New Security Concept (NSC) includes non-traditional threats like 
environmental degradation, terrorism, energy security, as well as geopolitical, ethnic, 
religious, diplomatic, and, above all, economic considerations.  
Former Chinese President Jiang Zemin officially incorporated the concept of multipolar world 
into Chinese foreign policy at the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1992 to 
support China’s stance that a fair, just, and peaceful world was only possible through 
multipolarity. In this framework, Beijing recognised that an internationalisation process was a 
necessary step to pursue the country’s modernisation.  Compared to past security policies, the 
NSC incorporated two major changes. First, it stressed a broad field of interests to protect, 
including, for the first time, economic security, marking the upgrade of economic discourses 
from the level of “low politics” to that of “high politics”. Second, it focused more on the 
interrelationship between external and internal security challenges (Baiyi, 2001: 281). 
The New Security Concept, which remains state-centric but argues at the same time for 
mutual and common security, was introduced in April 1996 when the “Shanghai Five” 
initiative (a partnership between China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz and Kazakhstan) was 
initiated. However, it was officially endorsed during the 15th Communist Party Congress in 
September 1997. In that period, after the collapse of the former USSR, the end of the 
Washington-Beijing-Moscow triangle73 reduced China’s strategic importance to the United 
States, which was emerging as the only superpower in the world, strengthening their military 
alliances (such as Eastern Europe enlargement of NATO and Japan-US security cooperation), 
and practicing military intervention (i.e. in the Balkans war) (Yang, 2006: 88).  
In February 1997, Deng Xiaoping, paramount leader74 of the People’s Republic of China from 
1978 and main architect of the Chinese economic reform, died. A few months later, in July, 
China regained the sovereignty over Hong Kong from the UK and, in September, the “third 
                                                                                                                                                   
Cold War period, has been described as the drive for a multipolar world (as from 1992), in which China pursues 
a security of sustained development. 
73
 During the Cold War, the United States enjoyed a privileged situation that relied on the difficult political 
relationship between Moscow and Beijing, especially from the end of the 1960s until the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Ideological differences, regional conflicts, and territorial disputes allowed Washington to occupy a 
privileged position within this complicated diplomatic triangular relationship. It was in this context that Nixon’s 
visit to China took place in 1972. 
74
 In modern Chinese politics, the paramount leader of the Communist Party is an informal term that refers to the 
most prominent political leader in the People's Republic of China. 
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generation” of communist leaders led by Jiang Zemin75 agreed at the 15th Party Congress to 
pursue the path of national reforms and to strengthen the international and diplomatic 
relations of the country. This decision represented a major step forward for Chinese foreign 
policy. 
In the 29 years from its founding in 1949 to 1977, the PRC was party to a total of 31 
international treaties. In contrast, in the 27 years from 1978 to the end of 2004, China signed 
236 international treaties (Yang, 2010: 149). This was the geopolitical context in which the 
New Security Concept was developed and implemented. The launch of the NSC was 
considered by some IR scholars and security analysts as the primary Chinese policy towards 
security cooperation with Southeast Asia to counterbalance the role of the US in an 
increasingly globalised world, laying the foundations to play a leadership role in a multipolar 
world (Garrett & Glaser, 1994; Goldestein, 1998; Swaine & Tellis, 2000; Thayer, 2003; 
Finkelstein, 2003; Yang, 2010).  
In early 2000, China renewed its efforts to promote its NSC in Southeast Asia and the concept 
has become recurrent in several government international statements and white papers. In 
2002, at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, the Chinese 
government presented two keynote documents: (1) China’s Position Paper on the New 
Security Concept and (2) China’s Position Paper on Enhanced Cooperation in the Field of 
Non-traditional Security Issues. This move marks an initial conclusion of Chinese re-
conceptualisation of security (Xin, 2004: 11). Since then, non-traditional security threats, such 
as uncontrolled population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, migration pressures, 
environmental degradation, and international terrorism, have received unprecedented attention 
in Chinese security discourses and were also further analysed in the 2008 China’s Defence 
white paper76. The security threats presented in the NSC were fundamentally of five different 
types: (1) military security, (2) political/regime security, (3) scientific and technological 
security, (4) economic security, and (5) environmental degradation. 
Although the official New Chinese Security Concept has undergone changes in its content and 
implications for policy, it has retained a major preoccupation with sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. As a consequence, the definition of military security was focused on defending the 
state’s territorial sovereignty and integrity, resisting foreign aggression and safeguarding state 
                                               
75
 In the Communist Party of China career advancements proceed mainly according to seniority, therefore it is 
possible to discern 5 distinct generations of Chinese leadership. The "third generation" lasted from 1992 to 2003, 
with Jiang Zemin as leader.  
76
 Found at http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm [accessed 30 July 2016].  
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unification (Finkelstein, 2003: 202). Almost the same was true for the definition of 
political/regime security. Internal instability has always been Beijing’s core security concern 
as it threatens its legitimacy. Being an undemocratically elected government, security 
measures were (and still are) aimed at maintaining domestic political, order with a particular 
focus on terrorism (Yang, 2010: 142). In this regard, the Shanghai Five initiative, which 
successively became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (adding Uzbekistan) in 2001, 
with the support of the The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and 
Extremism and The Agreement on Regional Counter-terrorism Agency, took the lead in 
opposing the so-called “three evil forces” on China’s western frontier: terrorism, ethnic 
separatism, and religious extremism77.  The instability of Tibet and Xinjiang poses, in fact, a 
significant security challenge to Beijing. While Beijing has the military instruments to control 
the separatist movement in both autonomous regions, the social instability in these regions 
could have a negative impact on the Chinese image at an international level and, 
consequently, on Beijing’s foreign policy.  
The third dimension of the NSC was the scientific and technological security, defined as a 
fundamental instrument for China’s socio-economic development. The transformation of the 
country from a socialist economy into a market economy required an increasing number of 
skilled workers to improve the international competitiveness of Chinese industries. This was 
considered by the third generation of PRC leaders as a priority and therefore included in the 
new security agenda. 
The most important dimension of the post-Cold War concept of security incorporated in the 
NSC was economic security. Chinese security analysts understood that without a strong 
economy, the military dimension of national security was not sustainable (Yang, 2010: 154).  
Following the economic breakdown of the former Soviet Union and the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe, President Jiang Zemin linked economic security to regime 
survival stating that: 
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 Beijing uses the phrase “three evil forces” referring to counter-terrorism operations undertaken within the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and to rally China’s western neighbors against independence movements, 
like the one in Xinjiang province. Muslim separatists in Xinjiang present China with its most significant terrorist 
threat, which emerged in the late 1980s (Yang, 2010: 144). The latest suicide attack on October 29th, 2013 in 
Tiananmen Square, just a few days before the closed-door four day conclave of 370 senior party leaders, is only 
the latest of a number of terrorist attacks that the Chinese authorities ascribe to the East Turkistan Islamic 




 “If we fail to develop our economy rapidly, it will be very difficult for us to consolidate the 
socialist system and maintain long-term social stability. Whether we can accelerate economic 
growth is therefore an important question both economically and politically” (Zemin, 1992). 
 
Economic security is understood as a measure to ensure the country’s economic stability and 
sustained development and, thereby, to guarantee and support its economic growth through 
full access to overseas markets. Moreover, economic security is not only relevant for the 
national economy but it is also related to societal security and social stability. In fact, the 
problem of a growing population, worsened by increasing waves of migrants moving from the 
countryside to urban areas, from economically underdeveloped central and western regions to 
the more prosperous and developed eastern and costal ones, is exacerbating social tensions 
and consequently undermining social stability.  
According to the Ministry of Public Security, in 2003 there were more than 58,000 “mass 
incidents”— the term the Chinese government uses to describe public protests — involving 
three million people, an increase of almost 15% over the year before (Lim, 2004). In recent 
years the number of recorded mass incidentsin China has increased steadily, from 32,000 in 
1999 to 87,000 in 2005 and even more significantly between 2006 and 2010, when over 
180,000 were reported. Most large-scale social riots in China revolve around economic or 
social grievances, which are generated by the rapid socio-economic transformation, increasing 
levels of social imbalance, and the poor quality of local governance.  
Social instability is strongly interlinked with the fifth dimension of the NSC, which is 
environmental degradation. In fact, as previously anticipated in chapter I, in recent years 
China has been witnessing - especially in rural areas - an alarming increase in societal unrests 
linked to environmental degradation and pollution, the so-called “environmental mass 
incidents” 78.  
Between the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s, the Chinese leadership realised that not 
tackling environmental degradation would undermine the stability and legitimacy of the 
Communist Party. Therefore, implementing a path toward sustainable development was 
becoming an imperative, not an option.  
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 Chapter I, page 16. 
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6.1.2 The Impact of Climate Change on China’s Security 
 
In the framework of environmental protection and climate change, three themes are 
particularly relevant for the Chinese government: water security, food security, and energy 
security, because they threaten the vision of stable economic development. If the current 
projections presented by environmental scientists and research analysts are correct, the 
economic and social impact of climate change would be very relevant for a country like 
China, which is currently in the process of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, 
confronting multiple challenges including economic development, poverty eradication, and 
improvement of living standards, and where internal stability is strongly linked to an high 
level of economic growth. In this context, climate change is both an environmental and a 
development issue.  
In the first edition of its National Climate Change Program, Beijing recognised that climate 
change had already caused changes in the distribution of water resources across the country, 
highlighting in particular an increase of hydrological extreme events, such as drought in the 
north and flooding in the south (NDRC, 2007: 18). These findings were in line with the 
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, which stated that climate change would impinge on the 
sustainable development of most developing countries in Asia, as it compounds the pressures 
on natural resources and the environment associated with rapid urbanisation, industrialisation, 
and economic development. As a consequence, the report stated, the effects of climate change 
would potentially threaten not only the natural environment and ecosystems, but also 
disturbed the social, economic, and political stability of a nation. Storm surges and flooding 
disasters derived from global warming and sea level rise will not only threaten regional 
industries, agriculture, cities, and harbour constructions, but will also pose a serious and 
concrete threat to national economic development (IPCC, 2007a).  
Since China became one of the key players of the world economy and the most populous 
country in the world, with more than 1.3 billion people, its impact on global warming has 
increased exponentially. Economic growth, structural changes, and integration into world 
markets were unleashed by the post-1978 reforms, which transformed China’s centrally 
planned economy into a market-based economy. This led China to become, in 2007, the 




In 2010, China’s CO2 emissions increased 10.4% over 2009, much higher than the world 
average level of 5.8% (BP, 2011). China’s CO2 emissions made up 25.1% of the world total 
share in 2010, but this share was only 5.7% in 1973 and 1.13% in 1950.  
This data can be understood by considering that, over recent years, China has somehow taken 
up the carbon emissions of several countries in the Western developed world, mostly from the 
US, Europe, and Japan, becoming what has been labelled as the “world’s factory”. From the 
early 1990s, developed countries have, indeed, significantly exported their manufacturing 
activities to developing countries, together with the carbon emission and other related 
pollution (Wen, 2009). 
In an interview with the New York Times in June 2007, responding to the rising international 
criticism about Chinese carbon emissions, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin 
Gang said, “The developed countries moved a lot of manufacturing industry into China […] A 
lot of the things you wear, you use, you eat are produced in China. On the one hand, you shall 
increase the production in China, on the other hand, you criticize China on the emission 
reduction issue” (The New York Times, 2007). 
 
Figure 6.1:  CO2 emission, total (MtCO2) of EU, US, and China from 1990 to 2009 
 
Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Environmental Sciences Division, Oak ridge Laboratory, 
Tennessee, United States and World Bank and UN population data, WB 2012 
 
According to estimates calculated by Tao Wang from the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change 
Research of the University of Sussex, the emissions from exports from China in 2004 
accounted for 1,490 million tonnes of CO2 while emissions avoided due to imports were 381 
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million tonnes of CO2 (Wang, 2007). This shows that 23% of China’s emissions were due to 
net exports. Other data provided by government officials and researchers are even higher, 
claiming that one third of China’s emissions are due to exports (Bina & Soromenho-Marques, 
2008). Indeed, a key driver of the rapid economic growth in China over recent decades has 
been the great expansion in the production of goods for export (Guan et al., 2009) and, 
although growth has slowed since the global financial crisis, between 2000 and 2007 the 
volume of Chinese exports grew by 390% (NBS, 2001-2010).  
As the Chinese economy has grown, the economic structure has also changed, transitioning 
from a net importer to a large net exporter of energy-intensive industrial products (NBS, 
2001-2010). The energy needed to support this massive economic growth has come from 
combustion of fossil fuels, primarily coal, which has contributed to a global increase in 
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) (Minx et al., 2011; Fan and Xia, 2012).  Fossil fuel-
intensive manufacturing, large manufacturing volume, and relatively weak emission controls 
have meant that China emits far more pollutants per unit GDP than countries with more 
advanced industrial and emission control technologies. At the same time, increased 
combustion of fossil fuels, relatively low combustion efficiency, and weak emission control 
measures have also led to drastic increases in air pollutants (Ohara et al., 2007; Lu et al, 2011; 
Lin et al., 2010). 
In the same period, in terms of CO2 emissions per capita, China’s emissions reached the 
world’s average level of 4.3 ton/person in 2006, and this number increased to 4.6 tCO2/person 
in 2007, 5.1 tCO2/person in 2008, and 6.1 tCO2/person in 2009. From 1990-2009, China’s 
CO2 emissions per capita increased by 113%, ranked the fastest in the world (Oliver & Peters, 
2010). As predicted by the International Energy Agency (IEA), China’s CO2 emissions per 
capita would overtake the EU by 2030 at 8.0 tCO2/person (2009a). However, as illustrated in 
the Figure 6.2, below, notwithstanding this relevant growth rate, Chinese emission per capita 
are still far away from the levels of the United States or Europe. 
 




Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Environmental Sciences Division, Oak ridge Laboratory, 
Tennessee, United States and World Bank and UN population data, WB 2012 
 
Although the correlation between the rise of global temperature and the frequency of extreme 
weather events is still a controversial issue among meteorology scientists, scientific evidence 
indicates that human activities do contribute to extreme weather events; human factors have 
been found to account for 75% of the European heat waves in 2003 (Stott et al., 2004). 
Although there are still uncertainties, differing perspectives, and contradicting theories 
regarding climate change science and anthropogenic climate change, scientific evidence has 
revealed that global warming is mainly caused by human-induced GHG emissions (such as 
CO2). According to the IPCC’s 2013 Fifth Assessment Report79, the majority of climate 
scientists today agreed that there is a probability between 90 to 100% that human influence 
has been the dominant cause of the observed warming temperatures, at least since the mid-
20th century80. Burning fossil fuels, changing land-use patterns, and cutting forests have 
greatly contributed to the accumulation of GHG in the atmosphere. The Earth’s average 
surface temperature has risen by 0.76 degrees Celsius since the late 1800s, and the effects are 
evident at a global level in extreme weather events, changed weather patterns, floods, 
droughts, glacial and Arctic ice melt, rising sea levels, and reduced biodiversity (IPCC, 2007).  
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 The IPCC, as an intergovernmental body jointly established in 1988 by the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), has provided policymakers 
with the most authoritative and objective scientific and technical assessments in the field of climate change 
sciences. 
80
 The exact term used in the IPCC report is “very likely” which is defined as a probability above 95%. The 
IPCC has used the following terms to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: Virtually certain 
99–100% probability, Very likely 90–100%, Likely 66–100%, About as likely as not 33–66%, Unlikely 0–33%, 
Very unlikely 0–10%, Exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. Additional terms (Extremely likely: 95–100%, More likely 
than not >50–100%, and Extremely unlikely 0–5%)  (IPCC - SPM, 2013, p. 4). 
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According to the Beijing Review, China’s average temperature in 2007 was 10.3 degrees 
Celsius, which made 2007 the warmest year since the establishment of a national climate 
observation network in 1951. This record high temperature, which marked the 11th year in a 
row that the national average temperature has been higher than in a normal year, was 
remarkably higher than the second highest figure of 9.9 degrees Celsius in 2006 (Beijing 
Review, 2008). The frequency and intensity of extreme weather events across China have 
increased relevantly in the last 50 years. Drought in northern and north-eastern China, and 
flood in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River and south-eastern China have 
become more severe. The country can be divided into two main meteorological regions: the 
“dry North,” referring to all areas north of the Yangtze basin, and the “humid South,” which 
includes the Yangtze River basin and everything south of it. 
The north possesses two-thirds of the country’s cropland, and one-fifth of the water. The 
south has one-third of the cropland and four-fifths of the water. Climate change may stress 
this imbalance because it will have a relevant impact on the hydrological cycle (Figure 6.3 
below). 
Rainfall is likely to increase around the poles and the tropics while in the sub-tropics average 
precipitation is likely to decrease. Climate models predict that global warming would cause 
less rainfall in northern China and more rainfall in southern China (Wen, 2009: 10). Indeed, 
there has been a continuous drought in the North China Plain since the 1980s, while flooding 
disasters have happened more and more frequently in southern China.  
 
Figure 6.3: China’s main rivers 
 
Source: Stratfor, 2009 
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In 2010, from the beginning of April, when the flood season started, the levels of more than 
230 rivers passed the danger threshold and some areas along the Yangtze River experienced 
the worst flooding in 30 years. Floods hit 27 provinces and municipalities, affecting 110 
million people and 8.06 million people were displaced and relocated. Floods also affected 
more than 7 million hectares of farmland and destroyed 645,000 houses, with a direct 
economic losses of about 20.88 billion US dollars (Xinhua, 2010b). This trend has been 
especially enhanced since the 1990s and droughts and floods are expected to become more 
severe in many areas while the melting of Himalayan glaciers is expected to exacerbate water 
shortages in several Chinese areas. The glaciers in the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau and the 
Tianshan Mountains are retreating at an accelerated rate, and some smaller glaciers are close 
to disappearing. Because the melting of snow coincides with the summer monsoon season, 
any intensification of the monsoon and/or increase in ice melting is likely to contribute to 
flood disasters in Himalayan catchments. In the longer term, global warming could lead to a 
rise in the snowline and disappearance of many glaciers, causing serious impacts on the 
populations relying on the seven main rivers in Asia – the Ganges, the Indus, the 
Brahmaputra, the Salween, the Mekong, the Yangtze, and the Yellow River – fed by melt 
water from the Himalayas (UNFCCC, 2007). Combined, these rivers provide the water needs 
for irrigation, industry, and the daily use of about three billion people in Asia. Many glaciers 
are retreating rapidly at 15-25 meters per year and this trend is dangerously increasing, 
exacerbating China’s already serious water shortages.  
Water security is a critical problem in China, and rapid economic development and an 
incremental population growth, combined with the adverse effects of climate change, 
exacerbates water shortages. Northern China faces the greatest threat in this respect, as it will 
be subject to heat waves and droughts that will worsen existing water shortages. Sociological 
studies have found that an increasing number of farmers in Gansu province in northern China 
have already abandoned their lands as a result of the rapid deterioration of their water 
environment (Kang et al., 2008: 446). In fact, climate change is just the latest variable in a 
system that has forced them to seek better opportunities elsewhere.  
China is water-rich in absolute terms, but given the number of people, the levels of pollution, 
and the location of China’s water resources, water is scarce throughout much of the country, 
and China’s leaders fear serious future shortages due to rapidly growing household and 
industrial demand. Moreover, global warming would enhance the frequency of floods and 
droughts, causing an unstable situation in water sources supply and water shortages (IPCC, 
2007; Erda et al., 2007). Mado County, in Qinghai Province (where the Yellow River 
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originates), used to have more than 1,000 lakes: now there are less than 300. As a 
consequence, the disappearance of high-land wetlands and the degradation of grassland have 
had a negative impact on the livelihood of many nomadic herders. In Mado County, it is 
estimated that around one fourth of the herders have become “ecological refugees”: they have 
been relocated and are totally dependent on government welfare now (Wen, 2009: 8).  
In a country where entire villages and communities are forcibly obliged by the central or 
regional authority to move from their homeland and household in order to make space for 
huge public infrastructures, it is surely not a problem to relocate a small community of 
pastors, but this will no longer be the case if the current trend continues. As mentioned by Mr 
Pan Yue, Deputy Minister of China’s State Environmental Protection Agency, in his 
interview with Der Spiegel in 2005: 
 
 “In the future, we will need to resettle 186 million residents from 22 provinces and cities. 
However, the other provinces and cities can only absorb some 33 million people. That means 
China will have more than 150 million ecological migrants, or, if you like, environmental 
refugees” (Der Spiegel, 2005).  
 
The water security issue in China is not only determined by the consequences of climate 
change but, most importantly, by an increasing water demand and water pollution from 
economic development and population growth. A study on the Qinhe River, one of the most 
important tributaries of the Yellow River, indicated that from 1970 to 2006, the average 
runoff of the Qinhe Basin has reduced by 84.1mm, with climate change contributing to 46.1% 
of the change and human activities accounting for 53.9% of the change (Fu et al., 2010). 
According to a 2007 report conducted jointly by the WB and the Chinese Government on the 
cost of pollution in China, from 2001 to 2005, an average of about 54% of the seven main 
rivers in China contained water deemed unsafe for human consumption (WB, 2007: xi). The 
same year, the Yellow River Conservancy Commission, a Chinese governmental agency, 
surveyed 13,000 kilometres of the river and its tributaries and concluded that a third of the 
water was unfit even for agriculture, due mostly to the pollution generated by the four 
thousand petrochemical plants built on its banks (The Economist, 2013). 
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Another key aspect in the framework of environmental protection and climate change is food 
security81. Agriculture is at the nexus of three of the greatest challenges of the 21st century in 
China: achieving food security, adapting to climate change, and mitigating climate change 
while critical resources, such as water, energy, and land become increasingly scarce 
(Beddington et al., 2012: 6).  
Over the past 50 years, increased water demand for industry and agriculture in the Yellow 
River watershed and climate change have caused the Yellow River to dry up frequently 
downstream, and to diminish its flow into the sea. In the arid and semi-arid regions of western 
China, climate change and overuse of surface water for agricultural irrigation have led to 
severe decreasing of runoff into the inland lakes, resulting in salinisation and shrinkage of 
those lakes. In eastern China, water quality in lakes and rivers is getting worse due to serious 
pollution caused by the development of industry, agriculture, and rapid urbanisation 
(Yongchao et al., 2005).  
Lin Erda, director of the Meteorology Institute of the China Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences, argued that the threat posed by retreating glaciers and water shortages to the 
agricultural sector directly threaten China’s food security because it would reduce output of 
agricultural commodities such as wheat, rice, and maize by the second half of this century 
(Moore, 2009). With a population of more than 1.3 billion people, food security is an 
especially sensitive issue in China. According to China’s National Meteorology Centre, the 
hard winter drought of 2008 and 2009, which was classified as an extreme weather event 
attributable to climate change, illustrates these security implications. This drought was the 
worst in 30 years and affected China’s principal wheat-growing areas, damaging several areas 
of farmland (Ackerman et al., 2012: 59). 
Global climate change would impact food production through a range of pathways: changing 
overall growing conditions in rainfall distribution and temperature regime, and disturbing the 
regular agricultural processes due to extreme weather such as floods, drought, and storms. 
Countries with an agricultural employment rate above 40% are considered to be highly 
sensitive to climate change (Dev, 2011) and, given the large number of people employed in 
agricultural sector, this is definitely a sensitive issue for China.  
Moreover, China is severely affected by desertification, and the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) notes that desertification-prone countries are “particularly 
                                               
81
 Food security is defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as a “situation that exists when all 
people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets 
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”, World Food Summit, 1996. 
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vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (UNFCCC, 2007). More than one-quarter 
of China is already desert, and the Gobi desert is steadily expanding, growing by 10,400 
square kilometres a year. According to the data provided by the United Nations, it grew some 
52,400 square kilometres between 1994 and 1999 (UN, 2004). This desertification threatens 
the livelihoods of some 400 million people, exacerbating not only the problem of availability 
of arable land, but also that of Internally Displaced People (UNCCD, 2000: 5). Water 
shortages, desertification, and the consequent reduction of arable land have also imposed 
serious socioeconomic costs on Chinese western regions that, compared to central and eastern 
regions, are relatively poor and underdeveloped.  These regions are strategically very 
important for the central government, being home to ethnic minorities who have long 
mounted challenges to Beijing’s rule, and the potential negative impacts of extreme weather 
events is a reason of high concern for the central government. In fact, instability in one of 
them, like, for example, Xinjiang or Gansu, could also bring instability to Tibet and Inner 
Mongolia and destabilise an entire area where social tensions are always ready to explode. 
The root causes of social tensions in those regions are a complex mix of history, ethnicity and 
religion, poverty, and underdevelopment, fuelled lately by environmental degradation and 
climate change (Van Wie Davis, 2008). 
While, according to the scientists, it is unclear whether climate change will actually threaten 
China’s total domestic food supply (Xiong et al. 2007), for the Chinese authorities it is clear 
that they cannot afford to ignore the security implications that a changing climate, such as 
large scale intrastate migration, decreasing agricultural water availability, and increased risk 
of catastrophic flooding, poses to China’s development priorities and objectives.  
 
 
6.1.3 Climate Change and China’s Energy Security  
 
Another primary source of concern, most probably the main one, for the Chinese Government 
in the framework of the country’s development priorities of securing economic growth and 
maintaining social stability, is related to energy security.  
The relationship between economic growth and energy utilisation matters greatly, not only 
from an emission perspective, but also from an energy security perspective. This means that 
climate change is not only an environmental issue for China, but also an opportunity to 
address the country’s serious energy shortage problems caused by growing demand, 
144 
 
inefficient use, and limited energy reserves (Lewis, 2008; Chen, 2012: 70). In the framework 
of national security policy, energy security is considered as a part of the Chinese homeland 
security system, meaning that the nation has the ability to control energy resources and obtain 
resources to ensure the country’s need for competitiveness and sustainability in a certain 
period of time. In this regard, stable energy supply and reasonable energy prices are the core 
of energy security (Craig, 2007: 120-129).  
Concerns about energy security are now at the forefront of many current international debates 
on energy policy, profoundly influencing the approach of decision-makers and policy makers 
about a range of issues from national and economic security to international diplomacy, and 
energy security has become a fundamental issue in international politics.  
After the 1973 oil crisis, experts and policy makers used to refer to “energy security” as 
“security of oil supplies” focusing primarily on how to handle any disruption of oil supplies 
from producing countries (OECD/IEA, 2011). Until 1993, when China became a net oil 
importer, the energy security concept entered China’s politics with a traditional understanding 
that energy security refers to oil security of supply. However, in the last two decades, in 
parallel with its impressive economic growth, the concept of energy security for the Chinese 
establishment has changed and expanded and now lies on its own ability to rapidly adjust to 
its new dependence on global markets, which represents a major shift away from its former 
commitments to self-sufficiency. In a broad and long-term perspective, energy security now is 
related to the prices and quantities that can provide enough oil for social and economic 
development in a sustainable manner, avoiding supply disruptions, shortages of supply, and 
soaring prices that will damage China’s economy82. The primary concern for China is to 
ensure it has sufficient energy to support economic growth and prevent debilitating energy 
shortfalls that could trigger social and political turbulence (Wang & Zheng, 2013: 508).  
Oil dependence has always been the biggest concern in the framework of energy security. In 
1993, China became a net oil importer (Table 6.1), and its foreign oil import dependence was 
22.6%, rising to an alarming level of 52% in 2004, which is a globally recognised level for an 




                                               
82
 Research Group on Chinese Homeland Security, Oil Safety - the Key of China’s Energy Issues, China’s Land 
Resource Newspaper, 2005. 
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Table 6.1: China’s foreign oil reliance 
YEAR 
Oil (Thousand barrels per day) 
Import Consumption Foreign oil dependence 
1990 123 2296.4  5.4% 
1991 210.8 2498.8 8.4% 
1992 375.8 2661.6 14.1% 
1993 667.7 2959.5 22.6% 
1994 617.5 3160.6 19.5% 
1995 772.4 3363.2 23.0% 
1996 893.7 3610.1 24.8% 
1997 1343.3 3916.3 34.3% 
1998 1200.4 4105.8 29.2% 
1999 1376.6 4363.6 31.5% 
2000 1965.5 4795.7 41.0% 
2001 1942.5 4917.9 39.5% 
2002 2093.4 5160.7 40.6% 
2003 2602.3 5578.1 46.7% 
2004 3360.1 6437.5 52.2% 
2005 3470.2 6795.4 51.1% 
2006 3819.9 7263.3 52.6% 
2007 4137.1 7479.9 55.3% 
2008 4519.2 7697.1 58.7% 
2009 5184.2 8069.8 64.2% 
2010 5777.3 8938.4 64.6% 
2011 6123.5 9504.0 64.4% 
2012 5188.4 10175.1 51.0% 
Source: USEIA, 2015 
 
While China was becoming more dependent on imported oil, the questions that followed were 
where to get oil resources and how to import them back to China and, above all, how to 
secure its energy supply deals by relying on commercial interest – the standard approach for 
all the biggest industrial energy users over the last two decades – rather than by locking up 
supplies in direct bilateral deals with producing countries. China’s push into Africa, Central 
Asia, and other energy-rich regions, which usually involves special government-to-
government deals, is a rejection of the reigning market-based approach to energy security 
(Victor & Yueh, 2010). 
In this context, from 1993, the Chinese government started an aggressive policy for the 
acquisition of equity stakes of oil assets and energy assets overseas, in the framework of its 
new energy security policy. The three major Chinese National Owed Companies (NOCs), 
including the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China Petroleum & 
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Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC), have been the key players in the practice of doing business abroad, especially in 
global mergers and acquisitions in upstream oil and natural gas. According to the IEA, in 
2010, Chinese oil companies were already operating in 31 countries and had equity in 
production in 20 of those countries, mostly in Kazakhstan, Sudan, Venezuela and Angola 
(IEA, 2010). Chinese companies have been further encouraged to internationalise since the 
“going abroad” policy of the 10th FYP (2001-2005), and the early wave of Chinese investment 
abroad has been augmented by Chinese investment in the renewable energy sector following 
the 12 FYP (2011-2015) and the recently inaugurated 13 FYP (2016 -2020). Moreover, to 
secure oil supply from the international markets, China also considered the diversification of 
oil suppliers and transport routes as an important energy security policy, investing also in 
transnational oil pipelines in North, Central, and Southeast Asia83. 
From 1990-2010, China’s aforementioned economic increase at an average rate of about 9% 
each year was mainly driven by the burning of fossil fuels, especially by a coal-dominated 
energy system. Rapid economic development leads to a soaring demand on energy and 
resources, challenging China’s development towards a sustainable, stable, and healthy 
pathway. In 2010, China’s primary energy consumption was 2432.2Mtoe, increasing by 
11.2% over 2009, and it accounted for 20.3% of the world’s total primary consumption. In the 
energy mix, coal consumption accounted for 48.2% of the world’s coal consumption, oil 
10.6%, and natural gas 3.4% (BP, 2011).  
China is currently the largest commercial energy user in the world and is projected to 
consume more than twice as much energy as the United States in 2040. It has been the 
world’s largest primary energy producer since 2007 and consumer since 2010. It is the second 
largest oil importing country, behind the United States, and the largest greenhouse gases 
emitter from energy since 2007. It is also estimated that by 2030, the total amount of Chinese 
demand will grow by 60%, based on the level of 2014, and 76% by 2040 (USEIA, 2013). 
Given this scenario, energy security has been at the top of China’s policy agenda because of 
the increasing energy demand, required to fuel its strong economic growth and development. 
In 2006, President Hu Jingtao proposed a “new energy security concept” when he talked 
about energy security issues at the G8 Summit in St Petersburg. He called for close 
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 Like, for example, the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, a multi-phase 400,000 bbl/d pipeline from Atyrau in 
western Kazakhstan to Alashankou in western China, which is a joint venture between the CNPC and the Kazakh 




international cooperation to increase oil and gas supplies and addressed the need of 
controlling domestic demand for “sustainable development of human society”. This new 
energy security concept was expressed by other Chinese leaders in international meetings in 
the framework of constructing a “resource-conserving and environmentally friendly society” 
(Kennedy, 2010).  
As outlined in Chapter I, Downs (2006) identified three key elements in Chinese approach to 
energy security: sufficient energy supplies to protect the Chinese government’s core 
objectives of prioritising economic development and social stability, affordable energy prices, 
and reliability for oil and natural gas to have the safe delivery of imports to China (Downs, 
2006). However, lately, another element entered into this scheme: stability of the network. In 
fact, a nation’s energy system is a complex, interconnected network in which a disruption in 
one part of the infrastructure can easily cause disruptions elsewhere in the system. After 
September 11, many policymakers and industry experts dedicated increasing attention to the 
system’s vulnerability to intentional attacks, accidents, or natural disasters. Power blackouts 
as well as chronic shortages of electric power in China have raised worries about the 
reliability of electricity supply systems. Today, the concept of energy security needs to be 
expanded to include the protection of the entire energy supply chain and infrastructure 
(Yergin, 2006). 
Climate change, especially through extreme weather events, has, in recent years, threatened 
China’s energy security by damaging energy infrastructure and directly cutting off energy 
services. Given the impact of climate change, an energy system supported by strong, stable, 
and reliable infrastructure emerges as a concern to ensure safe energy supply. Indeed, as 
happened in the United States with hurricanes Katrina and Rita, after the storms, the Gulf 
Coast refineries and the big US pipelines were unable to operate, not because they were 
damaged, but because they could not get enough power. This brought a new perspective to the 
security question, highlighting the fundamental role of the electric grid in the system. In early 
June 2010, several provinces in South China were hit hard by heavy rainstorms, and energy 
supply was disrupted due to the damage of energy infrastructure.  
From mid-January to early February 2008, South China was affected by extremely lower 
temperatures and strong snowstorms, which affected power transmission lines and distribution 
systems across the country. Extremely cold weather and snowstorms blocked coal 
transportation by railways, and coal reserves sharply decreased in most coal-fired power 
plants. Some installations stopped to operate due to lack of feedstock. Across the country, 19 
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provinces either have had to limit electricity use or have experienced electricity cut-offs, 
being affected by the extreme weather event (NDRC, 2008).   
Traditionally, China is a coal self-sufficient country and belongs to the group of six countries 
(the US, Russia, India, Australia and South Africa) that hold 81% of global coal reserves. 
These reserves are expected to last for more than 160 years, which means that coal will be a 
fixed element in the Chinese fuel mix (Baumert et al., 2005). Moreover, starting from 2005, 
China has become a net steam coal importer for the first time. Coal imports in China mainly 
meet demand in coastal areas, as 80% of China’s coal resources are located in the inland 
areas, such as Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Shaanxi, and only 6% of coal resources lie in 
coastal areas where there is high demand for energy resources for advanced economic 
development. This unbalanced distribution of coal production and consumption means that 
not only does China’s railway have to undertake much of the transportation of coal to coastal 
areas, but China is also vulnerable to the potential risks of coal supply disruptions to thermal 
power generation. The risk of these energy supply disruptions caused by extreme weather 
events warn that simply acquiring adequate energy resources is not enough to secure China’s 
energy supply, and building up a stronger and firmer energy system capable of managing 
emerging climate risks and unexpected disruptions is a fundamental element of energy 
security.  
In recent decades, China’s energy security policy has focused on the supply side of obtaining 
more resources, but it has now realised that taking measures to expand supply only is not 
sufficient to meet China’s energy security needs. Therefore, more efforts have had to be put 
on the demand side to reduce energy consumption and increase energy efficiency, meaning 
China’s energy security is managed on both the supply and demand sides in order to cope 
with the risks of energy shortage and supply disruptions due to extreme weather events. 
Indeed, regardless of the models, calculations, and assumptions, the Chinese government have 
identified two fundamental steps toward energy security:  the improvement of energy 
intensity (the total amount of energy consumed per unit of GDP) in order to increase the 
efficiency of energy consumption, and the transformation of the domestic energy 
consumption pattern, encouraging the development of renewable and clean energy. 
In this regard, an important role in reducing CO2 emissions will be played by renewable and 
clean energies. In the carbon constrained world, renewable and clean energies play a critical 
role for energy security and CO2 emission reductions. With the double aim of diversifying its 
own energy mix and implementing climate mitigation policies, China has implemented an 
ambitious long-term program of investment in renewable energy that has positioned the 
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country as a world leader in manufacturing renewable energy parts, coinciding with a global 
surge in wind and solar power.  
The challenge of energy security will grow more urgent in the years ahead because the scale 
of the global trade in energy will grow substantially as world markets become more 
integrated. Current and future advances in technology could therefore allow very large 
additional gains (Yergin, 2006). This implies that the interlinked energy demand of China and 
CO2 emissions trend will be a function of policy options and development pathways that 
China will take in the next decades. 
 
 
6.2 China’s Climate Change Policies and Actions 
 
China’s climate change policy is part of its energy and environmental strategy, which in turn 
is driven by the country’s overall economy growth targets. Inside the Chinese government, 
overwhelmed by the strategic priority of modernising the economy, economic and energy 
departments have played a predominant role in shaping the country’s climate policy, while 
environmental administration from central to local government is subordinate in the policy 
process (Chen, 2012: 24). 
China’s first engagement with international environmental protection frameworks was in 
1972, when it sent a delegation to the UN Conference on the Human Environment in 
Stockholm. Political factors associated with the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and, after 
1978, the imperative of growth maximisation, later weakened its commitment to 
environmental protection and, in the late 1980s, Chinese climate change policies were mostly 
limited to scientific investigations.  
Climate Change as a policy issue was brought to China from the international arena, when the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) founded the IPCC in 1988. Initially, the Chinese government viewed climate change 
policy as a highly scientific issue, mainly from the realm of foreign affairs (Stensdal, 2012: 
5). The first institutionalisation of climate change in China came in 1987 when the then State 
Science and Technology Commission (SSTC) founded the Chinese National Climate 
Committee (CNCC) with the objective of coordinating research on climate change 
(Beuermann, 1997: 225). In 1990, the State Council’s Environmental Protection Commission 
issued a paper on China’s position on global environmental problems, emphasising the 
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responsibility of developed countries for the deterioration of the global environment, and the 
sovereignty of developing countries over their natural resources and their rights to economic 
development. Climate change was viewed in this context.  
In 1992, former Chinese Premier Li Peng stated at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro that if the goal of environmental 
protection were to come into conflict with the goal of economic growth, priority would have 
been given to the economy (Beuermann, 1997: 226). Following the world conference in Rio, 
sustainable development was incorporated into national policy programmes but, as anticipated 
by the Chinese Premier, economic growth took priority. Since then, from the late 1990s until 
2006, economic development grew tremendously, bringing more wealth but also increasing 
the demand for natural resources and, above all, energy sources, which in turn meant more 
GHG emissions.  
The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 marked a turning point in the development path 
undertaken by Chinese authority. By ratifying the protocol, China showed the international 
community that it was ready to take on mitigation actions and play its part in the global fight 
against climate change. The watershed for domestic climate change policy came five years 
later in 2007, with the National Climate Change Programme, the first ever comprehensive 
policy paper in the context of growing global climate concerns produced/presented by a 
developing country. The 62-page document states China's basic standing, current 
achievements, challenges, and details key areas of actions, policies, and measures China 
would take to mitigate the effects of climate change. Even though the majority of the policies 
and programs mentioned in the plan were not specific climate change policies, those policies 
do have impacts on reducing GHG emissions while addressing, de facto, energy security. 
In later 2007, the State Council issued an official document requiring local governments to 
perform and implement the Climate Change Programme according to their specific situations. 
Moreover, in March 2008, the government elevated the status of the State Environmental 
Protection Agency into a fully-fledged Cabinet Ministry, with more staff and a bigger budget. 
An analysis of the Chinese institutions that have been responsible for climate change policy 
over time is necessary to understand how the government has approached this issue. Since the 
early 1980s the Chinese government, in order to address the topic of climate change, which 
involves issues related to environmental protection, energy, meteorology, research and 
development, technology, and foreign affairs, established an ad hoc inter-ministerial structure 
to manage and coordinate actions and initiatives between all majors actors involved in the 
development of the national and international climate change regime. 
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Following the imperative “development first”, China’s national climate change policies were 
necessarily influenced and determined by the importance of the different agencies involved in 
the inter-ministerial coordination, in which the National and Development Reform 
Commission (NDRC), a sort of macroeconomic and energy agency, has been playing a pivotal 
role, while the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the former State Environmental 
Administration (SEPA), and the China Meteorological Administration (CMA) has been 
marginalized (Fifure 6.4). 
 
Figure 6.4:  China’s inter-agency mechanism on climate change  
 
Source: Chen, 2012: 26 
 
At the very beginning, when the Chinese government started to manage climate change as a 
scientific issue, the CMA was appointed to be responsible for advising the government on 
policy options in the international arena involving the UNFCCC. As political awareness and 
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economic sensitivity surrounding climate change increased in the late 1990s, this role was 
shifted to the more powerful State Development and Planning Commission, which has since 
evolved into the NDRC (Lewis, 2007: 158). In 1998, the Chinese government established the 
National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC), an ad hoc inter-agency 
organisation that later included representatives from the NDRC, the Foreign Ministry, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, the CMA, the SEPA, and ten other ministerial-level 
departments. The NCCCC appointed the director of the NDRC as its chairman.  
As clearly illustrated in the Figure 6.4 below, within the highly bureaucratic Chinese 
architecture for environmental protection, responsibilities were scattered among several 
ministries, governmental agencies, and the National Department, and the State Environmental 
Protection Administration, ranking fifth in the agency order, had very limited powers in 
dealing with pollution controls and other environmental issues.  
China’s political system is made up of five interconnected levels: national, provincial, 
municipal, county, and township. To their counterparts one level down, leading officials 
effectively say throughout this system, “We will permit you sufficient flexibility to devise 
creative ways to make the GDP in your jurisdiction grow.” Success is rewarded in two ways. 
Formally, annual performance evaluations are pegged primarily to GDP growth in each 
jurisdiction. Informally, local officials personally benefit financially from that growth by 
investing in, or holding positions in key firms (Economy and Lieberthal, 2007). In this 
context, it is the local government, not the higher level of the environmental protection 
apparatus, that provides local environmental agencies with their annual budgetary funds, 
approves institutional promotions, and determines increases in personnel and even allocation 
of resources such as cars, office buildings, and employee housing (Jahiel, 1998: 35). Because 
GDP growth was the most relevant index employed to measure local administrators’ 
performance and was at the basis of their future promotions, local leaders treated economic 
growth as top priority and were unwilling to see local economy and new investments 
hampered by the implementation of strict environmental regulations.  
In 2004, in an attempt to improve the environmental protection performance at local level, the 
Chinese government introduced the Green GDP initiative. This initiative was addressed to 
measure the performance of local administrators and local communist party leaders, taking 
into consideration their achievement in environmental protection policies, deducting points 
from their GDP growth numbers in relation to environmental damages. However, facing the 
resistance of local officials and considering that there was no internationally accepted 
standard for calculating “Green GDP” to be used uniformly for the 31 Chinese regions, the 
153 
 
initiative never had any impact (WSJ, 2007). 
Between 2002 and 2006, China developed its first National Climate Change Assessment 
(MOST, 2006), which highlighted existing knowledge and key knowledge gaps and, in spring 
2006, SEPA announced that only about 500 out of the 70,000 violations of environmental 
regulations reported from 2003 through to 2005 had been dealt with. The agency attributed 
this abysmal record to the fact that local governments around the country actively encourage 
enterprises to violate environmental regulations and then protect them from punishment when 
they do (Economy and Lieberthal, 2007). In the same year, the review of the results of 
China’s tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2005), highlighted the very poor performance achieved 
on environmental protection. The plan, which began in 2001, called for a 10% reduction in 
sulphur dioxide in China’s air, but when the plan concluded in 2005, sulphur dioxide 
pollution in China had increased by 27%. 
In 2007, following the poor performances of its environmental protection policies and being 
increasingly under pressure, both at a national level for the rising number and intensity of 
incidents of social unrest due to environmental degradation, and at an international level 
following its rapidly growing emissions, the Chinese government upgraded the level of the 
National Coordination Committee on Climate Change, and established the National Leading 
Group on Climate Change, headed by former Premier Wen Jiabao. The National Leading 
Group, which brought together 27 member government agencies working on climate change, 
was aimed at devising national climate change strategies, directions, and measures, to unify 
national actions on climate change, to research international cooperation and negotiation 
processes, and to coordinate solutions to the key issues in responding to climate change.   
This was the starting point of a “new deal” in China’ s environmental protection policies and 
was mainly reflected in the actions and targets of the 11th Five-Year Plan. In 2007, the same 
year, China became the largest GHG-emitting country and the IPCC released its Fourth 
Assessment Report; climate change became a domestic policy issue in its own right, no longer 
merely part of the larger “environmental protection umbrella”. From this year on, the central 
government elevated the importance of climate change, making it a more prominent part of 
domestic policies.  
The outline of the 11th Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2006-2010) 
considered climate change as a major strategic task for China to build an energy-conserving 
and environmental-friendly society (SCIO, 2008). The first major policy statement concerning 
climate change was made in the National Climate Change Program, released in June 2007 
(NDRC, 2007a). China’s National Climate Change Program, which took the Chinese 
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government two years to formulate, set the general objectives of addressing climate change up 
to 2010: improve the capacity of public administration in controlling greenhouse gas 
emissions, enhance the capability of adaptation to climate change, and promote climate-
change-related research. In addition, it was also instructed that public awareness of climate 
change should be enhanced, and the institutions and mechanisms for dealing with climate 
change should be further strengthened (SCIO, 2008). Despite its refusal to shoulder 
internationally imposed quantified emissions reduction targets, China, in its national program, 
was putting forward some voluntary targets in energy conservation and fuel switching that 
could ensure emissions cutting.  
A National Science and Technology Plan for climate change was also released that specifies 
areas and measures for addressing key knowledge and capacity gaps related to climate change 
mitigation, impacts, and adaptation (NDRC, 2007b). China's Science and Technology 
Program on Climate Change, in 2007, set targeted phased goals for scientific work as a 
response to climate change during the 11th Five-year Plan period (2006-2010) and long-term 
goals up to the year 2020. Areas such as the science of climate change, R&D of greenhouse 
gas control technologies, adaptation technologies and measures, and major strategies and 
policies to cope with climate change were identified as priorities (SCIO, 2008).  
During the 10th Five-year Plan period (2001-2005), the government invested more than 2.5 
billion yuan in scientific and technological research on climate change through national 
science and technology programs such as the National Key Technologies R&D Program, 
National High-Tech R&D Program (863 program), and National Basic Research Program 
(973 program). By the end of 2007, more than 7 billion yuan from the national science and 
technology programs for the 11th Five-year Plan period (2006-2010) had been invested in 
R&D programs on energy conservation and emission reduction. In addition, through other 
channels, the country has invested large amounts of funds for R&D on climate change.  
In the 11th FYP the performance assessment of local administrators was also reviewed. In 
November 2007, the Chinese government released an internal note addressed to public 
administrators that used green figures per unit of GDP energy consumption and major 
pollutants reduction to assess provincial officials’ performances. Instead of pure economic 
figures, the Chinese government was trying to measure local official achievement through a 
much more complicated system that also included environmental indexes. According to the 
Implementation Plan for Unit GDP Energy Consumption Assessment System, approved by 
the State Council and included in the note, local administrators as well as leaders of the top 
1000 state-owned or controlled energy consumption enterprises were to be assessed by per-
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unit GDP energy consumption measures, calculated through a quantified scored methodology. 
For all provincial governments, energy conservation assessment results would be provided to 
the personnel department, and would be regarded as an important basis for a comprehensive 
assessment of the National Leading Group and leading officials of the government. According 
to the new rules, within those provincial governments that were evaluated as failing to meet 
those targets, the leading officials were excluded from any incentive treatments (such as 
annual productivity premium, honorary title, etc.). Moreover, the central government would 
temporarily stop the verification and approval of newly constructed high-energy consuming 
projects in the region. The top 1000 key state-owned enterprises that were evaluated as failing 
to meet targets would be subject to a notice of criticism, and would not be granted any 
incentive treatments or facilitations (such as being granted an “inspection free” period of 
time). Moreover, the verification and approval of their newly constructed high-energy 
consuming investment projects and newly added industrial land would be suspended. In 2007, 
the State Council made it a requirement for each province to implement the National Climate 
Change Action Plan in light of local conditions by establishing coordination mechanism and 
climate change agencies, and by making locally relevant policies and regulations (NDRC, 
2007b).  
In 2008, the NDRC set up the Department of Climate Change, the most powerful body in 
charge of climate change and related social development issues. The major work of the 
climate department focuses on analysing the social and economic impact of climate change, 
making strategies, plans and policies, coordinating international cooperation and capacity 
building, and facilitating implementation of energy conservation and emission reductions. In 
the same year, China also released the first white paper called China’s Policies and Actions for 
Addressing Climate Change, which presents policies and actions to adapt to climate change 
(SCIO, 2008). In the white paper, the Chinese government acknowledges the impacts and 
risks of climate change for the country’s development. This document, which devoted a 
special section to technological innovation, outlined the basic principle for addressing climate 
change, highlighting strategic areas of action, and listing specific targets and actions to 
support adaptation. The Climate Change Programme and the white paper are essential for 
understanding China’s climate change policy. Following the white paper, the NDRC released 
annual reports on the progress of China’s Climate Change Actions and Policies to summarise 
the yearly achievements on policies, actions, and solutions to the climate issues.     
The year 2009 saw further expansion of climate change polices in China. Prior to the COP 15 
in Copenhagen, China’s State Council adopted the country’s first carbon-specific goal. The 
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State Council decided that China would lower its carbon intensity84 by 40–45% by 2020 
compared to 2005 levels (Reuters, 2009). Earlier reduction in China had been measured in 
terms of energy saved, not in terms of emissions. In 2009, Premier Wen Jiabao declared: “In 
the years ahead, China will further integrate actions on climate change into its economic and 
social development plan…’ (NDRC, 2009). The term “low-carbon” began to appear in 
official statements, reports, and policy texts. Together with the continued emphasis on long-
term research and energy conservation efforts, there has been a slow but steady diversification 
of China’s policies on climate change, often using pilot projects85. During the 11th Five-Year 
Plan period, China accelerated the transformation of its economic development model, and 
achieved remarkable results in controlling greenhouse gas emission by promoting industrial 
restructuring, energy restructuring, and energy conservation, improving energy efficiency, and 
increasing carbon sink. To achieve this goal, in 2006 China’s government presented the fifteen 
year Medium and Long Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology and, in 
2007, the Medium and Long Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China. 
In November 2007, the Chinese Ministry for Science and Technology (MOST) and National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) jointly launched the International Science 
and Technology Cooperation Program on New and Renewable Energy. The program’s goals 
were twofold: diversifying the sources of technology imports, and expediting technology 
transfer processes between China and other countries (Tan & Gang, 2009: 5).  
With the ambition of becoming a global power in clean technology, China’s major enterprises 
are actively pursuing opportunities around the world, with a specific focus on developing 
countries and emerging economies. In order to support the private sector’s efforts, the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce established the Department of Scientific and Technological 
Development and Trade in Technology. Under its guidance, governments at different levels 
have been deeply involved in technology transfer to other developing countries. This outreach 
includes supporting Chinese firms to build a presence overseas through capacity-building 
programs aimed at training local staff in partner countries, and mandating “all-in-one service” 
as the way to transfer technology to local partners. The China Council for the Promotion of 
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 In 2010, China launched a national "low-carbon province and low-carbon city" experimental project. The first 
batch of selected localities included five provinces, namely, Guangdong, Hubei, Liaoning, Shaanxi, and Yunnan, 
and eight cities, namely, Tianjin, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Xiamen, Shenzhen, Guiyang, Nanchang, and Baoding. 
Currently, all the pilot provinces and cities have established leading work teams, formulated implementation 




International Trade, for example, has hosted training workshops for government employees 
and workers from 91 developing countries in the past decades (CCPIT, 2009).  
For developing countries, the bulk of technological progress comes from the adoption and 
adaptation of pre-existing but new-to-market technologies and through the spread of such 
technologies across sectors, within a country (WB, 2008). In the decades ahead, most of the 
growth in global energy demand will move decisively towards emerging economies, which 
will account for more than 90% of net energy demand growth in  2035 (IEA, 2013). 
Therefore, in order to achieve a low carbon economy, large-scale clean technology 
deployment is a key requirement in the developing world.  
China’s comprehensive efforts to lay the groundwork, both to achieve a domestic low carbon 
economy, and to assist other developing countries to do so, indicate its commitment to 
becoming a global player in the clean technology revolution. Moreover, its efforts also 
manifest in policy approaches, funding, and partnership models from which other developing 
countries can learn. The latest phase of domestic climate change policies occurred in 2009 
with the announcement of a carbon-intensity target, followed in 2011 by the 12th Five Year 
Plan’s widening of policies, in measure and in scope (Stensdal, 2012: 5).  
Energy policies have dominated China’s development strategy for a long time and today the 
government exploits global concern about climate change as a golden opportunity to improve 
energy efficiency and boost clean energy production. When such “no regret”86 policies were 
designed, policy makers might have placed emphasis on economic factors such as energy 
supply and jobs, rather than the environment. However, in practice, these no regret options, 
assisted through CDM87 projects and subsequently the new energy strategy, have functioned 
as an efficient means to help the country slow down its greenhouse gas emissions growth and 
gain a competitive position in the clean energy sector (Chen, 2012: xiii). 
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 No regrets options are by definition GHG emissions reduction options that have negative net costs, because 
they generate direct or indirect benefits that are large enough to offset the costs of implementing the options. The 
costs and benefits included in the assessment, in principle, are all internal and external impacts of the options, 
UNFCCC (.http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/index.php?idp=292). 
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 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the Flexible Mechanisms defined in the Kyoto Protocol 
(IPCC, 2007). The CDM allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries to earn certified emission 
reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2. These CERs can be traded and sold, and used by 




6.3 China’s 12th Five Year Plan and Climate Policy 
 
Since the Chinese government launched its 1st Five Year Plan (FYP) on National Economic 
and Social Development in 1953, the plans have become milestones for identifying the 
government’s strategic policy priorities over a multi-year time horizon. The plans are 
overarching strategies that shape the nation's economic and social development objectives and 
determine the allocation of resources among different sectors and industries. Despite China’s 
significant progress towards becoming a market economy, FYPs remain the benchmark by 
which the government measures its own success. In this view, delivering the FYP is a crucial 
source of legitimacy for the Chinese leadership. In the early years of the People’s Republic of 
China, successive plans revealed some very different priorities and also reflected the political 
situation of the time (Figure 6.2).  
 
Table 6.2: China’s Five-Year Plan 
PLAN DATES KEY FEATURE 
First 1953 - 1957 Stalinist Central Plan 
Second 1958 - 1962 Great Leap Forward 
Third 1966 - 1970 Agricultural Push 
Fourth 1971 - 1975 Cultural Revolution 
Fifth 1976 - 1980 Post-Mao (Reforms and Opening up) 
Sixth 1981 - 1985 Readjustment and Recovery 
Seventh 1986 - 1990 Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 
Eightn 1991 - 1995 Technical development 
Ninth 1996 - 2000 SOE Reforms 
Tenth 2001 - 2005 Strategic Restructuring 
Eleventh 2006 - 2010 Rebalance Alert 
Thwelft 2011 - 2015 Pro (sustainable) Consumption 
Thirteenth 2016 - 2020 China New Normal 
Source: China’s 12th Five Year Plan: Strategy vs. Tactics, Morgan Stanley Asia, 2011 – further elaborated by the 
author 
 
The 1st FYP (1953 – 1957) had been drawn up with the support of the Former Soviet Union 
and focused on large-scale construction, rapid heavy industrialisation under increasing state 
control, and the planning of an agricultural economy based on the soviet model. The 2nd FYP 
(1958 – 1962) moved on from the previous one, focusing on addressing growth in heavy 
industry, but is widely known as the Plan of the Great Leap Forward, a socioeconomic plan 
designed to transform China’s agrarian socioeconomic culture towards an industrialised one. 
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The program, which was grounded upon the Marxian prescription for the advancement of 
industrial technology, has been considered by a number of scholars and researchers the main 
cause of the Great Famine which yielded the deaths of twenty to forty-three million people 
(Meng et al., 2010; Kung & Lin, 2003; Johnson, 1998; Riskin, 1998). The 3rd FYP (1966 - 
1970), with a new emphasis on national defence and state sovereignty, reflected increased 
international tensions following Sino-Soviet split in 1961. The 4th FYP (1971 – 1975) was the 
last of the Mao era, and from 1976 onward China changed course, entering the period 
officially known as reform and opening up. This strategic shift was reflected in the Ten Year 
National Economic Development Plan for 1976-1985, and marked the beginning of three 
decades of impressive growth and tremendous transformation of Chinese economic and social 
structure.  
The 10th FYP (2000 – 2005) was the first to include some environmental targets and the 11th 
plan (2006 – 2011), even with development as its underlying primary goal, reflected, for the 
first time, the government’s growing concern with the environmental costs of China’s 
development model. The tensions between the growth imperative and sustainability were in 
evidence throughout the 10th and 11th Five-Year Plans, especially with regards to 
environmental targets. While the 10th FYP stressed the need for energy efficiency and set 
targets for the reduction of pollution, most of them were missed. The government renewed its 
efforts to balance headline GDP growth and environmental protection in the 11th FYP and, 
included within the most high profile environmental targets of the plan, there was a 20% 
energy intensity target by 2010 and a 15% renewable energy target by 2020. This was mostly 
driven by the need to enhance China’s energy efficiency and energy security.  
The Chinese Renewable Energy Law, which took effect on 1st January 2006, sets out the 
framework for promoting the development and utilisation of renewable energy from non-
fossil fuel sources such as wind, solar, water, biomass, geothermal, and ocean, and requires 
electricity grid companies to purchase power produced by renewable power generators in 
China (Ma, 2010). Since the promulgation of the Chinese Renewable Energy Law, Beijing 
investments in clean coal technologies, carbon capture and sequestration, and smart grid have 
been increasing exponentially. 
In an effort to weed out polluting and energy intensive industries, China has also instituted a 
differential pricing system, whereby state power companies now charge higher electricity 
prices to the least efficient industrial concerns and lower prices to the more efficient ones, in 
an effort to reward the most efficient producers and force the least efficient to either change or 
shut down (Friedman, 2009: 411). 
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By the end of 2010, the target of 20% energy efficiency reduction, on the basis of 2005, was 
achieved by 19.06%, and this resulted in a 0.63 billion ton coal equivalent energy saving and 
1.46 Gt CO2 emissions reduction. To achieve these targets, the Chinese government adopted 
drastic, top-down measures including closing down thousands of outdated and inefficient 
plants in its power and heavy industry sectors. Small plants were also consolidated to improve 
efficiency, and restrictions were introduced to discourage the production and export of 
energy-intensive products such as steel and cement (Ng & Mabey, 2011: 9).  
The challenge of implementing both the target of energy efficiency and renewable energy was 
a balancing of job creation and growth with environmental protection, and the main difficulty 
was maintaining sectorial targets against a background of other variables. The level of 
achievement suffered for a number of reasons: the lack of clear pathways was certainly one, 
but the ambition was also affected by higher than anticipated economic growth and the 
impacts of China’s stimulus measures, taken in response to the global economic crisis (Hilton, 
2011: 7-8). In the closing months of the 11th FYP, many local government officials, whose 
political careers had become dependent upon achieving energy intensity targets, started to 
take desperate measures, including closing down power plants, cutting electricity supplies to 
hospitals, traffic lights, and factories. These “emergency” measures had highly counter-
productive results and negative consequences, such as unanticipated pressure on diesel 
supplies as factory owners reached for their generators, generating pollution along with the 
electricity.  
The 12th FYP, which was endorsed by the National People’s Congress in March 2011, 
represents the first clear elaboration of China’s climate-change policies, and lay down the 
basis for China’s new model of economic development. In the 12th FYP, Chinese focus 
switched from the “quantity of growth” to the quality of development, summarised into seven 
key themes: sustainable growth, moving up the value chain, reducing disparities, scientific 
development, domestic consumption, energy efficiency, and environmental protection. 
In this Five Year Plan, for the first time, the targets of economic development, carbon 
intensity reduction, and energy efficiency improvement, along with other environmental 
related indicators for 2015 appeared together, implying that China’s climate-energy policy 
framework is shifting towards an integrated approach to meet the challenges of sustainable 
development. According to Professor Hu Hangang, Professor at the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences and Tsinghua University and the Director of the Centre for China Study, one of the 
most innovative characteristics of this 12th FYP is the theme of green development putting 
forward an “ecological security” strategy. In fact, emphasis was put on the need to “construct 
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a resource-conserving and environmentally friendly society”. The plan explicitly says that, 
faced with ever-stronger environmental and resource constraints, China must increase its 
sense of urgency and accelerate the transition from a brown economy model to a green and 
low-carbon development one (Hu & Liang, 2011). 
The developed world has vastly reduced air pollution over the past several decades through 
ever-tougher regulations on conventional pollutants like soot and acid rain, which cause sulfur 
dioxide. The need for developing countries and emerging economies to reduce air pollution is 
no different.  
Conventional air pollution is a tremendous threat to public health, and the costs of air and 
water pollution amass to an increasing percentage of GDP every year, (potentially) damaging 
China's growth rate. 
Any policies or efforts that divert investment from the dirtiest sources towards cleaner 
alternatives, like natural gas and renewables, will benefit public health, while helping the 
climate as well.  
The Chinese economy, despite the slowdown in its growth rate, continues to require a 
growing share of energy, which produces increasing air pollution. In 2013, China was the 
world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitter (29% of global emissions), the world's second-largest 
consumer of oil, and moved from second-largest net importer of oil to the largest in 2014 (US 
EIA, 2015). China’s dependency on imported oil and its air pollution problem give the 
country two key reasons to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels. To reduce air pollution, cross-
sectorial and long-term policies are needed to address the multiple key sources of pollution: 
energy, transportation, housing, and management of urban areas. The common necessitation 
of such policies is mostly the reduction of fossil fuel consumption.   
China’s efforts to reduce poverty and expand energy access, keep pace with rapid economic 
development, and implement policies aimed at tackling severe air pollution in its major cities 
have propelled its rapid rise to the front of the world’s clean energy race. Moreover, the 
Chinese government has put significant public investment into energy technology innovation, 
moving it up the value chain, and into policy efforts such as encouraging renewable financing, 
simplifying administrative procedures, and promoting “green credit”88. 
In 2013, China increased its CO2 emissions by 3%, which is low compared with its annual 
increases of about 10% over the last decades. This was primarily due to three key actions 
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implemented by the Chinese government: (1) the large increase of renewables (hydropower 
generation, wind, and solar), (2) improvement in energy efficiency, and (3) structural changes 
in the economic model of growth. Wind is growing in China more than nuclear, and, in a few 
years, solar and wind power could be the stronger drivers that push down the price of Chinese 
electricity. New renewable power capacity surpassed new fossil fuel and nuclear capacity in 
China for the first time in 2013 (REN21, 2014). China is now home to about 24% of the 
world’s renewable power capacity, including an estimated 260 gigawatts of hydropower. 
China’s renewable energy investment is part of its 12th Five-Year Plan for Economic and 
Social Development, which called for the country to spend $473.1 billion on clean energy 
investments between 2011 and 2015. China’s goal is to have 20% of its total energy demand 
sourced from renewable energy by 2020.  
The government’s decisive actions to support and subsidise the clean-energy industry have 
received remarkable payoffs. As a result of the Renewable Energy Law, the Medium and 
Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy (2007), and other detailed 
implementation regulations, China’s renewable energy industry has been booming as a new 
source of economic growth. Having taken a leading position in the sector of renewable 
energy, China is now the world’s largest market of wind turbines and solar panels, as well as 
the largest producer of wind power (Chen, 2012: 51).  
The energy efficiency improvement, a decline in electricity and fuel demand by the basic 
materials industry due to a slowdown in the growth rate, as well as the development of low-
carbon technologies in the final uses, have driven the reduction of carbon intensity of about 
4% (twice as fast as in 2012). In terms of energy efficiency, one of the most relevant targets 
of China’s 11th Five-Year Plan was to decrease the overall energy intensity of the economy by 
20%. To this aim, the government mobilised a national campaign to promote energy 
efficiency, targeting in particular the largest and least efficient energy consuming enterprises. 
The Top 1,000 Program targeted approximately 1,000 companies, which consume about one-
third of the country’s energy, for efficiency improvements.  
The 12th FYP builds directly on the 11th FYP’s energy intensity target and its associated 
programs, setting a new target to reduce energy intensity by an additional 16% by 2015. The 
lower target, in respect to the 11th FYP, can be justified by the fact that the largest and least 
efficient enterprises had already undertaken efficiency improvements, leaving smaller, more 
efficient plants to be targeted in this second round. Other key targets include an increasing of 
non-fossil energy to 11.4% of total energy use and a 17% reduction in carbon intensity.  
Finally, the continuation of structural changes in the growth model of the Chinese economy 
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has played a key role in slowing down GHG emissions. In recent years, China has closed 
down over 9,000 inefficient coal plants, and has committed to cap coal use starting from 
2015. Up until now the alternative to an inefficient coal plant in China has generally been a 
more efficient modern coal plant, but renewables are now a valid competitor in many regions. 
Moreover, the increasing role of “soft tech” and engineering services in the Chinese economy 
and the large investments and deployment in high-speed electric trains, electric buses, electric 
cars, and electric bikes, used by the millions, have played a relevant role.  
In addition, the Chinese government approved an energy consumption control target with the 
aim of bringing total energy consumption below 4 billion tonnes in standard coal equivalents 
by 2015 (NEAA, 2013). The 12th FYP’s advocacy of sustainable development is stronger than 
in any previous FYP: “In transforming the economic development mode, the importance of 
building a resource-saving and environment-friendly society should be stressed to save 
energy, reduce greenhouse emissions and actively tackle global climate change” (EC, 2011: 
7).  
In January 2011, the NDRC initiated the National Climate Change Planning, as one of the 
most important elements of the 12th Five Year Plan. The National Climate Change Planning 
aims to improve mechanisms and policy frameworks required to adapt to climate change and 
to help reach the 2020 emissions reduction target set by the Chinese government. The main 
focus of environmental concerns in the 12th FYP has been climate change and the creation of 
a green economy. In this view, the Chinese government recognises that “greening the 
economy” is an emerging global aspiration and has embraced the strategic goals of boosting 
the country’s economic growth while also enhancing environmental protection. Over the past 
decades, and especially during the 11th Five-Year Plan period of 2006 – 2010, China has 
prioritised green development in almost all leading economic sectors. Efforts have been 
undertaken to boost energy efficiency in industry, transportation, and building; to develop 
wind, solar, and other renewable energy sources; to create a resource-saving “circular” 
economy; and to transform traditional sectors through the use of energy-efficient and 
environmentally sound technologies (Pan et. al, 2012). Another goal of the 12th FYP is an 
improved system for monitoring greenhouse gas emissions, which will be needed to assess 
compliance with the carbon intensity target, and to prepare the national GHG inventories. 
Central to the 12th FYP is China’s new “green” industrial strategy, where the development of 
seven new strategic industries has been prioritised: alternative energy, biotechnology, new 
generation information technology, high-end equipment manufacturing, advanced materials, 
alternative fuel cars, and energy saving and environmental protection. The total value added 
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output of the new industries is expected to account for around 8% of China’s GDP in 2015 
and 15% by 2020 (Xinhua, 2010a; Xinhua, 2012a). As presented in Figure 6.3 below, these 
“strategic and emerging” industries are being promoted to replace the “old” strategic 
industries, such as coal and telecom, often referred to as China’s pillar industries.  
This move to rebrand China’s strategic industries likely signals the start of a new wave of 
industrial policy support for the new strategic industries, which may include access to 
dedicated state industrial funds, increased access to private capital, or industrial policy 
support through access to preferential loans or R&D funds (Lewis, 2011). 
 
Table 6.3: From old pillar industries to new strategic industries 
 The Old Pillar Industries  The New Strategic and Emerging Industries 
1 National Defence Energy Saving and Environmental Protection 
2 Telecom Next Generation Information Technology 
3 Electricity Biotechnology 
4 Oil High-end  Manufacturing (e.g. aeronautics, high speed rail 
5 Coal New Energy (nuclear, solar, wind, biomass) 
6 Airlines New Materials (special and high performance composites 
7 Marine Shipping Clean Energy Vehicles (PHEVs and electric cars) 
Source: Joanna Lewis, Energy and Climate Goals of China’s 12th FYP, March 2011 
Indeed, the Chinese government has implemented a number of policies to prioritise, fund, and 
deploy clean technology R&D and innovation. In a comparative assessment of public 
investment in energy research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) in the major 
emerging economies, China stood out as the largest government investor with public 
investments of approximately US $11.8 billion, plus an additional US $1.3 billion from state 
and local governments and partially state owned enterprises as of 2008 (Gallagher, 2014: 42).  
In pursuing global leadership in clean technology development, China has identified 
partnerships in the private industry, research sectors, and academia as a key approach. 
Through various channels (including forums, dialogues, seminars, and workshops), China’s 
universities and research institutes have started to play active roles in major collaborative 
projects in the fields of energy efficiency and clean technology. China is keenly aware that the 
next phase of the science and technology revolution will centre on clean energy, and is 
determined to emerge as a global power in science and technology development. By staying at 
the forefront of the clean energy revolution, China hopes to transform the label “made in 
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China” to the moniker “created in China” (Tan & Gang, 2009: 2-7).  
The 12th FYP represented a radical shift from administrative to marketǦbased instruments and 
innovation. Low carbon and clean energy industries have been placed at the heart of China’s 
forward strategy for growth, exports, and industrial modernisation. China’s new strategic 
sectors are expected to grow to 15% of GDP by 2020, and will be supported by an increased 
Chinese public innovation spending of 2.2% of GDP (Ng & Mabey, 2011: 4) mostly in R&D.  
Another important feature of the 12th FYP was the concept of “inclusive growth” emphasising 
“higher quality growth” with the double aim of raising sustainability and attempting to solve 
increasing wealth disparity. 
The 12th Five-Year Plan provided a powerful starting point for addressing these challenges 
and achieving these ambitious, but, what is more, provided clear targets, direction, and 
momentum for moving towards a more sustainable model of development. 
 
 
6.4 China’s Achievement and Performance under the Kyoto Protocol 
 
Since the first Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1991, China has played a key role in 
defining the architecture of the current climate change regime and has been one of the “Non 
Annex I” countries which largely benefitted from it, being the recipient of investments and 
transfer of know-how under significantly favourable conditions (usually reserved for much 
poorer nations) within the framework of the instruments provided by the Kyoto Protocol.  
The Kyoto Protocol required industrialised countries89 to reduce their GHG emissions by 
5.2% on average below aggregate 1990 emission levels during the first commitment period 
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 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) divides countries into three main 
groups according to differing commitments: Annex I Parties, Annex II Parties and Non-Annex I Parties. Annex I 
Parties include the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition, including the Russian 
Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States. Annex II Parties consist of the 
OECD members of Annex I, but not the EIT Parties. They are required to provide financial resources to enable 
developing countries to undertake emissions reduction activities under the Convention and to help them adapt to 
adverse effects of climate change. In addition, they have to "take all practicable steps" to promote the 
development and transfer of environmentally friendly technologies to EIT Parties and developing countries. 
Funding provided by Annex II Parties is channeled mostly through the Convention’s financial mechanism. Non-
Annex I Parties are mostly developing countries. Certain groups of developing countries are recognized by the 
Convention as being especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, including countries with 
low-lying coastal areas and those prone to desertification and drought. Others feel more vulnerable to the 
potential economic impacts of climate change response measures. The Convention emphasizes activities that 
promise to answer the special needs and concerns of these vulnerable countries, such as investment, insurance 
and technology transfer (http://unfccc.int/). Therefore, greater responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas 
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2008-2012 (Bohringer, 2003: 10). Due to the huge uncertainties in the science of climate 
change, the targets and timetables underlying the Kyoto Protocol were not derived from a 
clear-cut cost benefit analysis, but rather emerged from a political process involving hard 
bargaining on the scope, timing, and distribution of emission reduction (Bohringer, 2003: 15), 
based on a global carbon market artificially created to mitigate climate change. 
Even if, in general, economists are quite uncomfortable when decision-making is not based on 
a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis, the protocol constitutes the first international 
environmental agreement that seeks to achieve environmental targets using market-based 
instruments. As anticipated in Chapter V, this is achieved by creating a demand for carbon 
credits by putting a price on carbon dioxide (CO2) and demanding that certain sectors hold 
CO2 permits, corresponding to their emission levels, to be allowed to operate. To this aim, in 
order for each country to fulfil its commitment, together with national policies and 
programmes, three market mechanisms, known as flexible mechanisms, were identified and 
implemented: International Emission Trading (IET), Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). These instruments allow industrialised countries to meet 
their emission reductions targets and non-industrialised countries to gain in terms of 
technology transfer and know-how. Any Country that has ratified the Kyoto Protocol, 
regardless of emissions reduction commitments, is allowed to use one or more of this 
mechanisms. 
According to the IET, Annex B countries90 may alter their GHG cutback responsibilities by 
buying or selling emission quantities among themselves. Thus, one country could cut 
emission by more than is required and sell the excess to another country, which may then cut 
back by a smaller amount. Both JI and CDM involve the development of projects that reduce 
levels of emissions compared to what they would have been in a 'business-as-usual' scenario 
(known as the 'baseline'). These projects range from energy efficiency and fuel switches in 
existing power plants, to the construction of small renewable plants or the capture of methane 
from landfill sites to generate power. A project that reduces its emissions to below its 
“baseline” can claim credits for every tons of Carbon Dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) it does not 
emit. The main difference is that, while JI is an instrument to be used just between Annex B 
countries, CDM can finance emission reduction in non-Annex B countries and gain credits 
toward their GHG cutback responsibilities.  
                                                                                                                                                   
emissions in the short term was put on industrialized countries and under the Kyoto Protocol developing 
countries like China were only needed to report their emissions. 
90
 Annex B countries are those who have committed to some cutback in GHG emissions. 
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The CDM was the first of the flexible mechanisms to come into effect with the launch of the 
regulatory body, the CDM Executive Board in late 2002, and the approval and registration of 
the first project, based in Brazil, in late 2004. Welcomed as the "Kyoto surprise", the CDM 
enjoyed unexpected support from developing countries, and was the compromise solution 
between Brazil's proposed creation of an adaptation fund for climate-vulnerable countries – 
the Clean Development Fund – and the USA's demand for a market mechanism similar to the 
Joint Implementation scheme, but with developing countries.  
The Clean Development Mechanism is a project-based financing mechanism, whereby 
eligible industrialised countries may purchase carbon credits generated by projects hosted in 
eligible developing countries. However, according to UN rules, any CDM project must 
respect the principle of “additionally”, which means that the project must demonstrate that 
any activities would not have occurred under normal technical and economic conditions in the 
host country without certified emission reduction (CER) revenues. The Kyoto Protocol 
mandates that each CER issued for a CDM project should represent a real, measurable, and 
additional emission reduction. Emission reductions under the CDM must be “additional to any 
that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity” (Article 12(5)(c) Kyoto 
Protocol) in at least two areas: (i) the additionality of financial contributions of developed 
countries to mitigate climate change in developing countries; and (ii) the additionality of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions generated by mitigation activities (Streck, 2010). The rule 
of “economic additionality” requires that the resources from the Annex I investors are in 
addition to the financial obligations of the Annex I Party under the convention, and to current 
official development flows. The principle of “environmental additionality” requires that the 
CDM project activity brings about long-term environmental benefits related to the mitigation 
of climate change that would not have occurred in the absence of the project (Muller, 2009). 
The compromise that lay in the design of the CDM instruments was accepted by both 
developing and developed countries because they do not only provide emissions reductions 
for industrialised countries, but also accelerated sustainable development in developing ones. 
The advantages of the Clean Development Mechanism projects are threefold: (1) an 
environmental advantage on both a local and global level, derived from the reduction in GHG 
emissions resulting from the project; (2) a development advantage, both economic and social 
for the host country, which benefits from the location of the project and the transfer of 
technology; and (3) an economic advantage due to the improved financial viability of low 
GHG emission technologies, which favours their application, and, for entities with GHG 
emission reduction commitments, the possibility of satisfying these commitments at less cost. 
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Moreover, industrialised countries that face difficulties in meeting the requirements set by the 
protocol can invest in environmental projects in developing countries that have no emission 
reduction obligations and then buy certified emission reductions (CERs) to offset their 
obligations. In addition, although the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol started in 
2008, under the CDM, projects started to generate emission credits as from the year 2000. In 
this view, besides fund injection and technology transfer, the CDM is also a source of income, 
as any CDM projects generate CERs, which are issued by the CDM Executive Board, and can 
be sold on the international market to foreign organisations.  
Due to the mix of industrial activities and the levels of development across countries, 
developing nations tend to offer more opportunities for low-cost abatement. Under a carbon-
constrained future, the CDM concept ideally provides a "soft landing" for industrialised 
countries by slowing their required rate of abatement, and encourages developing nations into 
a more sustainable growth path. Moreover, even if some industrialised countries are able to 
fulfil their required emission reduction goals on their own, they still have incentives to buy 
CERs because the emission reduction costs in developing countries is much lower than that 
seen in developed countries: an industrialised country seeking to reduce emissions 
domestically is likely to face substantially higher costs, compared to investment in Clean 
Development Mechanism projects to cut emissions overseas. By providing investment 
incentives, the Clean Development Mechanism acts as an aid to project finance in host 
countries, encouraging sustainable development through the adoption of cleaner energy 
sources, or more efficient industrial processes.  
Host countries that tax the revenue from local projects, as is the case in China, will also be 
able to build a national fund that may be used for local adaptation to climate change. Thanks 
to the flexible mechanisms, China not only gained international support to improve its 
environmental governance domestically, but also had a very significant economic reward 
under the CDM.  
As shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 below, the People’s Republic of China, the worlds largest 
emitter of GHGs, is the “giant” in the CDM world and enjoys the highest CDM project 
potential because its marginal cost of emissions reduction is relatively low compared to that 
of many other developing countries. This is mainly due to its low (although improving) 
technological level and to the inefficient use of energy equipment. 
As the profit of CDM project developers from selling CERs to international buyers is 
additional to the original project revenue, the project’s internal rate of return (IRR) will be 
increased with carbon finance. This means that some environmentally friendly projects, 
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previously regarded as financially infeasible and not worth investing in (such as renewable 
energy projects vs. traditional power projects), suddenly become profitable after being 
authorised as a CDM project, due to the additional revenue available through selling carbon 
emission reductions produced by the project (Chen, 2012: 40).  As a consequence, the CDM, 
based on a complex institutional framework that involved both UN agencies as well as 
national administrations, has modified the underlying economic trade-offs of 
environmentally-friendly economic activities. 
 
Figure 6.5: Distribution of registered project by host party 
 
Source: UNFCCC, 2014 
. 
Figure 6.6: Distribution of CERs issued by host party 
 
Source: UNFCCC, 2014 
170 
 
In China, the CDM is a fundamental element of the national climate policy mix and, in June 
2004, seven months before the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the Chinese 
government enacted a draft regulation on the management of CDM projects, showing that it 
was prepared and eager to gain from the protocol, which was seen as a starting point for a 
more comprehensive plan to address global climate change. A few months later, in October 
2005, the NDRC, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and the Ministry of Finance jointly issued the Measures for Operation and Management of 
CDM projects in China to replace the draft regulation91.  
In all key official Chinese documents outlining the national strategy on climate change, such 
as the Chinese National Climate Change Programme (NCCP), the Science and Technology 
Actions on Climate Change, and the 2008 white paper on Climate Change Policies and 
Actions, the CDM is always mentioned as an important element of national mitigation efforts 
and is also identified as a key link to international cooperation. According to the white paper, 
CDM projects have “effectively boosted the development of China’s renewable energy, 
accelerated the improvement of energy intensity, and greatly enhanced the awareness of the 
seriousness of climate change” (SCIO, 2008). 
Each country involved in the Kyoto Protocol has established government bodies to promote 
and support the development of CDM and JI projects, producing guidelines for designing and 
structuring projects that detail the processes and permissions required. In this context, the 
Chinese government, keeping all its traditional concerns about foreign involvement in 
Chinese strategic sectors such as energy, agriculture, steel, and iron, has developed a legal 
framework to govern the CDM project cycle in order to heavily favour Chinese interests and 
to ensure Chinese “resources” are protected. According to Chinese regulation, CDM project 
developers should be Chinese-funded or Chinese-controlled enterprises in China. Moreover, 
the government has also identified a number of CDM priority areas to encourage the 
development of so-called “relevant” CDM projects anticipated to lead the transition to a low-
carbon economy and has also implemented a levy on CERs, applying differentiated rates for 
different categories of CDM projects, arguing that CDM projects must support the national 
sustainable development strategy. 
Finally, in order to boost the development of CDM projects at home as a central pillar of 
China’s policy toward sustainable development, the Chinese government, with the support of 
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 Office of the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change and Institute of Nuclear and New Energy 
Technology of Tsinghua University, 2006: 55. 
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UNDP, has established a CDM fund that started to operate in September 2010. The China 
Clean Development Mechanism Fund (CCDMF) is a national climate fund that integrates 
government and market functions. The mandate of the fund is to support China’s effort to 
address climate change and promote social and economic sustainable development, focusing 
on low carbon growth and climate resilience in China. It is a revolving fund that receives 
regular capital injections from levies collected by the government on CDM projects in China. 
The CDM cooperation under Kyoto Protocol has generated additional income and advanced 
opportunities for several enterprises. However, without an effective financing mechanism, it 
would have been difficult to bring the CDM cooperation from project level to country level 
and better contribute to the sustainable development of the country. In this regard, managing 
the revenues collected from CDM projects through the CCDMF, the government ensures that 
all collected levies are used to directly support projects and initiatives that address climate 
change in China.  
The revenues collected by the CCDMF are specifically earmarked to finance climate actions 
in China and to support the private sector to test innovative financial and economic 
instruments to address climate change. To this aim, the CCDMF also partners with various 
international institutions, including the WB, as well as domestic public and commercial 
entities to explore innovative ways to support low-carbon development in China. Through 
the CCDMF, the main objective of the government is to leverage private sector engagement 
in order to finance climate actions and ensure that the fund will play a long-term role in 
China’s climate finance, because national budget support cannot cover the financial burden 
of low-carbon development and the enormous costs of switching from a brown economy to a 
green one.  
Although the government attempts to manage and govern the CDM by intervening in the 
market has generated a number of complaints by many potential foreign investors at the 
beginning, particularly regarding the rule that only majority-owned Chinese enterprises may 
serve as project owners (Szymanski, 2006: 2), this has not discouraged foreign investments in 
Chinese CDM market. On the contrary, political direction and government action seem to 
have created a perception among business representatives of a well-functioning market 
characterised by stability (Buhr et al., 2012). CER buyers have cited the predictability of the 
Chinese regulatory system as a key factor in making their CDM investment decisions (WB, 
2008a).  
The CDM has become a vehicle for China to help stimulate investment in projects that 
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and to help cover the incremental cost of higher-efficiency 
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or low-carbon technology (Lewis, 2007: 165). By adding its own requirements to 
internationally sponsored projects, China has managed to frame international cooperation 
through CDM to support its domestic priorities, obtaining substantial economic gains. The 
active role of the government has played a fundamental role in attracting foreign investment 
and investors and contributing to the leading position of China on the global CDM market. In 
this context, over the past few years, supported by a number of state subsidies and a relevant 
stimulus package (Economic Observer, 2009; McKissack and Xu, 2011), China’s capabilities 
in the areas related to climate change (e.g. energy efficiency, renewable energy) have grown 
dramatically, allowing China’s firms to dominate the list of top renewable energy 
manufacturers from solar panels to wind turbines. The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) 
dedicates an entire section to green development. 
In general, the CDM project instrument has significantly benefited China in several ways by 
financing emission reduction projects, bringing China huge profits by selling CERs, providing 
new channels for environmentally friendly technology transfer, improving energy efficiency 
and energy conservation and, finally, by improving local environmental and social conditions. 
The Kyoto Protocol, the first international treaty including detailed obligations for 
industrialised nations to reduce their GHG emissions by 2012, has yielded huge benefits for 
China instead of imposing afflictive restraint upon the world’s fastest-growing economy 
(Chen, 2012: 34). Moreover, it has also contributed to raising its international profile; China is 
now proactive in international climate policy and hosts the largest share of CDM projects. In 
this view, the active participation in the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the relevant positive externalities which derive from it have significantly 
supported China’s decision to undertake the “no regret” strategy that emphasised mitigation 





In the past 20 years, China has implemented several policies and actions to address climate 
change through adaptation and mitigation measures. Like for any other country in the world, 
China’s climate change policy reflects its domestic circumstances, its national interest, and its 
social, economic, and development priorities. For Beijing, climate change is a threat as much 
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as an “opportunity” to accelerate its economic development by investing in low-carbon 
technologies and in the existing renewable energy market. 
In some cases, mostly related to Western countries, the equation of national security and 
climate change can arguably be ascribed to a need by advocates and politicians to provide 
arguments for taking action in political environments that are fundamentally hostile to any 
efforts to tackle climate change. This type of rhetoric has been especially common in the US, 
where some members of the US Congress still deny the existence of climate change, despite 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.  
In China, there has been no such need. Beijing is acting on climate changes in terms of 
mitigating GHG emissions and enhancing climate resilience, driven not only by its domestic 
needs for sustainable development in ensuring its ecological security and energy security, but 
also driven by its self-perception as a leading developing nation within the global South. 
In this context, Beijing’s sharp opposition to applying a direct link between climate change 
and security after having already implemented a number of domestic policies to securitise 
water, food, and energy issues, represents somehow a paradox. In fact, while water, food, 
energy, and natural disasters as a result of extreme weather events are all perceived as security 
issues, climate change is classified solely as a development one, remaining the only one 
global concern that has not been securitised yet by official Chinese discourse.  
This Chinese position can be understood in the framework of some clear but also implicit 
reasons that combined with each other do not allow China to embrace the Western vision of 
considering climate change as a security risk. First of all, as previously mentioned, the 
development of the climate security paradigm may result in the creation of international 
policies which, using global warming as a tool, could impose economic policies or political 
constraints aimed at slowing down or, at least, interfering with China’s impressive economic 
growth. Another reason is related to the basic principle of state sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and regime security highlighted in the NSC. In fact, notwithstanding the recognition 
of the potential threats that the combined effect of environmental degradation and climate 
change could pose to the country’s development, the securitisation of climate change 
represents a clear threat to one of the most important principles of China’s politics: non-
interference with the sovereignty and the internal affairs of states. Finally, another reason is 
related to the Chinese concern over maintaining its leverage in global climate change 
negotiations; engaging in global climate governance as a leading fast-growing developing 
nation within the global South. 
Thanks to its aggressive green policy, Beijing has been making active and remarkable efforts 
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to address climate change issues. During the 11th (2006-2010) and 12th (2011-2015) Five-
Year Plan China has done a lot to invest in renewable energy, improve energy efficiency, and 
decrease energy consumption and, through crucial economic and political reforms, has 
implemented several domestic policies toward a low carbon economic growth. Increasing 
investments in adaptation measures, using engineering, technical, and institutional 
instruments, have progressively upgraded China’s capacity to deal with the impact of climate 
change. Furthermore, economic and political reforms implemented in the last 40 years have 
supported capacity development in China and the country has been able to developed 
domestic policies and climate-relevant capacities, which produced mitigative effects. In this 
framework, the Chinese government has been pushing for the transformation towards a low 
carbon economy which is now a “must” of Chinese policy because it is simultaneously a 
response to global climate change, a key solution to address China’s air pollution problem, 
and a compulsory step towards achieving energy security.  
However, although reducing carbon emission intensity in China is a tough target, it is also one 
with relatively limited potential results. Even if carbon intensity has been reduced 
significantly, China’s GHG emissions would still increase in the next years due to the process 
of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation (Pan & Zhang, 2013). Notwithstanding the shift 
from “quantity” of growth to quality of development, as well as from a labour-intensive to a 
capital-intensive model, it is very difficult to imagine a significant change in this trend.   
Therefore, Beijing’s strategy towards the development of a low-carbon economy model of 
growth has been driven by two main priorities: (1) the drawing up of global financial 
mechanisms to support the development and supply of clean technologies; (2) the 
development of innovative and low carbon energy technologies to meet the increasing energy 







Chapter VII: China and International Climate Change 
Negotiations   
 
 “… the planet is just too small for these developing countries to repeat the economic growth 
in the same way that the rich countries have done it in the past. We don't have enough natural 
resources, we don't have enough atmosphere. Clearly, something has to change.” 
 
Mario José Molina-Pasquel Henríquez, 1995 Nobel Laureate 
 
Mitigating climate change is one of today’s major global environmental problems. Its 
interconnected natural dynamics and disregard for nation-state sovereignties has increased 
interdependencies in problems and policy solutions across borders. That has, in turn, 
compelled pundits and scholars from a range of academic disciplines to argue that structural 
mitigation can only be achieved by substantial collaboration across countries (Sprinz & 
Luterbacher, 1996). By implication, international climate change negotiations have been 
deemed crucial to meeting a number of purposes. They are expected to help propel a green 
economy model of growth, achieve an acceptable balance between social welfare in 
developed countries, sustainable economic growth in emerging economies, and poverty 
eradication in developing and least developed societies. This concept is synthesised by the 
CBDR principle, which clarifies that the nature of climate change negotiations is 
fundamentally a negotiation among different and competing economic interests. 
In the broader international literature, two major models are employed to explain how a 
country behaves and develops its position in international environmental negotiations. The 
first is the “Interest-Based Explanation of International Environmental Policy” – model 
developed by Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta in 1994. The second is the “Logic of Two-
Level Games” model developed by Robert D. Putnam in 1988. The interest-based explanation 
of the international environmental policy focuses on those domestic factors that shape a 
country's position in international environmental negotiations. According to this model, the 
country's ecological vulnerability toward environmental degradation and pollution and the 
economic costs of environmental protection and pollution abatement are the two crucial 
factors that shape a country’s behaviour in international environmental negotiations. The more 
vulnerable a country is to environmental problems, the more willing it is to participate in 
international negotiations; the higher the cost a country is going to have to pay for solving its 
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environmental problems, the less willing it is to participate in international environmental 
negotiations. By combining indicators of a country's ecological vulnerability (low and high) 
with abatement costs (low and high), countries can be classified into four categories: 
"pushers," "intermediates," "draggers," and "bystanders”. The interest-based perspective on 
international environmental regulation offers a partial but parsimonious view of how a 
country's preferences for international regulations are shaped (Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, 1994). 
While this model could be applicable to understanding the behaviour of countries in 
international negotiations related to atmospheric pollution, such as at the negotiations for the 
Montreal Protocol, it could be only partially applicable to understanding the different 
negotiating positions within the Kyoto Protocol because the negotiating parties of the protocol 
bear differentiated responsibilities and commitments under the framework of the protocol. 
The two-level approach instead recognises that central decision-makers strive to reconcile 
domestic and international imperatives simultaneously. The politics of many international 
negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game. At the national level, domestic 
groups pursue their interests by pressing the government to adopt favourable policies, and 
politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international 
level, national governments seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, 
while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two 
games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain 
interdependent, yet sovereign. According to this model, a synthesised research agenda that 
considers the interactions between domestic and international politics is the key to 
understanding a country’s behaviour in international negotiations (Putnam, 1988). However, 
this model bears some significant limitation when applied to understanding China’s behaviour 
towards ICCN. In fact, the model was developed in the context of US policy, a liberal 
democratic country with a seeming preference for a “free market” economy, and could hardly 
be applied to a socialist country with a centrally planned economy. As explained by 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff in their Survey of Contending Theories of International Relations, 
decision-making patterns in countries with different political institutions are markedly 
dissimilar and, therefore, applying a generic model is likely to lead to misleading conclusions 
(Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 645-6). Furthermore, neither of the two models addresses 
adequately how elite and wider perceptions of social issues, domestic and international norms, 
political and other expectations, or self-conceptions of key state and non-state actors impact a 
nation’s strategy and behaviour in ICCN. Much of this inadequacy comes from the two 
models’ one-sidedly positivist commitments.  
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At present, after more than twenty years of international climate change negotiations, 21 
United Nations Climate Change Conferences, and a considerable amount of money devoted to 
creating an artificial carbon market, somewhat modest results have been achieved in climate 
change mitigation. According to the International Energy Agency’s special report Redrawing 
the Energy-Climate Map, released in November 2013, the world is not on track to meet the 
target agreed by governments to limit the long-term rise in the average global temperature to 2 
degrees Celsius (IEA, 2013). Global emissions are increasing, despite the economic crisis, the 
reduction of US emissions, driven by the switch from coal to gas in power generation, and the 
lowest growth of emissions in China in a decade, driven mostly by the deployment of 
renewables and the improvement in the energy intensity of its economy.  Therefore, in the 
words of Mario José Molina, the planet is just too small to carry the economic growth of 
developing countries in the same way that the developed countries have done in the past.  
A key deadlock point in climate change negotiations is about finding an agreed “decoupling 
strategy” between the right to growth of the developing world and the CO2 energy related 
emissions reduction. According to climate scientists, a drastic reduction in aggregate 
emissions is necessary if the international community wants to achieve a reasonable 
probability of keeping global temperatures at liveable levels (i.e. keeping the 2°C target). In 
this framework, considering the pressing need of carbon emissions space for emerging 
economies such as China, India, and Brazil to support their economic growth and the 
forthcoming need of other fast-growing developing countries such as Brazil, Mexico, 
Indonesia, and South Africa to lift their citizens out of poverty, under the current scheme this 
drastic reduction can be achieved only if either developed countries dramatically reduce their 
current emissions in favour of developing ones, or developing countries and emerging 
economies accept a drastic limit to their emissions reductions, consequently imposing a 
dramatic slowdown to their economic growth. Therefore, the key question is how to address 
the decoupling of growth and emissions reduction without effecting the economic growth of 
emerging economies and developing countries. 
In this chapter, I analyse the development of the global climate regime from the late 1960s 
until the 2015 Paris 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21), evaluating China’s behaviour 
and investigating how Beijing’s role in global climate governance may shape an alternative 
global vision, bringing a new perspective to the international debate for meeting the challenge 





7.1 The Rise of Global Climate Policy and International Climate Change 
Negotiations 
 
A few years ago, the idea that a global climate policy could exist would have seemed strange 
or simply absurd because any change in climate was considered a part of the normal patterns 
of weather over time. However, more than a century ago, a Swedish scientist had already 
taken the first step in the anthropogenic climate change debate, with the publication of a paper 
that earned him the Nobel Prize92. In 1896, Svante Arrhenious undertook lengthy calculations 
of how carbon dioxide intercepts radiation in the atmosphere. He discovered that doubling the 
amount of carbon dioxide would have raised the planet’s average surface temperature some 5-
6°, while halving the amount of gas would have lowered the temperature about as much. 
Despite the scientific interest provoked by his research, for more than half a century after 
1896 almost no other scientific research was undertaken on global warming, and only in 
recent years has earth systems science advanced rapidly, helping to transform climate change 
into major political issues. 
Concerns about the environment and development are not new. The ongoing global 
environmental debate has been formed around the strategies needed to address the inter-
related challenges of building healthy societies, economies, and environment. This dialogue 
has its roots in the gradual merging of the environmental movement and the post-World War 
II international development community. Many people consider 1962 as the seminal year in 
which people began to understand the interconnection between environment and development 
with the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, which shattered the assumption that the 
environment had an infinite capacity to absorb pollutants. In 1968, the publication of Paul 
Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb on the connection between human population, resource 
exploitation, and the environment, and the research undertaken by the Club of Rome further 
strengthened the process of raising awareness about the environment, which reached its peak 
in 1972 with the UN General Conference on Human Environment.  
A detailed analysis about how the climate became a global governance subject can be found in 
Paul N. Edwards’ A Vast Machine Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global 
Warming (Edwards, 2010), in which he describes the science behind the consensus on climate 
change, arguing that, over the years, data and models have converged to create a stable, 
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 In 1903 The Nobel Prize in Chemistry was awarded to Svante Arrhenius "in recognition of the extraordinary 
services he has rendered to the advancement of chemistry by his electrolytic theory of dissociation". 
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reliable, and trustworthy basis for establishing the reality of global warming. According to 
Edwards, climate science systematically produces knowledge of the climate. It is a “vast 
machine”: a sociotechnical system that collects data, models, physical processes, tests 
theories, and ultimately generates a widely shared understanding of the climate and climate 
change. This knowledge production begins with observations, but these are only raw 
materials. Transforming them into widely accepted knowledge requires complex activity 
involving scientific expertise, technological systems, political influence, economic interests, 
mass media, and cultural reception. This knowledge production system delivers not only 
specifics about the past and likely future of Earth’s climate, but also the very idea of a 
planetary climate as something that can be observed, understood, affected by human 
behaviours, debated in political processes, cared about by the general public, and conceivably 
managed by deliberate manmade interventions. Ultimately, this knowledge infrastructure is 
the reason we can ‘think globally’ about climatic change (Edwards, 2010: 8).  
The development of climate change as a global issue took place initially in the scientific 
arena, as understanding of global warming and the greenhouse problem improved, but it is 
only in the last three decades that climate change has evolved from an environmental concern 
to a matter of geopolitics. The first major global environmental meeting was held in 
Stockholm in 1972, driven by increasing international concerns about global warming, and, 
for the first time, climate change started to emerge as a global issue. The 1972 UN Conference 
on Human Environment was the first step in the long process that led to the creation of the 
present climate regime.  
The development of the climate change regime can be divided into five periods: (1) the 
foundational period, during which scientific concern about global warming developed; (2) the 
agenda-setting phase, from 1985-1988, when climate change was transformed from a 
scientific to a policy issue; (3) the pre-negotiation period, from 1988- 1990, when 
governments became heavily involved in the process; (4) the formal intergovernmental 
negotiations phase, leading to the adoption of the UNFCCC in May 1992; and (5) the post-
agreement phase, focusing on the elaboration and implementation of the UNFCCC and the 
initiation of negotiations on additional and updated commitments (Sprinz & Luterbacher, 
1996).   
From the early stages of the development of the present climate regime, it was clear that, 
notwithstanding the fact that the regional effects of global warming would be different across 
the world, all nations would be affected by it, and the related costs in any given nation would 
be independent of whether that nation had or had not contributed to greenhouse gas emissions.  
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In the same way, the benefit that one country obtains in a reduction of its own global 
emissions does not reduce its risk of being affected by global warming if other countries do 
not act as well, and other countries cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of 
mitigation, even if they do not contribute toward the mitigation. Therefore, considering that 
the supply of a public good like climate change mitigation is highly vulnerable to free-riding, 
the negotiation of a new international ad hoc climate treaty was considered a necessary step to 
define and implement legal actions to address climate change at global level.  
This process began in December 1990, when the UN General Assembly established the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(INC/FCCC) to negotiate a convention containing "appropriate commitments" to be signed in 
June 1992 at the World Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) that took 
place in Rio de Janerio (UNGA, 1990). In May 1992, the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change was adopted and the Convention entered into force two years later on 21st April 1994 
as a result of its ratification by 50 states. 
In December 1997, at the third session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 3) held in 
Kyoto, Japan, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, strengthening the 1992 Climate Change 
Convention by mandating that industrial countries cut their carbon dioxide emissions by 6% 
to 8% from 1990 levels during the first commitment period starting in 2008 and ending in 
2012. The rules for the implementation of the protocol were adopted at the COP 7 in 
Marrakech in 2001 and the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in February 2005 after the 
ratification of the Treaty by the Russian Parliament in late 2004. The treaty needed at least 55 
industrialised countries, representing 55% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions in 1990, to 
sign it before it could come into effect and, with the withdrawal of the United States, which 
was responsible for 36% of emissions in 1990, in the early stage of negotiations, the 
ratification of Russia was the only chance for the treaty to come into force. The United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was a political compromise between the 
different and competing positions of the several stakeholders involved in the negotiation 
process, and the Kyoto Protocol was the outcome of this compromise.  
Countries, multilateral institutions, civil society organisations, and private stakeholders have 
different concerns, different mandates, different historical backgrounds, and different 
capacities and strategies when they engage in climate change negotiations. Nevertheless, as 
from the earlier stage of the climate regime formation, it was possible to identify two 
distinctive categories of countries with clearly different approaches to international climate 
change negotiations:  the “global North” and the “global South”.  
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These two fronts, however, were not two monolithic negotiating blocs but rather two 
heterogeneous groups of countries with similar economic interests and political aspirations. 
In the early 1990s, when developed countries were still the main actors and directors of the 
international discussions on climate change, two main positions emerged within them. From 
one side, the position of European countries together with Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand, advocated the establishment of clear targets and timetables on greenhouse gasses 
reduction. From the other side, the United States of America, the Former Soviet Union, and 
Japan argued that targets and timetables would be too strict and, in the end, largely symbolic, 
and they instead advocated a focus on scientific research and on developing national, rather 
than international, strategies and programs. 
The front of the developing countries was much more fragmented: Small Island and Atoll 
States, which later became the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), strongly supported 
the creation of a climate regime based on clear targets and timetables, whereas oil producing 
states held all economic interest in opposing and slowing down any climate regime based on 
emission reductions. Thirdly, between these two positions, another group of emerging 
economies, such as India, Brazil, and China, emphasised that they would not support any 
climate regime that could have a negative impact on their economic growth or could 
somehow limit their sovereignty. 
However, all together, developing countries and emerging economies stressed that climate 
change should not be regarded exclusively as an environmental issue but as a development 
issue as well. Fundamentally, following the call for a New International Economic Order 
proposed at Algiers Conference in September 1973 and formally adopted in April 1974 by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), developing countries 
argued that the creation of a new climate regime should consider overall economic strategies 
and social policies and programs aimed to achieve sustainable development (Najam, 2005; 
Krasner, 1987; Murphy, 1984). 
A compromise between the different negotiating positions was found by including emissions 
targets for developed countries and some basic principles concerning sustainable development 
for developing countries: a precautionary principle, common but differentiated responsibilities 
of countries, an open economic order, and the principle of taking into account those countries 
most vulnerable to climate change. The architecture of the treaty was then conceptualised in 
terms of the mutual rights and obligations of polluting and “victim states”, highlighting the 
nature of climate change largely being “produced” in the North and “experienced” in the 
South (Engberg-Pedersen, 2011). However, the principles detailed in Article 3 of the Climate 
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Treaty allow for different interpretations according to the competing interests and positions of 
the parties.  
From the scientific side, some 20 years after the adoption of the UNFCCC and the creation of 
the present climate regime, a greater global consensus on the science underlying climate 
change has emerged. The conclusions of such scientific research continue to be verified by 
large numbers of scientists in the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). The Summary for Policymakers for each IPCC Report is scrutinised and approved, 
line by line, by policy-makers, thereby providing greater ownership of the IPCC results in the 
policy community. Thanks to the close scrutiny of its work and despite some occasional faults 
(e.g. the so called Climategate scandal) the basic science advocated by the IPCC is 
internationally recognised (GUPTA, 2012; NAS, 2007; IAC, 2010).  
In 2007, after the worldwide enthusiasm arisen from the United Nations IPCC and Al Gore 
sharing the Nobel Peace Prize, expectations were high that the world would finally take action 
on global warming and the Copenhagen summit was expected to be a milestone in global 
climate policy. However, that was not what followed, and when the fifteenth session of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP 15) held in Copenhagen in December 2009 was concluded 
with a disappointing and poor negotiation outcome, in contrast to the high expectations which 
had preceded the meeting, the sharp division of the two negotiating fronts of Northern and 
Southern countries was as clear as ever. 
Most developing countries have refused to agree to anything that they consider to contravene 
the CBDR principle while, on the other side, some developed countries have refused to take 
additional commitments to reduce emissions, arguing that it would reduce their ability to 
compete with rapidly growing developing countries. The US from one side and China from 
the other emerged to play crucial roles for the two competing fronts during the Copenhagen 
negotiations. China, which became the biggest emitter of GHG in absolute terms in 2007, 
being a developing country, was not obliged to take any legally binding commitments, while 
was in the position to demand, under the UNFCCC rules, strong commitments from the 
developed countries. According to the United States, as long as this so called “firewall” 
between Annex 1 and the developing world remains, China can occupy a convenient position, 
namely that the world’s biggest emitter of CO2 is allowed to free-ride on the effort of other 
countries while being able to criticise the developed world (van der Goltz, 2009: 11). 
Finally, after two weeks of harsh confrontation between the two negotiating blocs of the 
global North and the global South – led respectively by the US and China – the climate 
summit ended with an agreement that provided for explicit emission pledges by all the major 
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economies – including, for the first time, China and other major developing countries. 
However, as a result of the strong opposition of China, there was no indication of a treaty with 
binding commitments. Key elements of the Copenhagen Accord, the outcome of the Climate 
Summit, included: (1) an aspirational goal of limiting global temperature increase to 2 degrees 
Celsius; (2) a process for countries to enter their specific mitigation pledges by 31st January 
2010; (3) broad terms for the reporting and verification of countries’ actions; (4) a collective 
commitment by developed countries for $30 billion in “new and additional” resources in 
2010-2012 to help developing countries reduce emissions, preserve forests, and adapt to 
climate change; and (5) a goal of mobilising $100 billion a year in public and private finance 
by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.  The accord also calls for the 
establishment of a Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (GCF), a High Level Panel to examine 
ways of meeting the 2020 finance goal. 
The substantial failure of the Copenhagen Climate conference to effectively limit GHG 
emissions and provide new impetuous for ICCN had started to generate increasing concerns 
over the capacity of multilateral climate negotiations to respond properly to the climate 
change challenge. As a consequence, the foundation principles of the UNFCCC became 
contested and the wording of the targets made the targets themselves questionable. Critics of 
the UNFCCC negotiation process have argued that it has become fatally cumbersome because 
it requires the impossible: consensus decision-making by 194 parties on every line of a 
complex and lengthy treaty (Eckersley, 2012).  
The changing attitude of the parties regarding the basic principles that were identified in 1992 
as a compromise between rights and duties to achieve a global deal on climate change can be 
attributed mainly to two reasons. First of all, the policies and measures designed to address 
climate change and to promote sustainable development were slowed down or shelved 
particularly sharply in the aftermath of the global economic crisis. In this context, the leading 
role played by the EU in the development of the international climate regime was severely 
undermined by the economic crisis, which weakened the capacity of EU countries to achieve 
long-term commitments. The EU, already impaired by the heavy influence of competing 
national interests, struggled with a mix-up of national policies, conflicting and expensive 
subsidies, a fragmented energy market, and an ever-growing reliance on fuel imports. 
Overwhelmed by the economic crisis, European countries seem to be more concerned with 
the cost of climate change policies than with their benefits. 
Secondly, the economic and geopolitical context in which sustainability has been discussed at 
a multilateral level has progressively changed since the Climate Convention was negotiated in 
184 
 
1992, and the evolution of ICCN has been influenced by the changing global economic order. 
The breakup of the USSR was accompanied by a gradual reduction of US global dominance 
and the shift to a multipolar world, above all in respect of the role that emerging economies 
have assumed in the global economic order. Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the so-called 
BRIC countries, now account for around half of the world’s foreign exchange reserves, while 
the world’s largest economy, the United States of America, runs a current account deficit that, 
to a substantial extent, is financed by capital exports from emerging market nations. The 
reserves of the BRIC countries are increasingly being channelled into foreign direct 
investments, thus strengthening the international influence of these countries. 
In December 2010, the outcome of the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16) was the 
Cancun Agreement, which sets out a package of decisions on how to reach GHG reduction. 
The agreement represented a critical step in creating trust after the failure of Copenhagen, 
and, by reaching an agreement with some substance at all, the Cancun conference succeeded 
in keeping the UN climate process alive. 
When the Cancun Climate Talks ended in mid-December 2010, it was clear for all the 
negotiating parties that the real and concrete outcome of COP 16 was the rescue of the UN 
climate negotiations process from an imminent collapse. It was also clear to all negotiating 
parties that this result was made possible by the more cooperative attitude of China and the 
United States, the two major GHG emitters, and by a large part, because of a Chinese 
compromise on two key points. The first was that China had shifted from a position focused 
on domestic voluntary mitigation actions to measurable, reportable, and verifiable nationally 
appropriate mitigation commitments (Zhang, H., 2013). In fact, China, India, and the United 
States agreed on provisions for the measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) of 
mitigation actions undertaken by developing countries, which was a sticking point at 
Copenhagen, with China concerned with avoiding infringements on sovereignty. The second 
compromise made by China was agreeing to submit national mitigations actions under the 
Cancun Agreements (as it did under the non-binding Copenhagen Accord), by which Chinese 
emissions reduction plans were incorporated into the UN process for the first time (Minas, 
2010). 
From a technical perspective the Cancun Agreement very much constitutes a “Copenhagen 
Accord plus”. Indeed, for the majority of countries supporting the Copenhagen Accord 
elaborated a year before (but not accepted by the conference then), Cancun provided the 




Moreover, the compromise reached in COP 16 has largely managed to invert the top-down, 
differentiated architecture based on targets and timetables that was the characteristic feature of 
the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. This architecture has been replaced with a much more 
bottom-up, undifferentiated system based on pledge and review that requires developing 
countries, especially the emerging economies, to be treated in much the same way as the 
developed world with regard to their climate mitigation and reporting obligations.  
The logic of ending differentiation between North and South was further consolidated at the 
seventeenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 17) held in 2011 in Durban, South 
Africa. COP 17 in Durban represents a turning point in ICCN. Unlike the Copenhagen Accord 
and the Cancun Agreements, which explicitly reaffirmed the core UNFCCC principles of 
“equity” – i.e. global policy should recognise that climate change hits poor countries hardest 
and that rich countries carry the major responsibility for past emissions - and “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”, the Durban Platform text makes no reference whatsoever to 
these foundational regime principles. Although it can be argued that since this new process 
has been launched under the premises of the Convention, all its principles and provisions will 
automatically apply, their absence from a key decision for the first time in 20 years of 
international climate talks is nevertheless relevant (Hurrel & Sengupta, 2012: 472).  
During the COP 17, a number of relevant agreements were reached among the parties, 
including an agreement on a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol starting on 1st 
January 2013, the establishment of the so-called Durban Platform for Enhanced Action to lead 
to a post-2020 international climate agreement, and the launching of the Green Climate Fund. 
The Green Climate Fund was incorporated in the Copenhagen Accord and established in 
Cancun as an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention to support 
projects, programmes, policies, and other activities in developing country parties. The fund 
should channel some of the $100 billion that rich countries promised to make available to 
poor ones by 2020 in COP 15, to help them cut emissions and adapt to climate change. 
The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) was 
established to develop a new protocol, another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with 
legal force under the Convention, applicable to all parties no later than 2015, in order to be 
implemented at the end of the Kyoto second commitment period in 2020. The phrasing used 
for the post-Kyoto global deal to be reached in 2015 was deliberately unclear, leaving a large 
bargaining margin open to the negotiating parties. In fact, the terms “protocol”, “legal 
instrument”, and “agreed outcome” are quite different from one another in nature and would 
produce considerably different results.  
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During the negotiations at COP 17, the new geopolitical and economic context somehow 
abated the traditionally sharp divide between the negotiating positions of the global North and 
the global South with the emergence of new alliances and initiatives. At the Durban 
Conference, the EU, the AOSIS, and the Least Developing Countries Group released a joint 
statement in terms of operating Durban mandate, while many developing countries had not 
reached a consensus. During the negotiations, the EU and the AOSIS expressed similar 
positions in terms of emissions reduction, finance, and the legal form of the future instrument 
to be defined. In terms of trade and unilateral measures, the range of consensus between the 
AOSIS and the EU was wider than that between the AOSIS and most developing countries, 
and the EU and the AOSIS converged to become the most positive power to promote and 
support the Durban Platform negotiations.  
At the same time, the more cooperative negotiating position of Beijing weakened the 
bargaining power of the G77 negotiating block. In fact, the increasing economic divide 
between China and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the growing level of the GHG 
emissions from China made, to several LDCs, the Chinese government negotiating interests 
seem closer to those of the US than to those of the G77. In this regard, it is worth mentioning 
that when Germany organised the second Security Council Meeting on Climate Change and 
Security in July 2011, Bolivia’s representative at the UN asserted that while climate change 
could be understood as a real threat to humanity and the Earth, the security implications of 
climate change should be dealt with in a forum where the guilty parties do not have seats for 
life or the right to veto (UNSC 6587th meeting, 2011). In fact, out of the five countries that 
possess veto power, four (the US, the UK, France, and the Russian Federation) are Annex I 
countries with historical responsibility, and the fifth country (China) is the largest emitter of 
GHGs. Consequently, during the negotiations held in COP 17, the three main developing 
countries groups – the AOSIS, the Africa Group of Negotiators, and the LDCs – supported by 
the EU, became a coalition, leading to more pressure on China and the US to agree to binding 
emission cuts. 
In December 2012 in Doha, Qatar, during the eighteenth session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP 18), the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, providing new 
commitments to the Kyoto Protocol for Annex I Parties who agreed to engage for the second 
commitment period. Parties committed to reducing GHG emissions by at least 18% below 
1990 levels in the 2013-2020 period. By ensuring the prolongation of the Kyoto Protocol for a 
further eight years, the Doha deal preserves the vital framework of international law and 
retains hard-won rules on accounting for emissions and trading between countries.  
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The nineteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 19), held in Warsaw in 
November 2013, was mainly focused on the demands of developing countries for increased 
climate finance, and for a new mechanism to help especially vulnerable nations cope with 
unavoidable “loss and damage” resulting from climate change.  
The real step forward towards the achievement of a global post-2020 climate regime was 
made in COP 20 in Lima, following the deal achieved a few weeks before the conference 
between China and the United States at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit. As it 
happened in COP 16, four years earlier, the significant step forward at COP 20 for the positive 
conclusion of the conference was due to a compromise achieved between the US and China, 
largely thanks to China’s more cooperative attitude and constructive support for the 
negotiations. The progresses made in Lima laid down the groundwork for a successful 
international climate agreement in Paris in 2015.  
 
 
7.2 The Paris Agreement 
 
The international agreement on climate change adopted at the twenty-first Conference of the 
Parties (COP 21) held in Paris on December 2015, is widely considered an historic milestone 
in multilateral climate diplomacy.  
The Paris Climate Agreement was reached largely on the back of the 2014 China-US deal 
aimed at strengthening cooperation on emission reductions. In fact, the pledge laid the 
foundation for other countries to present their own reductions and was a key determinant for 
the political and diplomatic success of the conference in Paris. Unlike COP 15, which failed 
to deliver a new climate treaty, at COP 21 over 195 parties agreed upon a common goal and 
the attendance of more than 150 world leaders at the conference firmly established climate 
politics in the sphere of high politics. 
The Paris Agreement establishes a long-term, multilateral framework under which countries, 
or “Parties to the Paris Agreement”, commit to undertake domestic actions to address climate 
change. It provides a comprehensive and rules-based approach to climate action containing a 
number of elements that parties consider critical to addressing climate change, including 
technology, finance, transparency, capacity building, and mitigation, as well as adaptation 
measures. The deal requires any country that ratifies it to act to stem GHG emissions in the 
coming century, with the goal of peaking GHG emission as soon as possible and continuing 
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the reduction as the century progresses. Two critical components of the Paris Agreement are: 
(a) limiting the temperature increase to “well below” 2°C and pursuing “efforts” to limit such 
increase to 1.5°C, and (b) achieving a balance between “sources and removal by sinks” – or 
net-zero emissions – in the second half of this century. 
That which is new and different in the Paris Agreement is that it allows the parties who have 
ratified it to define their own mitigation measures; it overcomes the strict binary 
differentiation of the Kyoto Protocol between developed and developing countries. 
Nevertheless, many developing countries and emerging economies, led by China, wanted to 
somehow preserve this dichotomy in order to grant different climate protection 
responsibilities to different countries according to their level of development. To this aim, the 
final formulation of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement preserves some degree of differentiation, 
stating: 
 
“Developed country Parties should  continue  taking  the  lead  by  undertaking  economy-
wide  absolute  emission reduction  targets.  Developing country Parties should continue 
enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-
wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances” 
(UNFCCC, 2015: art 4, para 4, p. 22). 
 
This formulation was agreed upon in order to find a compromise between China’s desire for 
differentiation and the United States’ requests to overcome the strict, out-dated binary 
division between developed and developing countries which, ultimately, was one of the 
factors that determined the US’s step back from the Kyoto Protocol. 
One of the key components of the Paris Agreement is that it adopts a "bottom-up" framework, 
meaning that all parties independently determine how much they will reduce their greenhouse 
gas emissions. While these commitments are not legally binding, the Paris Agreement does 
impose a legal obligation on parties to report their commitments and steps taken towards 
implementation, and these reports are subject to monitoring and verification. 
The national commitments of parties are currently expressed through ‘Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions’ (INDCs), many of which were submitted to the UNFCCC prior to 
COP 21 and include national strategies and policies to assist their implementation. 
Specifically, 187 out of 195 parties submitted their INDCs before the Paris Conference, 
outlining the steps they would take to fight climate change, and this was considered – at the 
eve of the conference – a clear signal of support for this new approach. 
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With respect to the issue of “loss and damage” discussed in COP 19 in Warsaw, the Paris 
Agreement formally accepts, for the first time, that many developing countries and least 
developed countries will suffer “loss and damage” as a result of climate change even if the 
more stringent target of 1.5 degree Celsius will be met. In this regard, Article 8, states: 
 
“Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage 
associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and 
slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and 
damage” (UNFCCC, 2015: art 8, para1, p. 26). 
 
However, at the same time, the Paris decision clearly states that, “Article 8 of the Agreement 
does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation” (UNFCCC, 2015: 8). 
Regarding the long debated issue of climate finance, the Paris Agreement stresses the need for 
the “Green Climate Fund to expedite support for the least developed countries and other 
developing countries” in formulating and implementing adaptation and mitigation measures 
(UNFCCC, 2015: 7).  
The GCF is the main UNFCCC fund for investing in low-emissions and climate-resilient 
developments; it can award substantial sums of funding for clean energy technology projects 
with the aim of leveraging additional funds from the private sector. At COP 15 in 2009, 
developed country parties committed to mobilising US $100 billion a year by 2020 from both 
public and private sources to assist climate action in developing countries. The Paris 
Agreement reaffirms this funding commitment by developed countries, and continues to 
strongly encourage the mobilisation of this scale of climate finance until 2025, with a view to 
set a new and more progressive goal prior to 2025. Article 9 of the agreement states: 
 
“Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country 
Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing 
obligations under the Convention and Other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to 
provide such support voluntarily” (UNFCCC 2015: art.9, para 1 & 2, p. 26) 
 
Notwithstanding, the Paris Agreement does not provide “per se” new specific figures on 
climate finance. However, following the targets and commitments announced at the UN 
Climate Summit, climate action from investors, bankers, and insurers has increased 
significantly, highlighting the business opportunities represented by climate change for the 
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future of the financial sector. Financial institutions and private investors made significant 
commitments to upscale their investments in renewable and clean energy, green bonds, low-
emission transport, and agriculture. 
The Paris Agreement also recognised that capacity-building efforts should facilitate 
technology development, dissemination, and deployment. In this regard, recognising that 
technology transfer and development alone would be insufficient to give effect to the 
necessary structural changes to energy systems required by the low-carbon strategies of many 
countries, especially in developing countries, new initiatives to support the transition towards 
low carbon economy development were created. Among them, the “Mission Innovation”, an 
initiative launched by 20 countries, including both the US and Saudi Arabia, which aims to 
reinvigorate and accelerate global clean energy innovation with the objective of making clean 
energy widely affordable, supporting clean energy innovation, and doubling investment in 
energy research and development from current levels of about $10 billion. These 
commitments recognise both the need to switch towards clean energy and, above all, the 
business opportunities that addressing climate change can offer.  
Further to climate finance coming from bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the EU Member 
States have also pledged about half of the initial capitalisation of US $10 billion to the GCF. 
In the first days of the conference, the US government announced a contribution of $30 
million to climate risk insurance schemes in the Pacific, Central America, and Africa, and a 
contribution of over $51 million to the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), hosted by 
the Global Environment Facility (EC, 2015; Rowling, 2015). From its side, before the Paris 
Summit, the People’s Republic of China announced the establishment of an RMB 20 billion 
($3.1 billion) South-South Climate Cooperation Fund, to help developing countries to deal 
with climate change and to enable them to better access capital from the Green Climate Fund. 
China's South-South Climate Cooperation Fund will coordinate and cooperate with the Green 
Climate Fund and other institutions to improve developing countries' ability to cope with 
climate change (MoFa, 2015a). 
China’s Foreign Ministry praised the agreement, calling it ‘comprehensive, balanced, and 
ambitious’, emphasising the positive role undertaken by the Chinese delegation in bringing 
the Paris conference to a final deal and adding, “This gives full expression to China’s sense of 
responsibility as a major country in tackling climate change” (Mofa, 2015b). Indeed, before 
the Paris Conference, China had signed a number of bilateral statements on climate change 
with India, Brazil, the European Union, the United States, and many others in an attempt to 
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pave the way for the global deal to be reached in Paris. In this regard, in presenting its INDC93 
Beijing demonstrated that tackling climate change is an intrinsic requirement of China’s 
sustainable development strategy as well as the obligation of a responsible major country 
(NDRC, 2015).  
While the Paris Agreement is mostly focused on the post-2020 period, its support of decision-
implementation strengthens voluntary efforts to enhance climate actions in the pre-2020 
period by encouraging developed countries to increase the provision of finance, technology, 
and capacity-building to developing countries. Therefore, the policies and actions all countries 
are currently taking to address climate change, as well as planned efforts up to the year 2020, 
will be crucial for the sustainability of the future climate regime. 
 
 
7.3 China and International Climate Change Negotiations 
 
China is a rising global power with a growing impact on international climate change 
negotiations, and its relevance in global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emission is widely 
acknowledged. China plays a key role mainly for two reasons: first, it is the world’s leading 
carbon polluter and the second largest (and rapidly growing) economy of the world. Second, 
its position within the G77 enhances its role in climate negotiations. Despite not having the 
problem of limited weight in acting alone, China has historically associated itself with the 
G77, using the group as protection against being singled out. As the largest developing 
country emitter within the Group, this has allowed China to take a leadership role in 
formulating the positions of the G77, while ensuring the political support of a large number of 
developing countries on its stances (Lewis, 2008).  
Chinese climate policy is determined by both domestic and international considerations. Key 
domestic interests are linked to the country’s economic development, ecological vulnerability, 
and energy issues. China’s climate strategy is intimately linked to its energy development 
strategy and driven by the country’s overall economic development goals of growth, poverty 
alleviation, and social stability. At international level, China’s climate policy is framed in 
respect to the principles of sovereignty, equity, and enhancing its international image.  
Since joining the United Nations in 1971, China has ratified more than 50 multilateral 
                                               
93
 China offered to reduce CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 60-65% from 2005, to raise the share of non-fossil 
fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20% by 2030, and to achieve peak CO2 emissions around 2030. 
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environmental agreements and its climate change policy has been developed in parallel with 
the evolution of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was 
ratified by China in 1993. China has been participating in international climate negotiations 
from the beginning. It signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 and, since then, has, from one side, 
upheld the UNFCCC as the most authoritative, universal, and comprehensive international 
framework for coping with climate change (SCIO, 2008) and, from the other, has labelled the 
Kyoto Protocol as the basic framework and legal foundation of international cooperation for 
addressing climate change (SCIO, 2011). 
In the earlier stages, the Chinese government interpreted climate change policy as a highly 
scientific issue to be managed by environmental agencies and institutions. This approach has 
changed in the last two decades, mainly due to the ecological vulnerability of the country, the 
economic ramifications of environmental policy, and the increasing sense of responsibility to 
fully engage in global environmental governance due to its increasing role as leading 
developing nation within the global South. However, while framing climate change as a 
global challenge that can be addressed by extensive international cooperation between the 
developed and developing world (SCIO, 2008), China has always opposed any discussion 
about binding emissions levels for emerging economies and developing countries in respect of 
the principle of CBDR. Being a fast-growing developing country, China’s international 
negotiation stances has been focusing on opposing any binding emissions reduction which 
could harm the country’s social and economic development as well as its modernisation. In 
China, almost 70% of the electricity generated goes to industrial production and any reduction 
in emissions would have a direct impact on economic growth and poverty eradication. 
In July 1990 at its 18th meeting, the Environmental Protection Commission (EPC) of China’s 
State Council issued a proclamation entitled “China’s Principles and Positions on Global 
Environmental Problems”. The declaration highlights several principles: the responsibility of 
developed countries for global environmental deterioration, the harmony of both 
environmental protection and economic development, the recognition of developing 
countries’ right to develop, the sovereign equality of all states, and the need for new and 
additional funds for developing countries. These principles formed the basis for China’s 
stance throughout the international negotiations (Jeon & Yoon, 2006: 850-1) 
Up until the mid-1990s, China consistently opposed any environmental diplomatic initiatives 
that threatened its economic development and interfered with its domestic affairs. At the 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), China chaired a 
session of 41 developing countries, acknowledging the need for international cooperation to 
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promote environmental protection and sustainable development, but demanding, at the same 
time, financial assistance, respect to the right to development, and no interference in the 
internal affairs of developing countries (Ross, 1998).  
In 1998, Benjamin Gilman, Chairman of the US House of Representatives’ Committee on 
International Relations, characterised China’s position on climate change at the 1997 Kyoto 
conference (COP 3) as a “policy of the Three Nos: no obligations on China, no voluntary 
commitments by China, and no future negotiations to bind China” (USHC on IR, 1998). 
However, over the last two decades, while China’s commitments and participation in global 
environmental agreements increased, the government’s position towards ICCN has 
progressively changed. Although resistance to mandatory targets remain unchanged, China 
started to apply an increasingly flexible and cooperative attitude towards ICCN since COP 3. 
This change was primarily due to the consideration that emission reductions would not only 
affected the global environment, but would also impact the country’s economic development. 
Therefore, rather than solely an environmental issue, climate change started to be considered a 
core energy issue as well. 
At the fifth Conference of the Parties (COP 5) held in Bonn in 1999, the head of the Chinese 
delegation emphasised that, although China would move on with its national strategy aimed at 
limiting the growth of greenhouse gas emissions in line with its own sustainable development 
strategy, and would continue actively promoting and participating in international climate 
cooperation, it would be impossible for the Chinese government to undertake any obligation 
of greenhouse gas emission reduction before China attains the level of a medium-developed 
country (Zhang, 2003). In his official speech at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit, 
Premier Wen stated that: 
 
“The Chinese government has set the target for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. This is a 
voluntary action China has taken in light of its national circumstances. We have not attached 
any condition to the target, nor have we linked it to the target of any other country. We will 
honor our word with real action. Whatever outcome this conference may produce, we will be 
fully committed to achieving and even exceeding the target” (MoFA, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the failure of the Copenhagen Conference, in January 2010, 
China notified the UN of its nationally appropriate mitigation actions to be undertaken under 
the Copenhagen Accord. While stressing that the actions were autonomous and domestic, 
Chinese authorities stated that China would endeavour to lower CO2 emissions per GDP unit 
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by 40-45% by 2020 on a 2005 baseline, together with other actions (Minas, 2010; Kopra, 
2012). 
These remarks reflected the growing involvement of Chinese authorities in ICCN, and when 
China hosted, for the first time, the UNFCCC talks in Tianjing in October 2010 for the final 
meeting before the Cancun Conference the Chinese commitment to the ongoing international 
negotiation process was once again demonstrated. The choice of venue seemed designed to 
showcase China’s commitment to addressing global warming: Tianjin is, in fact, the site of 
both a carbon exchange and an eco-city that China has been developing together with 
Singapore and with significant private sector investments.  
In this research, I argue that the evolution of Beijing’s position in the framework of ICCN 
could be ascribed to the threefold identity shift China has experienced since the early 2000s. 
The three elements of China’s identity shift are strictly interconnected and, combined with 
each other, have determined the Chinese shift towards a more active role in global 
environmental governance. The first element of this identity shift is related to the ambition of 
the Chinese government to enhance its national image, playing the role of responsible 
developing country stakeholder in the ICCN, and maximising at the same time its role as a 
leading fast-growing developing nation within the global South. The second element arises 
from the acknowledgment of the country’s vulnerability to climate change and the growing 
understanding that climate change will bear significant political, economic, and social costs 
for China. In 2006, the Ministry for Environmental Protection stated that the cost of 
environmental degradation in 2004 was more than $62 billion, or 3.05% of GDP. In 2010 the 
cost of environmental degradation was about $230 billion, or 3.5% of the nation’s GDP, more 
than three times that in 2004. According to some foreign scholars that have criticised the 
methods by which Chinese researchers have reached those numbers, suggesting that some 
crucial measures of environmental degradation were not included in the calculations, the 
figure could be even worse (Li & Graeme, 2010). Finally, the third element of this identity 
shift is related to China’s increasing concerns over its energy security. Beijing’s rapid 
development is driving increasing energy consumption in all economic sectors. Energy is 
therefore the key to China’s economic development and is one of the main reasons for China’s 
unwillingness to take on binding emission reduction targets; because an increase in emissions 
will be necessary to allow Chinese economy and industry to be developed further.  
From the Chinese perspective, one of the key challenges in the framework of ICCN remains 
the question of how the mitigation burden will be translated into a new climate regime. In a 
world of unequal states that have different historical responsibilities for causing climate 
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change, and different capacities to respond to climate change, equity should be one of the 
basic principles of the climate regime (Winkler et al., 2011). From an historical perspective, 
the principle of equity has had the greater influence over the Chinese government’s attitude 
toward ICCN. The key global climate policy (or equity) issue is that without developed 
countries sharply reducing their emissions, other countries will not receive their fair share of 
the carbon budget for sustainable development and the eradication of poverty. In this regard, 
developing countries advocated per capita emission rights, which significantly challenges the 
Northern way of living, requiring a long-term structural change. In fact, this change has been 
always excluded from the negotiation table by developed countries as of the first Rio Earth 
Summit in 1992, and was clearly synthesised by President George Bush Sr. at the Earth 
Summit: “The American way of life is not up for negotiation. Period”.  
For this reason, Chinese climate change negotiators have repeatedly drawn attention to the 
“survival emissions” of developing countries and the “luxury emissions” of developed 
countries, stressing the need for developed countries to change their own patterns of 
production and consumption, rather than transferring their responsibility to developing 
countries. Burden-sharing has been always a central issue in climate negotiations, and it is 
very likely that any future climate policy that could be perceived as obstructing economic 
progress will fail, especially in large developing countries and emerging economies that are 
counting on rapid economic growth to lift their citizens out of poverty.  
The histories and trends of the development of different countries has shown that to approach 
the development level of industrialised countries necessarily means higher per capita energy 
consumption. To date, there is no historic precedent for achieving high per capita GDP with 
low per capita energy consumption (Zhang, 2013). Lack of electricity impacts public health 
and slows down economic growth, and energy and ecological services are directly related to 
human well-being. The development of infrastructure, urbanisation, manufacturing, and food 
production are essential for economic growth, and for the alleviation of poverty, and all of 
them need “carbon space”. Estimates suggest that currently worldwide 1.6 billion people lack 
virtually any access to electricity, which has a direct impact on public health and economic 
growth. The backward energy development and utilisation technology has been (and partially 
still is) one of the main reasons for the low energy efficiency and high intensity of greenhouse 
gas emissions in China and, notwithstanding the impressive progresses made by government 
policies, outdated technology still occupies a relevant share in China’s basic industries.  
Energy is a common denominator in the climate change discussion for China: it is the basis 
for economic development but, at the same time, energy use is also the main cause of rising 
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emission and domestic pollution. In this framework, to control greenhouse gas emissions and 
reduce energy intensity is not only considered to be relevant to fight climate change, but also 
an important tool to achieve energy security. As a consequence, China and other emerging 
economies, such as India and Brazil, have begun to implement policies aimed at decoupling 
economic development from carbon emissions and, in particular, the Chinese government has 
started to consider air pollution and climate change as a single challenge. China is playing a 
key role in decoupling energy consumption from the carbon emissions because in China 
climate change is becoming a driving force to address both energy security and air quality 
restoration, as previously mentioned in Chapter I.  As with its overall economy, the Chinese 
clean energy sector is reorienting from an emphasis on exports toward greater domestic 
consumption. This shift is evident in record-setting deployments of wind and small hydro 
capacity in recent years and especially by China’s dramatic growth in solar power capacity: 
solar deployment increased almost fourfold in 2013 (PEW, 2014: 13). According to Phyllis 
Cuttino, Director of Pew’s Clean Energy Program, no other clean energy market in the world 
is operating at that scale. The Pew report says China’s efforts to slash poverty, expand 
economic development, and solve its air pollution problems have driven the country to invest 
heavily in clean energy (Magill, 2014).  
China’s domestic energy policies are driving it towards the reduction of the carbon footprint 
of its economy in the internal market, combining energy security and air pollution prevention. 
At a global level, China’s carbon footprint should be considered according to two main 
indicators: the per capita emissions and the spatial perspective. With regards to the former, 
China, which is the bigger emitter in absolute terms, had much smaller per capita emissions 
than the US: 7.1 tons versus 16.4 tons (Roberts, 2013). Regarding the spatial perspective of 
China’s carbon foot print, estimates attributed more than 30% of China’s emissions to goods 
it manufactured for export (Peters et al, 2012). In 2012, the UK’s Energy and Climate Change 
Committee stated that:  
 
“Successive governments have claimed to be cutting climate change emissions, but in fact a lot 
of pollution has simply been outsourced. We get through more consumer goods than ever before 
in the UK and this is pushing up emissions in manufacturing countries like China”94.  
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Despite the economic growth, and although China is the world’s second largest economy, the 
country is still a developing one, as well, as illustrated in Figure 7.1 below by the per capita 
footprint. The spatial perspective of China’s carbon footprint is a key driver of one of the 
most controversial issues in climate negotiations: who should carry the cost of decarbonising 
Chinese industry? Should the developed economies, which have outsourced their own 




Fig. 7.1: World per Capita Carbon footprint 
 
Source: Zhu Liu – Harvard Kennedy School, 2013 
 
The private sector is taking the responsibility to promote low carbon development in China; 
following the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility, and according to the Chinese 
programs and rules, many global corporations are placing China at the centre of research and 
development on sustainable production and consumption patterns of the whole supply chain.  
Businesses such as Walmart and Microsoft have already acknowledged that, having driven the 
expansion of China’s manufacturing sector, the developed world can now support the country 
to decarbonise, delivering global benefits that outweigh concerns over competition. The 
West’s support for China’s low-carbon energy development will have a global benefit: it is a 
combination that has the potential to deliver a significant change in global emission 
reductions, as emissions from anywhere in the world affect climate globally – meaning the 
benefits of the West helping China to decarbonise are greater than the sum of its parts. China 
strongly believes that the development and the dissemination of clean energy should be 
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supported by financial resources, as well as by financial and trade mechanisms in all the 
markets, starting with the developing world. Particularly, the spatial perspective of China’s 
carbon footprint suggests that China could share global targets and commitments on 
emissions reduction in exchange for the financial and technological support for both Chinese 
and the developing economies’ decarbonisation.  
In this context, equity is a crucial issue to be considered for the implementation of the new 
climate regime as well as a critical point for developing countries and emerging economies’ 
sustainable development. China is highly investing in decarbonising its economy, and this is 
the strongest driver for the decarbonisation of the world economy, considering the key role 
China plays both in the global economy and in the global race to reduce emissions. Without 
China, it is not possible to reduce the global emissions.  
Yet, China cannot address this immense challenge on its own. Following the path of global 
corporations, developed countries should share the efforts of China’s low-carbon development 
in the framework of common rules to optimise intellectual property and fair competition in 
order to strengthen innovation in the Chinese industry with mutual global benefits. However, 
governments of developed countries and the international financial institutions seem unready 
to support the decarbonisation of the Chinese economy, because of the risk of China’s 
increasing competitiveness on the world market. 
For this reason, China has, on the one hand, been pushing for the linkage of the Paris 
Agreement with policies to support the development and the dissemination of clean energy 
technologies as the only gateway for building an effective agreement for the reduction of 
global emissions, and, on the other hand, has simultaneously opposed binding emissions 
reduction targets because they could severely hamper its development perspectives with 
serious consequences for its political stability. 
 
 
7.4 International Relations and Global Climate Change: the Role of 
Climate Policy as a “Game-Changer” in International Relations  
 
The geopolitical context in which the international climate change negotiations for the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement has taken place is significantly different compared to 20 
years ago, and the evolution of ICCN has been highly influenced by the changing global 
economic and political order. 
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India, China, and Brazil have risen as new powers and have gained political, economic, and 
financial influence and confidence vis-à-vis the old powers of Europe and the United States. 
As illustrated in Table 7.1 below, the BASIC countries have more than doubled their 
economic weight in the international system over the last 20 years, with a consequent increase 
in their political and negotiating power.  
The BASIC countries’ emergence has affected the equilibrium of the climate regime and 
destabilised the compromise achieved in Rio in 1992 on sustainable development. The “Rio 
compromise” between environment and development, embodied in the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997, transposed the relation between environment and development to a system of rights and 
obligations. A compromise can be defined as “an agreement implying mutual concessions” 
with a view to reach a common solution that the parties must jointly implement (Van Parijs, 
2012). However, when the positions of the negotiating parties change, the basis of the 
compromise no longer holds, and this is exactly what has happened to the climate regime. 
After 20 years of ICCN, the political and economic context in which negotiations take place 
has changed dramatically, as well as the power, preferences, and stances of the negotiating 
parties.  
 
Table 7.1:  The weight of BASIC in 1990 and 2012. Share of global GDP (in PPP: 2005) as % of global 
total 
 1990 2012* 
Brazil 3 2.9 
China 3.5 14.8 
India 3 6 
South Africa 0.8 0.8 
BASIC 10.3 24.5 
USA 21.4 19 
European Union (27) 18.4 19.4 
Japan 8.9 5.5 
 
*CHELEM-CEPII estimations 
Source: CEPII, 2011 
 
Traditionally, countries have been divided into two categories: developing countries were 
grouped together under "Annex I" and developed countries, judged responsible for climate 
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change to a greater extent, were grouped under "Annex II". Today, the previously clear 
demarcation between Northern and Southern countries used in past climate negotiations is 
becoming blurred and the economic divides between developing countries are widening, 
making the negotiating interests of emerging economies closer to that of the G7, rather than 
that of the G77. 
Emerging economies are fast-developing countries, and, while they have begun to decouple 
economic development from carbon emissions, their emissions continue to increase rapidly. 
The relative share of the emissions of the developing world is continuously increasing, and 
their absolute emissions will soon overtake those of the developed world. The increased 
relevance of developing country economies as global polluters goes hand in hand with a shift 
in the global balance of power – economic, military, and political – away from the West, 
towards the emerging economies of the developing world.  
Over the last ten years, China and India have become the world’s second and third largest 
economies, Brazil has risen to seventh, Mexico to tenth (WB, 2015a). This increase in 
economic influence has been accompanied by growing political assertiveness. India and 
China have discarded the low profile they kept in international climate negotiations in the 
1990s and are now even more willing to actively defend their interests, make their voice 
heard, and veto decisions that are in contrast with their national interests (Streck & Terhalle, 
2013). At the same time, linking the domestic and international agenda on climate change 
progressively, the approach adopted by China in ICCN is that one of proposing targets backed 
up by coherent policy framework to be implemented at national level. 
China’s rapid development in both investment and the production of renewable energy has 
received increasing international attention and China is now the world’s leading investor in 
renewable energy. Certain business sectors regard low-carbon and clean technology as a field 
in which China has opportunities for comparative advantage, and Chinese companies have 
already reached leading positions in manufacturing a number of low-carbon technologies. 
Clean technologies is a domain in which China wants to reach a world leadership position, 
and China has considerable potential to be inspired by, and in turn to drive, a global transition 
to a low carbon future (Hallding et al., 2009: 51-52). 
In recent years, Chinese leaders have implemented a number of impressive reforms, which 
include aggressive efforts to transform the country into a leading centre of innovation and a 
low carbon economy. Beijing is supporting research and development, recruiting Chinese 
born and foreign trained scientists to return to China to head labs and manage research 
centers, and is analysing models of innovation that have become successful in the West. 
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Beijing has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in the clean-energy sector and is providing 
subsidies to domestic manufacturers to encourage and support the development of the clean-
energy industry (Sanwal, 2013; Economy, 2010). These efforts, aimed at making a shift 
towards a more sustainable energy base, started to delivered promising results in 2012, and 
China announced significant further steps in early 2013. 
According to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) 2014 Technology Roadmap – Solar 
Photovoltaic Energy Report, the largest growth in solar PV power will come from China. As 
shown in Fig. 7.2 below, at its peak China will contribute about 40% of electricity generation 
from solar PV in the world in 2030. China is expected to overtake Europe as the largest 
producer of PV electricity soon after 2020, with its share regularly increasing from 18% of 
global generation in 2015 to 40% by 2030, then slowly declining to 35% by 2050. From 2030 
to 2050, the share of India and other Asian countries is expected to rise from 13% to 25%. By 
contrast, the United States’ share is expected to remain at about 15% from 2020 on, and 
Europe’s share to decrease constantly from 44% in 2015 to 4% in 2045 (IEA, 2014: 21).  
These forecasts will probably be revised, considering the progresses that can happen in the 
technology field over the next 40 years, but they are a reliable indicator of the future trend. 
 
Fig. 7.2: Forecast regional production of solar PV electricity 
 
Source: IEA, 2014 
 
This data suggests that in the near future China will help change the world. However, that 
future has already started because in 2013 China was already the largest single market for 
solar PV installations in the world, accounting for 30% of net installations (new installations 
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less facilities retired from service).  
Given that the 13th Chinese Five Year Plan further strengthens the path towards green growth, 
it seems likely that China’s shift towards low-carbon development – and a more positive 
stance in climate negotiations – is intended to be both structural and long term. Beijing 
invested more than $103 billion in renewable energy in 2015, almost $88 billion in 2016 (one-
third more than the US), and plans to invest $361 billion in clean energy by 2020, pursuing its 
goal to become a "clean energy super power". 
The “One Belt, One Road” initiative launched by President Xi Jinping in 2014 is further 
driving the increasingly outward-looking nature of Chinese infrastructure companies. Under 
this initiative, smaller and developing Asian countries, like Myanmar, Laos, or Cambodia, are 
seeing accelerated economic growth driven by Chinese investment, which in turn is 
developing new markets for Chinese exports (Roman, 2016). As a consequence, any reduced 
US commitment to Asia could allow China’s share of development to expand more. 
For the time being, Latin America is currently one of the most attractive regions in the world 
for renewable energy development, and Chinese companies are already highly active in 
renewables investment in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and other countries in the region. 
Chinese investment in Latin America has reached US $237 billion yearly, compared with the 
US’s investment of US $268 billion. However, with an agreement in place to increase 
Chinese investment in the region to US $500 billion, and the concrete possibility of the US 
leaving the Trans Pacific Partnership (which includes Mexico, Peru, and Chile), China seems 
better positioned to capitalise on the renewables boom taking place across South and Central 
America (MoFA, 2015). 
Only a few years ago China accounted for a negligible share of installations. In 2009, China’s 
share of new solar PV installations was only 2%. The key driver of this change has been the 
relevant and growing support of the Chinese government for the solar PV generation sector, in 
contrast, for example, to what has happened in the European Union. In early 2010, the EU 
was estimated to account for about 80% of global installations, but it has now become a minor 
market. In 2013, the three leading markets were China, the US, and Japan, which together 
accounted for 61% of installations. In 2009, Germany installed over 50% of the solar PV 
added in the world, but in 2013 it accounted for only 9% (Freeman, 2014). One of the main 
reasons for this has been a sharp reduction in support for the sector across Europe, especially 
in the eurozone, due to the persistent effect of the economic crisis. 
Today, countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) play a major 
role on the global stage. A second group of emerging countries, such as Indonesia, Mexico, 
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Nigeria, and Turkey, are rapidly gaining importance as economic and political players, 
especially in their respective regions. The rise of these countries shapes the nature of global 
development challenges and the instruments used to address them. Issues of environmental 
sustainability and social inequality have become even more pressing today than at the end of 
the 1990s, and the role of development assistance as an instrument to engage with emerging 
economies is in a fundamental transition period. The future negotiations for the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement holds the potential to generate momentum for a “new 
bargain” among developing countries, emerging economies, and industrialised countries.  
The climate treaty negotiated at the first Rio Earth Summit in 1992 was an attempt to bring 
together environment and development to reconcile a growing global economy within a finite 
global ecosystem. However, competing interests within 20 years of ICCN has not been able to 
resolve how to manage the rising living standards of all those who have so far been excluded 
from the benefits of globalisation, and developed countries have slowly moved towards a 
policy of burden shifting rather than burden sharing. Moreover, responding to the scientific 
evidence of climate change, political concerns, and geopolitical shifts in a multi-polar world, 
developed countries recognise climate change and sustainable development as “mutually 
reinforcing”, while also qualifying climate change as a security treat. 
The construction of an international climate regime after 2020 is of great significance for 
planning the global governance of greenhouse gases, and it is also the necessary institutional 
arrangement for global environmental security. A redefinition of national security is being 
pushed by raising the question, among others, of whether traditional roles of national states 
and international agreements will prove to be adequate to achieve human security. However, 
the essential question in considering climate change as a geopolitical threat is the nature of the 
threat – environmental or developmental – and whether the correlated risks are addressed 
better by promoting cooperation or by preventing conflict. The choice to be made is between 
implementing new rules for intervention to meet environmental risks, advocating the RTP, or 
new rules for societal and technological transformations, following the approach that China 
has been pushing forward in recent years.  
In this context, the policy issue for China, India, and other emerging economies is whether to 
continue with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities agreed in 1992, or 
acknowledge the significance of the different concerns coming together around human well-
being and take a more forward looking approach to sustainable development as a tool to 
achieve human security. 
By shifting the global agenda from environmental risk as the principal concern to seeking 
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human wellbeing within ecological limits, emerging economies can shape new global goals to 
focus on the implementation of sustainable development. Poverty reduction in recent decades 
has been significantly achieved by the rapid growth in China, which alone accounts for three 
quarters of the global reduction. A review of past trends suggests that two-thirds of poverty 
reduction depends on growth, and one-third on equality. In this regard, the key global concern 
should be modifying longer-term trends in production and consumption patterns to determine 
how standards of living can be raised within ecological limits. As developing countries shift to 
urbanisation and manufacturing to provide employment and services, limiting the use of 
natural resources while still achieving high standards of living will require a review of 
existing global rules and the definition of new rules. The Paris Agreement is a good starting 
point. In his keynote speech at the United Nations Office in in early January 2017, President 
Xi labelled The Paris Agreement a milestone in the history of climate governance, and stated 
“We must ensure this endeavour is not derailed. All parties should work together to 
implement the Paris Agreement. China will continue to take steps to tackle climate change 
and fully honour its obligations”95. 
The design of the post-2020 international climate agenda now takes into consideration that 
keeping global emissions within agreed limits has very different implications for fast growing 
economies and in areas where growth has stabilised. Economic analyses suggest that the most 
rapid growth of the middle class will occur in Asia, particularly in China and India. During 
the next four decades, new and expanded middle classes in the developing world could create 
as many as four billion additional consumers and the volume of related infrastructures will be 
huge. China and India are still building their infrastructure and their energy use per capita is 
predicted to increase at a similar rate to that one of the industrialised countries in the period 
1970-2011, and despite energy intensity of GDP in 2030 being less than half of the level in 
1970, incomes and population are expected to drive a 40% increase in global primary energy 
use (Sanwal, 2013). Therefore, the transition towards a low carbon economy is the only 
possible way to (try to) achieve the targets foreseen in the Paris Agreement. 
How to build a green economy to achieve sustainable development and lift people out of 
poverty and how to improve international coordination for sustainable development were the 
two key themes of the UN Conference for Sustainable Development (Rio+20) held in Rio de 
Janeiro in June 2012, aimed at further eliminating poverty, changing unsustainable production 
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and consumption patterns, and protecting and managing natural resources. 
Given the complexity and uncertainty surrounding the environmental, social, and economic 
processes upon which pathways to sustainable development depend, the guiding principle for 
the new international climate regime should be to update the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities to instead emphasise “sharing responsibility and prosperity”. 
International cooperation will then be seen in terms of sharing technological development and 
exchanging experiences on societal transformations that will lead to emissions reduction, and 





International Climate Change Negotiations started in the early 1990s, based on the outcomes 
of the White House Conference on Climate Change, the first report of the IPCC, and the 
Second World Climate Conference in Geneva. The UN Convention on Climate Change was 
signed at the Rio de Janeiro world summit on Environment and Development in 1992. In 
1997 the Conference of the Parties of the Convention approved the Kyoto Protocol and the 
emissions reduction commitments of industrialised countries based on the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, in 2000, at the end of the Aja Conference of the Parties, the conflict between the 
EU and the US on the application of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities “killed” the Kyoto Protocol, and the failure of the Copenhagen Conference in 
2009 disclosed the real nature of international climate change negotiations, which is primarily 
the negotiation of different and competing economic interests, as well as domestic political 
priorities, between the several stakeholders involved in the process.  
China’s framework policies on climate change reflected, similarly to the United States, its 
domestic circumstances and socially-embedded conception of its national interest. Simplistic 
accounts blamed China for being selfish, whereas more complex analyses pointed out that the 
interests of major players were fundamentally too far apart to be reconciled (Dimitrov, 2010). 
From one side, the US were not keen to undertake any emission reductions burden without a 
clear parallel engagement from China and other emerging economies, while, from the other 
side, China and other emerging economies claimed more emissions allocations to support 
their economic growth and were united in opposing any emissions reduction not complied 
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with the principle of equity.  
The rise of China and other emerging economies has changed the balance of power between 
the global South and the global North, as well as the negotiating roles of individual actors in 
the two blocs. The evolving geopolitical context has been reflected in the framework of 
International Climate Change Negotiations. Thereby, emerging economies have exercised 
their newly achieved economic role in world affairs to safeguard their national priorities and 
interests, as well as to reinforce their transforming identities.  
The Paris Agreement has followed from apparently cooperative behaviour of the US and 
China. They played a key role in facilitating the negotiations on the basis of the deal agreed a 
few weeks before the COP 20 in Lima. The new agreement seems to mark the opening of a 
new era in global climate action based on the Chinese perspective that climate change cannot 
be tackled as an independent variable. Instead, according to Beijing, it has to be viewed as 
intrinsically linked to one’s economic growth, domesticaly mediated welfare needs, and social 






Chapter VIII: China’s Rise in Global Environmental 
Governance   
 
“There is detectable a causal relationship between the shifts which have occurred over time in 
the general economic and productive balances and the position occupied by individual powers 
in the international system…economic shifts heralded the rise of new Great Powers which 
would one day have a decisive impact upon the military/territorial order. This is why the move 
in global productive balances toward the “Pacific rim” which has taken place over the past 
few decades cannot be of interest merely to economists alone”. 
 
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, 1988 
 
Twenty years after the end of the cold war and the demise of the bipolar world, a lack of 
consensus remains on the status of the distribution and exercise of power in today’s world. 
The term global power is a more contemporary term for great power, which refers to the 
ranking of states, primarily in terms of their military and economic capabilities, and is a better 
fit for 21st century conditions than superpower, a term first coined in 1944 by William Fox in 
his book The Superpowers: The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union – Their 
Responsibility for Peace (Fox, 1944). During the Cold War, the use of the term “superpower” 
denoted the emergence of a new class of power that was clearly superior in military and 
economic terms to the traditional European great powers of the 19th century, distinguished by 
the possession of the nuclear power of ultimate destruction. The processes of globalisation, 
which has been said characterises the present world politics, has brought about a further 
change in the ranking of international power, so that a great power now needs more than 
nuclear capabilities: beyond being merely great, or super, it now needs to operate on a global 
level (Dellios, 2005).  
That which is clear, however, is the rise of new powers seeking a global political role 
comparable with their increased economic impact on world economy. In this new framework, 
rising powers are changing the dynamics of power in the international system by seeking a 
greater voice in international institutions as they try to achieve a global political role 
commensurate with their growing economic capabilities and clout (Tank, 2012). In this 
context, China and other emerging economies, such as India and Brazil, are clearly set to play 
a much more relevant role in the next decade, and there have been several different 
predictions about their impact on international politics. 
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The rapid rise of China has made its relationship with the world increasingly interactive; any 
action undertaken by China would be relevant for the rest of the world. Some forecasts 
suggest that, as China represents the developing countries, and the United States the 
developed ones, China and the US should co-lead the world under some sort of G2 
arrangement. David Shambaugh, Professor of International Affairs and Director of the China 
Policy Program at George Washington University, notes that the relationship between the 
United States and the PRC has rightly been described by officials on both sides as the most 
important, as well as complex, bilateral relationship in the world (Shambaugh, 2013). This 
complexity is often undervalued in the media as experts seek to portray the relationship in the 
simple arithmetic of China's rise and America's decline (Levine, 2014). China-US relations 
are among the most important bilateral ties in the international community, as demonstrated 
by the climate deal reached in November 2014 during the APEC Summit, just before the COP 
20 in Lima, and calling on the United States and China to cooperate has an undeniable logic. 
However, while both Washington and Beijing are destined to fail if they confront the world’s 
problems by themselves, the narrative of a G2 is not consistent with the Chinese foreign 
policy of a multipolar world, presented by Jiang Zemin in 1992 at the 14th Congress of the 
Communist Party (Turner, 2009).  Encouraging multipolarity is a means by which China 
believes it can advance its quest for great power status (Tien & Zhu: 175) and leading 
development nation within the global South. 
It has been more than 15 years since China’s accession to WTO and China’s rapid economic 
growth has been parallel with its engagement in the globalisation process. In the past thirty 
years, China has moved from the periphery to the centre of the international system, 
transforming itself from an impoverished country, where peasants comprised the largest 
portion of the population, to an “economic powerhouse” with an expanding middle class and 
more megacities than any other country in the world. This remarkable transformation has 
required, and will continue to demand, massive quantities of resources. Today, given its 
resource endowments, the size of its economy, and its status as world’s manufacturing plant, 
China is increasingly dependent on foreign resources to feed its greedy industries. With the 
increasing demand for foreign resources and the growth of overseas investment, a key 
question is whether China’s quest for natural resources – pursued through a mix of trade, 
investment, and military means – is changing the world, be it for good or ill, or if this quest is, 
in fact, changing China, bringing it into the fold of existing international rules, practices, and 
institutions (Economy & Levi, p: 7). 
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As discussed in Chapter II, in International Relations, competing theoretical perspectives offer 
different answers to this question. In this Chapter, I argue that China’s participation in the 
Western-led global governance system is based in its identity-driven calculus of national 
interest. Thereby, while this participation has informed China’s experience with the United 
States and the European Union and has further shaped mutual expectations, it did not 
“Westernise” the country in a top-down manner. Therefore, while continuing to work within 
the present global system, China has already pursued the same approach the US has long 
taken (and may proceed to do so): picking and choosing among multilateral treaties, 
institutions, and initiatives and occasionally acting alone or opting out to preserve its 
sovereignty or freedom of action (Patrick, 2010). Pursuing this strategy, China is slowly 
working on a parallel structure of global governance, expanding its regional political and 
cultural influence enabled by the South-South cooperation and the projection of a Chinese 
brand of soft power that engages countries who do not feel represented by today's global 
governance system, or those who seek to increase autonomy from the US.  
In this complex international reality, fixed alliances and old Western-led international 
structures may count less than shifting coalitions of interest, shared developing world and 
postcolonial identities, and new regional networks. Chinese climate change policy and 
negotiation strategy at an international level reflect this trend. 
 
 
8.1 The Challenge of China’s Rise 
 
In 1803, Napoleon allegedly said: "China is a sleeping lion. Let her sleep, for when she wakes 
she will shake the world” (Ng & Chen, 2014). 
In the post-Cold War era, especially in the beginning of the 21st century, the “rise of China” 
has become a recurrent topic between scholars, pundits, and policy makers in the West, and 
much has been written on what this “rise” implies for the rest of East Asia, the United States, 
and the world as a whole (Zhang, 2011: 235-6). China’s economic rise has been largely 
viewed with uncertainty and anxiety in the Western world. Its rapid economic growth, 
military modernisation, and increasing appetite for energy has prompted many in the United 
States and Europe to talk about a “China Threat”96. Over the past decades, there has been an 
intensive debate in Europe, North America, and Japan over whether a rising China should be 
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considered an opportunity or a threat; a conservative status quo power to be engaged with or a 
rising revisionist state to be contained (Shambaugh, 1996). The People’s Republic of China 
has the largest population in the world, the fastest growing economy, the largest army, the 
largest middle class, a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, a manned 
space programme, a nuclear arsenal, and so on (Callahan, 2005). However, for policy 
analysts, economists, policy makers, historians, and scholars it is still difficult to understand 
and define the impact of a rising China on global governance.  
In recent years, within the growing international debate on environmental security, scholars, 
pundits, and politicians raised warnings on potential resource wars due to the unprecedented 
Chinese demand to fuel its impressive economic growth. In this framework, the securitisation 
of environmental issues with the development of the climate security paradigm has been read 
by some researchers97 as a tool to slow down or, at least, to interfere with China’s impressive 
economic growth. In this regard, there is now overwhelming evidence that human-induced 
climate change is altering the natural world and, at the same time, shifting the dynamics of 
international politics (Habib, 2011; Roberts, 2011). 
Materialist accounts of China’s actions abroad assert that its behaviour is primarily propelled 
by its need to secure energy, metals, and strategic minerals in order to fuel its economic 
growth and to support the rising living standards of its immense population, which amounts to 
about one-fifth of the world’s total (Kaplan, 2010). In these accounts, natural resources are 
portrayed as a historical flashpoint between emerging and established powers. England and 
Spain are said to have built and maintained colonies partially to satisfy their resource demand 
and after World War II (WWII), the United States of America extended its influence over 
distant resource-producing lands and spent relevant resources to protect seaborne commerce, 
in part to assure itself of reliable access to the resources lacking at home (Economy & Levi, 
2014: 2). In the 1950s and 1960s, as Japan emerged from WWII, the country consistently 
achieved growth rates similar to those seen more recently in China (Gordon, 2003: 245-6) and 
this was seen as an economic threat by American manufacturers, who experienced great 
anxiety over the popularity of Japanese cars and electronics.  
Therefore, as China’s political and economic relevance continues to rise in world affairs, it 
will become increasingly important for political analysts to evaluate China’s international 
relations discourse in order to fully understand China’s intentions.  
                                               
97
 See: Gupta & Dutta, 2009; Hartmann, 2010; Boas, 2012; Mayer et al. 2013. 
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From Bush administration-era exhortations that Beijing act as a “responsible stakeholder”, to 
Obama administration hopes that China would become a “partner in underwriting the 
international order”, American leaders have consistently called on China to join the prevailing 
global system. In essence, according to David Shambaugh, the Western strategy towards 
China from the 1970s through to the 1990s was premised on integrating China into the 
existing international institutional system, so as to both strengthen the system by giving China 
a deserved “place at the table” but also to “socialise” China into the prevailing rules and 
norms of the system (Shambaugh, 2013: 130), inviting the country to join global governance 
institutions and play the role of a responsible stakeholder.  
From the early 1970s, over the course of the last four decades, China slowly entered the 
global institutional order. According to Shambaugh, this process passed through four broad 
phases of system challenger, system studying, system exploitation, and system altering 
(Shambaugh, 2013: p 132-136).  
During the first three phases, the guiding principles for Beijing’s participation in global 
governance institutions were dictated by Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine: 
 
 “At present, we are still a relatively poor nation. It is impossible for us to undertake many 
international proletarian obligations, so our contributions remain small. However, once we 
have accomplished the four modernizations98 and the national economy has expanded, our 
contributions to mankind, and especially to the Third World, will be greater. As a socialist 
country, China shall always belong to the Third World and shall never seek hegemony” 
(Deng, 1978). 
 
Therefore, the two main guidelines were: (1) any international obligations were dependent on 
Chinese economic development; and (2) notwithstanding the level of its economic 
development, Beijing should always present itself and, consequently, be considered in any 
international forums, as a country belonging to the Third World. Thus, modernisation was 
highlighted as the essential condition for solving China’s domestic problems as well as the 
cornerstone for achieving international status, since the role China plays in international 
affairs would depend on the extent of its economic growth. 
                                               
98
 The Four Modernizations were the essential economic and development goals first set forth by Zhou Enlai in 
1963, and enacted by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, to strengthen the target areas of Chinese industrial modernisation: 
agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology. 
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The first phase, upon joining the UN and throughout most of the 1970s, was characterised by 
an attempt to challenge the existing order that had excluded China’s participation in global 
governance institutions over the previous two decades. In the late 1970s, with the ascension to 
power by Deng Xiaoping and other reformist leaders in 1978, China’s stance in the UN and 
international bodies shifted from a system challenger to a system studying phase (1978–1984), 
in which China mainly sought to study and learn how these international institutions operated. 
In the mid-1980s, the third phase started. During this phase, China further integrated into the 
international institutional order and learned how to benefit from it. In parallel, as Beijing 
learned how to “play the system”, its presence and voice also grew, launching the fourth 
phase in the early 2000s, during which China started to became a more proactive international 
actor.  
Since the adoption of the policy of reform and opening up in 1978, the main objective of 
China’s foreign policy had been to create conditions that were advantageous for economic 
development in the framework of the guiding principles of national sovereignty and security, 
as stated in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. When Deng Xiaoping became the 
paramount leader of the PRC in December 1978, China was still struggling with the social 
and political chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Per capita annual income was less than US 
$100. By the time he stepped down in 1992, several hundred million Chinese citizens had 
been lifted out of poverty, and China was rapidly becoming stronger, richer, and more modern 
(Vogel, 2011).  
Among all the tasks that Deng performed between 1978 and 1992, the most important was 
probably the reworking of the Maoist discourse of the New China, providing it with both 
continuity and verisimilitude in order to establish it as an ideological brace for his reform and 
opening up. (Solé-Farràs, 2016). In this regard, Deng’s guiding principles in foreign affairs, 
such as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the socialism with Chinese characteristic, 
the narratives on China’s Peaceful Development, or the discourse about China being a 
permanent country of the Third World, notwithstanding the level of its economic 
development, arise from an attempt to seek legitimacy for its reform and opening up policy, 
looking back on Chinese tradition. 
Chinese debates over international relations and China’s role in the world are inextricably 
linked to Chinese domestic politics. China’s economic priority is ensuring access to its goods, 
expanding outward investments, and consolidating its position as a regional and global hub of 
advanced production networks. Upgrading China’s industrial structure takes priority in its 12th 
Five Year Plan, where the PRC, among other priorities, enabled itself to manufacture industry 
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products in the high-end chain, which has always been monopolised by the West. Therefore, 
the over-arching driving factor behind China’s foreign policy, and the common denominator 
in most of China’s global activities, is China’s own domestic economic development, and any 
efforts are geared towards the safeguarding of its national sovereignty, security, and 
development interests. 
In this framework, in parallel with the attempt to modernise its economy and achieve its 
development goals, China’s leadership has been engaged, since the early 1990s, in reassuring 
the international community about China’s peaceful rise. The term ‘China’s peaceful rise’ 
calls for a harmonious international environment for China’s growth, promising great benefits 
for the Chinese people, its neighbours, and the entire world. The term was forged in early 
2000 by Chinese Communist Party theoretician Zheng Bijian, and was replaced soon after by 
the more nuanced term “China’s peaceful development”. 
The concept of peaceful development was presented in a 2005 State Council White Paper and 
immediately became one of the key discourses in China’s foreign strategy. The White Paper 
recalled that, since the policies of reform and opening up were introduced at the end of the 
1970s, China has successfully embarked on a road of peaceful development, compatible with 
its national conditions and characteristics of the times (SCIO, 2005).  
Since becoming a member of the WTO in 2001, China has followed a more cooperative 
attitude in foreign policy, actively promoting multi-polarisation, equality in international 
relations, and the empowerment of developing countries. In this framework, China’s 
contribution with more than 3000 troops to serve in UN peacekeeping operations, its active 
participation in non-proliferation diplomacy (including hosting the Six-Party Talks on North 
Korea), and its willingness to settle territorial disputes with its neighbours represent an 
evolution in China’s international commitments. By becoming a WTO member and supporter 
of the UN peacekeeping forces, China has come a long way from its former reactive and 
obstructive stereotype (He, 2007; Guo, 2008).  
This new foreign policy approach was synthesised by former Premier Wen Jiabao on the 
occasion of the 2010 official visit of former EU President Barroso, when he affirmed that 
China would shoulder more international responsibilities as it was the aspiration of the 
international community and in China’s own interest too. 
In this context, the major issue for Western powers is how to a manage relationship with a 
rising power, such as China, which contains elements of both partnership and rivalry. The 
ideal scenario would be for the rising powers to embrace Western principles, norms, and 
rules, just as candidate countries to the European Union adopt its acquis communautaire - the 
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whole body of EU laws. In this view, the US tried to increasingly involve China’s 
participation in the Western system in an attempt to “westernise” the country. Hence, it was in 
September 2005 that former US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick spoke of how it 
was in both American and Chinese interests that China become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in 
the international system (Zoellick, 2005). Explicit in this construct is the idea that, because 
China has so richly benefited from its steady integration into the global order over the past 
three decades, it therefore has a self-interested “stake” in strengthening and sustaining that 
order (Gill & Schiffer, 2008). In 2010, the United States National Security Strategy argued 
that ‘new and emerging powers who seek greater voice and representation will need to accept 
greater responsibility for meeting global challenges’ (White House, 2010). Indeed, in a 
globalised world, none of today’s international problem such as global financial stability, 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, or energy security can be managed without 
engaging new and emerging powers, and the US has no choice but to rely on rising powers to 
help address today's global challenges. However, even if Washington may want them to do 
more on the world stage, it cannot control their choices and it will not always like the results 
of their participation (Patrick, 2010). In fact, even if the basic interests of established and 
emerging powers could reach a parallel on such global issues, national perspectives and 
priorities on the same issue may differ, and the path undertaken by emerging countries is 
increasingly not that of implementing existing rules and follow them blindly.  
This trend emerged very clearly and was strengthened in the wake of the financial crisis, 
when China's central bank governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, called for the creation of a new "super-
sovereign reserve currency" to replace the dollar. In a paper published on the People's Bank of 
China's website, Zhou stated that “the outbreak of the crisis and its spillover to the entire 
world reflected the inherent vulnerabilities and systemic risks in the existing international 
monetary system”. Therefore, an international reserve currency "disconnected from individual 
nations" and "able to remain stable in the long run" would benefit the global financial system 
more than the current reliance on the US dollar (Zhou, 2009).  
Even if the statement was not followed up by any formal action from the Chinese 
government, it was read by international political observers as an attempt to challenge the 
dollar's role as the world's reserve currency and, at the same time, as a tool to support China’s 
strategy to gain a greater voice in international financial institutions. As a consequence, in the 
aftermath of the crisis, a number of policy analysts and politicians across the world started to 
talk about the beginning of the end of the Wall Street Model and the American Power (Pew 
Research Center, 2009; Lowestin, 2010). 
215 
 
Between the end of 2009 and early 2010, the common narrative on an international power 
shift focused around the rise of China and the decline of the United States. Former Russian 
President Medvedev called the 2008 financial crisis a sign that the United States’ global 
leadership was coming to an end (Kramer, 2008). And even the former Canadian leader of the 
Liberal Party, Michael Ignatieff, suggested that Canada should look beyond North America 
because ‘‘the noon hour of the United States and its global dominance were over” (The 
Economist, 2009). 
In this context, leaving behind Deng Xiaoping's mantra "hide brightness, cherish obscurity", 
even some Chinese policy analysts began discussing China's rise as a world power, arguing 
that the United States had begun an inevitable decline that would leave room for China at the 
top of the global pecking order (Economy, 2014).  
Even before the financial crisis, some scholars were questioning US dominance on the 
grounds that the Afghanistan and Iraq wars had damaged it both financially and morally. In 
2006, Wang Yiwei, a scholar at Fudan University in Shanghai, published an article in the 
Global Times with the provocative title: “How we can prevent the US from declining too 
quickly”. The article, which suggested that a precipitous decline in U.S. power would harm 
Chinese investments, predicted the United States would soon fall to the status of a regional 
power rather than a global one and advised Washington to ‘learn to accept Chinese power on 
the world stage’ (Wang, 2006). 
Wang’s article generated a tremendous response from readers and intellectuals, which spurred 
further debate within China about whether U.S. power was in decline (Glaser & Morris, 
2009). Fu Mengzi, a professor at the Beijing think-tank China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations, believes that the high point for US power projection was 2000 and 
that US power has been declining since then, especially with Iraq and Afghanistan. According 
to Mengzi, ‘the financial crisis has made it seem more and more obvious’ (Dyer, 2009).  
The financial crisis had, indeed, significantly weakened the US and its security presence in 
Asia, and several China-watchers started to explain a number of international confrontations 
involving China, above all with Japan and other neighbours on outstanding territorial and 
maritime disputes, with the claim that Chinese foreign policy had suddenly shifted toward a 
hard line posture, labelling 2010 as China’s year of assertiveness (Shambaugh, 2013). From 
2010, the long-discussed topic of China’s rise has come to be dominated by a new theme 
among both Chinese and foreign observers: the image of the supposedly cautious, low-profile 
Beijing of the past giving way to one of a more confident, assertive (some say arrogant), anti–
status quo power that is pushing back against the West, promoting its own alternative norms 
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and policies in many areas, and generally seeking to test the leadership capacity of the United 
States. This new image has prompted many Western pundits to assert that the Chinese are 
finally “revealing their true colors” (Swaine, 2010). 
Beijing’s foreign policy attitude, pressing harder on some of its core interests, from climate 
change to territorial issues, was interpreted by many Western policy makers as an indicator 
that China wanted to maximise its own comprehensive power and, as a consequence, refuelled 
the debate over the negative international consequences of China’s rise, revitalising the so-
called China Threat Theories.  
However, as underlined by Nye in his Washington Quarterly article American and Chinese 
Power after The Financial Crisis, extrapolating the wrong long-term projections from short-
term cyclical events like the recent financial crisis can lead to costly policy miscalculations 
(Nye, 2010). In Joseph Nye’s words, analysing the challenge that China poses to the United 
States and, more generally, to the Western world using the narratives of the rise and fall of 
great powers underlying the supposed new assertiveness of Chinese foreign policy, as well as 
the supposed belief of the United States’ decline, tells us a lot more about psychology than it 
does about reality (Nye, 2011: 157).  
Alastair Johnston, in his article How new and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness, 
reviewing examples of PRC assertiveness prior to 2010 to contextualise the emergence of the 
new assertiveness meme in 2010, argued that the historical records of the last decades seem 
not to support the claim of a more assertive China (Johnston, 2013). China has simply never 
stopped confronting the US and its Asian allies over a number of issues that question its 
national sovereignty and domestic priorities. Some examples of this in recent history are: the 
Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995/1996, the detention of 24 crew members of an American 
surveillance plane after a collision with a Chinese fighter jet in 2001, the border closing with 
Mongolia to protest the Dalai Lama visiting Ulan Bator in 2002, the killing of nine 
Vietnamese fishermen in the South China Sea in 2005, or the blowing up of an old weather 
satellite in 2007. 
On the other hand, the narrative of the United States’ decline has appeared cyclically, starting 
from 1958 when the former Soviet Union won the first battle of the space race with Sputnik, 
contininuing through to the oil embargo and the closing of the gold window in 1973, the 
1980s rust belt economy, and the 2008 outbreak of the financial crisis. According to Nye, it 
will be important for security analysts not to mistake their simple theories for reality, to avoid 
misleading historical analogies and to avoid letting exaggerated fears create a self-fulfilling 
prophecy (Nye, 2006).  
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In his lecture China's Challenge to American Hegemony at the London 2010 Global Strategy 
Forum, former US Ambassador Charles W. Freeman Jr. (the chief interpreter during President 
Nixon's trip to China in 1972) stated that: 
 
"The more likely prospect is that China will take its place alongside the US and others at the 
head of a multilateral system of global governance. In such an oligarchic world order, China 
will have great prestige but no monopoly on power comparable to that which the US has 
recently enjoyed. The world in future will be more “democratic” and, likely, more muddled than 
in the past because many countries, not just the United States or China, will share power in it. 
There will be ample opportunities for countries with trusted relationships with Washington and 
Beijing to influence how they participate in global affairs. There will be no hegemon, and there 
will be no ‘G-2’ " (Freeman, 2010). 
 
The likely near future will not see one or two countries play a hegemonic role upon the other, 
but rather a multipolar balance of economic power. In this sense, the primacy of the United 
States in the world economy has come to an end. China is joining the US, the EU, and Japan 
at the top, and India, Brazil, and other G-20 countries will most probably follow in the years 
to come. 
The first and most significant feature of rising powers is their economic stature and their 
attempt to achieve a global political role comparable with their increased economic relevance. 
In this view, China could perhaps have become more confident in defending its national 
priorities on the international stage but it will hardly become more aggressive and surely will 
try to avoid any open confrontation with the United States. In fact, an aggressive foreign 
policy will have a direct impact on its commercial relations with a devastating effect on its 
economic growth and, consequently, on its political stability. 
The current generation of Chinese leaders, realising that rapid economic growth is the key to 
domestic political stability, has focused on economic development and what they call an 
‘‘harmonious’’ international environment that will not disrupt China’s growth (Nye, 2010). 
Beijing’s response to this new awakening of the China Threat was to publish a second white 
paper, China’s Peaceful Development, in 2011. In this new paper, which was primarily an 
update of the previous one published in 2005, Beijing presented Chinese historical and 
cultural tradition as being aligned with the principle of peaceful development, with the aim of 




“China has declared to the rest of the world on many occasions that it takes a path of peaceful 
development and is committed to upholding world peace and promoting common development 
and prosperity for all countries. […] China declared solemnly again to the world that 
peaceful development is a strategic choice made by China to realize modernization, make 
itself strong and prosperous, and make more contribution to the progress of human 
civilization. China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development” (SCIO, 2011a). 
 
Moreover, the concept of peaceful development was highlighted two years later by Mr Wang 
Yi China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs at the UN General Assembly, when he once again 
presented China’s peaceful culture and history as reassuring factors, stating that “The culture 
of a country determines its values, and its history points the way to its future99”. 
 
 
8.2 The Beijing Consensus and Chinese Soft Power 
 
China’s economic success generated a lot of discussion about a Chinese Model of 
development, and from the early 1990s economists and policy makers started to analyse the 
“case study” of Chinese economic development. For the past three decades, China’s leaders 
have managed a hugely complex transition from a centralised, Soviet-style planned economy 
to a more dynamically open one, and have done so with some success. Chinese leaders not 
only reformed China’s inefficient state-owned enterprises, but also managed, under the close 
scrutiny of the Communist Party, to comply with WTO rules and procedures, facilitating 
China’s joining in December 2001. A few years later, in 2004, with the publication of a paper 
by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a UK Foreign Policy Center scholar, entitled The Beijing Consensus 
(Ramo, 2004), the Chinese Model started to be discussed as an alternative to a Western-based 
model of development for developing countries. According to Ramo: 
 
“China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not 
simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way 
that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a 
world with a single massively powerful centre of gravity. I call this new centre and physics of 
power and development the Beijing Consensus” (Ramo, 2004: 3-4). 
 
                                               
99
 https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/CN_en.pdf [accessed 22 January 2017]. 
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The name “Beijing Consensus” emerged from a comparison with the Washington Consensus, 
which became the dominant model of international development during the 1980s and 
particularly after the end of the Cold War. The term “Washington Consensus” was coined in 
1989 by the English economist John Williamson, referring to a set of specific economic 
policy prescriptions promoted by Washington-based institutions such as the IMF and the WB, 
which were believed to be necessary for the recovery of Latin American countries after the 
economic and financial crises of the 1980s (Williamson, 2000).  
Since the early 1990s, the term “Washington Consensus” has been largely used and widely 
accepted as the most effective model to be implemented to enhance growth in developing 
countries. However, this model, prescribing a neo-liberal approach to economic development 
that includes reducing the role of the state in the economy and maximising the role of the 
“free market”, eliminating government subsidies, privatising government industries and 
public utilities, and removing barriers to foreign trade and foreign investment, became less 
attractive with the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008. 
In the period that followed, China’s impressive economic performance and capability to 
promptly react to the hit of the financial crisis captured the attention of an increasing number 
of emerging economies and developing countries, providing a completely new path to reflect 
upon as an alternative model of development. Positioned in contrast with the Washington 
Consensus, Ramo stated: 
 
“China’s new development approach is […] flexible enough that it is barely classifiable as a 
doctrine. It does not believe in uniform solutions for every situation. It is defined by a ruthless 
willingness to innovate and experiment, by a lively defend of national borders and interests, and 
by the increasingly thoughtful accumulation of tools of asymmetric power projections […]. 
Change, newness and innovation are the essential words of power in this consensus” (Ramo, 
2004: 3-6)   
 
For many international observers, above all from developing countries and emerging 
economies, the Chinese system is not just fascinating for its economic record but also because 
it can achieve far reaching complex decisions quickly, in contrast to the slow and complicated 
policy system that has plagued both the European Union and the United States, especially in 
the years of the global financial crisis.  
The critical difference between a socialist market economy (i.e. the Beijing Consensus) and a 
capitalist market economy (i.e. the Washington Consensus) seems largely to be a matter of 
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who has political power in the country. In Deng Xiaoping’s view, in a capitalist country, the 
wealthy capitalists dominate both the economy and the political systems. In a socialist system, 
political power is in the hands of the vanguard communist party that represents the interest of 
the “people”. It is the party that will make sure that the socialist market economy does not 
lead to the kind of exploitation and inequalities that result from a truly capitalist system, and 
that the market part of the economy ultimately serves the goal of building socialism and 
achieving communism (Joseph, 2014: 179). 
The Beijing Consensus has been widely discussed at international level and has attracted the 
interest of various countries, from Latin America, Africa, South Asia, and the former Soviet 
republics, making it a major source of China’s soft power. However, internally, the Chinese 
have refrained from endorsing the idea of a Chinese Model, nor have they shown much 
interest in the debate about the subject. As early as 1985, in a conversation with Jerry 
Rawlings, former President of Ghana, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said: “Please do not 
copy our model. If we have any experience to introduce, it is that we make policies according 
to our own national conditions” (Men & Shen, 2014: 34-35). 
Indeed, mainstream Chinese scholars continue to hold the view that China’s development 
model should not be propagated abroad because doing so would fuel further fears about 
China’s rise revitalising the so-called China Threat Theory (Jacques, 2012).  It is for this 
reason that the influential public intellectual and commentator Hu Angang has argued for the 
substitution of the label “Beijing Consensus” with “Beijing Proposal”. According to him, the 
latter term offers a better illustration of the relational character of China’s security governance 
(Kavalski, 2012: 105). As Hu suggests:  
 
“The significance of such renaming is that the expression Beijing Consensus implies that China 
is imposing its way on others. If anything, it should be known as the Beijing Proposal. Other 
countries can choose whether or not they would like to accept it. In addition, they may accept it 
wholesale or accept it only in part” (Hu, 2011: 7).  
 
Moreover, the relevance and exportability of China’s own experience is limited because of its 
unique characteristics. In this regard, as underlined by Professor Arif Dirlik, a Kai Feng 
Scholar expert on modern Chinese history, it is important to draw a distinction between a 
Beijing Consensus, which points to an alternative global organisation, and a Chinese model 
that answers to the particular needs of Chinese society (Dirlik, 2006: 7).  
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Main critics of the Beijing Consensus blame that it ignores not only the devastating negative 
environmental, social, and health externalities of China’s development, but also issues such as 
social welfare for workers, human rights abuses, corruption, and huge wealth disparities 
among citizens. When Hu Jintao took over from Jiang Zemin as General Secretary of the 
Central Committee at the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 
November 2002, the development paradigm of Chinese politics was still "GDP first and 
Welfare Second". Hu started then to advocate policies aimed at addressing some of the main 
socio-economic downsides of China’s three decades of spectacular growth, particularly the 
country’s very serious environmental problems and the necessity for sustainable development. 
The overall goal of these policy priorities was to create an “harmonious socialist society”, 
which was formally endorsed by the seventeenth CCP Congress in late 2007 and presented as 
a “scientific outlook on development” that “calls for comprehensive, balanced and sustainable 
development” (Wang & Zheng, 2007; Xinhua, 2007). 
During the Hu mandate, the downsides of China’s emphasis on economic growth – above all 
income inequality, huge regional disparities, and environmental degradation –  and the social 
unrest it produced became increasingly clear and sparked a major debate on China’s 
development strategy, calling the leadership to undertake wider political and socioeconomic 
reforms. In the opinion of Shi Yinhong, Professor of International Relations at Renmin 
University in Beijing, for China to be an inspiration to the world, China first needs to be an 
inspiration to its own people (Glaser & Murphy, 2009). This is probably one of the reason 
why Premier Xi Jiping, within two weeks of taking over as party leader in 2012, began 
exposing his vision of the “China Dream”, which involved a combination of a much higher 
standard of living and the ascent of China to Global Power status. 
The China Dream integrates national and personal aspirations, with the twin goals of 
reclaiming national pride and achieving personal well-being. It requires sustained economic 
growth, expanded equality, and an infusion of cultural values to balance materialism. In its 
initial formulation, this concept clearly has strong elements of nationalism at its core. In 
advancing the Chinese Dream, the government is trying to draw citizens together around a 
shared mission and driving change, especially people in lower-tier cities and rural areas, as 
they experience increased affluence and opportunity100. 
Chinese media almost immediately began playing up the slogan. The party propaganda chief, 
Liu Yunshan, ordered the idea to be written into school textbooks and the government raised 
                                               
100
 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/Chinese-dream.html [accessed 22 January 2017]. 
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awareness of its view of the Chinese Dream with a poster campaign and other publicity. 
Chinese social media quickly became full of postings about the Chinese Dream, in which 
people express their demand for free education, better air quality, and safe food (China Daily, 
2014). A ballad with the title “Chinese Dream” performed by Chinese singer Chen Sisi 
became a hit and more than 1.1 million fans follow her microblog, where she tweets about the 
Chinese Dream (The Economist, 2013a). 
Premier Xi’s first major address to Chinese citizens, after being appointed President of the 
People’s Republic of China by the National People’s Congress in March 2013, was given the 
title “The China Dream, The People’s Dream”. Dreams are indeed powerful, and the vague 
definition of the Chinese Dream allows people to project their own dreams onto the concept’. 
As pointed out by Yang Jiechi, former Ambassador to the US and Chinese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs from 2007 to 2013, the Chinese Dream is a purposeful tool to boost China’s 
influence in international affairs, and one which demonstrates a high level of integration and 
synergy between China’s domestic and foreign policies (Yang, 2014). Therefore, the China 
Dream can be considered another element of Chinese soft power, because it should raise the 
image of China as a fast-growing nation, striving to improve the welfare of its people, and 
secure its place as a respected leader in the international community.  
In its search for status as a global power, China indeed discovered long ago the importance of 
international image building and soft power. In the 1960s, Hans Morgenthau stated that the 
national image ‘determinates what we are as members of society’. Individuals and states seek 
to raise their reputation because ‘in the struggle for existence and power […] what others 
think about us is as important as what we actually are’. Hence, a ‘policy of prestige’ is ‘an 
indispensable element of a rational foreign policy; states strive to impress other nations with 
the power one’s own nation actually possesses, or with the power it believes, or wants the 
other nations to believe, it possesses’ (Morgenthau, 1993: 84–93). The image of a state is a 
key factor in determining ‘whether and how easily the state can reach its goal’, perhaps even 
more significant than the expansion of military and economic power (Jervis, 1970: 5–8). 
The Chinese leadership seems to have appropriated and internalized a specific reading of 
power and history: genuine global powers possess multidimensional strength. They grasp the 
idea that power is comprehensive and integrative, not atomistic. Nor is power today the same 
as in the nineteenth or twentieth century, according to this narrative, when industrial and 
military power prevailed. Today, it must reflect a strong cultural and normative dimension 




“We need a new narrative if we are to understand power in the 21st century. It is not just 
prevailing at war, even though military power is still important. The narrative of power is now 
not so much concerned with whose army wins; it is especially about whose story wins. 
Therefore we are impelled to think more in terms of narratives and whose narrative is going to 
be effective” (Nye, 2011a: 22). 
 
The concept of soft power entered the Chinese academic discourse two decades ago with an 
article published by Professor Wang Huning of Fudan University on culture as the main 
source of a state’s soft power: “If a country has an admirable culture and ideological system, 
other countries will tend to follow it […] It does not have to use its hard power which is 
expensive and less efficient” (Wang, 1993).  
Coined by Joseph Nye in the late 1980s, the term "soft power" refers to a country’s ability to 
persuade others to do what it wants them to do through attraction rather than coercion or 
payment. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, social 
institutions, and policies (Nye, 2004: X). In Soft Power: The Means to Success in World 
Politics, Joseph Nye argues that successful states need both hard and soft power (and “smart 
power”), the combined ability to coerce others and shape their long-term attitudes and 
preferences (Nye, 2004). The idea of soft power features crucially in the story of China's 
emergence as a global power. Another means for achieving recognition as a rising power is in 
fact through the projection of soft power (Tank, 2012).  
Most of the discussion about soft power in China has focused on culture and the idea that the 
best way to make the country seem more attractive to the outside world was through the 
potential magnetism of Chinese civilisation (Dyer, 2014: 178). President Hu Jintao, in his 
keynote speech to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party in 2007, stressed the 
need to enhance Chinese culture as the country's soft power, emphasising that ‘Chinese 
culture has been an unfailing driving force for the Chinese nations’: 
 
"Culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity 
and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength. We must 
enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people's basic 
cultural rights and interests” (Hu, 2007). 
  
As a consequence, since the late 2000s, the Chinese leadership has progressively increased 
government funding for the development of China’s soft power, both domestically and 
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abroad, in order to achieve mainly two goals. The first is to present a positive and less 
threatening image to the world, otherwise fuelled by the country’s rise. The second is to 
support Beijing’s cultural diplomacy as a tool to promote an understanding of the nation’s 
ideals and values in an effort to build broad support for its economic and political goals. 
The Beijing Olympics, the Shanghai Expo, the growing number of international channels 
offered by CCTV, the Xinhua News Agency, the China Daily and the Global Times, the 
Chinese films industry, and the many hundreds of Confucius Institutes around the world, are 
part of what might be described as China’s going out cultural strategy aimed to expand the 
Chinese global cultural footprint (Jacques, 2012; Shambaugh, 2013; Dyer, 2014). The big 
media investments are the most visible elements of China’s soft power project, but beneath 
the surface there are two central ideas about the attractiveness of Chinese culture: an attempt 
to establish a sort of modern Chinese aesthetic that the rest of the world might find enticing, 
and an effort to tap into the wisdom of ancient thinkers to flesh out a non-Western worldview. 
China wants to present itself to the world as a culture that is both new and old (Dyer, 2014: 
178). In fact, if trying to revive a Chinese intellectual tradition is one pillar of the 
government’s plan to enhance the country’s soft power, another one is the effort to present 
China as a modern and advanced country in the field of green growth and clean technology 
development, as illustrated previously in Chapter VI. China is presenting itself to the world as 
the source of ancient wisdom and high technology, which together form an alternative model 
of progress and development (Callahan & Barabantseva, 2011: 3).  
However, even if wealth, economic strength, and technological innovations are preconditions 
for the exercise of soft power and cultural influence, as underlined by Yan Xuetong, one of 
the most prominent public intellectuals in China and Professor of International Relations at 
Tsinghua University in Beijing, an increase in wealth can raise China’s power status but it 
does not necessarily enable China to become a country respected by others (Xuetong, 2013: 
100). According to him, the CCP, together with other steps, should open up the channels of 
public discussion to ensure that party cadres and the general public realise China will need 
more than economic growth to secure lasting national power. Everyone must understand that 
some of Chinese society’s less-than-attractive elements must change if the country’s rise in 
cultural terms, essential to consolidating its military and economic rise, is to succeed (Lynch, 
2013: 635).  
In this regard, several Western scholars argue that, despite its economic successes, China’s 
international influence will remain limited as long as it fails to evolve in an attractive political 
system. If the authoritarian growth model produces soft power for China in authoritarian 
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countries, it definitely does not produce attraction in democratic countries (d’Hooghe, 2010). 
Joseph Nye has criticised Beijing’s efforts to acquire soft power through a centralised scheme, 
emphasising that despite spending billions of dollars to increase its soft power, China has had 
a limited return on its investment. According to him, what China seems not to appreciate is 
that using culture and historical narrative to create soft power is not easy when they are 
inconsistent with domestic realities (Nye, 2012). In David Shambaugh’s words, the Chinese 
government is approaching soft power and public diplomacy in the same way that it 
approaches constructing high-speed rail or long-distance highways: by investing money and 
expecting to see the development (Shambaugh, 2013: 267). 
As a consequence, notwithstanding the positive results achieved by the country during Hu’s 
mandate and the encouraging signals of the new Xi leadership, while China already enjoys 
considerable and increasing influence among developing and least developed countries, the 
Beijing Consensus still exercises very little soft power in the Western world. However, as 
stated by Jian Wang in his 2010 book Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through 
Communication, “while the debate on the intentions and merits of its global outreach 
continues, China has embarked on its quest for a massive image makeover” (Wang, 2011: 10). 
Most important, political and academic adoption and self-initiated use of the term soft power 
reflect certain national self-imaginaries and roles that China’s party-state leadership believe 
their country is entitled to, should reinforce, live up to, and perform globally. Such self-
conceptions enable a range of foreign, environmental, energy, and climate change policies and 
practices: from aggressive investments in clean energy and renewables to the promotion and 
defence of the CBDR principle on behalf of the global South. 
China’s soft power push indicates a self-confidence that the country now represents 
something that can be introduced in other countries; that it has things to teach the rest of the 
world (Dyer, 2014: 180). Even though academic and political elites have criticized China’s 
understanding of the concept of soft power as merely strategic and, consequently, highly 
ineffective Beijing experience is crafting an innovative model for an increasing number of 
developing countries because it fits their particular political and development context.  
In fact, not everyone sees China through Western eyes, and China looks very different 
depending on which part of the world you are observing it from. Looking at China from an 
African perspective surely provides the best vantage point. Moreover, Africa is not the only 
place from which China looks appealing, its soft power also draws people in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, and parts of Asia, where the popular impression of China might contrast 
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favourably with the general perception of the West, or where Beijing might be seen as a 
welcome partner in tough financial times, or as a trusted long-time ally (Moss, 2013). 7 
 
8.3 The Combined Action of Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: China 
and South–South Cooperation 
 
South-South cooperation has existed since the late 1950s but only in recent years has it 
become a recurrent issue in discussions on international cooperation for development, 
following the rapid economic growth experienced by some emerging economies such as 
China, Brazil, India, and South Africa. The idea of South-South cooperation (SSC) evokes a 
positive image of solidarity between developing countries providing a context for 
understanding development differently. According to this narrative, donors take interest in the 
unique historical, political, and cultural experiences of the recipient country before making 
aid commitments, which is something that traditional North-South cooperation often 
overlooks (Sotero, 2009). As such, SSC is an attractive proposition, intended to help 
developing nations break away from aid dependence on the West and achieve true 
emancipation from former colonial powers (Carmody, 2013; Stuenkel, 2013).  
In this framework, the terms used are “cooperation” and “partnership”, as they appear to offer 
the possibility of building a horizontal relationship between the so-called donors and 
recipients. The element of cooperation is critical to the extent that it enables a particular 
country to progress on its own, which, in turn, presupposes horizontal supportive flows in the 
form of trade, technology, and investment. These processes are interlinked and may in turn 
generate forward and backward linkages, which eventually may produce positive synergies 
across Southern economies. This phenomenon is underlined by the he sharp expansion in 
trade and investment linkages among Southern countries (RIS, 2013).  
In recent years, China has become the most important trading partner for Brazil, South Africa, 
and Africa. Each of the BASIC has seen its share of exports heading to emerging markets 
increase meaningfully over the course of the past decades. In 2012, more than half of all 
exports from China, India and Brazil, and 48% from South Africa, were destined for emerging 
markets (Stevens et al., 2013). At the same time, the rise of BASIC countries as key actors in 
the global political economy has boosted prospects for changing the conventional practice of 
development cooperation, which has been dominated by multilateral institutions and bilateral 
aid agencies since the “invention” of development in the 1950s (Rist, 2008).  
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In fact China, India, and Brazil have begun to redefine their role in development cooperation 
by intensifying their efforts to support various development activities undertaken by countries 
in the global South, especially in Africa and in their respective geographical areas, leading to 
an unprecedented growth of so-called “South-South aid” in recent years. Over the past 
decades the field of development has undergone deep changes as emerging powers expand 
their South–South cooperation and increasingly contest the norms set through established 
Western-led development institutions, particularly the IMF, the WB and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). The world of development assistance is being shaken by a shift 
occurring across the global economy. More than fifty years of Western aid have not 
succeeded in bringing much prosperity to Africa and other poor but resource rich countries. 
At the same time, emerging economies, with rapidly growing strength and size in the global 
economy, moved primarily by a quest for energy security, new trading opportunities, and new 
economic partnerships, are beginning to change the rules of the game, providing aid on their 
own terms and norms. In fact, much of their financing options appear to be less conditional 
and less concerned with the broader structural economic and political issues that often 
dominate the official North–South aid agenda (Eisenman & Kurlantzick, 2006) and, as a 
consequence, more attractive for recipient countries. Common to most of these new donors is 
that none of them belong to the donors’ club established within the OECD, the so-called 
Development Assistance Committee.  
At the head of this group of emerging donors is China, which combines grants, zero-interest 
loans, debt relief, and concessional loans as well as preferential export credits, market-rate 
export buyers’ credits, and commercial loans from Chinese banks. Outside the framework of 
international regulated development assistance, China expanded its bilateral cooperation with 
developing countries, including newly independent states in Asia and Africa. What appears to 
have won Beijing significant credit in Central Asia and Africa is its commitment to the 
practice of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states. 
In Central Asia, Russia’s invasive policies in the post-Soviet spaces have contributed to 
Beijing’s prominence in the region, which has been consolidated through the establishment of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 (Kavalski, 2012: 23). The founding 
documents of the SCO underline the central role of good neighbourly friendship in order to 
achieve an efficient regional cooperation in a number of fields such as trade, scientific 
development, environmental protection, energy, transportation, tourism, as well as safeguard 
regional peace, security and stability. 
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In Africa, the Chinese EXIM bank, a state bank solely owned by the Chinese government and 
the country’s official credit agency, is the world’s largest provider of loans, ahead of the WB 
(Carmody, 2013: 5). On this continent, China’s development assistance programmes have 
witnessed spectacular growth since 2002 and development aid increased from just $1 billion 
in 2002 to $10 billion in 2004. In 2007, the country’s Official Development Assistance 
amounted, according to a report published by the US Congressional Research Service, to 
some $25 billion (Quadir, 2013: 322-324).   
The Chinese government officially outlined its foreign aid policy towards Africa in a 2006 
white paper, China’s African Policy, which underlined Africa’s strategic importance to China 
and clarified China’s ambition to play a greater role in the African continent based on its 
relevant amount of foreign aid coupled with trade and investment activities. According to the 
white paper, China seeks to establish and to develop a new type of strategic partnership with 
Africa, characterised by equality and mutual confidence in political affairs, mutually 
beneficial cooperation in the economic realm, and the strengthening of exchanges in cultural 
affairs (PRC, 2006).  
Nevertheless, China is not a new power in Africa and its engagement with the continent is 
long standing, being the development partner of many African countries since the late 1950s. 
During the early period of Sino-African relations, China was ideologically motivated, 
providing support for national liberation movements as well as direct state aid, most 
noticeably for Tanzania. The huge TanZam railway construction project that connects 
Zambia, through Tanzania, to the Indian Ocean has been an important milestone in Sino-
African relations implemented thanks to a Chinese interest free loan of $406 million. This was 
Beijing’s first major infrastructure project on the continent, demonstrating the political 
interest of China in collaborating with postcolonial states in Africa through a non-Western 
model of development (Garner, 2007: 8).  
Indeed, by the mid-1970s, China had a greater number of aid projects in Africa than did the 
United States (Taylor, 2009: 13) and had established diplomatic relations with 43 African 
countries. From the late 1970s onwards, after the UN seat was achieved in 1971 and mutual 
diplomatic recognition between China and USA was established in 1979, China’s policy 
towards Africa shifted from an ideological interest to an economic one, following Deng 
Xiaoping’s agenda of economic growth and modernisation. The 12th CCP National Assembly 
in 1982 officially marked a shift from a policy that emphasised “economy serves diplomacy” 
to policies based on “diplomacy serves the economy” (Anshan, 2007). Chinese ties with 
Africa were strengthened in the late 1980s, partly due to the strong Western reactions 
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provoked by the Tiananmen brutal repression, which lead Beijing to seek political support in 
the developing world (the Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited 14 African countries between 
1989 and 1992), and partly due to Africa’s economic reform programs launched in the early 
1990s. 
However, the renewed Chinese interest in the African continent is not only motivated by 
temporary political constraints or ideological considerations but it is the result of a clear and 
coherent political and economic strategy towards development and modernisation. Thanks to 
the diplomatic ability of the Chinese government, Beijing has developed an overall approach 
to African Affairs, which places the country on the same level as those Western powers that 
have consolidated political and economic ties with the African continent. Simultaneously, 
Beijing has achieved more, in regards to both the ideology that has driven Western diplomatic 
moves in Africa and the traditional instruments used to implement them (Gardelli, 2009: 1).  
China’s engagement in Africa has expanded dramatically in recent years, most notably since 
China turn from a net energy exporter to a net importer in the mid-1990s. In this new 
expanded phase of engagement in Africa, China has placed special emphasis on the soft 
power aspects of its engagement, playing both to African audiences and to a broader 
international stage, where it seeks to portray itself as a nonthreatening, responsible global 
power (Cooke, 2009: 29). Analysing the strategy and the remarkable results achieved by 
Beijing, it is possible to identify three major areas of interest behind the diplomatic efforts of 
China in Africa. First of all, its expansion in Africa is linked most directly to the requirements 
of China’s rapidly growing economy, especially in energy resources, minerals, and other 
commodities. Secondly, this expansion is also aimed at creating new markets for Chinese 
goods and services. Finally, the overall diplomatic and economic efforts of China in Africa 
are accompanied by a strong diplomatic push to build friendly partnerships and strategic 
alliances with African governments.  
The abundance of natural resources in Africa has led Beijing to seek long-term deals with 
African governments that ensure continued access to all its raw materials and sources of 
energy and, at the same time, allow China to gain support from African countries in 
international forums. Chinese officials have explicitly claimed that foreign aid is designed to 
create a strategic platform for Chinese companies to go global. China mainly provides three 
types of economic assistance to countries with which Chinese companies do business: grants, 
interest free loans, and concessional loans (Economy & Levi, 2014: 54).  
The second key reason that drives China’s expansion towards Africa is the need to open up 
new markets to absorb the overproduction of the Chinese economic system, and the African 
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continent, having achieved an unprecedented growth rate in recent decades, is one of the 
world’s last attractive economic frontiers. According to the data presented in a 2010 
McKinsey report on the progress and potential of African economies, real GDP rose from 
4.9% per year from 2000 through to 2008, more than twice its pace in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and several sectors, such as telecom, banking, retail, and constructions, are booming (Roxburg 
et al., 2010). Until recently, China concentrated on a few big resource rich countries, but now 
places like Congo or Ethiopia, where minerals are scarce or hard to extract, are also getting 
more attention.  
The decision by the Huajian shoe company to establish a production facility in Ethiopia is a 
reflection of China’s new thinking with regards to Africa and China’s use of certain markets 
as manufacturing platforms to export to global markets. It is projected that rising labor costs 
could cause China to export 80 million manufacturing jobs, and both Chinese manufacturers 
and African governments understand the opportunity that exists to relocate many of those jobs 
to the African continent (Hamlin et al., 2014). A growing number of Chinese firms want to be 
close to Africa’s fast growing consumer class. Africa is now more often seen by Chinese 
firms as a place to do business rather than a site from which to gather resources. An IMF 
study in 2011 found that only 29% of foreign direct investment in Africa was in mining (The 
Economist, 2013: 35-36). 
The third key reason that motivates the Beijing government towards Africa is the need to find 
affordable and reliable diplomatic support for Chinese stances in international forums. The 
strategic importance of the African continent is rooted in the fact that it is the largest group of 
states which tend to vote as a block in multilateral contexts. The support of African countries 
has been fundamental for Beijing on several occasions: from the blockage of Taiwan’s 
accession to the WHO, to the rejection of the proposed sanctions against Beijing for domestic 
human rights abuses. The political leverage of African countries was determinant in awarding 
Beijing the Olympic Games in 2008 and the Shanghai Expo in 2010 (Gardelli, 2009: 12). 
Moreover, since the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, the diplomatic support of 
several African Countries has become a fundamental asset for the Chinese negotiation 
strategy in the framework of ICCN. 
However, Chinese expansion into Africa has been subject to criticism, both from Western and 
African policy makers and scholars.  Critics have claimed that, for the most part, Africa is 
exporting oil and other raw materials to China, while importing cheap manufactured Chinese 
goods - an exchange remarkably similar to that of the colonial era. In June 2011, Secretary of 
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State Hillary Rodham Clinton gave a speech in Zambia warning of a “new colonialism” 
threatening the African continent: 
 
“We saw that during colonial times, it is easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off 
leaders and leave. And when you leave, you don’t leave much behind for the people who are 
there. We don’t want to see a new colonialism in Africa” (Phillips, 2013: 504). 
 
Clinton did not refer to China by name, but her remarks were clearly aimed, in particular, to 
growing Chinese investments in Africa. 
Since China began seriously investing in Africa in 2005, it has been routinely cast as a 
stealthy imperialist with a voracious appetite for commodities and no qualms about exploiting 
Africans to get them (Moyo, 2012). Indeed, the accusation that China is a new colonising 
power, exploiting Africa’s natural resources and flooding the continent with low-priced 
manufactured products while turning a blind eye to its autocracies, is at the core of most 
critiques of China’s current engagement with Africa (Taylor, 2009: 1-2). The most common 
complaint is that Beijing, in its drive to secure reliable supplies of raw materials, has 
encouraged investments in states that the West has overlooked, providing assistance to some 
of Africa’s most repressive and corrupt regimes, such as Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and 
Omar al-Bashir in Sudan.  
This policy, according to the critics, has undermined the efforts made by other international 
donors to either ostracise such regimes or leverage “tied aid” to the implementation of 
specific domestic governance reforms (Shambaugh, 2013: 110). This approach to secure 
access to African resources is what David Zweig and Bi Jianhai have defined a ‘resource-
based foreign policy’, which by its very nature has ‘little room for morality’ (Zweig & 
Jianhai, 2005: 31).  
There is extensive academic literature covering the involvement of China in Africa and the 
way in which China has managed to establish its influence on the African continent. Chinese 
involvement in Africa is either interpreted cynically as an extraction of resources, which is 
undermining the West’s effort to promote good governance throughout the African continent 
(Collier, 2007), or the long-awaited ally needed to break the vicious circle of “dead aid” 
which is the disease of which it pretends to be the cure (Moyo, 2009: IX-X). 
On the whole, however, African nations welcome China’s engagement and public opinion 
polling in Africa shows the most positive perceptions of China anywhere in the world 
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(Shambaugh, 2013: 111). In an interview with Foreign Affairs in October 2013, Senegal 
President Macky Sall stated that: 
 
“The cooperation with China is much more direct and faster than the cooperation we have with 
Western countries and other bilateral donors. There are a lot of criteria on governance, on this 
and that, and a lot of procedures. That’s one of the obstacles to effective cooperation: too many 
procedures. Each partner has its own list of these procedures, and so countries spend a lot of 
time dealing with procedures. I’m not saying that what China is doing is better, but at least it’s 
faster. And we need speed” (Reid, 2013: 8). 
 
In fact, in recent decades, China has managed to increase and strengthen its influence in 
Africa, using both development aid and FDI, and China’s alternative path is attractive because 
it provides alternative sources of economic opportunities (Breslin, 2007: 2). In 2008, former 
Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade wrote in the Financial Times that: “China’s approach 
to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial 
approach of European investors, donor organizations and non-governmental organizations” 
(Economy & Levi, 2014: 72). 
To a large extent, this is the result of China’s successful foreign policy towards Africa. In fact, 
China’s rising trade and investments in Africa have been matched by a major diplomatic push 
to foster closer ties with African governments, win support for China’s worldview, and 
reassure Africans (and the world) of China’s friendly intentions. Beijing, which has 
diplomatic relations with forty-nine African countries, maintains an embassy with an 
accredited ambassador in forty-eight of them, commercial counsellors in forty of those 
countries, and seven consulate generals in five of them (Cooke, 2009: 31-33). Moreover, there 
is a custom in Chinese diplomacy that the Foreign Minister’s first overseas trip of the year 
always begins in Africa. This is a kind of diplomacy that African countries, generally 
marginalised in the international arena, are very sensitive towards.  
Building partnership is a distinctive feature of China’s diplomacy and, according to Brantly 
Womack, Professor of Foreign Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics and 
expert of Chinese national and international politics, in the post-Cold War period, there is no 
country that has made more friends than China (Womack, 2008). The most comprehensive of 
China’s diplomatic efforts towards Africa is the triennial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC), established in 2000. China and African countries agreed to meet every three years 
to seek mutual economic development and cooperation, enhancing reciprocal understanding, 
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expanding consensus, strengthening friendship, and promoting cooperation. According to 
David Shambaugh, no non-African nation had ever previously initiated anything like FOCAC 
(Shambaugh, 2013: 109). 
The implementation of South-South cooperation activities has taken different and evolving 
forms, which include capacity-building, training, technology transfer, and financial assistance. 
South-South cooperation has developed in such a way that the process has become a 
multifaceted engagement. 
As previously anticipated in Chapter I, the message that Beijing is channelling through SSC 
has been built upon its adherence to the the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Among 
them, the principle of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as the 
principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states has supported China’s position 
as an international actor that can both be trusted and emulated. In its worldwide “charm 
offensive”, China is using soft power to project an image of a responsible as well as reliable 
international player, to position itself as a model of social and economic success, and to 
develop stronger international alliances (Kurlantzick, 2007). 
 
 
8.4 China’s New Role in Global Climate Governance 
 
Traditionally, the relationship between emerging and established powers (and institutions) is 
understood as being either confrontational or cooperative: emerging powers might either 
revolt against the West or be integrated into the Western-led liberal order (Pu, 2012: 360).  
In social sciences, socialisation is a process whereby the values, norms, and beliefs of a 
specific social space (or “culture”) are internalised by the members of that society 
(Suchinmayee, 2008: 8). International Relations scholars have borrowed the concept of 
socialisation to conceptualise the interaction between states and international society, focusing 
mostly on how emerging powers are learning and internalising the existing norms. However, 
this conceptualisation has largely ignored the role of non-Western powers in shaping the 
evolution of international norms.  
From a theoretical perspective, socialisation is not a static process in which newcomers only 
receive the imprint of the organisation. It is a dynamic process in which newcomers bring 
experiences, values, and ideas into the organisation (Austin, 2002). Therefore, in order to 
understand international political change it is necessary to investigate the attitudes, 
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behaviours, and perspectives of emerging powers towards international norms by 
conceptualising socialisation as a two-way process (Pu, 2012). Understanding socialisation as 
a two way process, or as a reciprocal process, allows one to investigate how rising powers are 
socialised into the existing order of global governance, internalising certain norms while, at 
the same time, reshaping some others when they join (Terhalle, 2011: 345).  
In this view, what has been labeled as China’s new assertiveness could be understood instead 
as the distinctiveness of China’s perspective in its external relationships. As argued by 
Andrew Hurrell, Director of the Centre for International Studies in the Department of Politics 
and International Relations at the University of Oxford, being an active member of global 
multilateral bodies is perfectly compatible with a willingness to challenge the status quo and 
to favor new forms of global governance (Hurrell, 2010: 11). In this regard, the much 
discussed redistribution of voting rights within the IMF, agreed upon in 2010 but not yet 
ratified by the US101, is not aimed at undermining the Bretton Woods institution but it is 
addressed at achieving an updated balance of voting power that reflects the economic power 
of the members of the board. However, at the end of 2016, China still had a smaller share than 
Japan, even though its economy is more than twice the size102 (Summers, 2016).  
The process undertaken by emerging economies in reshaping the structure of international 
governance has gained momentum in the aftermath of the global financial crisis when, while 
Western countries were overwhelmingly concerned with the question of how to address the 
domestic implications of the crisis, emerging economies were able to react more promptly.  
Dealing with the global financial crisis, the Chinese government has shown stronger political 
mobilisation and economic development capability than the United States or Europe, and this 
greatly expanded the country’s global influence (Yan, 2011: 258-259). Moreover, the 
proliferation of norm-setting forums such as FOCAC, SCO, the annual BRICS Summit, and 
other international forums initiated in the framework of SSC, has granted emerging powers 
new ways to contest norm-setting efforts that are perceived to be Northern-led (Erthal 
Abdenur, 2014: 1878).  
As China has grown as an economic power, its self-confidence has increased and this shifting 
balance of material power is changing the landscape of diplomatic influence and normative 
order. The recentring of the global economy in Asia, a feature of the current phase of global 
capitalism (Dirlik, 2014), has created the space for Chinese policy moves to shift the power 
                                               
101
 In 2010 the G20 countries agreed to increase China’s IMF quota from 3.65% to 6.19% but the US Congress 
has refused to ratify the agreement, preventing the reforms from being implemented. 
102
 Calculated in US dollars, market exchange rates. 
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relations within the structures and institutions of global capitalism towards China (and Asia 
more broadly). The hosting of the G20 by emerging economies is symbolic of their enhanced 
global influence when compared to the pre-crisis dominance of the G7/8 (Summers, 2016). 
This new scenario, coupled with a more proactive role in several multilateral forums, has 
allowed China to start influencing the evolution of international norms and, as a consequence, 
it has started to move from the role of norm taker to that of norm maker. 
International Climate Change Negotiations is one of the key examples in which the normative 
preferences of emerging economies – led by China – are shaping crucial issues in global 
governance. The 2009 Copenhagen climate summit can be considered a turning point in 
global climate governance, where Western ambitions to define the agenda of world politics 
were no longer merely criticised by non-Western players, but rather ‘effectively put to an 
abrupt halt’ (Terhalle, 2011: 341). During the fifteenth session of the Conference of the 
Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 15), it was clear that emerging economies were not willing to 
grant the old Western powers sole authority to define the limits of responsible sovereignty, 
wanting instead to exercise their new economic power, reshaping international arrangements 
in a way that could suit themselves and their national priorities and economic interests. 
Essentially, bolstered by their increased economic power, the BASIC states apply a hard 
conception of national sovereignty and, correspondingly, resist the effective delegation of 
authority to international bodies, which is one of the key characteristics of their view of 
international order (Hurrell, 2007: 291). 
In Copenhagen it become clear that Western leadership in global governance was eroding and 
geopolitical power was moving towards major emerging economies, such as China, India, 
South Africa, and Brazil (Hurrell & Sengupta 2012) with the PRC playing a key role in the 
process. In this context, emerging powers demonstrated their solidarity by rejecting the 
Western agenda (Pu, 2012: 342-3) and imposing their own guidelines for the Summit. China 
established a close alliance with India, Brazil, and South Africa and, with the exception of the 
Small Island and Atoll states, also constructed a common cause with developing countries in 
the G77 who took China as their representative. For the first time in a major global conference 
in the modern era, neither the United States nor Europe was leading the process. The arbiters 
of the conference and the authors of the final agreement were the BASIC countries led by 
China, with the United States playing a secondary role (Jacques, 2012: 211). 
The coordinated action of the BASIC group was prepared in a pre-summit organised and 
hosted by the Chinese government in Beijing in late November 2009. China’s policy makers 
invited the representatives of India, Brazil, South Africa, and Sudan, being the chair of the 
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G77, with the aim of agreeing on a common negotiating position. Officially, the four 
countries and the chair of the G77 said they were keen to make a contribution towards a 
consensus in Copenhagen but the key topic of the pre-Copenhagen summit called by China 
was the establishment of a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, binding only 
Western states103. In order to lock down their negotiating position, the four countries and the 
chair of the G77 agreed to a strategy that involved jointly walking out of the conference if the 
developed nations tried to force their own terms on the developing world. 
Once their position was finalised, China was accepted as spokesperson for the BASIC states’ 
proposal, and the four nations issued a joint press release which made it clear that the 
developed nations should be ready to contribute funds and share green technology if they 
expected emerging economies and developing nations to take major actions on environmental 
protection (Dasgupta, 2009; Steven, 2010). This negotiating line was successful. In fact, one 
of the outcomes of the Copenhagen Accord was the creation of the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF), with the goal of mobilising $100 billion a year in public and private finances by 2020 
to address the needs of developing countries. While governments never agreed to any 
particular immediate level of funding for the GCF, the UN stated that the minimum goal for 
the initial public capitalisation of the fund was at least $10 billion by the end of 2014, which 
was actually reached at COP20 in Lima. However, even if the Executive Director of the fund 
signalled this result as a landmark achievement, a large gap still existed between the achieved 
amount and the 2020 target of $100 billion a year agreed upon at the Copenhagen Accord. For 
this reasons, the effectiveness of the fund was openly questioned by the head of China's 
delegation at the following COP 16 in Lima, describing the 10 billion US dollar achievement 
“far from adequate” (RTCC, 2014).  
In December 2014, during a South-South Cooperation Forum on Climate Change held in 
parallel to the Lima Climate Change Conference, Minister Xie Zhenhua, Vice Chairman of 
the NDRC, made two announcements. Firstly, he stated that China would double its financial 
contribution to the South–South cooperation. Secondly, he announced that China would not 
contribute to the Green Climate Fund, preferring instead to establish a South-South 
Cooperation Fund in order to provide a longer-lasting and more formal mechanism to support 
developing countries address climate change, based on the principle of mutual respect and 
win-win cooperation (Hongqiao, 2014). The forum, which brought together more than 200 
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 As reported by The Times of India the pre-summit was organised after reports suggested that rich nations led 
by Denmark were working to set the agenda of the conference by presenting a draft containing a set of specific 
proposals (Dasgupta, 2009). 
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participants from developing countries, emerging economies, and international organisations, 
highlighted the importance of South-South cooperation as a key element of the cooperation on 
environmental challenges and, at the same time, enhanced the role of China as a leading 
country in the field.  
Since 2001, China has trained nearly 2000 climate change officials and professionals from 
developing countries and, above all, has contributed a total of about 270 million yuan ($44 
million) to helping other developing countries enhance their capacity to address climate 
change (Beijing Review, 2014: 17). Financing climate change mitigation and adaptation 
measures through North-to-South finance has always been a critical issue in the framework of 
UN climate talks. However, since the early 2000s, South-South financing for climate change 
has increased significantly and was strengthened even further in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. This was made possible thanks to several policy cooperation and cross-border 
financing institutions within the global South, which were established in recent years by 
emerging economies, with China playing a leading role.  
In the past decade, in the framework of ICCN, China has been the main architect of the 
negotiating position of developing countries and emerging economies within the G77, 
progressively acquiring a leading role within the group. Moreover, thanks to the several 
policies implemented domestically to support the transition of its economy towards the 
development of a low carbon economic model of growth, as well as its remarkably economic 
achievements, Beijing has been increasingly regarded by a growing number of developing 
countries as a model to follow and emulate. 
In the first stages of its participation in the global climate regime, China acted mostly as a 
defensive player against its Western counterparts, but during the last decade – above all after 
COP 15 – Beijing’s position has slowly shifted from defensive to active engagement in global 
environmental governance. Beijing was previously against any measurable, reportable, 
verifiable, and nationally appropriate mitigation commitments (MRV) for developing 
countries and emerging economies, preferring instead domestic voluntary mitigation actions. 
However, at COP 16, in Cancun, China agreed on provisions for the measurement, reporting, 
and verification (MRV) of mitigation actions undertaken by developing countries.  
Beijing was strongly against the proposal, offered by the developed countries, of an evolving 
and dynamic interpretation of the convention principles. Furthermore, following Beijing’s 
interpretation of the CBDR principle, its negotiating position in ICCN firmly emphasised that 
developed countries should take the lead in addressing climate change; to provide financial, 
technological, and other assistance to help developing countries fulfil their sustainable 
238 
 
development responsibilities. Today, with its key role in establishing new sources of 
financing for climate change policies in the global South, as well as its significant investments 
in clean energy and low carbon technologies, both domestically and abroad, China has 
become a world leader in green finance and clean energy development. Due to its strong and 
effective policy of energy reforms – supported by massive state-led investments in green 
growth – Beijing has achieved remarkable results in the share of renewables in its energy mix 
and the improvement of its energy intensity.  
Such progress has helped China make increasingly ambitious pledges in the framework of 
ICCN, leading to the pledge made in Lima, in 2014, to achieve peak CO2 emissions around 
2030 and to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 
20% by 2030. This pledge was made few weeks after the “climate deal” achieved between 
Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Barack Obama during the last 22nd Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation summit held in Beijing in November 2014, which was crucial 
for facilitating the conclusion of the Paris agreement at COP 21 in December 2015. 
The deal achieved between China and the US represented, therefore, the endorsement of 
Beijing as a leading fast-growing developing nation within the global South as well as the 
endorsement of its role as norm maker (or its normative power) in global environmental 
governance. In fact, this deal shifted the criteria upon which actions taken by developing 
countries are reviewed, from emissions reduction to longer-term transformations, which 
acknowledges the importance of social and economic development to emerging economies. 
With this deal, the United States recognised the effectiveness of China’s sustainable 
development policies and, at the same time, acknowledged that the country needs more time 
(and “carbon space”) to achieve the status of a mature industrial economy.  
China’s shift towards low carbon development is intended to be both structural and long-term, 
and but the increasing alignment of Beijing’s economic and environmental agenda has been 
reflected in a more positive stance in ICCN and has been one of the key contributing factors 




A world that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, seemed to be firmly framed under the 
American unipolar moment is now a world where progress in arenas from economic stability 
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to environmental protection to development assistance requires not only China’s agreement 
but also its active engagement (Florini, 2011: 1). 
In his 1933 inaugural address to the United States, President Roosevelt stated that the greatest 
thing Americans had to fear was fear itself.  Sixty years later, President Clinton asserted that 
the United States have much more to fear from a weak China than a strong China. Given the 
global challenges that both China and the United States face, they have much to gain from 
working together (Nye, 2010). 
The prospect of an influential Chinese wealth and military power, coupled with America’s 
devaluation of its own political and economic prestige, has led to growing speculation about 
China’s emergence as a global hegemonic player to rival and, maybe surpass, the United 
States. However, China has still a long way to catch up in military, economic, and soft power 
resources in order to be a global power. In the military field, there is no comparison between 
the military capability of China and the United States (Yan, 2011: 260).  
Despite its impressive economic figures, and its successful and rapid economic recovery from 
the financial crisis, it is misleading to think that China’s rise means that it will soon take over 
the US position in global governance, and analogies to other rising powers with shallower 
histories – France, the United States, Germany, Japan, the USSR – are not helpful in 
predicting the consequences of China’s rise (Freeman, 2014). Either way, China’s leadership 
has, couched the nation’s international beavior in a purprtedly vital interest to perpetuate a 





Chapter IX: Conclusions 
 
“A one-thousand-mile journey starts from the first step. To achieve the nationally determined 
action objectives on climate change by 2030, China needs, building on actions already taken, 
to make a sustained effort in further implementing enhanced policies and measures in areas 
such  as  regime  building,  production  mode  and consumption  pattern,  economic  policy,  
science  and  technology  innovation  and international cooperation”. 
 
China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, NDRC, June 30, 2015 
 
 
9.1 Thesis structure and how it helps answer the research question  
 
The objective of this research has been to investigate the driving factors and forces behind 
China’s increasing engagement in global environmental policy and, ultimately, Beijing’s shift 
towards a norm-making role in global environmental governance.  
Since the substantial failure of the Copenhagen Climate Summit, convened in the framework 
of international climate talks, Western governments have criticized Beijing’s environmental 
policy as inadequate in the global fight against climate change.  The country’s purportedly 
intransigent negotiating position – labelled as the “policy of 3 Nos” by the former US 
Chairmen of the Committee on International Relations104 – has been identified as the main 
obstacle in the global fight against climate change. However, since the early 2000s, Beijing 
has gradually designed and implemented an increasing number of programs and policies 
aimed at mitigating the effects of domestic environmental degradation and global climate 
change. 
My research question has focused on identifying the determinants behind China’s shift in 
environmental and climate change policy from a defensive attitude towards an active 
engagement, which, ultimately, has led the country to play a leading role in global 
environmental governance. 
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 In 1998 Benjamin Gilman, Chairman of the US House of Representatives’ Committee on International 
Relations, characterized China’s position on climate change at the 1997 Kyoto conference (COP 3) as a “policy 
of the Three Nos: no obligations on China, no voluntary commitments by China, and no future negotiations to 
bind China (USHC on IR, 1998). 
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This research has examined whether the different policy perspectives between China and the 
developed countries in the framework of International Climate Talks reflect China’s 
reluctance to adopt internationally shared obligations, or if the PRC is rather attempting to 
create an alternative development model, firmly anchored to the CBDR. The latter would 
mean that China has not been simply disengaged, but that it has rather introduced a distinct 
perspective into the international debate on how to respond to this global challenge. In so 
doing, I argue that China’s identity and self-perception shifted from being a recipient of 
international norms (a “norm taker”) to assuming the role of a global norm entrepreneur 
(“norm maker”).  
To this end, a threefold document, literature, and discourse-analysis approach has been 
employed to investigate the evolution of China’s environmental policy both at domestic and 
international levels. To examine and substantiate the hypothesized norm-making evolution, 
this study has tied its dynamics to underlying shifts in China’s collective social identities 
along three key and interconnected dimensions. 
A first dimension is related to the evolution of China’s self-perception within the international 
political-economic system as a leading developing nation within the Global South. A second 
dimension refers to China’s concerns over the growing economic, social, and political costs of 
its environmental degradation and pollution, mostly due to its impressive economic and 
industrial development based on fossil fuels. Finally, a third dimension of this identity shift is 
related to China’s increasing concerns over its energy security. 
These three dimensions of China’s identity shift are mutually reinforcing and, combined, at 
least partially account for Beijing’s shift towards a leading role in global environmental 
governance.  
This research has employed a social constructivist conceptual lens. This has enabled a 
coherent analytical framework following the underlying theme of the research: China’s 
identity construction and national interest. By drawing on social constructivist ideas and their 
identity-based approach, this research shows how China’s climate diplomacy (understood as a 
combination of South-South Cooperation and China’s brand of “soft power”) has worked to 
secure broad political support within the Global South for Chinese climate change and 
development policy. Thereby, with the aim to (1) reconvert its “brown” and energy-intensive 
economy toward a more efficient and low-carbon one, (2) to oppose the development of 
environmental norms which could negatively impact its economic growth and, finally, (3) to 
enhance its international image of a responsible rising power, Beijing has started to act as a 
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norm-driven actor behaving in accordance with and building consensus around the CBDR 
principle. 
The first chapter has introduced the topic of this research, its central and organizing question, 
and its core argument. Thereby, Chapter I has situated the dissertation in academic and policy 
discourses of China’s role in international climate change negotiations, in particular at the 
intersection of the climate change securitisation debate and China’s broader rise to power in 
international affairs. 
The second chapter contextualizes the leading role of China as a fast-growing developing 
nation for the Global South within the North-South divide debate. By analysing the rise of 
China through the lens of three principal International Relations theories, I explain why the 
limitations of realism and liberalism in understanding the shift in China’s environmental and 
climate change policy call for an identity-based contribution to address the central research 
question. Finally, the chapter introduces the concept of Normative Power China understood as 
the capacity of Beijing to act as a global norm entrepreneur in the framework of international 
environmental governance. 
The third chapter is dedicated to presenting the methodology of the research. 
The fourth chapter has analysed the discourse on environmental security and climate change 
investigating both the scientific findings as well as the Western-led narrative on climate 
change securitization towards the development of the climate security paradigm. Considering 
that norms constitute and redefine state interests and approaches, norms about the 
environment, climate security or sustainable development not only regulate what states do, 
but they can also be connected to their identities and are thus expressive of how they define 
themselves and their interests. Analysing the Western discourse on environmental security 
through a social constructivist approach has shed light on China's response to what it 
encounters internationally as a North-driven securitization of climate change. The chapter has 
embedded China’s response in a broader process of identity construction and performance 
both domestically and abroad. In responding to the securitization of climate change, China has 
strengthened progressively its normative power and, accordingly, played a crucial role in 
framing the global debate on climate change as a subject of North-South politics. 
The fifth chapter discusses the development of the “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” (CBDR) principle within the framework of ICCN and its relevance in 
China’s identity shift. I argue that China’s adherence to the CBDR has been integral to 
creating a network of partners built on the collective identity of the Global South. This has 
been instrumental for Beijing in promoting an alternative model of development that allows 
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for an opposition to the securitization of climate change. Accordingly, the CBDR principle 
has enabled the Chinese government to de-escalate the issue of climate security and switch 
the international focus from security discourses to development ones. In so doing, China has 
engaged diplomatically and politically those countries that do not feel represented by today's 
global governance system, reinforcing its (much-discussed) alternative model of economic 
development, the so-called “Beijing Consensus”.  
Chapter VI is centred on the analysis of China’s approaches and policies towards climate 
change. The relevance of this chapter in answering the research question is twofold. First, it 
deconstructs the narrative of China as the “climate villain” in global environmental 
governance by analysing some motivations behind the PRC’s resistance to applying the 
climate security paradigm. On the other hand, the chapter helps examine China’s domestic 
policy framework on converting its “brown” and energy-intensive economy into a “low 
carbon” model of growth. In tackling the domestic societal experience of Chinese economic 
growth as intertwined with the sense of national environmental degradation and economic 
insecurity, this chapter helps substantiate the proposition on China’s threefold collective 
identity shift as constitutive of its evolving ICCN leadership. 
The seventh chapter summarizes the history and development of the climate change regime 
from the first international environmental conference in Stockholm (1972) to the 2015 Paris 
Climate Summit, investigating the evolution of China’s behaviour in ICCN. While 
environmental studies have investigated national climate change policies and their 
determinants over the last few decades, little attention has been paid to what constitutes the 
bargaining positions that governments assume in climate negotiations and the strategies they 
thereby deploy (Bailer & Weiler, 2014: 43). Such positions and strategies reflect structural 
economic and domestic factors and they arise from intertwined cost-benefit calculations and a 
sense of historical and social appropriateness. 
In this framework, the international focus on emission reductions has, according to China, 
overshadowed the core issue of international climate change negotiations: finding a socially 
acceptable balance between (1) a consistent level of welfare in developed countries, (2) 
sustainable economic growth in emerging economies, and (3) the eradication of poverty in 
developing countries. In other words, Chinese governmental discourses associate the manner 
in which international climate change negotiations have unfolded in the last three decades 
with their purported failure to address the relationship between climate change policies and 
local and global economic development. The analysis thus focused on the role of climate 
change policy as a game changer in international relations, whereby emerging and developing 
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economies have started to play a more active role arguably since the beginning of the century, 
and certainly in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  
Chapter VIII discusses the elements of China’s identity shift as a leading fast-growing 
developing nation within the Global South, namely: the so-called Beijing Consensus, South-
South cooperation, and Chinese conception of “soft power”. The Chinese government has 
extensively resorted to South-South cooperation discourses and practices and has 
declaratively embedded them in its “soft power”. This has strengthen its leading role in a 
coalition of developing countries and emerging economies towards the development of a new 




9.2 China’s evolving role in global climate action: Offering a competing 
narrative of recent history by way of general conclusions 
 
The rise of China and other emerging economies has changed the economic, political, and 
diplomatic balance of power between the Global South and the Global North. This changing 
geopolitical context has been reflected in ICCN. Thereby, emerging economies are looking 
for a global political role congruent with their self-conception and sense of increased 
economic relevance in world affairs. Accordingly, they have exercised the newly attained 
economic relevance to safeguard their own national priorities and interests. 
The different and competing negotiating positions of developed and developing countries 
were clearly summarized by the sharp division between the two negotiating fronts of the 
Global North and the Global South, led respectively by the United States and China at the 
2009 Copenhagen international climate change conference (COP 15). During COP 15, 
emerging economies were not willing to grant the old Western powers the sole authority to 
define the limits of “responsible sovereignty”. Accordingly, they wanted to exercise their 
growing economic clout by reshaping international arrangements in a way that could suit 
them and their national priorities and economic interests.  
Bolstered by self-perceptions of increased economic relevance, the BASIC countries have 
been able to impose their own guidelines and agenda for the Summit. For the first time in a 
major global conference in the modern era, neither the United States nor Europe occupied a 
leading position. Therefore, the Copenhagen climate summit represents a turning point in 
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recent international politics where Western ambitions to define the agenda of world politics 
were no longer merely criticized by non-western players. Rather, they were effectively put to 
an abrupt halt thanks to the newly achieved global weight of coalitions of developing nations 
(Terhalle, 2011: 341) and the prominence of development for their national identities. Among 
them, China has played a key role in designing and implementing the negotiating strategy as 
well as acting as global south leader in the negotiations. 
Several factors can be ascribed to this game changer in international climate talks. The 
economic and geopolitical context in which sustainability has been discussed at multilateral 
level has progressively changed since the climate convention was negotiated in 1992. 
Moreover, the evolution of ICCN has been influenced by the changing global economic order.  
During the last 20 years, starting in the late 1990s, a significant shift in the global distribution 
of economic power has occurred (Roberts, 2011). The political and economic rise of emerging 
economies has been paralleled by a relative decline of Western powers, the EU and the US. 
Brazil, Russia, India and China (the so-called BRIC) have today not only almost 42 per cent 
of the global population105, but also almost 30 per cent of the global gross domestic 
product106, among them, China’s economy has risen exponentially since the late 1990s. At the 
same time, the EU’s share of the global population is around 7 per cent while North America 
amounts to 5 per cent107.  
Chinese governmental discourses surveyed in this research imply that this gradual increase in 
the aggregate power of the emerging economies should also be reflected in the influence they 
exert in various global institutional settings, including climate change negotiations (Qi 2011: 
313). Moreover, at times, they seek to reinforce the taken-for-granted nature of North/South 
and developed/emerging binaries. 
Among the BRICS, China stands out as a giant growth-wise with an economy equal to the 
other BRICS countries combined. It has the largest army, the largest military budget, and the 
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 Available from: http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/ [Accessed 20 May 
2017]. 
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 China: share of global GDP adjusted for PPP from 2010 to 2021. Available from: 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/270439/chinas-share-of-global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/; Brazil: Share in 
global GDP adjusted for PPP from 2010 to 2020. Available from: 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/259307/brazil-share-in-global-gdp-adjusted-for-ppp/; Russia: Share of global 
GDP adjusted for PPP from 2010 to 2020. Available from: http://www.statista.com/statistics/271379/russias-
share-of-global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/; India: Share of global GDP adjusted for PPP from 2010 to 2020. 
Available from: http://www.statista.com/statistics/271328/indias-share-of-global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/ 
[Accessed 20 May 2017]. 
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 Population Comparison: China, EU, USA. Available from: http://www.worldometers.info/population/china-
eu-usa-japan-comparison/  [Accessed 20 May 2017]. 
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highest rate of economic growth. China lags behind Russia and Brazil in income per capita, 
but this is bound to change if China maintains roughly its current growth rates. At any figure 
of GDP growth above 7 percent per year, the Chinese economy will double in a decade (Nye, 
2015: 44). The change in macroeconomic variables has ostensibly stood out among the factors 
that have changed the dynamics of international climate talks. Improved diplomatic and 
economic relations across the Global South have also played a role, and they have been 
carefully built and strengthened in the past decades by the Chinese Government.  
However, I have argued that the newly attained economic relevance in world affairs as well as 
the new geopolitical context in which ICCN have taken place are not sufficient to account for 
the changing role of China in international environmental governance. Instead, in juncture 
with the factors mentioned above, I argue that China’s behaviour in global environmental 
governance comes from an identity shift based on three dimensions related to the country’s 
new role and self-conception as a fast-growing developing nation within the Global South, 
and its sense of environmental crisis and volatile energy security. 
In the last two decades, through climate change negotiations, the People’s Republic of China 
has developed a large number of partnership and cooperative frameworks with other 
developed and developing countries, which have significantly improved its diplomatic 
credentials. At the same time, it has played an increasingly pivotal role in international 
relations in the field of climate change, influencing significantly global negotiating strategy 
and discourse, and has been successful in building large coalitions in support of its positions, 
becoming an unavoidable player in climate change diplomacy. Moreover, by anchoring its 
foreign policy and diplomacy to a “developing country” rhetoric vis-à-vis developed nations, 
while simultaneously acting as an aid donor toward least developed countries, Beijing has 
been able to raise its international profile and expand its influence on both ends. 
In this context, while still participating in Western-led international institutions, China has 
begun to invest growing diplomatic and economic resources into building alternative 
institutional options to the “Bretton Woods” system in several different fields to provide new 
sources for financing climate change policies in the Global South. 
This trend has gained momentum in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, which has 
largely diverted the attention and efforts of the United States and European Union in ICCN. In 
the aftermath of the financial crisis, the European Union’s ICCN role has been weakened by 
the conflicting positions of its Member States concerned with the cost of climate change 
policies more than with their benefits. The EU’s retrenchment in ICCN has come after a brief 
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period of its global leadership on the issue following the United States’ decision to not take up 
the Kyoto Protocol for ratification in the Senate.  
In this context, weak financial commitments by the Global North to support developing and 
emerging economies in the decarbonisation process (requested by the scientific community to 
meet the 2°C target) are negatively correlated with the pressing need of developing nations for 
“carbon space” (i.e. increasing emissions) to support their economic growth and lift their 
populations out of poverty. The interaction of these two variables (“Northern” financial 
commitments and “Southern” need for carbon space) underline the declining leadership of 
developed countries in policies and measures able to “decouple” the right to growth and the 
CO2 emissions. 
As a consequence, since the COP 15, Western countries have been overwhelmingly 
concerned with the question of how to address the domestic implications of the crisis. 
Meanwhile, emerging economies have been able to react more promptly, catalysing the 
attention of the vast majority of developing countries for climate change policies. China has 
been able to push forward a new narrative that enables a new focus, approach and a set of 
actions toward the development of a low carbon economy. From the Chinese perspective, 
climate change cannot be tackle as an independent variable but has to be view as intrinsically 
linked to economic growth and social development, with the implementation of target policies 
and greater investments in R&D and innovation. 
In this respect, alongside official North-to-South transfers, South-to-South financing for 
climate change mitigation and adaptation has increased in recent years under the framework 
of the so-called South-South cooperation (Minas, 2014). The past two decades have seen a 
surge in South-South economic cooperation including trade, investment, development 
assistance, and other financial flows. China has been the main architect and leader of this 
trend promoting a number of high profile institutions of policy cooperation and cross-border 
financing within the Global South. The BRICS’ New Development Bank, the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund, the China Insurance Investment Fund, 
and the China-Africa Production Capacity Cooperation Fund have significantly enhanced the 
fundraising capacity of developing countries. All these new instruments have been 
spearheaded by emerging powers, with a leading role of China, which symbolizes its growing 
influence in development funding and potential new sources of financing for climate change 
policies in the Global South.   
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Combined with China’s long-term efforts to develop trade and aid ties with Africa, these new 
instruments form the basis of Chinese strategy to build consensus around its ambitions to 
exercise a role of the Global South’s leader in global environmental governance.  
In its domestic policy, China has introduced policies predicated on reducing dependence on 
energy-intensive industries and developing more efficient ones by defining targets in its Five 
Year Plans and promulgating new laws, standards, and rules. In the past years, Chinese 
government has implemented a number of policies to prioritize, fund, and deploy clean 
technology R&D and innovation. In a comparative assessment of public investment in energy 
research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) in the major emerging economies, China 
stood out as the largest government investor with public investments of approximately US$ 
11,8 billion, plus an additional US$ 1,3 billion from state and local governments and partially 
state owned enterprises as of 2008 (Gallagher, 2014: 42). 
In pursuing global leadership in clean technology development, China has identified 
partnerships between private industry, research sectors, and academia as a key approach. 
Through various channels (including forums, dialogues, seminars and workshops), China’s 
universities and research institutes have begun to play an active role in major collaborative 
projects in the fields of clean technology (Tan & Gang, 2009). China seems to believe that the 
next phase of the science and technology revolution will center on clean energy, and is 
determined to emerge as a global power in science and technology development (Tan, 2010). 
In this framework, the promotion of low-carbon and energy cooperation under the One Belt 
and One Road initiative (involving a number of developing countries) reinforces Chinese 
political and diplomatic strategies and leadership in ICCN. 
Since the first Rio Earth Summit in 1992, international cooperation on climate change has 
been centred on technology transfers and technical assistance accompanying financial aid 
from developed to developing countries. However, this strategy has not yet delivered the 
desired results as the current rate of decupling energy use from GDP and population growth 
needs to double to achieve the 2 Degree scenario [IEA, 2015].  One of the key deadlock 
points in climate change negotiations has always been about finding an agreed “decoupling 
strategy” between the right to growth of the developing world and the CO2 energy related 
emissions. Moreover, in recent years, developed countries’ investments in clean and low 
carbon technologies do not keep up with those from Chinese. Simultaneously, their 
commitments and pledges on climate finance have often failed to materialize.  
In this context, emerging economies have started to invest own funds, particularly on climate 
adaptation measures. Their “green” (private or public-private) sectors continue to invest in 
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low-carbon technologies like renewable energy. In the fields of solar power generation, 
hydropower, and other areas, China has progressively become internationally competitive. 
Essentially, to tackle its environmental crisis and overcome its energy security concerns, 
Beijing has developed a new approach of linking up climate policy with green growth. The 
Chinese approach has garnered the attention of other emerging and developing economies in 
part because it provides a concrete alternative model of climate action that moves away from 
a Western-led vision of climate security to a wider vision of climate change as a socio-
economic and development issue. The Beijing approach is bound to be attractive not only to 
developing countries but also for other industrializing countries such India and Brazil which 
have already embarked on adopting the “Beijing Consensus” on building alternative pathways 
to industrialization. This emergent model is not being driven by ‘Kyoto-style rhetorical 
statements as to anticipated carbon emission reductions, nor as a moral imperative as seen by 
the West’ (Mathews, 2014: xii; 48). Instead, it has come about through an extraordinary 
development challenge for China and other newly industrializing nations looking to join the 
club of industrialized and post-industrial societies whose economies are based on services and 
innovation rather than manufacturing. In this framework, in John Mathews’ words, as a matter 
of necessity, a new approach to environmentally conscious development has emerged in the 
East, with China leading the way (Mathews, 2014: 46-48).  
The new role of China as a climate leader for the Global South was reinforced during the 22nd 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit held in Beijing from 8th to 10th November 2014, 
where Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Barack Obama reached – as deemed by 
several international observers – an unprecedented climate change deal. 
The relevance of the agreement lays in the fact that it shifts the criteria upon which actions 
taken by developing countries are reviewed: from strict goals of emissions reduction – which 
constituted previous negotiations – to long-term policy transformations. Moreover, for the 
first time, it acknowledges the importance of social and economic development for emerging 
economies, thus moving away from the earlier sole emphasis on environmental security to a 
focus on human security as well. The agreement recognises that countries will have different 
time frames for peaking GHG emissions due to their different starting points108. 
The unfolding leading role of China in global environmental governance was consolidated a 
year later at the COP 21 in December 2015, when 196 Parties of the UNFCCC adopted the 
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 Full text of the agreement can be found at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/fact-
sheet-us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-and-clean-energy-c [Accessed 1 April 2017].  
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Paris Agreement which sets a target to maintain the global average rise in temperatures up to 
2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and preferably below 1.5 degrees. China’s shift 
toward a more active participation in the international climate change negotiations has been 
deemed a key contribution for the diplomatic success of the Paris Climate Talks (The White 
House, 2015; Xinhua, 2015; Li, 2016; Hilton & Kerr, 2017). 
The Paris Climate Agreement drew on the 2014 China-U.S. pledge to cooperate on emissions 
reductions. That pledge laid the foundation for other countries to present their own reductions. 
China's special representative on climate change Xie Zhenhua called the conference "a crucial 
point in the global climate governance process." Soon after the announcement of the Paris 
deal, a commentary from Xinhua news agency called the deal ‘a particularly sweet victory for 
China, which emerged to take a leading role in the negotiations’, highlighting China’s recent 
commitments on climate change as a sign of its new role as a world leader in climate 
governance (Xinhua, 2015). 
 
 
9.3 Summary of other key findings 
 
Two additional key findings stand out in this research. They concern (1) the epistemologically 
unstable status of the climate security paradigm understood as a direct link unstable status of 
the climate security paradigm understood as a direct link between climate change and conflict; 




9.3.1 The narrative of China as the “Climate Villain” in international Environmental 
Governance and the Development of the Climate Security Paradigm 
 
In some cases, mostly observable in Western countries, the equation of national security and 
climate change can arguably be ascribed to a need by advocates, politicians, and public 
servants to provide arguments for climate action in political environments that are hostile to 
or sceptical of efforts to tackle climate change. This type of rhetoric has been especially 
common in the US, where some members of the U.S. Congress still deny the existence of 
climate change or its anthropogenic character, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.  
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Nonetheless, in the framework of ICCN, the intransigent negotiating position of Beijing has 
been historically identified (in Environmental and Political Science literatures) as the main 
obstacle undermining major achievements in the global fight against climate change. In this 
context, the increasing emphasis by the Global North on the security dimension of climate 
change has been read by many researchers, academics and policy makers in the Global South 
as an excuse to use global warming to impose economic and political constraints on China 
and other emerging economies and interfere with their development, as well as undermine the 
role that they are starting to play globally (Gupta & Dutta, 2009: 36; Boas, 2012; Mayer et al. 
2013). 
In fact, casting climate change as an existential and urgent threat for national and international 
security may consequently sideline the CBDR principle. This would be consequential, since 
the principle represents the key compromise between the different negotiating positions of 
developed and developing countries, and one that serves to undergird the present international 
climate regime. The architecture of the Kyoto Protocol was conceptualized in terms of mutual 
rights and obligations of polluting and “victim states” underlining the nature of climate 
change as largely “produced” in the North and “experienced” in the South (Engberg-Pedersen, 
2011). According to the Chinese government, the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” represents the bedrock of international climate change negotiations and 
action on climate change must be taken within the framework of sustainable development and 
should by no means compromise the efforts of developing countries to alleviate poverty and 
backwardness (MoFa, 2009; Xinhua, 2009). China has argued that applying binding emission 
reductions for all countries, even if adjusted for their levels of economic development, would 
impose a screeching halt to any possibility for developing countries to lift their citizens out of 
poverty. Regarding larger emerging economies, it would inhibit their ability to sustain their 
fast economic growth, which is needed for massive expansions in energy, transport, and urban 
infrastructures (Ma, 2010; Chen, 2012). 
Moreover, research on climate security has predominantly investigated the causal links 
between climate change and conflict, thereby addressing the need for military intervention 
(the so-called Green Helmets) to stabilize failing states and ungoverned territories. Thus, the 
securitization of climate change represents another clear threat to one of the most important 
principles of China’s foreign policy and international relations: non-interference with the 
sovereignty and internal affairs of states (Sanwal, 2013). This norm also allows China to 
enhance its role in several African countries (Kopinski et al., 2012: 1-8) as an international 
actor that can be both trusted and emulated. One view of the climate security paradigm has 
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tied it to bureaucratic agendas of policy-makers intent on advancing particularistic national 
interests, or to internal strategies of international organizations looking for new rationales for 
their existence after the Cold War. Academics and pundits advancing this criticism are 
sceptical of theoretical and empirical insights produced via this scholarly and policy paradigm 
(Scheffran & Battaglini, 2011; Bernauer et al., 2012; Gleditsch, 2012; Scheffran et al., 2012; 
Theisen et al., 2013). Rival accounts understand climate change more accurately as a “threat 
multiplier” (Cousins, 2013: 200), which exacerbates existing sources of conflict and 
insecurity, rather than an independent variable.  
For several years, researchers have been analysing links between climate change and violent 
conflict, starting with the work of the Toronto Group, led by the Canadian political scientist 
Thomas Homer-Dixon, and the Environment and Conflict Project (ENCOP) in the 1990s, to 
the more recent analyses of Hsiang, Meng and Kane (2011) and Hsiang, Burke and Miguel 
(2013). The dominant form of analysis is a quantitative one, correlating extreme weather 
events, or temperature and precipitation data with conflict records. Yet the ambiguous 
findings of several studies have led to controversy within the research community (Schilling, 
2014). A decade of generalizable quantitative research on climate change and armed conflict 
appears to have produced more confusion than widely accepted knowledge (Buhaugh, 2015: 
269).  
The relationship between climate, climate change, and conflict has been empirically tested in 
a wide variety of studies, but the literature has not yet converged around a commonly 
accepted set of results (Salehyan, 2014). The battle line is mainly between quantitative and 
qualitative research. On one side are the ‘quants’ whose methods identify correlations 
between conflict and climate in global or regional data sets. Conversely, the ‘quals’ study 
individual conflicts in depth (Solow, 2013). The most comprehensive assessment of the 
scientific literature to date, the Human Security chapter of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report, states that while individual studies vary in their 
conclusions, collectively, the research does not conclude that there is a strong positive 
relationship between global warming and armed conflict (IPCC, 2014: 772). 
The climate security paradigm has always been rejected by China and other emerging 
economies. From their perspective, any international climate agreement must reflect the needs 
of developing countries to gain more carbon emission space. Focusing on the security 
consequences of climate change will just divert political attention and financial resources 
from the common goal of sustainable development. China recognises and is directly 
experiencing the adverse effects of climate change. However, according to the government, 
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this is a matter of sustainable development policies and investments towards mitigation and 




9.3.2 China’s green growth: recent achievements and future perspectives  
 
China has come to perceive itself as a new science and technology leader globally. Moreover, 
its state-party leadership and businesses believe that the next industrial revolution will centre 
on clean energy. Therefore, their determination to reinforce and advance China’s global role 
in science and technology development seems only logical (Tan, 2010). 
China’s shift toward a more active participation in the international climate change 
negotiations has been deemed a key contribution for the diplomatic success of the Paris 
Climate Talks (The White House, 2015; Xinhua, 2015; Li, 2016; Hilton & Kerr, 2017). 
Over the past decade, there has been a steady increase in both the scope and ambition of 
China’s domestic environmental and climate policies. China’s evolving policies and 
programmes on domestic environmental governance implemented following the guidelines of 
the 11th and 12th Five Year Plan (FYP) gave China the opportunity to re-formulate its 
priorities in international climate negotiations. They also helped pave the way for increased 
climate cooperation at the international level. 
The 12th FYP, which outlined China’s new model of economic development, included 
explicit energy and carbon intensity targets, investments in low-carbon industries, increased 
targets for R&D spending, pilot carbon markets, and measures to boost renewables in order to 
reduce dependency on coal in the energy mix (Zhang, 2015). These measures must be seen in 
the context of a radical shift in Beijing’s economic policy, which became linked explicitly 
with the climate agenda (Stern, 2011; SCIO, 2014). Prior to the 11th FYP, China’s policies on 
climate change were driven mainly by concerns over competitiveness and energy security 
rather than climate vulnerability. The focus was typically on meeting domestic imperatives 
such as economic development, poverty alleviation and pollution abatement rather than solely 
emission reductions. 
Starting with the 11th FYP, the balance of China’s environmental and economic policy began 
to change: the costs imposed on China’s population arising from the traditional industrial 
model of development were tangible and reflected in the worsening air and water quality and 
soil pollution. These considerations have led the state and party leaderships in Beijing to 
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acknowledge that a systemic change toward a low carbon economic model of growth was 
perhaps inevitable (Li & Wang, 2012). Furthermore, China was beginning to feel not only the 
domestically mounting social pressure (i.e. the so-called mass incidents), but also an 
increasing sense of responsibility to fully engage in global environmental policy to strengthen 
its role as a leading developing nation within the Global South. Moreover, Beijing has come 
to perceive the traditional development model as unsustainable in the long run due to 
diminishing returns as rising labour costs drove up production costs, and over-investment 
began to generate surplus capacity and redundant developments rather than growth (Cai, 
2012; Garnaut & Huang, 2005; Zhu & Kotz, 2011).  
The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress in November 2013 
marked a change in economic policy compared to the previous decade. The new model of 
development designed by the Chinese leadership was characterized by a lower target of GDP 
growth in comparison with the previous years, gradual transition from heavy industry to 
services, increased productivity through innovation, and a greater role for domestic 
consumption to decrease over-reliance on investment (EC, 2011; Stern & Green, 2015). 
At the same time, environmental sustainability was also prioritized as an instrument aimed at 
‘accelerating economic restructuring’ (SCIO, 2014). Consequently, emissions reduction 
would come from the combined effect of slower growth and a more balanced economy, in 
addition to specific measures promoted through targeted policies (Green & Stern, 2016). In 
2015, after enacting the revised Environmental Protection Law, the Chinese government 
issued a series of regulations and policies address to the “Ecological Civilization”109 as a key 
slogan that would inform future government planning. Furthermore, the 13th Five-Year Plan 
(2016-2020) for Economic and Social Development further outlined a comprehensive plan for 
promoting the unique “ecological civilization” in the next five years. Climate targets have 
been incorporated into the 13FYP and, for the first time, “Green Development” became one 
of the five major principles underpinning China’s long-term growth. 
By the end of the 12th FYP, the positive results of Beijing’s as progressive alignment of 
domestic economic and political development agendas provided the government with a larger 
manoeuvring space within international climate talks. As noted by Green and Stern, before 
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 The concept of ecological civilization first appeared in official government documents at the 17th National 
Congress of the Communist Party (CPC) in October 2007. In his report to the CPC, General Secretary and 
President, Hu Jintao, proposed China ‘build an ecological civilizations and a model of growth and consumption, 
as well as industries, which are frugal in their use of energy and resources and protect the environment [China 
Daily, 24 October 2007]. Available from: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-
10/24/content_6201964.htm [Accessed 1 April 2017]. 
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COP 21, thanks to domestic reforms, China was in the enviable position of being able to 
propose a target that could potentially allow it to ‘under-promise and over deliver’ (Green & 
Stern, 2016: 436). Hence, on the eve of the Paris Climate Talks, the “going low carbon” 
policy that China was not ready to assume in Copenhagen – considering it a constraint on its 
economic development – was instead the key message Beijing was proposing to the world. 
 
 
9.4 This Study’s Innovative Contribution  
 
According to Kelly Sims Gallagher in “The Globalization of Clean Energy Technology – 
Lessons for China”: 
 
‘China is intrinsically interesting as an enormous country with 20 percent of the world 
population, the second largest economy, the largest energy production and consumption, and 
the largest greenhouse gas emissions on the planet. China is also worth examining because of 
the polarizing perceptions many have about this rapidly industrializing country’ Gallagher, 
2014: 27). 
 
The rise of China has become a recurrent topic among scholars, pundits and policy makers in 
the West and much ink has been spilled analysing what this “rise” implies for the rest of East 
Asia, for the United States, and the world (Zhang, 2011: 235-6). The original contribution of 
this research is multifaceted.  
First, it lies in the analysis China’s evolving international role as a Normative Power, in 
particular in contextualizing its rise in the framework of International Climate Change 
Negotiations and in tying its normative role to a somewhat unexpected domain of 
international politics and global governance – climate change and climate action. Thereby, 
this thesis has expanded the application of the norm-taking/norm-making matrix to a 
relatively new actor (China) in a novel way (by analysing its role and behaviour in global 
climate change politics). In doing so, it has also problematized the dominant criticisms of 
China’s role in ICCN as obstructive, reactive, or difficult.  
Second, this research contributes to interpretive and identity-based analyses of climate 
governance and it approaches China’s evolving climate behaviour and international leadership 
as driven by intertwined cost-benefit calculi and a sense of appropriateness. This study has 
analysed the evolving role of Beijing in ICCN as more than just a consequence of its 
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economic performance. Otherwise, this link could be explained by, for example, applying the 
Kuznets curve model under specific hypotheses. Instead, this research has explored more fully 
the qualitative and social nuance of politics and public policy. Accordingly, it has embedded 
China’s evolving global role in development and climate governance in (1) the material 
variables of economic power as well as (2) an identity shift that has taken place gradually 
since the early 1990s. In fact, this study has argued that the former would be impossible to 
understand without the latter. In other words, it has consistently demonstrated how the ‘useful 
and ‘right’ (or ‘appropriate’) have been mutually constitutive throughout the process of 
China’s behavioural change in international development and global environmental 
governance. In doing so, this thesis helps to address the relative lack of identity-based and 
sociological explanations of China’s globally changing role and behaviour in ICCN110.  
Third and more broadly, this research makes a combined theoretical and empirical 
contribution to interpretive, constructivist, and sociological-organizational accounts of great 
power behaviour, power transition, and institutional participation – areas of study traditionally 
dominated by the ‘neo-neo debate’ in International Relations. This analysis shows that 
identity dynamics play a tangible role in practices that may be otherwise interpreted as ‘power 
grabs’, ‘increased assertiveness’, and ‘strategic’ or ‘instrumental’ behaviour focused on utility 
maximization  
Over the past five decades, academic and policy discourses on climate change, sustainable 
development, conflict and security have been largely climate-centric (i.e. focusing mainly on 
emission targets). Little attention has been devoted to the contextualization of climate policy 
impact within the broader processes of economic, social, and geopolitical changes. While the 
concept of “Normative Power Europe (NPE)”, has been widely recognized by scholars and 
policy makers and is today a consolidated concept in International Studies, there are few 
discussions of emerging powers as normative powers. In particular, the notion of a 
“Normative Power China” might appear provocative and controversial if applied to the field 
of global environmental governance. In fact, even before the failure of Copenhagen, in 
Western environmental and Political Science literature, the intransigent negotiating position 
of Beijing has been identified as the key factor that has undermined major achievements 
within ICCN. 
However, reforms implemented with the 10th, 11th and, above all, the 12 FYP marked the 
shift toward a low-carbon economic model of growth which was seen as a strategic 
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 For a review of current literature see Zhang Haibin, 2013. 
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opportunity for China to (1) address its growing domestic environmental crisis; (2) mitigate 
the negative impact of ever-increasing GHG emissions on China’s international image, and 
(3) develop technologies in increasing demand as the world gradually accepted carbon 
constraints. Following this path, six months before the Paris Summit, China communicated to 
the UNFCCC its ambitious Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). 
The new course of the Chinese state-party leadership, the more cooperative and flexible 
attitude in ICCN, and political support of a growing number of developing countries and 
emerging economies (secured by Beijing through its climate diplomacy) has allowed China to 
play a key role in the conclusion of the Paris agreement, achieving its normative goals: 
- The consolidation of the CBDR in the Paris Agreement; 
- Finance and technology transfer from developed countries to support mitigation and 
adaptation measures in developing countries, and 
- Flexibility in five years reviews for developing nations. 
Given that the 13th FYP reinforces the importance of ‘green’ and low-carbon development 
growth, it seems likely that China’s shift toward low-carbon development – and a more 
proactive stance in climate negotiations – is bound to be structural and long term. 
 
 
9.4.1 Brief reflections on possible avenues for further research 
 
Based on this dissertation’s argument, a few avenues for further research can be suggested.  
First, future research could analyse the impact of Chinese Soft Power at the global level, in 
particular its influence on the global politics of climate change and development and more 
specific issues therein. In the past years, China has positioned itself as a cautious champion of 
economic globalization and integration, signalling a desire to take on a greater international 
leadership role. The country is doing this in several ways, but China’s active and conscious 
promotion of its Soft Power (as a measure of its international attractiveness and ability to 
influence other countries’ preferences and behaviour) stands out.  
In 2014 Xi Jinping affirmed that “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good 
Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s message to the world,” calling for a 
stronger national effort to link China’s popularity and likeability to its economic rise. 
According to David Shambaugh, in the last decade, the PRC has invested some $10bn a year 
to expand its foreign-language media abroad, create more Confucius Institutes and foster 
educational exchanges, boost aid outflows, sponsor cultural festivals abroad and, generally, 
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portray Beijing as a defender of the international order, trade, and globalization (Shambaugh, 
2015). Nevertheless, according to a large number of western scholars (including the “father” 
of the notion of Soft Power, Harvard professor Joseph S. Nye who coined the term in 1990), 
Beijing’s Soft Power has a limited impact worldwide. Experts such as David Shambaugh, 
Elizabeth Economy, or Joshua Kurlantzick affirm – among others – that China’s soft power 
campaign is limited by the dissonance between the image that China aspires to project and the 
country’s actions. According to their analysis, rising nationalism, crackdowns on 
nongovernmental organizations, censorship of domestic and international media and political 
repression, definitely constrain China’s soft power (Albert, 2017; Shambaugh, 2013; Nye, 
2012; Kurlantzick, 2006, Pan, 2006).  
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the PRC is pushing even harder on its Soft Power Strategy 
and the latest initiative of Beijing, the massive Belt and Road Initiative, also known as “One 
Belt, One Road,” fits into this soft power offensive. Beijing plans to spend and raise as much 
as $1 trillion in an effort to create a vast new road and rail infrastructure, energy projects, and 
other needed infrastructure across many parts of Eurasia and even in Africa and parts of 
Western Europe. One Belt, One Road is by far the largest economic spending plan in the 
world today. The infrastructure creation, aid, and jobs that may come with the initiative could 
boost growth from Laos and Pakistan to many parts of Eastern Europe, and could potentially 
improve China’s public image in these countries and regions. Is it possible that this new 
massive investments plan will be able to increase the attractiveness of Beijing not only in the 
already favourable African and South American Countries but also across the Global North? 
Another extension of this dissertation’s research could be in the growing field of literature on 
resistance to (western) norms. In this regard – for example – the ODA can be taken as a point 
of departure for future research. Starting from the growing involvement of the PRC in the 
African Continent, the analysis can be focused on how the PRC, instead of claiming 
superiority over Western ideals, may adopt a strategy of “social creativity” by promoting 
alternative standards to justify China’s aid programs (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010). In fact, as 
highlighted by Reilly, achieving international acceptance of such standards is a critical goal 
for Beijing in advancing the two core objectives pursued throught its aid program: (a) 
defending PRC strategic interests; while also (b) bolstering Beijing’s credibility as a 
responsible contributor to global and regional governance (Reilly, 2012). 
Another interesting field of potential research lies in the so-called “Beijing Consensus” and 
his juxtaposition versus the “Washington Consensus” and this would effectively draw on this 
dissertation’s argument on China’s norm-making behaviour. Beginning in the early 1990s 
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(with roots in the 1980s), the Washington Consensus (advocating orthodox market 
liberalization measures and institutions of liberal-democratic government) imposed itself as 
the dominant way for developing countries to achieve successful economic development. 
Private companies, international financial institutions, and the US government have actively 
promoted market liberalization and liberal-democratic formulations of the “rule of law” as 
successful-development prerequisites and, more importantly, as a fundamental condition for 
obtaining International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) assistance. At the same 
time, China’s market-authoritarian development has produced two-decades of double-digit 
economic growth and is increasingly challenging free-market liberal democratic precepts, 
becoming progressively more attractive in several developing countries and emerging 
economies. In recent years, the “China Model” has become shorthand for economic 
liberalization without political liberalization. While the U.S.-led Bretton Woods system, 
centred on the IMF and the WB, has long driven the operation and ideals of finance and 
economy in the second half of the past century, China and other emerging economies who 
seek to expand their influence are attempting to revise the means for governing the global 
economy by establishing systems of their own. One particularly noteworthy development is 
the successful establishment of the AIIB, the multilateral development bank initiated by China 
in 2013. The AIIB, being a Chinese initiative, is an important vehicle to spread Chinese 
norms of financial governance, which, since the early 2000s, have been a major target of 
Western criticism in relation to its foreign aid, above all in Africa.  
In a 2013 article published on “ChinaUSfocus”, Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for 
Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, reported that the so-called Chinese model 
has gained considerable ground in Southeast Asia (Kurlantzick, 2013). Moreover, examining 
the political trajectory of the ten states that belong to the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, it seems that some of them have moved in the direction of arguably more 
authoritarian China and away from liberal democracy over the past decade. How related is 
this to China’s perceived successes in national economic development, in contrast to the 
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